This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`


1837
ARTES
SCIENTIA
VERITAS
LIBRARY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
TUEBOR
CIRCUMSPICE

AP
2
M66

THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY

VOLUME IV.
OCTOBER, 1916—JULY, 1917

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
NEW YORK AND LONDON
The Knickerbocker Press
1917

The Knickerbocker Press, New York

The Mid-West Quarterly

Owned and Controlled by the University of Nebraska

P. H. FRYE, *Editor*

HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER
PHILO M. BUCK
Associate Editors

SAMUEL AVERY
Chancellor of the University
CHAS. SUMNER ALLEN
President of the Board of Regents
Advisory Committee

CONTENTS OF VOLUME IV.

	PAGE
The Philosophy of Tragedy, by HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER	1
The Over-Social Function of the State University, by CHAS. SUMNER ALLEN	16
Made in Germany, by RANDOLPH S. PAUL	34
The Chinese Colonies, by MINNIE THROOP ENGLAND	42
Some Aspects of Abnormal Psychology, by L. B. PILSBURY, M.D.	63
A Pragmatic Interpretation of the History of Philosophy, by HORACE M. KALLEN	75
American High Prices and European Loans, by W. G. LANGWORTHY TAYLOR	89
The Congressional Gerrymander in Missouri, by HAROLD S. QUIGLEY	107
Professorial Advancement, by SAMUEL AVERY	119
A Shakespeare Festival at Stratford-on-Avon, by CLARENCE STRATTON	123
The Women in Spenser's Allegory of Love, by FREDERICK MORGAN PADELFORD	134

333929

PAGE

Our Literary Limitations, by MARGARET LYNN . . . 146

Justice, by WILLIAM GRANGER HASTINGS 157

Screenings: Tagore, by F. M. F. *Tagore and the New Orient*, by H. B. A.—*Neo-Orientalism*, by P. M. B., JR. 170

The Purchase of the Danish West Indies, by CHESTER LLOYD JONES 185

Curbs, by PHILO M. BUCK, JR. 196

Toleration in Puritan England, by ELBERT N. S. THOMPSON 204

The Poetry of William Vaughn Moody, by BERT EMSLEY . 223

Cantor's Leap into the Transfinite, by ELLERY WILLIAM DAVIS 239

Nietzsche Once More, by LAURENCE FOSSLER . . . 251

The Year in American Finance, by PHILIP LEWIS HALL . 265

Medea in Attica, by HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER . . 270

Asia, by HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER 271

Whither the Tempest, by CHANDLER TRIMBLE . . . 272

The East of the World, by CHANDLER TRIMBLE . . 273

Screenings: Unneutral America—Two Letters—Schoolmasterly—The Hunting of the Dean, by P. M. B., JR. . 274

David Starr Jordan—Eugenics and War, by CHARLES KUHLMAN 285

A Study in Immigration, by E. J. HAINER 304

The English in Egypt, by J. E. MILLER 317

Movie Democracy, by LEWIS WORTHINGTON SMITH . . 334

Star Twinkling, by ELLERY W. DAVIS 346

The Sentimental Movement, by DUDLEY MILES . . 354

The Æsthetic Fallacy in Literary Appreciation, by J. WARSHAW 361

Screenings: Pacifism and Ideas—Educating America—An Irish Plot, by P. M. B., JR., ... 371

Annual Subscription: $2 Single Number: 50 cents

The Mid-West Quarterly

Vol. IV. October, 1916 No. 1

I. *The Philosophy of Tragedy* - Hartley Burr Alexander

II. *The Over-Social Function of the State University* - Chas. Sumner Allen

III. *Made in Germany* - - - Randolph S. Paul

IV. *The Chinese Colonies* - - Minnie Throop England

V. *Some Aspects of Abnormal Psychology* - L. B. Pillsbury

VI. *A Pragmatic Interpretation of the History of Philosophy* - Horace M. Kallen

---

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New Rochelle, N.Y. London New York

The Knickerbocker Press

Entered as second-class matter, October 1, 1914, at the Post Office at New Rochelle, New York

The Mid-West Quarterly

Is owned and controlled by the University of Nebraska

P. H. FRYE, *Editor*

HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER
PHILO M. BUCK, Jr.
Associate Editors

SAMUEL AVERY,
Chancellor of the University
CHAS. SUMNER ALLEN,
Advisory Committee

The *Quarterly* is issued during the months of October, January April, and July

Annual Subscription $2.00

Single Numbers . . . . . 50 cents

Address the Publishers, Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons
New Rochelle, N. Y., or
2, 4, and 6 West 45th Street, New York City

All contributions and editorial communications should be directed to the editors of The Mid-West Quarterly, Station A, Lincoln, Nebraska

THE
MID-WEST QUARTERLY

Vol. IV] OCTOBER, 1916 [No. 1

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRAGEDY

I

We all remember Polonius' introduction of "the best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral, scene individable, or poem unlimited." And if we have not been able to follow in its detail so nice a subdivision of dramatic art, I presume that most of us have, at one time or another, made some less ambitious classification of our own. At least we have recognized the broad distinction between the domains of Thalia and Melpomene, and we have asked ourselves, perhaps, by what subtle fascination the laughter and tears of the theatre do so englamour the imaginations of men, holding us in the thrall of illusion, and sending us, willing dreamers, to wander in fields remote from the serious duties of life.

It is with this question that I would deal: by what philosophy can we explain or justify the sincere concern with which the men of so many generations have turned their eyes to the stage? Why should men of genius have so prized the players' mimic hours that they should have been willing to give the best of their effort to the theatre? And why should mankind, in reflective appraisement, place its dramatic literatures so near to supremacy among things humanly precious?

The answer to such questions is by no means simple. It must rest upon a philosophy that can comprehend all the ends and forms of life and give to each its fitting value. It may begin with a merely æsthetic theory, but it can cease only with an insight

into the nature and meaning of the world. It is small wonder that the greatest of philosophers have found this theme worthy of their study; and it is less wonder, perhaps, that only the greatest have been able to give solutions that have appealed widely to men's minds.

II

"Tragedy"—and I am quoting S. H. Butcher's justly praised version of Aristotle's famous definition—

> "tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions."

Upon every phrase of this definition have been written volumes of commentary. It would be futile in a brief space to attempt even to call attention to the problems involved; nor is it necessary to do so in order to get at the root of Aristotle's philosophic conception, for this is defined, if not clearly, yet unmistakably, by two phrases, the first and the last of the definition. "Tragedy is an imitation of an action"—this is the first; "through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions"—this is the last; and as the first gives us the key to Aristotle's conception of the essential nature of tragedy, so the last gives us his conception of its justifying purpose, first and last together answering the "What?" and "Why?" which seem to form the native sequence of interrogation on all matters which stir our human curiosity.

When Aristotle calls tragedy an "imitation," he is but echoing the speech of his time; for the Greeks regarded not only the drama, but all forms of artistic expression as forms of *mimesis*, as "imitations" of things and actions. Thus, the Greek dances, from which drama takes its origin, were conceived as a play of expression, imitative because induced through art. Plato says:

> "Choric movements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions, fortunes, dispositions,—each particular is imitated, and those to whom the words, or songs, or dances are suited, either by nature or habit or both, cannot help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and calling them beautiful."

Similarly, music was felt to be an imitation of the mood or disposition which it stirred, and especially amongst the Platonists, to each of the recognized modes was assigned a gamut of imitated feeling: the Dorian mode exemplified dignity and courage, the Phrygian wildness and excitement, the Æolian warlike turbulence, the Lydian effeminacy,—

> "Lap me in soft Lydian airs,
> Married to immortal verse
> Such as the meeting soul may pierce
> In notes, with many a winding bout
> Of linked sweetness long drawn out. . . ."

The conception of the imitative office of the art of painting was even more naïve. Excellence in this art seemed in large part to lie in its power of producing illusion. Apollodorus, whose light-and-shade effects superseded the earlier work in line and flat tones, earned the epithet of "shadow-painter" because he painted men as they appear to be; Zeuxis is said to have depicted grapes so realistically that the birds pecked at them; and Plato, in an ironical vein, likens the art of the painter to that of a man who creates all things by the simple expedient of turning a mirror upon all in succession.

Thus the earlier and commoner meaning of "imitation," among the Greeks, was something very nearly the same as what we mean by "realism" in art. But when Aristotle speaks of tragedy as an "imitation of an action," he has in mind something more subtle and philosophical. As with most of his conceptions, the suggestion comes from Plato. Plato had conceived the world of sense and feeling—the world with which our five senses acquaint us and in which our daily affairs centre,—not as the reality which common-sense tells us that it is, but as an imperfect copy or "imitation" of the true reality of which mind alone can give us knowledge. I might illustrate Plato's notion by the article of furniture whose sensible reality is the chair or table which we see and use, but whose substantial reality, the chemist will tell us, is the molecular structure of its materials, visible only in the light of reason; the molecular substructure is thus the true form, or reality, of what we grossly perceive as a thing of sense, or of which our senses may be said to give us the imperfect copy. Thus the world of sense becomes a world of appearance

and illusion, vaguely imitative of the invisible reality which we know through ideas only.

This Platonic philosophy Aristotle adopted, but with an important modification. For Plato had held that the world of sense and the world of ideas have nothing genuinely in common, that they are indeed as remote from one another as the difference between a chair and an aggregate of molecules would suggest, and that the most we can hope in the midst of the world of sense is to be able to correct something of its outer illusoriness by a main reliance upon inward reason. It was because of this deep distrust of sense that Plato condemned so relentlessly the whole *motif* of art; imitating, as it does, he says, not the reality, but only imperfect and deceptive copies of realities, namely, the things of sense and feeling, it conduces not to knowledge but to deception, and is "thrice removed from the king and the truth." For which reason Plato rigidly banned all forms of art, save such as gave moral lessons, from his ideal republic.

But Aristotle, while he adopted Plato's philosophy in its general outlines, was unwilling to follow in his sharp division of the sensible world and the real; rather, he maintained, while it is true that our senses do deceive us, while it is true that sensible things are but imitations of the essential reality, still even as imitations they bear some impress of the forms which they imperfectly represent; and the whole discipline of knowledge consists in our ability so to profit by our experience of illusion as to be able at last to discern the ideal nature which is dimly present in the most deceptive phenomena of sense. Plato had cut the universe sharply into a realm of ideal reality and a realm of sensible illusion; but nature, says Aristotle, is not, like a bad tragedy, constructed of episodes; it is one connected, and dramatic, whole.

In this philosophy of Aristotle's the word "imitation" loses the somewhat derogatory cast which it possesses with Plato; it is no longer the fault of sensible things that they are but imperfect copies, deceptive imitations; it is their virtue that they *can* imitate the ideal reality, and so give us the clues of knowledge, leading us to the truth. So conceiving imitation, Aristotle was in the way to answer Plato's strictures upon art; and I make little question that Aristotle's *Poetics* is his direct acceptance of the challenge which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates in the tenth book of the *Republic*. Socrates has just ruled, for the

reasons which we have stated, that poetry must be banished from the ideal state; but he goes on to say of her:

"Let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered state we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. . . . And we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets the permission to speak in prose in her behalf: let them show that she is not only pleasant but also useful to states and to human life, and we will listen in a kindly spirit. . . . We too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble states has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm to us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that we may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many."

This is the challenge which Aristotle accepts—as Sidney and Shelley and our own poet Woodberry have also accepted it in their several *Defences* of poesy. And Aristotle is in a position to make good his defence on the basis of his reinterpretation of the meaning of "imitation." For with him, as we have seen, "imitation," as we find it in nature, is the key to our understanding of what is ideal and perfect in nature; it is the guide to truth. And if such is the case with the works of nature in general, how shall it be less the case with the works of human nature, and especially of our clearest expression of human ideals in works of art? Plainly it is the mission of art also, even from its imitative character, to lead us into the ways of truth and understanding.

Art, then, according to Aristotle, is an imitation of nature, not in her outward and sensible forms, but in her inner and essential meanings, in her *ideal* character. And he praises art in proportion to its truth to this ideal character. Our youth, he says, should be familiarized with the works of the painter Polygnotus, for Polygnotus depicts men, not realistically as does Dionysius, nor satirically as does Pauson, but as "better than they are," as idealized men. For the same reason tragedy is a loftier form of art than comedy, for the writers of comedies demean their characters, while the tragic poet is a creator of heroes.

Nor must we think that Aristotle is here confusing two senses of the word "ideal"—the sense in which it designates "the stuff that dreams are made of" with the sense in which it means what

ought to be. For these two meanings were naturally identical in Aristotle's philosophy. This philosophy is what we moderns would call an *activistic* philosophy: the very essence of reality, according to it, is action, movement, development; reality does not consist in being present, but in being promised; reality is the form, or ideal, toward which, through material imperfection, the world is ever striving. "Action is the goal, and actuality is action," is his own phrasing. And because the end of enlightened desire and the formal objects of wisdom are both dependencies of this natural genesis, the two meanings of "ideal" coalesce.

This same activistic view of nature leads Aristotle to count tragic drama as first among the arts. "For tragedy," he says, in one of the most notable passages of literature, "is an imitation not of men, but of an action and of life; and life is essentially an action, not a quality." The drama is great because it is an imitation, not of physical forms, but of evolutional *motifs*, because it is the completest image art can give of that life whose true being is, as Plato had said, not in the world of sense, but in the world of spirit.

I cannot dwell upon all the subtleties of this conception. I can only point out that from it flows that odd Aristotelian rule that the poet should prefer a "probable impossibility" to an improbable fact, and again his sagacious saying that "poetry is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." It is the universal alone which possesses probability; it is the universal alone which is truly knowable; and in a world whose universals are acts, not things, that art which deals directly with action—governed by the law of reason, which is the law of probability—will give us our maturest insights into the truths of life.

Thus in his very definition of tragedy, Aristotle has retorted upon Plato. Fidelity to truth and to the ideal reality Plato had made the ground for his rejection of poetic art; but the highest fidelity to truth calls for this very art, says Aristotle, for the poet's imitations of life are our most capable guides to the spiritual truth of nature.

III

Our first question is answered. Tragedy is an imitation of an action,—an imitation not for the sake of producing an illusion of

motion, as is the case with the cinematograph, but an imitation designed to reveal to us nature's actuating ideals in so far as these are manifest in our human constitution. The tragic stage is a mirror, but it is the magic mirror which reflects back to us neither the bravery of our outward shows nor the humility of our outward asceticisms, but only the naked truth of our inward dispositions.

What, then, of our second question? What is the purpose of tragedy? . . . You will recall the phrase in which Aristotle answers it: "through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions." Probably no phrase in the writings of Aristotle and few phrases in literature have occasioned so much discussion as has this one,—the main reason for it being that the passages in which Aristotle doubtless expounded his meaning belong to the lost portion of his work. In a recent edition of Aristotle's *Poetics*, perhaps the most scholarly yet produced, the late Ingram Bywater collates more than fifty versions of Aristotle's phrase, dating from the edition of Paccius in 1527 to that of Hatzfeld and Dufour in 1899. Bywater's own rendering is that tragedy must be furnished "with incidents arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish the catharsis of such emotions."

A comparison of the two translations which I have quoted—viz., "through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions," and, "arousing pity and fear . . . to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions"—will reveal certain of the differences that have animated the commentators. Does Aristotle mean that just pity and fear, and no other emotions, are to be aroused and purged by tragedy? or does he intend, as Bywater's version indicates, that pity and fear are to be taken as typical of the *kind* of emotions appropriate to tragedy? Much controversial powder has been burned over this question, and indeed it is not altogether so trivial an issue as at first sight it may appear; nevertheless, Aristotle mentions explicitly but these two emotions, and it seems to me that we might properly assume that he meant no more,—at the same time allowing that for the Greek as for us the vocabulary of emotion was essentially a meagre one, giving small measure of the infinite range of feeling as we namelessly know it, so that Aristotle's conception of fear might well include the whole gradation from panic terror to reverential awe while his idea of pity could well comprise horror and shock at the one extreme and an almost divinely impersonal

compassion at the other: with such elasticity of application open, the precise phrasing becomes a secondary matter.

We may say as much for another difference that marks the two versions. Professor Butcher interprets Aristotle as claiming for tragedy "*the* proper purgation" of pity and fear; Professor Bywater substitutes "*its* catharsis," or purgation, meaning that there are other arts than tragedy which may purge the emotions. Undoubtedly Aristotle did recognize for other arts than drama the function of purgation, or catharsis, just as he recognized that other arts than drama are imitative arts; indeed, we may always say that what Aristotle asserts of tragedy in a general sense, *as a form of art*, he would assert with equal generality of other forms of art; his treatment of tragedy is the key to his whole theory of art. Thus, in the *Politics*, he says of music:

> "In education ethical melodies are to be preferred, but we may listen to the melodies of action and passion when they are performed by others. For feelings such as pity and fear, or, again, enthusiasm, exist very strongly in some souls, and have more or less influence over all. Some persons fall into a religious frenzy, whom we see disenthralled by the use of mystic melodies, which bring healing and purgation to the soul. Those who are influenced by pity or fear and every emotional nature have a like experience, others in their degree are stirred by something which specially affects them, and all are in a manner purged and their souls lightened and delighted."

But if the general function of art is thus a catharsis of the emotions, and tragedy possesses this function most capably only as being the loftiest of the arts, what are we to say is Aristotle's understanding of the process? And why is it a good? The real difficulties with Aristotle's phrase lie in this one word *catharsis*, which has been the talk of generations of critics. In what sense can art act as a purge or cathartic for our emotional nature, and what can so strange a metaphor mean when applied to feelings such as pity and fear?

Among the critics there are two dominant interpretations of this metaphor of Aristotle's. The one group gives the figure of a purge as near a literal interpretation as is possible in the connection. Aristotle belonged to a family of physicians, and the Greek medical term *catharsis* is rendered by its English equivalent *purgation*. The use of the term in reference to pity and fear implies, says Bywater, "the tacit assumption . . . that the emotions in question are analogous to those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient humoral theory of

medicine, have to be expelled from the system by the appropriate catharsis." The other group of critics render Aristotle's term by the word ***purification*** or the Latin ***lustration***, understanding it to mean something analogous to a religious purification of the soul from its drosser passions. The great name of Lessing is to be found among the supporters of this interpretation.

Between these two opinions—each of which, it appears to me, could be bettered by supplementing philology with some salt of psychological insight—there may be a middle view that will appeal to us as Aristotle's more reasonable meaning. But before stating it, let us recur to some of the historical antecedents of his thought.

Aristoxenos tells us that the Pythagoreans employed music to purge the soul as they used medicine to purge the body. This Pythagorean spiritual catharsis is clearly the source of Aristotle's conception; for Plato, in whose works it also appears, was as familiar with the thought of the followers of Pythagoras as was Aristotle with Plato's philosophy. It is in a passage of the *Laws* that Plato describes what must have been the Pythagorean understanding of the process. Plato is speaking of the affinity of motion and life:

> "Infants should live, if that were possible, as if they were always rocking at sea. This is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. . . . The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear, which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy."

The Bacchic women of whom Plato is speaking are the wine-maddened mænads who follow the god Dionysus in his wild revels of dance and song. They are the women who figure in *The Bacchantes* of Euripides, and indeed we may regard this tragedy as the dramatic portrayal of such a catharsis as Plato

has in mind. We should remember, too, that Greek tragedy took its origin from these same Dionysiac revels, coming to be, in its artistic realization, a kind of vicarious purgation of the whole city from the madnesses with which the spirit of the god obsesses men. "Such feelings as pity and fear and *enthusiasm*," Aristotle said, in the passage from the *Politics* which I have given; and there is significance in the addition of just this word *enthusiasm*, for it is the term whereby the Greeks designated the idea of being possessed by a spirit, and especially by the spirit of the god of wine.

Is it not plain that the catharsis which for Aristotle is the proper effect of tragedy is *both* a purgation and a purification—a relief from distempered emotion coupled with a quiescent broadening of our powers of sympathetic understanding? Sympathy is at once a gift of the emotions and of the imagination; it cannot exist in a state of inner and personal perturbation, the state that Aristotle calls fear; and, on the other hand, it cannot exist where the feelings are cold and unmoved. It is just the function of art, and above all of the drama, according to Aristotle, to purge or relieve us of the personal and disturbing element of emotion, while at the same time it stimulates our imagination to a compassionate comprehension of the suffering natures of our fellow men, and so, as a Greek might put it, to a purified insight into human life.

IV

This is Aristotle's conception. But it is not yet an answer to Plato's challenge. Let me revert once more to the latter's criticism of poetry.

"If you consider," says Socrates, "that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control by our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets; the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own. . . . And does

not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness;—the case of pity is repeated. . . . And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue."

Such is Plato's arraignment of poetic art, and I think that no one who is familiar with the kind of emotional debauch which is so often confused with the true appreciation of art, can doubt the measure in which Plato's strictures are just. But is there a function of art to which they do not apply? and has Aristotle correctly pointed it?

I think that both questions can be answered in the affirmative, and I think that Aristotle's famous phrase indicates both answers. At the same time it would be foolish to deny that this phrase must receive a large interpretation. What it means directly, we have endeavoured to show; but what it signifies in a general scheme of things, in a whole philosophy of life, we can only infer from our general knowledge of Aristotle's thought,—for he nowhere explicitly states his case.

That philosophy differs from Plato's in an important particular which we have already stated: it is activistic, where Plato's is purely ideal; it is temporal, and we might almost say temporalizing, where Plato's is eternal, and austerely reserved. Aristotle accepts an imperfect world of nature as an empirical fact, hoping for its redemption, but willing to take it for what it is; Plato sees in imperfection only the obstinate illusion which veils from us the truth that should be ours. Accordingly, art is for Aristotle a legitimate allegory of the understanding, while for Plato it is only the measure of our self-deception.

There is another and more personal and psychological reason for the difference in the two philosophies. It is obvious to any reader of Plato and Aristotle that Plato, who condemns art, is infinitely more moved by æsthetic charm than is Aristotle, who justifies it. "If her defence fails," says Socrates, and we know that it is Plato speaking his own inmost nature, "then, like other persons who are enamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think their desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner of lovers give

her up, though not without a struggle." Plato and Aristotle both were true Hellenes in their devotion to the maxim: "Nothing in excess"; self-control was with each of them the essence of virtue. But Plato was temperamentally an artist; before he came to know Socrates, he was a poet, and the music of poesy was ever ringing, Siren-like, in his ears. That he turned from her, rigidly and ascetically, is only the token of the glamour with which the figure of Socrates had seized upon his mind; for Socrates was the last of men to yield to emotion, or to permit the mists of feeling to suffuse his vision of truth. I cannot but think that Plato's absence from that last dialogue, where Apollodorus was rebuked for weeping, was due to his lack of confidence in his own powers of control and his shamed fear of showing weakness before his master. Plato's asceticism may thus, throughout, be but the spiritual self-protection of a nature too keenly sensitive to the charms and beauties of that sensible world which the love of truth had taught him to despise. For Aristotle there was necessary no such inner handicap, his was not the artist's temperament, but the scientist's; and he could survey with even gaze ugly and beautiful, true and false, apportioning to each human expression its proper human rôle. Thus, in his philosophy of art, he answers Plato, not directly by a refutation which could have been but meaningless to the Platonic temperament, but indirectly, by implication from his whole philosophy of life; for with Seneca he would say, "To me naught that is human is alien," and with Pindar, "The things of mortals befit mortality," and of the heroic past, which was the main theme of Attic tragedy, he could say with Vergil's wanderer:

sunt lacrimæ rerum, et mentem mortalia tangunt.

There is one point further. Plato's criticism was in effect that art, in stirring our emotions, loosens our control of them, that moved by the mimic passions of the stage we stand to lose our sense of proportion, and in the emotional exigencies of life are in danger of weakly yielding to feelings which we should rise above. The very lesson that Hamlet felt the stage ought to yield, Plato feared it would yield:

> **"O! what a rogue and peasant slave am I:**
> **Is it not monstrous that this player here,**
> **But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,**
> **Could force his soul so to his own conceit**

That from her working all his visage wann'd,
Tears in his eyes, distraction in 's aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit? and all for nothing!
For Hecuba!
What's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba
That he should weep for her? What would he do
Had he the motive and the cue for passion
That I have? He would drown the stage with tears,
And cleave the general ear with horrid speech,
Make mad the guilty and appal the free,
Confound the ignorant, and amaze indeed
The very faculties of eyes and ears."

Plato would have looked with abhorrence upon such an outcome, and Hamlet was too Aristotelian in his temperament to make it possible,—for want of reflection is not his besetting fault, nor emotional madness his weakness. As for Aristotle himself, no more than Shakespeare himself, would he have regarded this as the proper effect of tragedy. Rather, he would have said—and we may affirm this with confidence—that the knowledge of life which comes with the tragic catharsis will make us wiser and better-contained and more capable human beings, quicker to respond to life because of the quickening of our sympathies in the presence of the moving spectacle. "There seems to be in us," he says, "a sort of affinity to harmonies and rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the soul is a harmony, others, that she possesses harmony." Aristotle would not, with the Pythagoreans, say that the soul is a harmony; but he would agree with them that music is a proper medicine for a perturbed and cacophonous spirit, and we should not, as some critics seem to fear, be making a mere moralist of him in asserting that in tragedy, as in music, he beheld an agent which could purify and ennoble the harmonies of the soul.

I believe that this was Milton's understanding of Aristotle, as expressed in the famous introduction to *Samson Agonistes:*

"Tragedy, as it was anciently composed, hath been ever held the gravest, moralest, and most profitable of all other poems: therefore said by Aristotle to be of power by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of those and such-like passions, that is to temper and reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight, stirred up by reading or seeing those passions well imitated. Nor is Nature wanting in her own effects to make good his assertion: for so in physic things of melancholic hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours."

The suggestion drawn from the old homœopathic medicine, with its doctrine of like-cure-like, we may pass as fanciful,—though I have little doubt that in Milton's mind it bore a very special significance in relation to the theme of the blinded hero of Israel which he, the blinded poet was about to treat. But the conception that it is the office of tragedy to reduce the passions to just measure, and so to assuage the malease of a troubled and disconsolate life, was the Aristotelian lesson which Milton, more than most men, was in a position to learn.

And can we discover a nobler image of the true catharsis than is Milton's own poem?

> "Blind among enemies, O worse than chains,
> Dungeon, or beggary, or decrepit age!
> Light, the prime work of God to me is extinct,
> And all her various objects of delight
> Annull'd. . . ."

Too well we guess these words from Samson's mouth are Milton's own, as again we see Milton more than Samson in the bitter Puritan conscience that refuses forgiveness, not only to Delila, but to himself:

> "I to myself was false ere thou to me,
> Such pardon therefore as I give my folly,
> Take to thy wicked deed. . . ."

But at the last, when the action is done, and the little deeds of earth are flitted away, the spirit is changed:

> " . . . no time for lamentation now,
> Nor much more cause, Samson hath quit himself
> Like Samson, and heroicly hath finished
> A life heroic. . . ."

And then it is, in the final chorus, that we come upon a transfigured Milton, rising, in the spatiousness of his spiritual insight, to a perspective of life within which the contentions and afflictions and harsh bickerings of a mortal lot are shrunken and meaningless,—just as the moil of troubled waters is seen as a passing glamour from the serene altitudes of sunny hills:

> "All is best, though we oft doubt,
> What th' unsearchable dispose
> Of highest wisdom brings about,
> And ever best found in the close.

Oft he seems to hide his face,
But unexpectedly returns
And to his faithful Champion hath in place
Bore witness gloriously; whence Gaza mourns
And all that band them to resist
His uncontrollable intent,
His servants he with new acquist
Of true experience from this great event
With peace and consolation hath dismist,
And calm of mind, all passion spent."

Surely this passage—hauntingly reminiscent of the great Æschylean hymn to Zeus, "who hath set wisdom in suffering, and guideth men's feet in the way thereof,"—surely it brings to us the final image of the accomplished catharsis and the great end of tragedy. A "new acquist of true experience" whence should fall a "calm of mind, all passion spent": can Aristotle have meant other than this by that chastening of the passions which he makes the end of tragedy? Something of a broader understanding of life, something of the divine compassion for all things human, these, and the stout Hellenic virtue of a self-control that can proclaim reason king even in the midst of bodily distress,—these are the gifts which the Greek philosopher and the English poet alike saw to be the great gifts of true dramatic art. And bearing these gifts in mind, and judging art by our need of them, can we require a saner or fuller justification of our more worthy tastes?

HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER.

University of Nebraska.

THE OVER-SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY

Not long ago the public read with astonishment the news that the efficiency of one of the leading state universities was the subject of legislative inquiry. To investigations of financial transactions of these institutions it had been accustomed. These had the sanction of popular opinion, for the revenue of the state is limited, and the legislature is directly responsible for the economical expenditure of it. The language of constitutions and university charters implies, it is true, that the power to supervise is general. The university, legally speaking, is an agent and the legislature the principal. That such inquisitorial power had seldom been exercised in the past clearly appears in public sentiment as reflected in the press, for with few exceptions the propriety of the action taken by the Wisconsin legislature was challenged.

What is the explanation of the proceeding which provoked so much comment? Why did the legislature exercise a function hitherto entrusted to the university administration itself? Ostensibly the object was to ascertain whether teachers were rendering adequate service, whether the service was utilized by the organization to the best advantage. This was plainly a subterfuge. The real aim was ulterior. The inquiry was the outgrowth of hostility not only to the university administration, but also to the "Wisconsin idea" of university activity. In the minds of some supporters of the investigation, the university, when the "Wisconsin idea" was fully realized, would become an invisible government directing the very department of state upon which its life depended, as well as all other public activities. Such was the interpretation placed upon the growing influence of the expert whose opinions carry weight because of the prestige of a great institution of learning. The sincere desire of the university administration to render the largest service to the state appeared to the opposition, no doubt, as a new form of paternalism in which one powerful organization was seeking to dominate the whole field of public and private enterprise.

The press as a rule declared such fears to be groundless, and

looked upon the inquiry as a fiasco. On the other hand some newspapers of high standing, among them the New York *Evening Post*, while reserving judgment on the merits of the controversy as disclosed, took occasion to call in question the "Wisconsin idea" of the function of the university. Thus the investigation, whether inspired by proper or improper motives, has raised an issue.

The university is a special agency created by the state to make the stores of knowledge available for social ends. Knowledge is helpful in every activity. Why should any limitation be imposed upon the university expert? Why should he not pursue error and inefficiency to the very boundary lines of the state? There are limitations upon this function of the expert fixed by law. A consideration of these legal provisions may suggest the answer. That there is error and superstition in some forms of religious thinking will not be doubted. Nor will it be disputed that such errors arising from gross ignorance affect conduct to the injury of society. Yet the constitution forbids institutions of learning from exposing the falsity of conclusions in religious belief. It does not say so in these very words but the meaning is plain. The exact thing prohibited is "sectarian instruction," but this phrase taken in connection with other provisions was clearly intended to give effect to the clause which declares that it is the *inherent* right of every individual to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his conscience. To this end the state directs the university to observe the rule of *laissez faire* with strictness.

There is another field, the boundary lines of which are more or less obscure, from which tradition, sanctioned by common consent, has excluded the expert, representing the university. This is the field known as "partisan politics." Nowhere is the need of knowledge and expert advice more urgent, but the risk to learning is too great to be assumed.

The rule in each case explains itself. It is obvious to common sense that learning as an agency of the state could render no social service by exposing errors of such a character, and that furthermore the attempt to expose them would seriously impair its influence and usefulness. A certain degree of aloofness is essential to the exercise of its function. Are the conditions that require the attitude of aloofness in learning the characteristics of the present age or of all time? The sciences taught in the

university have traced the main tendencies of existing behaviour back to the pre-human ancestors of the first human stock. They find that the same thing that precipitated eruptive, explosive action three hundred thousand years ago—obstruction of immediate desire—precipitates it now. When excitement reaches a certain pitch the artificial rules of civilization cease to bind. The incidents of the war across the sea show unmistakably that the remote past inheres in the present. The late Alfred Russel Wallace, in summing up the results of nearly sixty years of patient research, declared that there was no proof of any real advance in character during the entire historical period. In support of his conclusion he pointed to the sacred literature of ancient India in which there are ethical conceptions unsurpassed to-day. By "character" he means, of course, the raw material of individuality, unmodified by acquired habits. The tragedy of Othello is still recognized to be a true representation of human nature, and to have a psychological basis. There reason is seen to be the handmaid of feeling and action. As feeling gathers volume and action reaches the eruptive stage, reason loses the power to weigh evidence and draw inferences. In the fury of destructive impulse all social standards, all moral obligations, are swept aside. If proof was necessary to support the conception of human action in this drama, cultured Europe furnishes it to-day.

But there is no need to stray into such distant fields to find the explanation of the attitude of aloofness toward controversy which the constitution requires of learning when it is an agency of the state. Every phrase in the declaration of rights in this instrument has an historical meaning and that meaning is disclosed in the social and political life of Europe since the states now existing took form. The bill of rights is the epitome of the struggle for civil and religious liberty. The clause that forbids learning as an agency of the state to supervise and direct religious thought is the result of a policy adopted at the outset and continued as far down as the sitting of the famous Long Parliament in the seventeenth century. The ordinance for the suppression of blasphemies and heresies, passed by that body, declared that any man denying the doctrine of the Trinity, or of the Divinity of Christ, or that the Scriptures are not the Word of God, or the resurrection of the body, or a future day of punishment, "shall suffer the pain of death." The policy was then vigorously assailed by Vane and his followers, and was soon to be rejected. But

the function of learning as an agency of the state, as expressed in the act of the Long Parliament, was a function that had been performed hitherto throughout the Middle Ages practically without challenge. The Tudors and Stuarts used learning to mould the forms of thought, both civil and religious. In fact it was the conception of authoritarian government that learning was the servant of administration, and that it was its office to relentlessly pursue the error of opposing thought to the very boundary lines of the state..

The provision in state constitutions severing the former relation existing between learning and administration, directing learning to hold itself aloof from religious controversies, the unwritten tradition that political controversies are to be shunned, are merely the result of observing what happened under the former policy. Designed to maintain order, that policy led to anarchy and revolution; designed to enforce respect for learning as an agency of the state, it led to disrespect and contempt. Both learning and administration emerged from the struggle without prestige, without honour. In the light of that experience it is not strange that the modern democratic state considered the relation of learning, as a state function, to administration, to religious and political differences, so important that it defined it in the fundamental law,—the written constitution. Its conception of the relation is reflected in the warning to learning to hold aloof from the discussion of that which had been the subject of the most bitter controversies,—religious differences. The historical events that led to this admonition show that it was not the sense of propriety that caused the state to single out religion for special mention, but the conviction that learning as an agency of the state cannot with safety enter into the discussion of problems pressing for immediate solution upon which there is deep feeling.

Interpreting the constitution and the unwritten tradition which reflects the general meaning of the history that led to the adoption of the constitution, university administrations have as a rule construed the mission of learning as a state function, aside from routine instruction, to be cultural. A reaction against this view has plainly set in. It is indicated in the phrase often applied to the policy,—"sitting on the lid." An institution devoted solely to the ends of general culture, many sincerely believe, is an institution already fallen into "innocuous desuetude." No doubt the rule in some instances has been extended beyond the

reason for it. But before considering to what extent it may be safely relaxed, it is perhaps worth while to glance briefly at this intangible something called "general culture." Is it a mere phantom, having no connection with reality, with human action? Let us see.

The people of Europe, the United States, and Canada are of the same civilization, the same blood. Intellectually and morally, they are equals. There are no forts on either side of the border line of Canada and the United States; no munition factories with trained workers, applying science to the invention of monster guns to destroy the cities and industries across the line. The political boundaries of Europe are dotted with forts, patrolled by large standing armies. Designing destructive weapons of war is one of the main occupations of inventive genius.

Why do people of the same blood, the same moral standards, behave differently? Because of the intangible something called "culture." The forts, siege guns, and standing armies of Europe are the expression of the attitude of distrust and suspicion; the undefended border of Canada and the United States, of an idea of human life and an attitude toward it,—an attitude of mutual respect and confidence. If this attitude should change to-morrow, forts and gun works would soon spring up. Peace on the western continent is not the result of a form of government. Democracies have fought time and again in the past and they are now fighting. There is peace in America because human life has come to be viewed more and more in the light of the sentiment expressed in the Declaration of Independence. If that sentiment should decay, peace would depart. It is because of the high value that document has taught us to place on human life that we are more reluctant to destroy it.

Where general culture is fostered, public opinion, as a rule, is vigorous. The statistics of homicide in the United States, taken in connection with the location of institutions of learning, are highly suggestive. The East and Middle West, relatively to the South, have from the beginning been under the influence of strong colleges. Assuming as the basis of calculation a population of one hundred thousand, the homicides among the whites in Savannah, Georgia, are 15.8; in Milwaukee, they are 1.9; in Boston, 4.7; in New York, 5.4. In all these states save Wisconsin, the penalty for the crime is the same,—death. In Wisconsin it is life imprisonment. The group of scholars who have

made up the faculties of Harvard, Yale, Brown, Cornell, Dartmouth, Oberlin, Michigan University, Wisconsin University, have played no inconsiderable part in forming a public opinion that has restrained individuals from violating social standards. Through this new instrument, made possible by improved methods of communication, culture is more and more becoming the power behind the throne that determines the character of federal, state, county, and municipal government. Whether dominant opinion is to be public, or a majority class opinion, depends upon the vitality of general culture. The intangible thing is plainly not a mere phantom.

But the mere fact that the university is a force in sustaining general culture does not necessarily imply that it may not be effective in furthering immediate ends, in solving practical problems. It has always been difficult for a democracy to utilize it, social resources. In action it lacks the steady control of more centralized governments. Undeveloped social resources are lost power, as well as undeveloped natural resources. Development can take place only as knowledge becomes increasingly available for action. Germany's success in conserving the supply of food under the greatest difficulties is merely an illustration of the value of knowledge and foresight in action. Other nations possess equal intelligence, but administration is so clumsy that it is wasted in large part. There is no effective method of selecting the right man for duty, of giving him the necessary authority.

The state university is a plant upon which the state has expended millions of dollars. Its vast libraries contain the learning of the past and the present. Its laboratories are amply equipped with apparatus for innumerable experiments. Trained men are in charge of them. Why should not this storehouse be made a social asset to the fullest extent?

In the technical phase of industry, the value of the equipment has been and is being realized. The accelerated pace of agriculture and the mechanic arts, the generous support these industries have given to legislative appropriations for the industrial college, are convincing proof of substantial results. May not the university department render a like service in the broader social problems upon which human interest centres?

Where human interest centres, there controversy is potential. Our constitution has indicated plainly that controversy is a danger zone to learning. Yet the very reasons that prompted this

action would seem to suggest that learning as a function of the state might render effective service in the solution of controversy. The authoritarian state, as before remarked, conceived that the function of learning as a function of the state was to reduce truth to a formula to the end that thought might be controlled. James I. of England voiced this sentiment in his famous exclamation, "no bishop, no king." Discerning executives could not fail to notice that thought tends to find expression in action. Learning as the servant of prerogative was useful in repressing the initiative. It therefore fastened the rôle of servant upon learning.

Its successor not only severed the relation formerly existing between administration and learning as a state function, but took the thing authoritarian government abhorred,—the expression of difference,—and made it the corner-stone of the new commonwealth. Drawn before the theory of evolution was known, couched in language suggesting the social philosophy of the eighteenth century, the underlying conception of human life reflected in the Declaration of Independence is, nevertheless, in accord with modern biological science. The assertion that it is a self-evident truth that the individual has an inalienable and inherent right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness may not in the exact form stated express the present conclusion of anthropological science. The phrase "inherent individual rights" would seem to suggest that solitary life was the primary form. What speculative view of the origin of society the authors of the Declaration of Independence had is wholly immaterial. What conception they entertained of existing society is the important point. This appears in the instrument itself. These propositions are clearly indicated: (1) individuality is an irrepressible fact; (2) difference is the inevitable incident of individuality; (3) difference rightly treated is an effective force in social progress.

This is merely the political form of the conclusion of science that individual variability is a principal factor of evolution. Through this variability the general level of life is raised.

But the constitution makers were not unmindful that difference is the peculiar peril of democracy. No people had more brilliant prospects than the people of the mediaeval Italian republics. The leadership of Europe was almost within their grasp. Nowhere did industry, art, and literature flourish with such vigour; nowhere was wealth so abundant, so well distributed.

But differences arose within the ranks and the ship of state was wrecked. So it was with the democracies of ancient Greece. Lincoln summed up the history of them when he said in one of his messages to Congress that the real problem that confronted the American people was not the great Civil War but the capacity of the people to cope with difference under a democratic form of government.

The radical change in the relation of learning as a function of the state shows how important that relation was conceived to be in the new commonwealth. The plain intent was to reverse in every particular the policy of authoritarian government. First, learning was isolated by placing it under a separate organization that had no connection, direct or indirect, with administration. Second, it was directed to maintain a specific attitude toward controversies.

The separate organization, the warning to hold aloof from controversies, the unwritten tradition that partisan politics is a forbidden field, indicate a definite conception of the part learning was to play in the new state. Mindful of the disaster that overtook the older democracies, their successor thought it probable that a body of opinion formed at a higher level, detached from mmediate ends, might arrest the disruptive tendency by a practical demonstration of the utility of difference. It saw that learning, when it is disconnected from material interests, naturally expresses the pure spirit of inquiry of which difference is a powerful stimulus. The lay world, it believed, could hardly fail to be impressed by the example of a group of eminent men devoting their lives to the cause of social progress, and to that end welcoming opposing opinion as a means of testing the validity of propositions and divesting truth of error. The very isolation of the university thus would enable it to render effective service in the solution of democracy's pressing problem,—difference.

It has been stated that the enumeration of rights in our written constitutions is at once a conception of human life and an attitude toward it. It is also a method of procedure in social life, based upon the notion that individuality necessarily begets difference. This rule may be expressed in a phrase: "*act as if difference was genuine.*" This is the real meaning of tolerance.

It is the natural function of learning as an agency of the democratic state to engraft this conception of the problem of controversy upon public opinion, for it was the very purpose of

the state in isolating it to enable it to arrive at the philosophy of difference. In the innumerable controversies that arise in other states and foreign lands, the university has the material to illustrate the principles stated in the constitution, and the method of applying them. The great European war lends itself admirably to this end, for here the nature of the problem is disclosed in broad, distinct lines. The method of procedure indicated by the constitution, and embodied in the rule, "*act as if difference was genuine,*" is essential in laying bare the merits, for popular feeling, as usual, confuses the issue by treating it as the struggle of vice and virtue, and opposing currents of feeling fasten the rôle of vice, one on the triple entente, the other, on the Teutonic alliance. As the preponderating feeling favours the triple entente, its version first deserves consideration. The rule stated assumes that German conduct is human conduct, just what American conduct would be if the American had been born into the German environment. That education profoundly modifies standards of conduct is a matter of common knowledge; that the education of the German child gives him an entirely different conception of the state than the education of the American child is well known. The rule, "act as if difference was genuine," unquestionably applies to German ideas and German sentiments expressed in the war.

Does this concession resolve all opposition and bring the American and German opinion into full accord? Again the constitution answers the question. Section 1 reads as follows:

> "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights, and the protection of property, governments are instituted among people, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

This, it will be observed, is stated as a general principle. The rights defined are independent of boundary lines; they are the same across the border as within it. The people of Belgium are manifestly included within the principle, and they have been deprived of rights declared to be inherent and inalienable.

There is strong partisan feeling in America; there is harsh and unjust criticism: but eliminating these, there remains an opposition and that opposition is defined in the constitution itself.

The real difference lies between the principle stated in our fundamental law and the German state policy.

But Germany as a nation also has a view of the Belgian incident. What that view is appears very clearly in official expressions and acts. The German purpose was revealed at the very outset in the Chancellor's public announcement of the reasons that moved the government to strike France through Belgium rather than upon her own border; those reasons were purely military; a more effective blow could be delivered from that quarter. The meaning cannot be mistaken. It is the view that strong, progressive nations have always entertained. The interests at stake were conceived to be of more importance than the suffering of Belgium. The preservation of a superior culture seemed to justify the sacrifice of life and property.

The two conceptions of the social order are irreconcilable. One affirms that the very condition of social progress is a conception of the social value of individual life. The other affirms that the quantity of interest cannot be disregarded and that collective interest *as such* is superior to the interest of society in the individual. This is the view that prevailed in the ancient and mediaeval world and was challenged for the first time by the modern democratic state.

The mere fact that Belgium has suffered does not decide the issue between the Nebraska constitution and German state policy. Great reform movements incidentally cause suffering and property loss. The real question for learning to discuss is this: does the knowledge gained through history, philosophy, and the social sciences indicate that the principle operative in social progress is in accord with the Nebraska constitution or with German statecraft? In passing it may be observed that the conclusions of two eminent German scholars support the conception in the Nebraska constitution. In his *World's Legal Philosophies* Fritz Berolzheimer declares that the process through which the advance has been made since the Middle Ages is the emancipation of the individual. By this phrase he means that the individual has been admitted into world relation. He acts upon the whole and the whole reacts upon him. Kohler, in his *Philosophy of Law*, deduces from social science and history the conclusion that the small state of the twentieth century is a forward step in the evolutionary process, and that the next step will be to make sovereignty subject to the new order. Both theories rest upon

the biological conception that variety, individual and collective, is a fundamental factor of progress.

The aim of the democratic state is not merely to prevent war. There are controversies not reaching the stage of armed conflict whose injurious effects are as great as those of war. It is the principle that leads to the solution of the problem of difference itself that the constitution attempts to formulate. In the elucidation of this principle, learning, as an agency of the state, is exercising a function plainly committed to it.

All the elements distinguishable in the European war appear in domestic controversies. The tendency, illustrated in the cartoons of the warring nations, to regard the opponent, morally speaking, as a monster, as the incarnation of the evil spirit, is inherent in the controversial attitude itself, and ineradicable. So is the tendency to conceive collective interest as the demand of justice.

Viewed in the light of the constitution, treated by its method under the rule "act as if difference was genuine," the recent reform movement in the United States shows in a marked degree each of these tendencies. The agricultural West located the devil in the financial East, and the financial East was equally persuaded that the destroying spirit had his habitation with the farmers of the West. The vigour of the respective conceptions compared favourably with those disclosed in the present war.

The collective aspect was also identical. When the owners of railroads were the dominant class in politics, they entertained no doubt that the interests of the state and their interests were in accord. When the class that rides on the railroads succeeded the former, the cheap fare was thought to be the plain demand of justice. When the ruling class is a large majority it becomes the "peepul" of the demagogue, and asserts in its behalf the doctrine of sovereignty, for this doctrine is merely a sincere belief that the collective interest of a large and permanent group is synonymous with social justice. This is the psychology of the German view of the Belgian incident. It is not in accord with the constitution because that instrument repudiates outright the quantitative theory of justice. Individuality as such is deemed to be the vital concern of the state.

The rule, "act as if difference was genuine," resolves all of these distorted conceptions into a farmer bias, a banker bias, a promoter bias, and a consumer bias. Even the arch-fiend the

temperance reformer finds in the liquor traffic, loses his identity. He is seen to be a temporary phase of a permanent problem. From the beginning of history down to the nineteenth century, the use of alcohol as a beverage had the practically unanimous approval of world opinion. In some countries radical changes in industry and social life, together with the use of highly intoxicating liquors, transformed an ancient custom into a moral problem. As in all instances, opinion does not move uniformly, and inevitably it moves more slowly in the class that has interests vested in the business. Tariff reform never looks the same to the consumer and to the protected manufacturer. The conduct of brewers and manufacturers is merely an illustration of the fundamental law of difference.

In the student body, learning as an agency of the state has an opportunity to impress upon the coming generation the conception of democracy's problem as outlined in the constitution. There has been a tendency of late years to belittle the Declaration of Independence, and the bill of rights in state constitutions. It has been broadly intimated that these historic documents, the foundation of our state, are a mixture of sentimentalism and erroneous social philosophy. As a social theory, it may be conceded that a wrong reason is given for a right conclusion. If emphasizing an attitude is sentimentalism, then this criticism is applicable. But this emphasis is justified by social science. The conclusion has long since been reached that the primary stuff of life is will, of which emotion is an aspect. The present view of the function of sentiment is expressed in these lines of Herbert Spencer:

> "Ideas do not govern the world; the world is governed by feeling to which ideas serve only as guides. . . . The ideas current in the state must on the average be congruous with the feeling of the citizens, and therefore on the average with the social state the feeling has produced. Ideas wholly foreign to the social state cannot be evolved, and if introduced from without, cannot get accepted."

The basis of the social state is rational action, and rationalization can begin only where the initiative is lodged,—in the acting impulse and its attendant emotion. The emphasis is not wrongly placed in the constitution.

The theory of "inherent and inalienable individual rights," erroneous as it may be in form, is merely an effort to appraise the

social value of individuality. Expressed in biological terms it is the unanimous conclusion of evolutionary science,—the conception that individual variability is one of the principal factors of progress. Without it there could be no advance. Social life is the indispensable stimulus, the condition, of development, but the social idea can find expression only through individuality. The high levels of social action are always associated with individuals. Individuality in the persons of Plato, Jesus, Socrates, Emerson, and Lincoln has created social standards that are a continuing and permanent influence in moulding conduct. Their social value is beyond calculation. Obscure and unknown individuals on a smaller scale perform the same office. In its doctrine that the enduring basis of the state is (1) an emotional attitude toward life, self-respect, and respect for others; (2) the full expression and realization of individuality, the constitution has the support of both social science and history. The failure to appreciate the truth that these conceptions are complementary as used in the constitution is the cause of the reaction against individualism.

While the outward form of the fundamental conceptions of the constitution bears the stamp of Rousseau and his school of thought, the deeper meaning of the doctrine of the inherent and inalienable rights of life, liberty, pleasurable activity, of religious worship, of the free expression of thought on all matters of human interest, is no less than a conscious effort to make available the forces that evolutionary science discerns in the ascending movement of life. The *élan vital* of Bergson has, throughout the entire series, expressed itself and gained increasing control over the environment through the medium of variable individuality. If this view of the scheme of social action is impressed upon the student body during its undergraduate residence, learning as an agency of the state will have rendered a lasting service. The coming generation will then start with the knowledge that the problem of difference lies at the very threshold of the democratic state and is the object of its fundamental rules. Authoritarian government for ages maintained a contentious attitude toward difference. The blighting effect of that policy is made clear in the pages of history. The democratic state, warned by that experience, initiated the receptive attitude toward difference. The stimulation of individuality it believed to be of vital importance, and whenever individuality is vigorous, opposing opinion is vigorous. Action it conceived as being informed by

the continuous play of searching criticism, and as taking place through the voluntary selection of the views that have withstood the test. The undergraduate under this conception is not going out, as he is often told in Commencement addresses, to fight the hosts of evil domiciled in certain occupations and places. His mission is to assist in refining the crude ore of human opinion, selecting and conserving the pure forms, and in this process difference performs a co-operative function. Some views are narrower than others, some are extreme. Were it otherwise, difference could not subsist. But even the most extreme views have value in that they afford the means of comparison. Nor will the undergraduate be under the illusion that progress may be attained through mass plays, and gushing resolutions. This comes only when the spirit of inquiry is vigorous, and opinion is subjected to criticism from every angle, through ceaseless, painstaking effort.

In economics and sociology, learning as an agency of the state, in the investigation of the permanent laws and forces of social action, approaches more closely to the zone of controversy. The effect is visible in the discussion of current problems. Prof. E. A. Ross in his brilliant and scholarly articles has made sociology a mine of wealth to the public. Yet occasionally the attitude of the former authoritarian state toward difference appears. In the census of modern sins the devil is again discovered. His habitation is with the rich. The propriety of becoming an avenging nemesis seems to him to be beyond question.

These social sciences often afford a clear view of conditions in the existing social order that require modification. In such instances the duty to speak is plain. But learning as an agency of the state cannot depart from the fundamental social conceptions declared to be authoritative in the constitution. In that instrument the devil is nothing but egoism, which, as more or less, inheres in individuality itself. The inner aspect of opinion in the poor, the rich, the educator, is an immaterial inquiry in view of the fact that the constitution embodies a fixed conception of the origin of difference and of the method of treating it. The origin it attributes to an inherent bias; the method is the rule, "act as if difference was genuine." The doctrine of tolerance means that opposition is assailed only in its outward, tangible form; the inner aspect is assumed to be good faith. As long as this rule prevails, the effort to localize the devil in a class

or group must be abandoned by learning when exercising a state function.

The value for social action of knowledge acquired through research in sociology and economics has led some to entertain the view that these departments should enter the field of action and become propagandists. The topic under consideration is the function of learning *as an agency of the state*,—not its entire function. It is clear that learning in this capacity, when it becomes an advocate, excites deeper resentment than learning acting through an individual. The reasons are apparent. In the former capacity it has a dual rôle, as viewed by its opponent. As expert, it pronounces final judgment on the merits; as advocate, it is the executive that enforces the judgment. Learning at once falls under suspicion, for suspicion is the inseparable incident of the attitude of antagonism.

The principal reason, however, why the modern democratic state detached learning from administrative functions was that the exercise of such functions incapacitated it for performing the service required of it. It was the menace of controversy to learning,—a menace shown to be real by overwhelming proof,—that moved the state to declare religious differences a forbidden subject. It may be said that the idealism of the modern university would enable it to walk with safety in the danger zone. The world has never seen greater idealists than the fathers of the Christian church, who kept the lamp of civilization burning when the hordes of barbarism overran Europe. Time without number they intervened in civil affairs and forced kings to observe the law of social justice. Yet it is the unanimous verdict of history that the function of temporal power committed to it was disastrous. After its bitter experience with bishops appointed by Rome, England tried government at the hands of the godly and devout. But the recollection of the Parliament that sought to usher in the kingdom of heaven on earth, caused a shudder throughout the whole land for many years. The culmination of the long struggle to sever the connection between learning and temporal power is the constitution that enjoins the attitude of aloofness.

The raw material of human nature is of the toughest fibre. Its springs of action were set for the harsh conditions that confronted pre-human life. Had they been weaker, the struggle would have been given up as hopeless. The existing environment

tends strongly to modify these deep-seated tendencies, but the resistance is exceedingly stiff. "Is Christianity a failure? I don't know. It has never been tried." So remarked an eminent divine recently. Paradoxical as the statement may seem, it contains a fact recognized by social science. The acting tendencies with which we of the twentieth century enter the world are not distinguishable from the acting tendencies of those born in the first century. The process of socialization has been extremely slow because of the intractable material. It is the knowledge of this fact that has led to the modern custom of looking upon the cultivation of social ideals as a separate calling and upon the pursuit of gainful occupations as inappropriate for the minister.

That action with respect to immediate personal ends is in nowise different within and without university circles is apparent. The position of the college president as executive is known to be difficult and it is difficult because of the conflict between individuals and departments. The scholar's poise is largely due to the fact that his aim is general and independent of time. "Only the light-armed reach the summit," and it was the intention of the modern state so to equip learning.

The genius of the democratic state is illustrated in the separation of functions. Even administration is divided into the judging function, the legislating function, the executive function. The reasons for this division are the reasons that suggested the isolation of learning. The design, the outline of which appears in the constitution, was to make learning, as an agency of the state, the over-soul of democracy. It was felt that the tremendous problem of difference, of which the great European war is but a passing incident, could never be solved without organizing a body of opinion at a level above the play of immediate interest. As this body gathered volume, its influence would be felt below.

Seen from the angle of philosophy difference appears as the indispensable condition of progress. From the lowest level it appears to be a malevolent thing that excites distrust and suspicion, and these are an insuperable obstacle to co-operative effort. The distrust and suspicion that are the principal cause of the enormous waste of life and property in Europe, are destructive in this land. A single illustration will suffice. Crime is at bottom an educational problem, for the object of punishment is to influence future action. It is the complex result of heredity and social surroundings. If the problem could be entrusted to the

wisdom, the knowledge, and the ripe experience of society, the gain would be incalculable. This is possible only through the selection of individuals for such duty. Distrust of the capacity of the state to make such a selection is the sole explanation of the crude machinery of criminal administration,—the jury drawn by lot from the citizens at large, vested with power to suspend the law; the prison warden holding his appointment as a reward for political service. The amount of knowledge and experience of the highest value for action, but unavailable because of distrust, is beyond computation. Efficiency is the application of knowledge to action, and without increasing efficiency there can be no progress. Public opinion is profoundly affecting political action and the result may be observed in the betterment of municipal government. As it gathers increasing momentum and coherency, selection on a larger scale will become possible. The hope of democracy lies in the character and permanence of its public opinion.

To fulfil this mission public opinion must reflect the spirit of the constitution, and the university is peculiarly fitted to assist in keeping the two in accord. The constitution is more than an organizing act to vest the people with the forms of government. Modelled upon the Declaration of Independence, it embodies a fundamental conception of human life and of the problem of difference. It postulates the origin of difference in the inherent bias of individuality; it regards individuality as important because bias differentiates opinion, and by means of the comparison of opposing views society is enabled to guide its course more safely through the avoidance of errors. Holding difference to be the incident of individuality, it deems the genuineness of difference not to be open to discussion. This is the rule of tolerance. These are all grounded upon a conception unknown to authoritarian government,—the social value of individuality and the dignity of human nature. It is this doctrine that moves America to withhold its approval of the invasion of Belgium. For under it the individual human life is the subject of world relations; he owes a duty directly to the world to observe the over-obligations of society in its entirety, and the world in turn owes him a reciprocal obligation. Between these no state may intervene. This is the meaning of the "emancipation of the individual."

In the solution of world problems, and the larger state prob-

lems, the university may and ought to be a factor whose influence grows from more to more. But the constitution, embodying the experience of the past, has indicated that its power to serve lies rather in its capacity to impress fundamental conceptions upon the power behind the throne,—public opinion,—than in assuming direction of administrative functions. In conceiving the relation of learning, as an agency of the state, to controversy as important, the constitution is fully justified by history. The preservation of that relation does not accord with an ideal in the realization of which the university becomes an expert, guiding the action of all departments of state, supervising legislation upon issues that affect interests and provoke controversy.

CHAS. SUMNER ALLEN.

San José, California.

MADE IN GERMANY

At a moment when the decline and fall of the United States was never more assured, when hysterical prophecies have replaced dignified debate in our councils, and when faith is almost treason, it is not altogether inopportune to define certain issues which have lost all the clarity their importance ought to maintain for them.

The Advertising Department of Preparedness is asserting that at this moment and for the immediate future, if not forever, this nation is threatened by the gravest peril in its history, and that it is totally unprepared, or at least inadequately prepared, to cope with this peril.

The peril is invasion. The invader is Germany.

It is a little curious that such prophecies should obtain so shortly after the German surrender—a grudging one, it is true—to almost every demand concerning U-boat warfare made by this country. The anxiety of proud and militaristic Germany to avoid a break with defenceless America is certainly noteworthy. We could not harm Germany or affect the conflict considerably by intervention. Yet Germany has given up a powerful weapon of naval attack upon our representation that she must do so. Why?

Moreover, certain offsets to our helplessness are headlined by the pessimistic Preparedness press almost every day. The German army is busy and will probably be busy as long as it lasts, attempting to break through the allied lines, and the German Zeppelins are busy killing the women and children who live in unfortified English towns, and the German U-boats have suffered many losses at the task of sinking neutral vessels contrary to the instructions of their own admiralty. It must also be conceded that the western battle line is a number of kilometres from Paris, which was to have been taken in three weeks by sweeping through Belgium; that the Zeppelins have still a number of English towns to visit; and that a large percentage of the world's neutral shipping still enjoys a certain restricted freedom of the seas.

All this is unquestionable fact, but it does not daunt the

advocates of Preparedness. On Preparedness reasoning it makes no difference at all.

In the first place, Preparedness has its *patriotic* argument, summarized by the slogan "America First." By a dexterous twist and turn of the mind this doctrine is easily interpreted "Safety First." And the hoarse shouting of such phrases as these rouses people as no commonplace arguments ever could. They have the required patriotic ring. They inspire their hearers. Under their influence it is a simple matter to sweep aside all opposition by calling it misguided or hyphenated treason.

In the second place, Preparedness has *a geographical* argument, which is in the nature of a counterclaim to an argument submitted by the opposition. The Atlantic is 3000 miles wide. But nothing could be more foolish than reliance on this remoteness. Modern steamships have destroyed nautical distance. Many expert calculations are available, which show the amazing number of men who could be landed in ten days upon our shores.

Thirdly, what may be called the *economic* argument is submitted for our consideration. After the war the German nation will be bankrupt. It is true that war is an expensive luxury, but it is also true that national bankruptcy is the most plausible motive there could be for the invasion of a rich country. Necessity is the mother of invasion. Furthermore, after this war the competition for the commerce of the world will be keener than ever before. There will be a mad scramble by Europe to recover from us the trade we have snatched away. In such a situation war is possible at any time.

Fourthly, Preparedness has its *historical* arguments. After our own Civil War, in spite of the killing and wounding of 635,000 men on the Union side alone, we had the leading army of the world. It is history that the unfortunate Maximilian was frightened out of Mexico by this army.

Looking back at our history, we find that every American war has been an offensive war; that no nation has ever sought war with us. On the other hand, there are many instances when nations have taken great pains and swallowed bitter humiliation to avoid war with us. If this were true, it would mean merely that we have been lucky. But it is not fundamentally true. Though in each of our wars we were the aggressor, it was because

somebody else was the oppressor. Nominally we began our wars; actually our enemies began them. England began the Revolution when she put a tax on the colonies without granting them representation. She also began the War of 1812 when she restricted the freedom of the seas and stole American seamen for her navy. And so with all our wars.

Fifthly, Preparedness would be certain of failure in a modern age like our own, if it did not have *scientific* arguments. In all our previous wars we have relied on volunteers. Now, however, when war is no longer the hand-to-hand, man-to-man conflict it used to be, volunteers are manifestly useless. They may know how to die, but without training they could not possibly know how to fight. War has taken enormous scientific strides. It is now entirely mathematical. It has become a question of gun range and digging capacity in cubic inches. The romance has vanished. Soldiers are no longer individuals; they are cogs in an almost perfect machine of destruction.

In the sixth place, there are the *prophetic* arguments for Preparedness. That England, in view of her North American possessions of a greater square mileage than the United States, could not afford to let the German fleet get beyond the North Sea, is a delusion. That the jealousies and hatreds sure to follow this war will protect us is also a snare for the unwary. If the German army were sent over to America, the French army would be foolish not to pounce on Alsace-Lorraine. This, again, is rank fallacy. England might combine with Germany; France might combine with them both. There are stranger things in history. England and France, the traditional rivals of history, are allies now. National jealousies and hatreds are only the reactions of national self-interest.

A dispassionate and unbiassed person might wonder which side these arguments were supposed to be on. But there is another argument, which is not the least of those for Preparedness. The conflict of reason is greater than the conflict of authority. Preparedness, wherever it started rolling, has gathered momentum. It has scooped in some leaders on whose side it pays to be. It is well organized. It has three great generals: a President, who has recently gone barn-storming solemnly to call attention to our shameful unpreparedness; an ex-President, who says that it is time we put away the illusion that "God protects children, drunken men, and the United States"; and another ex-President,

who has gone to the trouble of publishing his views. It is captained by ex-ambassadors, editors, college presidents, ministers, inventors, and little school girls.

In the face of these authorities we may as well dismiss any possibility of our readiness to resist invasion. With people who are excited enough to foresee an invasion by Germany at a time like this it is useless to argue about the state of our defences. We may as well let it go by default that we are unprepared. And we are not prepared, as these people measure preparedness. If we believe in their coming invasion, in Preparedness with a capital "P," we can certainly make a better job of our practice.

After all, is it not a question of belief? What do the American people believe in? Has all their talking and writing and worrying been simply on the question of whether or not they are prepared? Not at all. The real question is above and beyond all this. The real question is whether or not they ought to prepare.

At a time when the leading ex-President of the greatest republic in the world tells his people that they should "Fear God and Take Their Own Part," this question may be superfluous. As long as we have a double standard of morals for nations and individuals, it may not be important what nations ought to do. Yet to some of us this question must be decisive. Let us ask ourselves, therefore, whether or not we ought to prepare.

It is only a dilatory plea that we do not know how to prepare now, and that we should wait to learn the military and naval lessons of this war, available as they soon will be at practically no cost to us. This waiting can decide us only in favour of a navy "equal to any afloat" as against an "incomparable navy"; or in favour of dreadnoughts as against submarines.

The real answer was given by Lord Rosebery in a Rhodes lecture at the University of London on November 16, 1915, in the following words:

"I know nothing more disheartening than the announcement, recently made, that the United States—the one great country left in the world free from the hideous, bloody burden of war—is about to embark upon the building of a huge armada destined to be equal or second to our own. It means that the burden will continue and be increased exactly in proportion to the fleet of the United States. I confess that it is a disheartening prospect that the United States, so remote from the European conflict, should voluntarily in these days take up the burden, which, after the war, will be found to have broken, or almost broken, our backs."

After the war the world is going to look for a national leader. It will want a nation first to act as peace-maker and then as leader. Mr. H. G. Wells has phrased the opportunity of the United States to be that nation in the following language:

"It is one of the most interesting speculations in the world how far this new organization of the American mind is capable of grasping the stupendous opportunities and appeals of the present time. The war and the great occasions that must follow the war will tax the mind and the intellectual and moral forces of the Pledged Allies enormously. How far is this new but very great and growing system of thought and education in the United States capable of that propaganda of ideas and language, that progressive expression of a developing ideal of community, that in countries so spontaneous, so chaotic, or democratic as the United States and the Pledged Allies must necessarily take the place of the organized authoritative Kultur of the Teutonic type of State? As an undisguisedly patriotic Englishman I would like to see the lead in this intellectual synthesis of the nations, that must be achieved if wars are to cease, undertaken by Great Britain. But I am bound to confess that in Great Britain I see neither the imaginative courage of France nor the brisk enterprise of the Americans."

The world will also look first to the United States, because we will not have been in this war, and because we are big, and because our history is relatively clean. It is watching us now. It may not, but still it may, follow its new leader farther than we dream. This time alone can tell. But one thing cannot even now be doubted. The world will never follow a nation it cannot trust. No one will ever voluntarily follow a leader he cannot trust. The same is true of nations. And can we ever again, after what happened in July and August, 1914, trust a nation armed to the teeth?

It is perhaps a retreat to speak lastly of the other answer to the question of whether or not we ought to prepare, because there can be no greater failure than failure to serve mankind. But let us see what we shall do to ourselves,—what we are doing now.

Although with her national existence at stake and in the midst of the greatest war of her history England for a long time did not dare to pass a real conscription statute, we in America are preaching compulsory military service.

We are placing entrance to our civil service at least partially on a military basis.

The Slater Bill, appropriating $100,000, and introducing the principle of compulsory military service for boys who do not work,

and upsetting all our notions and customs touching the custody of children, has just been jammed, almost without discussion, through the New York State Legislature and approved by Governor Whitman. Commenting editorially on this bill the New York *Evening Post* says:

"Convinced that universal training is the only safeguard and school for democracy, Governor Whitman has signed, and now defends, the Slater Bill, providing military training for boys between sixteen and nineteen not engaged in earning their living. The case for democracy, in the light of educational statistics for New York State, works out as follows: In 1913 the number of boys enrolled in the elementary schools of the state was about 600,000. The number of boys in the public and private secondary schools was less than 70,000. The number of male undergraduates in the colleges was about 15,000. Only ten per cent. of the elementary school population enter the high schools. Only about 2½ per cent. reach the college. Since the years between sixteen and nineteen cover the last half of the high school and the first half of the college, we may place the student population between those years, in high school and college, at about 30,000. Of 100 boys in the elementary schools, only five will thus be found continuing their education after the age of sixteen. To this 5 per cent. the provisions of the Slater Bill will apply, and this is the universal training and democracy which the bill is likely to foster. Nineteen boys out of twenty know from the start that they are not destined for Governor Whitman's 'peace-loving citizenship adequately trained in arms.' That power and privilege is reserved for the twentieth boy. The children of New York State are to be drilled in democracy by giving military training to the sons of the well-to-do."

Four other bills have been passed recently by the New York State Legislature which contain similarly radical departures from the customs and ideals of over 100 years. There is Senator Stivers's strike-breaking bill, making every able-bodied man in the state between the ages of eighteen and forty-five subject to draft and another Stivers bill raising the strength of the New York National Guard to 23,000, and adding to it machine gun companies. Still another Stivers bill deals with the requirements for Naval Militia officers. The Welsh law sets apart for all school children twenty minutes in each school day for "such physical training as the regents after conference with the military training commission may determine."

On May 13, 145,000 men and women marched up Broadway and Fifth Avenue, New York City, to demonstrate their belief in Preparedness. One railroad company made this day a holiday on the tacit condition that its employees parade. A mercantile company gave each parading employee a new straw hat and a

cane, and every possible inducement was offered to men who would so far forget their convictions as to march. A similar parade has been held in Boston, and on June 14th the President himself was to parade for Preparedness.

A prominent novelty expert has prophesied a million sales during the remainder of 1916 for "Military Tactics," a new card game combining the principles of Bridge and Five Hundred with what its name implies. The promoters of this novelty are betting thousands of dollars upon their understanding of the hysterical condition of the American people.

The Fall of a Nation and *How Great Britain Prepared*, are heavily advertised in our theatrical columns. Hundreds of books of warning are being published, telling the American people how quickly and how heavily they must arm themselves. The dental cream advertisement of a leading company is headed by the phrase, "A Lesson in Preparedness." A little school girl has acquired national fame because she sent a dime to one of our New York dailies with which to start a fund for a new dreadnought, *The America*.

The National Security League, the Army League, the Navy League, the American Legion, the American Defence Society, the Aero Club of America, the Special Aid Society (Massachusetts), the Detroit Business Men's Training Battalion, the Military Training Association of Pittsburg, the United Boys' Brigades of America, are instances, both large and small, of the kind of organizations which are working more or less madly for Preparedness.

Military training camps were to be held this summer, among other places, at Monterey, California; Fort Logan, Colorado; Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; Fort Sheridan, Illinois; Ludington, Michigan; Fort Snelling, Minnesota; Plattsburg, New York; Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas; and Fort Oglethorpe, South Carolina. A banner hanging over Wall Street invited clerks in that neighborhood to spend their vacations on a naval cruise.

Purdue University, Indiana University, the University of Illinois, the University of Minnesota, Missouri State University, Nebraska State University, the University of Pittsburg, the University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State College, the University of Wisconsin, Racine College, are among the many institutions of learning giving military instruction to their

students to-day. Including military instruction in the public school curriculum of Chicago is being discussed, and the same possibility is being considered by the Board of Education of Wheeling, West Virginia. But we have gone even farther than this in our high schools. In Washington all boys must submit to military drill, which includes rifle practice, as a condition of entry into the schools, while a new Senate Bill, introduced by Senator Chamberlain, of California, provides that all persons between the ages of twelve and twenty-three years, inclusive, must submit to military drill under penalties ranging from $25 to $500 and twenty days' imprisonment. This in a democracy in times of peace and under the authority of civil law.

The Hay Bill, more than doubling the number of regiments in the army (the infantry from 31 to 65, the field artillery from 6 to 15, the cavalry from 15 to 25, the coast artillery from 171 to 363 companies, the engineers from 3 battalions to 7 regiments and 2 mounted battalions, the aviation corps from 26 officers to 148, the medical corps from 444 officers to 805), raising the pay of many grades of soldiers, and providing for a regular army reserve for practically the first time in our history, has been described by many as a half-way measure.

Is not all this disheartening proof that we are coming to believe no price too big to pay for national security? Who is the real peace-at-any-price man—the one who will give only his property and life for peace, or the one who will sell his soul for peace? Suppose we preserve our own hemisphere intact, and lose our national soul, what shall it profit us?

If a national soul is ever lost, it is lost when the nation forgets even to consider what it ought or ought not to do. Where is our national poise? We blame Germany for its theory that might makes right, and we are frantically trying to become mighty. Is it any protection against Germany to become German? Is starting a fire, insurance against fire? Is it the German armies, after all, that are most to be feared? Or is it ourselves? Shall Germany conquer America without landing a soldier on her shores? Or shall it be written in the bold-faced history, whose making has been entrusted to us, that in 1916 a spirit that was made in Germany invaded America, and was conquered by the American spirit there?

RANDOLPH S. PAUL.

New York City.

THE CHINESE COLONIES

There is no prospect that "the deadly virus of militarism"[1] now abroad will affect China immediately. But the rise of Japan has put a check upon the dismemberment of China and the latter as well as the former country may have to be reckoned with in the future as an imperialistic nation. Those best informed on Oriental questions convey the impression that China, as well as Japan, has any number of surprises in store for the Western world.[2] Whether or not China develops imperialistic ambitions the possibility of such a contingency arising lends interest to the place China now occupies among the colonizing countries of the world, and to the present position and value to China of the Chinese possessions. These possessions are four in number, namely, Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet. Their area and population are as follows:[3]

	Square miles	Population	Number to square mile
Manchuria	363,700	8,500,000[4]	23
Mongolia	1,367,953	2,580,000[5]	(nearly) 2
Chinese Turkestan	550,579	1,200,000	2
Tibet	463,320	6,430,000[6]	14
Total	2,745,552	18,710,000	
China	1,532,800	410,000,000	

[1] *Cf.* Stead, *Great Japan*, p. 204.

[2] "The influence of Japan is paramount, and it seems probable that the world may witness an alliance of the Yellow Race that will bring about astounding results." Morse, *Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*, p. 45. Colquhoun (*China in Transformation*, p. 255) predicts "a future for China which will astonish and may appall the world."

[3] Compiled from Richard's *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire*. The same data from the official census of 1902 are also cited in the U. S. Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, April, 1909, p. 100. *Cf.* Morse, *Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*, p. 203: The Japanese estimate the area of Manchuria at 379,005 square miles, but other authorities declare it to be 400,000 square miles. Lawton, *The Empires of the Far East* (1912), vol. ii., p. 1116.

[4] Writers differ greatly in their estimates of Manchurian population: Gerrare, *Greater Russia*, p. 223, places the number at 7½ millions; Simpson, *Manchu and Muscovite*, p. viii., says that the most conservative estimates are 17 or 18 millions, and the Japanese staff places the number at 20 millions; Little,

From the above table it will be seen that the territory controlled by China numbers almost twice as many square miles as China proper. Indeed China ranks third (England first, France second) as a colonizing nation in area of colonial territory under control. Her rank is lower when the people governed is considered, as the Chinese dependencies are rather sparsely populated.

Manchuria is naturally divided into two distinct regions; the northern sloping towards the Amur River, the southern sloping towards the Gulf of Liaotung. Both regions are almost wholly mountainous, although each has a fertile plain.

Mongolia consists of mountains and tablelands and, on the whole, is a rather poor country. It is inhabited largely by cattle breeders who continually shift their tents. Chinese Turkestan is a great desert surrounded by high mountains and is so sandy and barren that it has been called "Chinese Siberia."[1] Tibet is a vast mountain mass, the highest and largest in the world. The greater part of the country is barren and is chiefly inhabited in the south and east where the soil is fertile and the inhabitants relatively well to do.

China like other countries has had to pay the usual price of colonies—war; so that viewed from the military standpoint alone the possessions have cost the Chinese considerable. Imperialistic wars are chiefly of three kinds: to acquire territory; to maintain control over possessions; and to defend territory against foreign aggression. China has had experience with all three forms. The first is illustrated in the conquest of Tibet between A.D. 1698 and 1703,[2] and the annexation of Eastern Turkestan following an outbreak in Mongolia in the eighteenth century.[3]

The maintenance of authority in all four of the colonies

The Far East, p. 158, gives the population as 21 millions; Lawton, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 1116, gives an estimate of 17 millions.

[5] Seward, *Chinese Immigration*, pp. 382–83 (written in 1881), states that the opinion of Dr. Edkins, reaffirmed by Dr. Williams, is that the Mongols number about 10,000,000. Price, *Siberia*, p. 262, says Russian authorities estimate the population of Mongolia to be no more than 2,500,000.

[6] Those best acquainted with Tibet put the population at 2 or 3 millions at most.

[1] *Cf.* Deasy, *In Thibet and Chinese Turkestan*, p. 329; Richard, *Geography of the Chinese Empire*, p. 524.

[2] Richard, *Geography of the Chinese Empire*, p. 554.

[3] Morse, *Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire*, p. 21.

has occasioned the mother country great anxiety. In 1850, for example, a rebellion began in Chinese Turkestan, said to have been caused by the tyranny of local Chinese officials,[1] which lasted for twenty-eight years. The rebels at first were very successful and killed off all the Chinese resident there to the number of 30,000. After the Chinese were murdered, the spirit of bloodshed being abroad, internal dissensions arose that wiped out many of the remaining inhabitants. Russia stepped in nominally to restore order and China found it necessary eventually to ransom back the territory.[2] Rebellion and massacre still continued until China sent, in 1878, an army of extermination which still further reduced the population of Turkestan. Nevertheless the Tungans still devote a great deal of their time to plotting against their rulers, and Chinese officials regard the country as far from safe.[3] In Mongolia the tribes of the north, being far from Pekin, are kept under nominal control by annual gifts from China. In other words, they are bribed to keep the peace.[4] In Manchuria the authorities have had to deal severely with the mounted bandits who have terrorized the country districts for many years. Inscriptions warning against robbers may be seen.[5] A salutary effect, it is reported, has been produced by many captures and executions,[6] yet similar measures for some hundreds of years have not been successful.

In the demands upon the mother country to defend colonial territory, Tibet has taken the lead. Indeed, settling the difficulties of Tibet with border states has been one of China's chief

[1] Sergeant, *The Great Empress Dowager of China*, p. 55.

[2] A special commissioner, Manchu Chunghow, was sent to St. Petersburg to treat with Russia regarding the withdrawal of Russia from the Chinese territory. The result of the negotiations was that Russia was to retain the most valuable part of the territory occupied and was to receive an indemnity of £500,000 for the expense incurred in the occupation of the province. When this settlement was announced, the dissatisfaction at Pekin was so great, war with Russia was threatened, but finally Russia agreed to reopen negotiations. Under the new agreement China recovered all but a small strip of territory, but the indemnity was raised to £900,000. Sergeant, *op. cit.*, pp. 112–15.

[3] Church, *Chinese Turkestan*, pp. 135, 146; Geil, *Eighteen Capitals in China*, p. 343.

[4] Roberts, *Flight for Life and Inside View of Mongolia*, pp. 239–40.

[5] Denby, *China and her People*, vol. ii., p. 65.

[6] U. S. Monthly Consular Reports, Dec., 1907, p. 36; Whigham, *Manchuria and Korea*, chap. vii.; McKenzie, *Unveiled East*, pp. 96–98.

functions.[1] One of the most important occasions was the uprising of 1749 which was initiated by the murder of the Gyalpo by the Chinese Ambans, and which resulted in the massacre of the Chinese and the invasion of the country by the Nepalese. The latter virtually overran the country. The Lamas of Tibet then turned to China for help and a force of 70,000 men was sent to their aid, and the enemy was routed.[2]

The next step after a territory is acquired and control established is to consider its support and development. To what extent colonies shall be developed and how the funds for their support and development shall be raised is a very important matter for all parties concerned. For administrative purposes the Chinese dependencies are under the control of a central department at Pekin known as the Mongolian Superintendency or Colonial Office.[3] The relations with Tibet and with the Mongolian tribes and princes are regulated by this office. Until 1858, Russian affairs concerning the Mongolia frontier were also referred to this department.[4] Much of the power of the colonial office is delegated to the provinces of China adjacent to the territory to be controlled. Tibet is controlled by the province of Szechuan; Chinese Turkestan depends on the viceroy of the provinces of Kansu and Shensi in China proper. He deputes a governor for the colony who resides in a splendid palace at Urumtsi, one of the principal towns in Turkestan. Parts of Mongolia are controlled by the adjacent Chinese provinces, and the remainder, as stated above, is directly under the supervision of the Mongolian Superintendency. Manchuria is no longer a colony from the administrative viewpoint since it is now on the same administrative basis as the eighteen provinces of China.

These Central Asian dominions have been a serious burden on the Chinese exchequer.[5] Little says that Tibet is a constant drain upon the Chinese treasury.[6] The people of Mongolia pay no taxes to China but to their princes, and the latter are expected to furnish military contingents when needed. Chinese Turkes-

[1] Gundry, *China and her Neighbours*, p. 128.

[2] Candler, *Unveiling of Lhasa*, p. 5; *cf.* Crosby, *Tibet and Turkestan*, pp. 188–98; Eames, *The English in China*, pp. 120–21.

[3] Gorst, *China*, p. 160.

[4] Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, p. 8.

[5] Colquhoun, *China in Transformation*, p. 1.

[6] That is upon the Szechuan treasury—*Far East*, p. 198.

tan is a poor province and the other provinces contribute annually towards the cost of its administration about 200,000 taels.[1] In Manchuria the provincial collections are inadequate to pay all administrative and developmental expenses. In 1907, for example, the disbursements, which included considerable sums for education, military equipment, public works, and the outlay attendant upon inaugurating new administrative departments, were estimated at 4,000,000 taels, making it necessary to supplement the provincial collection with special appropriations from the central government.[2]

China's policy regarding the development of Manchuria has undergone a decided change in late years. After the contest with the Russians in 1652 for the control of Albazin on the Amur, the Russians were carefully kept as far away as possible from Manchuria. It has been the Manchu policy through timidity to keep the whole of this region as far as practicable unoccupied and undeveloped. It was not until 1888, after the British consular and military officers had visited and reported on the fertility of the colony, that the old policy was abandoned. The Manchurian provinces have been civilly organized, populated as rapidly as possible, and placed under cultivation in order that Russian aggression might be resisted by the economic strength of the provinces.[3] The imperial commission which visited Manchuria in the fall of 1906 memorialized the throne at length upon the steps necessary to develop this possession. It was proposed to conserve the Liao River, to extend the Chinese railways, to open and operate mines, and to undertake various and extensive administrative reforms[4]—a program which necessarily involves extended financial outlay on the part of the mother country.

The recent movement towards colonial development embraces the other colonies as well as Manchuria. For example, China has loaned the governor of Turkestan one hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars to establish a cotton mill to compete with Russian goods; and a railway for Tibet has been under consideration.

Fortunately to offset, at least partially, the heavy expenses attendant upon the acquisition and maintenance of colonies,

[1] Deasy, *In Thibet and Chinese Turkestan*, p. 329.
[2] U. S. Monthly Consular Reports, Dec., 1907, p. 38.
[3] Parker, *China*, pp. 96–98.
[4] U. S. Monthly Consular Reports, December, 1907, p. 37.

there are certain potential economic advantages arising from the control of territory such as the receipt of direct revenue, opening of governmental positions, an outlet for population and capital, military advantages, a source of supply of raw materials and food products, and new markets for goods. The trade advantages are the ones chiefly emphasized; but, as I have endeavoured to show in a former article, the value of colonial trade to the governing country is quite generally over-estimated.[1]

The hope of direct revenue from colonies, although once a leading desideratum in acquiring control of territory, is of waning importance in the Orient as well as in the Occident, and where the practice of paying tribute or money to the governing country without value received persists, it is now little more than a form. Nepal, now under the sphere of influence of British India, paid tribute to China from 1792 to 1866,[2] thus maintaining a formal recognition of Chinese suzerainty. Every five years a deputation composed of priests and high military functionaries proceeded from Nepal through Lassa to Pekin with their tribute offerings.[3] Korea paid tribute until about twenty years ago.[4] The princes of Mongolia pay a certain nominal tribute to the ruler of China, but this is more than offset by the fact that, while they send tribute, they receive, in Oriental fashion, much more valuable presents in return.[5] The people of Tibet pay a poll-tax to China.[6] Every three years the Dalai Lama of Tibet sends on the backs of 300 camel, escorted and guarded by 300 horsemen, tribute to the ruler of China consisting of presents in kind valued at 5000 taels.[7] There are also several principalities within Tibet governed by chieftains who pay tribute to China. Turkestan

[1] England, "Trade and the Flag," in *University Studies* (University of Nebraska), July, 1910.

[2] Richard, *Geog. of Chinese Empire*, p. 554.

[3] Holdich, *Tibet the Mysterious*, pp. 22, 108.

[4] Morse, *op.cit.*, p. 317.

[5] Roberts, *op. cit.*, pp. 239–40.

[6] *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, vol. iv., p. 118.

[7] Richard, *op cit.*, p. 549. Thomas (*The Chinese*, p. 312) writes: "China exacts no direct tax in Thibet. She collects yearly a nominal tribute from the central government at Lhassa." Kawaguchi (*Three Years in Tibet*, p. 519) says: "In days gone by, Tibet used to forward this tribute to China, but subsequently the payment was commuted against the Grand Prayer which is performed every year at Lhasa for the prosperity of the Chinese Emperor. As a result of this arrangement, Tibet ceased to send the tribute and China to send the prayer fund."

since its reconquest is nominally a source of revenue. According to the *Imperial Gazetteer*,[1] published at Pekin, this province furnishes an annual subvention of 5000 tons of grain and 100 horses and camels. This tribute, however, is probably used to cover administrative expenses in Turkestan such as the imperial post stations. Taking everything into consideration the direct revenue accruing to China in the form of tribute from her colonies cannot be regarded as of great importance.

Nor do the Chinese colonies furnish as many governmental positions as might be expected from the extent of territory controlled. Tibet probably provides the fewest of any since the government is in the hands of the Dalai Lama, assisted by four ministers of his own choosing under the control of two Chinese residents who are in reality regents of Tibet.[2] These residents must be consulted in the selection of all important officials, and even the choice of the Dalai Lama by the head monks is not effective until approved by Pekin, but it is not the policy of China to interfere directly or in detail with Tibetan administration.[3] The chief administrative officers in Chinese Turkestan are Chinese. The highest officer is the Futai or governor; next to him in rank are two Taotais; and under them are Chow-Kuans, who correspond to district magistrates. Officials of lower rank than these are usually natives.[4] In Mongolia the tribes are divided into banners and placed under the control of military governors who are generally of Manchu extraction.[5] Manchuria has

[1] Cited by Little, *Far East*, p. 198. "From all these countries during the period that I remained at Peking there came representatives, sometimes bearing tribute, sometimes on business ventures. Korea sent, until she was made independent by Japan, a mission every year bearing tribute, and incidentally selling ginseng, which was admitted duty free. Each year a Mongolian deputation came partly to dispose of skins, game, carpets, and brassware, and partly to do obeisance to the throne. Nipal, also, sent a body of little black men on a similar mission, and so did all the subject countries. In the winter the streets were full of these curious representatives of outlying peoples, all in their tribal costumes, among whom the Korean with his horse-hair hat, the Nepaulese with his turban, the Manchu with his almost brimless hat, and the Mongolian women decked out with barbaric splendour of silver rings and ornaments, were prominent." Denby, *China and her People*, vol. i., pp. 65–66.

[2] Gundry, *China and her Neighbours*, pp. 127–28; Gorst, *China*, p. 159; Richard, p. 546.

[3] Crossby, *Tibet and Turkestan*, p. 196; Chandradas, *Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet*, p. 236.

[4] Deasy, *In Thibet and Chinese Turkestan*, p. 328; *cf.* Gorst, *China*, p. 159.

[5] Gorst, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

also been governed by Manchus,[1] prior to 1876 directly from Pekin. In that year it was decreed that each of the three provinces of Manchuria should have a civil governor with various sub-officers. In 1907 the system was changed again by the appointment of a viceroy to rule over all of Manchuria assisted by three civil governors. This places Manchuria, as noted above, on the same administrative basis as China proper. Since the Revolution, Manchu officials in the outlying provinces are being replaced by Chinese officers, but the vast area of Outer China has made the work of replacement very slow.[2]

The absurdly low salaries paid these Chinese colonial officials detract from the value of colonial offices, unless the officers incline to dishonest methods of securing an income. In such a case there are many avenues for acquiring wealth open to them. The Pekin authorities allow the officials to levy the means of transport for the long journeys they must take in connection with their duties so that it is within the power of the mandarins to rob the people if they see fit, by demanding horses, camels, or anything they choose greatly in excess of their needs, and by the sale of the surplus accumulating a considerable store of wealth. In Tibet, whenever the Chinese resident goes on any excursion, official or otherwise, he forcibly extracts from the villagers provisions, conveyances, and labour at pleasure. The merciless treatment of the ponies and yaks by the resident's numerous retainers causes the animals to die in numbers on the road and no compensation is given the villagers for their losses. Nor do the courts of justice listen to their complaints.[3] Another source of revenue to officials is the sale of passports to Chinamen who cross the frontiers, and the imposition of fines if their stay exceeds the time limit of forty days. If the officials are ingenious they can arrange delays and thus increase their income from fines.[4] It is not surprising that colonial officials employ such doubtful methods if one recalls the extent to which such practices prevail in China proper.[5]

[1] Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 60. [2] *Cf.* Price, *Siberia* (1913), p. 269.

[3] Chandradas, *Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet*, p. 237.

[4] Gorst, *China*, p. 160.

[5] "It is a matter of common knowledge that the income of the Chinese official is not in any degree measured by his official salary, that the annual profit of his office may be Tls. 100,000 with an official salary not exceeding Tls. 1,000." Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 81; *cf.* Colquhoun, *China in Transformation*, pp. 193–94; Nichols, *Through Hidden Shensi*, pp. 146–47.

The colonial armies afford openings to those inclined towards a military life, although there does not seem to be any intention on the part of China of stationing large numbers of troops outside her own provinces. According to Kawaguchi, there are two thousand Chinese soldiers stationed in Tibet, distributed equally at four places—Lassa, Tingri, Shigatze, and Tomo. As a result of the British expedition to Lassa in 1904, the Chinese Government decided to send to Tibet, besides an Imperial Commission, a Tartar general with five battalions of infantry, four regiments of cavalry, and two batteries of artillery.[1] The Imperial resident of China in Tibet is the head of the Tibetan army and his Chinese staff consists of an Assistant Amban, two Laoyeh, and a paymaster.[2]

The pay of Chinese soldiers like that of officials is not such as to make positions in the colonial army very desirable. Pale countenances are common among the soldiery, due to the difficulty in living upon their small pay. They are given free house rent—they are not stationed in barracks—but are expected to supplement their pay with outside work such as keeping stores or carrying on trade.[3] In the Tibetan army the native private receives 2¼ rupees per month, and each Chinese private is paid 14 rupees and thirty *sers* of barley meal per month. The expenses of maintaining the army are borne by the Tibetan government, which has to contribute in addition 50,000 rupees to the Residency establishment, exclusive of the salary of the Amban. The Tibetan Government and the nation alike groan under the weight of these heavy expenditures.[4]

The Chinese possessions are of considerable value to China from the military point of view. The Chinese are sufficiently numerous to fill up a large standing army, yet, since the profession of soldier for so many centuries has been regarded as degrading,[5] the recruits are not always the most desirable. The Tibetans are bolder than the Chinese, and during the Mohammedan Rebellion in China, 1895–96, Tibetan soldiers rendered substantial aid to the Chinese, the inducements to help being offers of land.[6] As for cavalry, the plains of Mongolia provide a race of

[1] Richard, p. 546.
[2] Chandradas, *Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet*, p. 236.
[3] Kawaguchi, *Three Years in Tibet* (1909), pp. 550–51.
[4] Chandradas, *op. cit.*, p. 239.
[5] *Cf.* Dyer, *Japan in World Politics* (1909), p. 235.
[6] Wellby, *Through Unknown Tibet*, pp. 299, 304.

natural horsemen who need only to be drilled and organized to become effective.[1] Manchuria offers potential food supplies[2] for armies of the north. In the struggle between Japan and Russia the latter country's army was fed very largely with wheat that grew in Manchuria. The cutting off of that supply would have necessitated the removal of the army inside of a month.[3] Tibet is a possession to be prized also because its vast mountain masses form an almost insuperable bulwark of defence to China on the south-west, better than the strongest defence works.[4] The deserts and plateaus of Mongolia and Turkestan likewise furnish effective barriers against invasion.

For a country so vastly populated as China the possession of outlying territory might well be regarded as of inestimable value as an outlet for surplus population. One ordinarily thinks of China as a country that is densely overpopulated. But considering China as a whole it is not overpopulated,[5] and some believe that the population tends to decrease rather than increase.[6] It is only in certain districts that the population is congested; in other parts there are vast unoccupied areas awaiting development. China is over twenty times the size of England, and, it is said,[7] could maintain a population of 650,000,000 or 750,000,000. Because of the superior fertility of the soil, she could support more inhabitants to the square mile than could England, and might double her numbers before the pressure of population was severely felt. Under present conditions, however, China cannot support her people and many are compelled to emigrate from the congested districts or else resort to living in boats on the rivers and lakes.[8]

The Chinese as a whole are neither aggressive nor migratory.[9] Yet the proportion of Chinese who go abroad is considerable, and emigration would undoubtedly increase if it were not for the

[1] Simpson (Weale), *The Re-Shaping of the Far East*, vol. ii., p. 370.

[2] "The future in Manchuria is a magnificent one, for Manchuria is destined to become the greatest wheat-producer in the East, the greatest lumber-field and the greatest gold-mining centre." Simpson (Weale), *Manchu and Muscovite*, p. 527; *cf.* also, Lawton, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., pp. 1122–23.

[3] Dyer, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

[4] Richard, p. 539.

[5] *Cf.* Colquhoun, *Mastery of the Pacific*, p. 47.

[6] Whigham, *Manchuria and Korea*, p. 145.

[7] Curzon, *Problems of the Far East*, pp. 404–05.

[8] Colquhoun, *China in Transformation*, pp. 71–72.

[9] *Cf.* Seward, *Chinese Immigration*, pp. 382–83.

restrictions placed upon it by certain of the Powers. According to the last official investigations, the number of Chinese abroad (exclusive of students) is approximately as follows[1]:

Hongkong	314,390
Macao	774,560
Formosa	2,258,650
Philippine Islands	84,060
French Indo-China	1,023,500
Annam	197,300
Siam	1,500,000
Burma	134,600
Straits Settlements and Singapore	1,300,000
Dutch East Indies, Java	1,825,700
Russian Asia (Siberia)	37,000
Korea	11,200
Japan	17,700
Sandwich Islands or Hawaii	27,000
Australia and New Zealand	35,460
Society, Fiji, and other Islands of Pacific	20,000
Lesser Antilles, Trinidad, British Guiana	10,000
Peru	45,000
Chile	7,000
Brazil	20,000
Mauritius	3,150
South Africa	5,000
Transvaal	8,200
Europe	1,760
Total	9,216,230

The colonizing power of the Chinese is great because apparently they can live, thrive, and multiply in any part of the world that is habitable, whereas white men, if they would retain the qualities characteristic of their race must practically confine themselves to the temperate regions.[2] The Chinese are good colonizers also because they quickly make themselves at home anywhere and readily intermarry with any peoples with whom they come in contact. Their method of colonization is the opposite of that of the British, in that it commences with the

[1] Richard, p. 478.

[2] *Cf.* Miller, *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, pp. 12–13. Colquhoun (*China in Transformation*, p. 58) says: "Among the various races of mankind the Chinese is the only one which in all climates, the hottest and the coldest, is capable of great and lasting activity. The Chinaman fulfils in the highest degree the ideal of an intelligent human machine."

lower classes instead of the upper, the coolie ever being the advance guard.[1]

According to Ireland[2] there are four classes of Chinese emigrants: criminals endeavouring to escape from justice; those who are influenced by the pictures missionaries have painted of conditions in Christian countries; those whose friends or relatives have emigrated and sent back favourable reports to the home country; and those who have suffered persecution or who are threatened with persecution from the high officials of the southern provinces. This latter class is an important one and largely explains why so many Chinese prefer other flags than their own. A Chinese official was sent by his government as consul-general to Singapore in 1893 to report upon the reasons why so many thousands of the Chinese yearly voluntarily expatriate themselves; the explanations generally given was the fear of the investigations of the local mandarins, the oppression of the yamen underlings, and the various extortions of clansmen and neighbours.[3] Pyau Ling mentions five causes of Chinese emigration: the stress of war at home, the discovery of gold in California, the inducements to emigrate offered by transportation companies, class distinctions which make the peasantry anxious to better their condition, and family attachment which makes many follow friends and relatives to new lands.[4]

That the Chinese have not gone to their colonies in the numbers that might have been expected since so much of the colonial territory is adjacent, may be explained partially, but not wholly, by their preference for other flags than their own. Marquis Tseng writing some twenty-five years ago says that in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan there are immense tracts of country which have never felt the touch of the husbandmen.[5] There is, however, an increasing movement of the Chinese towards these colonies.

Tibet does not contain an alien population of any importance. The country is so difficult of access and so jealously

[1] Peck, *Travels in the Far East*, p. 221.

[2] *China and the Powers*, p. 17.

[3] Curzon, *Problems of the Far East*, p. 407.

[4] "Causes of Chinese Emigration," *Annals of Am. Acad. of Pol. and Social Science*, Jan., 1912.

[5] "China, the Sleep and the Awakening," in *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, Jan., 1887 (cited by Curzon, *Problems of the Far East*, pp. 408–9).

guarded by the Lamas that, in spite of the many expeditions undertaken of late years, it is one of the most unknown regions of the world. The Chinese population there is composed chiefly of officials and traders and apparently does not form a very large part of the total inhabitants of the country. The permanent population of Lassa, the capital of Tibet, is 20,000 of whom 2000 are Chinese, and Chamdo in Anterior Tibet has a population of 7000 only 500 of whom are Chinese.[1]

Chinese Turkestan has never been settled up again by the Chinese since the great rebellion which so terribly thinned out the population of this province. The inducements to do so held out by the authorities have been unavailing. The chief reason assigned for this situation is that the Chinese fear that Russia will soon take control of the country, and they do not care to live under foreign rule.[2] On the contrary there has been a gradual movement of population from Turkestan to China, with the result that Mohammedans form a large proportion of the population of China in spite of repeated massacres of Moslems. Their numbers have been placed from twenty-five to thirty millions. In Pekin there are twenty thousand Mohammedan families. At least their numbers are sufficiently large to form an important factor in the future of China. Their religion is adapted to the Chinese and gives to the Chinese convert independence, courage, and devotion—qualities which he lacks.[3]

Chinese immigration into Mongol territory which began some centuries ago was at first for purely political reasons. The time-honoured method of deporting criminals was in use, and colonization was encouraged by building fortified cities. Under this system the number of Chinese settled in Mongolia was not large. Seward,[4] writing in 1881, gave his estimate that not more than one per cent of lands of Mongolia had been taken up by the Chinese. This in spite of the fact that China has controlled Mongolia for more than a century, and there is nothing to prevent the Chinese from passing over the border into this grass country and establishing true settlements. The climatic conditions, it is true, are not especially favourable to settlement, as the flimsy Chinese houses[5] are not adapted to the extremes of weather nor

[1] Richard, p. 552. [2] Church, *Chinese Turkestan*, pp. 135–36, 146.
[3] Colquhoun, *China in Transformation*, p. 26.
[4] *Chinese Immigration*, pp. 382–83.
[5] U. S. Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, April, 1909, p. 100.

to the frequent sand-storms common to Mongolia and Turkestan. The infertility of the soil is also a hindrance to settlement. At any rate, Seward considered the chances as good that the pastoral Mongols would become agriculturists as that the Chinese would displace the Mongols by means of agriculture.

Within the last fifteen years or more, however, there has been a marked movement in the way of settlement of Mongolia, as well as of Tibet and Manchuria. This spontaneous colonization is being fostered by the Chinese Government which rightly sees in this emigration to the dependencies a means of strengthening the national position. The cost to the government is not great—small financial aid in special cases, and the labor of issuing edicts to the governors of provinces suitable for such emigration. Dyer[1] quotes from a recent report to the throne by the imperial resident at Kobdo, Mongolia, as follows:

"I have ordered officials to find ways and means how, on the one hand, to build new settlements, and, on the other, to obtain as many as possible new settlers. All natives and emigrants, whether Mongols, Chinese, or Kirghiz, and time-expired soldiers who wish to cultivate land, shall receive money for cattle and seed-corn, and shall be carefully protected by the authorities. The mineral wealth of the Altai Mountains has long been praised by the inhabitants. After careful consideration of pros and cons it is evident that it cannot be worked now, but companies must be formed which have sufficient capital for the carrying out of operations."

Of recent years there has been a gradual movement of population from Manchuria westward into Mongolia. These settlers have taken with them their form of civil government that obtained in Manchuria, and thus made it difficult to determine the actual frontier line between Manchuria and Mongolia.[2] It is estimated that the Chinese agricultural belt is thus advancing upon Mongolia at the rate of ten miles a year.

For racial reasons the settling up of Mongolia may not be as satisfactory as that of Manchuria, for the Chinese assimilate themselves to the Manchus by intermarriage with the ruling race in Manchuria, but little or no intermarriage takes place with the Mongols (although in some cases the Mongol khans have intermarried with the ruling Manchu families), and the latter, unlike the Manchus, do not adopt the Chinese language or literature. Colonization in Mongolia will mean, probably, the pushing back towards the desert of the native population. Already

[1] *Japan in World Politics*, p. 235. [2] Lawton, vol. ii., p. 1116.

the Mongols have been dispossessed of their most fertile valleys and forced to remain on the high grazing land throughout the year. Chinese immigrants have taken the greater part of the land of Mongolia which is suitable for cultivation. The khans of some of the eastern districts of Mongolia were compelled in 1910 by the Chinese authorities to set aside for Chinese colonization 11,250,000 acres of land in their territories, and similar concessions were required of the western districts. This alienation of land for Chinese settlement is viewed with alarm by the Mongols and was one of the factors leading to their recent revolt.[1]

The settlement of Manchuria by the Chinese is encouraged by the fact that it borders on the province of Chihli, China, which has been the seat of the imperial government for five hundred years. As a result of this proximity the Chinese, who are shrewder and more industrious than their northern neighbours,[2] have gradually pressed forward into Manchuria until it has become in fact a Chinese colony. The Manchu language is spoken only in remote parts, but Chinese manners and customs prevail everywhere. The Chinese show their superiority to the Manchus by monopolizing trade and agriculture.[3] The southern province of Manchuria, Shenking, is the most important and contains about nine-tenths of the total population of the country. Of these it is estimated that not one-fourth and possibly not more than one-tenth are of the stock of the conquering Manchus,[4] but the great majority are immigrants from the two Chinese provinces, Chihli and Shantung, and descendants of these immigrants. Out of a total population of 8,500,000 in Manchuria, 4,000,000 are Chinese emigrants[5] and the numbers of the latter are increasing. Some of these immigrants are only transients,—coolies seeking employment for short periods who ultimately return to their homes with their savings.[6] Every year in April,

[1] *Cf.* Price, *Siberia*, pp. 292–94.

[2] Richard, p. 493; Seward, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

[3] Lawton, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., pp. 1116–17. [4] Morse, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

[5] Richard (pp. 478, 493), says that the Manchus form at most one-tenth of the total population of Manchuria while the Chinese in Manchuria and Mongolia together number ten to fifteen millions.

[6] The insignificance of the cotton goods trade at Dairen is ascribed to the large number of this transient class of coolies there who bring with them clothing sufficient to last until their return home. U. S. Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, May, 1908, p. 139.

thousands of labourers come from the provinces of Chihli and Shantung, China, assist in the cultivation of the fields and return home in September.[1] Yet much of the colonization is genuine. The part the Chinese Government is taking in this movement is shown by the following newspaper item from Tientsin[2]:

"On the recommendation of Viceroy Tuan Fang, the Chinese Government has appointed the Manchu lieutenant-general, Ching Hsien, to be officer in charge of the transportation of poor natives to Manchuria for agricultural purposes, for the provinces of Kiangsu, Kiangsho, and Anhui are too thickly populated at the present time. After the arrival of the emigrants in Manchuria each man will be given ten Chinese acres of arable land for cultivation, without taxes of any kind, for a period of five years, while all cattle and tools required by the farmers will be supplied by the Government free of charge. All married men are permitted to take their families with them to Manchuria, so that they may settle there permanently."

The settlement of Manchuria is complicated by the fact that the province is also being rapidly colonized by the Japanese.[3] Dalny or Dairen contains 10,000 Japanese out of a population of 40,000.[4] In some respects the developmental projects undertaken by the Japanese have encouraged the settlement of the Chinese there in spite of the antipathy the Japanese have aroused by their high-handed methods.[5] The South Manchurian Railway Company under Japanese control, for example, has adopted the policy of training Chinese to fill as many positions as possible of the inferior grades in the railway service, with the expectation that, eventually, almost all the station and train hands will be Chinese. The reasons for this policy are the resultant saving in wages, since Japanese in Manchuria must be paid twice as much as Chinese for the same work, and secondly, the better service rendered patrons by Chinese employees, as the former are chiefly Chinese. It will take some time to carry this new policy into effect, yet its operation is shown in the fact that the Chinese employed increased from 40 per cent. to 45 per cent. in the two years from 1907 to 1909.[6] The Japanese, moreover, are not able to compete very successfully with the Chinese either as

[1] Richard, p. 493.
[2] U. S. Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, Febr., 1908, p. 190.
[3] See Dyer, *Japan in World Politics*, p. 200.
[4] Richard, *op. cit.*, p. 500.
[5] *Cf.* Angier, *The Far East Revisited*, pp. 268–69.
[6] U. S. Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, June, 1909, p. 57.

merchants[1] or farmers. In addition the Manchurian winters are rather severe for Japanese.[2]

Will China retain her colonies? That is the question. It is conceded that governing countries must maintain sufficient control over their possessions to settle difficulties that arise with foreign countries, if they wish their sovereignty to be respected. China's hold, therefore, on her possessions is a precarious one because of its nominal character. China has acknowledged her inability to restrain Tibetan invasions of English territory,[3] and it is well known that for many years the Tibetans have ignored the suzerainty of China unless it suited their convenience to recognize it.[4] China is capable of sending a body of troops to Tibet sufficiently strong to compel a settlement of any troubles that may arise with the English, but "it has suited her book to maintain the present elusive and anomalous relations with Tibet, which are a securer buttress to her western dependencies against encroachment than the strongest army corps."[5] Yet such a policy of evasion can be only a temporary one. Sooner or later China will be called upon to give up all claims on Tibet unless she has in the meantime made her position there a less nominal one.

Tibet, in fact, has been menaced by three countries—England, Russia, and Nepal.[6] It is not long since the influence of Russia in Tibet seemed to be preponderant. The British, alarmed at the growing Russian influence, in 1904 sent the Younghusband expedition to Tibet to inquire into the situation. It reached Lassa, the capital city, and the Dalai Lama,[7] the civil and reli-

[1] *Cf.* Angier, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

[2] Mavor, *Economic History of Russia* (1914), vol. ii., p. 239.

[3] *Cf.* Candler, *The Unveiling of Lhasa*, p. 5. Regarding the mission from India into Tibet, Lord Lansdowne, speaking in the House of Lords, February 2, 1904, in answer to the question why they did not deal with the matter through the Chinese Government, said: "In 1890 we did deal with an incident like this through the Chinese Government, and the agreement then entered into by the Chinese Envoy, aided by a Tibetan assessor, was absolutely repudiated by the Tibetans; and on this occasion, although we have invoked the assistance of China, we have done so quite in vain." Drage, *Russian Affairs* (1904), pp. 720–21.

[4] *Cf.* Candler, *op. cit.*, pp. 303–04.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 11; Little, *Gleanings from Fifty Years in China*, p. 10.

[6] *Cf.* Kawaguchi, *Three Years in Tibet*, p. 526.

[7] D'Ollone, a major in the French army, who secured an audience with the almost inaccessible Dalai Lama, says of him (*Forbidden China*, p. 307): "Not

gious ruler of the country, fled to Mongolia. The English fixed up an agreement with the remaining authorities that Tibet could not cede nor lease any territory, nor admit the representatives of any foreign power, nor grant mining or other concessions, nor pledge her revenues, without the consent of Great Britain. Tibet agreed to pay $2,500,000 towards the cost of the expedition. The home government, however, did not sustain the treaty but remitted two-thirds of the indemnity and withdrew the troops from Chumbi Valley, the key to Tibet. The result was that China gained more power than before over Tibet and, for some time after the Younghusband expedition, seriously strengthened her hold in that colony.

Later events, however, have again thrown Tibet more and more under British influence. The Dalai Lama returned to Tibet from Mongolia, but was deposed by the Chinese in 1910. He went to Darjiling, India, where he was received with honours. On the outbreak of the revolution in China, the opportunity was seized by the Tibetans to assert themselves, for the Chinese Ambans are both feared and despised,[1] and there is a strong national party in Tibet as in most colonies under alien control. They therefore revolted[2] and overpowered the Chinese garrison at Lassa. In July, 1912, the Dalai Lama deemed it safe to return. When in the same year, 1912, the Chinese Government dispatched troops to Tibet to restore Chinese authority there, Great Britain protested against this action on the grounds that it was not in accord with the treaty of 1906. Great Britain recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but refuses to allow Chinese sovereignty. British rights in Tibet are now conceded by Russia. The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 recognized that Great Britain because of her geographical position has a major interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the foreign relations of Tibet. The English are endeavouring to strengthen their position by dividing Tibet

---

only does the Dalai-Lama speak and act as a man habituated to command, but there is nothing of the monk in his manner, nor even in his clothing. He is a vigorous man, with a soldierly face and figure, and the sight of him explains his unexpectedly adventurous career." With regard to his personal appearance D'Ollone says (p. 305) that his features are European in type and that he might well have been taken for a French officer except for his orange-coloured skin.

[1] Chandradas, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[2] Lawton, *The Empires of the Far East*, vol. iii., p. 1495.

into Outer and Inner Tibet and securing concessions for Outer Tibet—the portion next British territory—which could not be secured for Tibet as a whole.[1]

Nor is Chinese authority in Turkestan very secure. It is frequently predicted that the occupation of Turkestan by Russia will take place before long.[2] Russian movements to conquer Turkestan have consisted so far of peaceful means, trade, and settlement. The very best type of Russian self-supporting emigrants are making their way into Turkestan in increasing numbers. Many of them are devoting themselves to the cultivation of cotton on a large scale.[3]

China's grip upon Mongolia has been greatly weakened by the revolt in Outer Mongolia. It is generally believed that Russia has sown disaffection among the Mongols in order to strengthen her own influence in the province. It would in any case be very easy to stir up dissension because of the oppressive taxation and disabilities of the Mongols. The Chinese seemed to have picked them out for especially severe treatment and this attitude was reinforced by the exploitation of the native rulers. The result of this joint policy was the gradual but progressive impoverishment of the Mongol tribes.[4] Naturally the first opportunity to revolt was seized. China did not relinquish any of her rights in Mongolia without a struggle. Special expeditionary forces were sent into the colony and severe fighting resulted. But in the end the Mongols were victorious. The revolt promised to spread into Inner Mongolia and fear on the part of China of losing still more territory led to an early suspension of hostilities. Popular feeling in China against Russia at this time was very bitter, Russian goods were boycotted, and runs occurred on the branches of the Russo-Asiatic Bank in China. Under the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol, 21st October–3rd November, 1912, Outer Mongolia becomes in effect a protectorate of Russia.[5] Russian's position in Outer Mongolia corresponds to Great Britain's in Tibet. Russia recognizes the suzerainty of China

[1] Associated Press dispatches, November, 1915.

[2] *Cf.* Vambery, *Western Culture in Eastern Land*, p. 378; "History shows that although Russia may be checked, never will she be thwarted. She has gone from west to east, and she will go from north to south." Lawton, *The Empires of the Far East*, vol. i., p. 431.

[3] Weale, *The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia*, p. 273.

[4] *Cf.* Price, *Siberia.*

[5] Mavor, *Econ. Hist. of Russia*, vol. ii., p. 242.

over Mongolia, while China in turn recognizes the autonomy of the Mongols, and the special interests of Russia in their territory.[1]

Russia and Japan have bound themselves to withdraw from South Manchuria within a short period if China proves herself capable of providing an established government and adequate police control in the province. The right of the Chinese Government to purchase the Chinese Eastern Railway now wholly in Russian hands expires in 1937. Even if China were able to exercise the option of purchase of the railway, it is very likely that Russia will retain the line under the plea of conquest. Japan's lease to territory and rights in Manchuria expires March 26, 1923.[2] It is doubtful, however, whether China will be competent to meet the situation in the short time intervening for preparation. Probably neither Japan nor Russia expect to be called upon to give up the hold they have obtained in Manchuria. At any rate Secretary Knox's proposal to neutralize the Manchurian railways was openly flouted both by Japan and Russia.[3]

China has come to fear not only Japanese designs upon Manchuria but upon China proper.[4] Recent events have given impetus to Chinese fears. Japan asserts, however, that she merely is stepping into Germany's place in Shantung, and into Russia's in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. At any rate since the Sino-Japanese treaties China has increased her activities in her outlying provinces. A special fund is to be provided for the founding of new industries and for the development of agricultural and pastoral pursuits in Mongolia; commercial and industrial unions are to be formed to aid the Mongolian unemployed; a Sino-Mongolian bank with a capital of $1,200,000, one-half of which is to be furnished by the Chinese Government, is to be founded. Prominent Chinese business men of Pekin have established the Manchurian and Mongolian Enterprise Bank

[1] *Cf.* "Secession of Mongolia from China," in *Contemporary Review*, vol. ci., pp. 579–84; "Mongolia in Russia's Grip," in *Review of Reviews*, Febr., 1913, p. 238; *Independent*, July–December, 1913.

[2] Mavor, *Economic History of Russia* (1914), vol. ii., p. 239.

[3] Goodrich, *The Coming China*, p. 217.

[4] "The annexation of the Chinese Empire is something more than a dream with the Japanese; it is a growing ambition. The writer has seen a map called 'The New Great Japan' upon which the boundaries of that empire are made to include Korea (it was drawn before the annexation), Manchuria, practically all of Eastern Siberia and to the west as far as Lake Baikal, and all the rest of the Chinese Empire." Goodrich, *The Coming China*, pp. 226–27.

with a capital of $2,000,000. The bank is designed to aid agriculture, stock-raising, afforestation, and irrigation in Manchuria and Mongolia. Other enterprises may be cited such as the movement to establish telegraphic communications between points in Eastern Mongolia and Pekin, and so on.[1]

The outcome of the Chinese colonial situation is problematical. The weak point, after all has been said, is the unsettled condition within China herself.

MINNIE THROOP ENGLAND.

University of Nebraska.

[1] See U. S. Commerce Reports, September 20, 1915.

SOME ASPECTS OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

After a hundred years of science and twenty-five hundred of philosophy we are not yet freed from the grip of wholly naïve and uncritical assumptions. Some of these we meticulously conceal and some we cannot sufficiently exploit, as though reiteration were the soul of reason. Our reticence in the one direction is no less remarkable than our loquacity in the other, and both are often conditioned on misapprehension of either ourselves or our world. Perhaps it augurs well for the possibilities of the human mind that centuries of introspection have exhausted neither our curiosity nor our fallibility. It is heartening to think that speculation is not dead, nor indeed in any danger of dying of inanition. It is pleasant to reflect that the periodic recrudescence of wonder does not find us without that saving salt of inquisitiveness which leads to investigation. Moreover, it is fortunate that the faculties of the human mind can nourish themselves upon pabulum so rich as the human mind itself.

This may not have the force of a teleologic principle, but it doubtless has its uses. Consider the profound mollification of stern social forces that might ensue were we ever to arrive at an actual understanding of ourselves. With what exquisite urbanity, or at least fearless insouciance, might we then contemplate the hitherto disquieting ambitions of rival persons or nations. What refreshing vistas of amelioration would lure us on could we but cast out all demons of anxiety and apprehension and learn to appreciate ourselves; that is, to comprehend our motives and our limitations, as we do our friends and neighbours. Who can doubt that perfect understanding would bring perfect peace or that the resolution of all our fears would be conducive to mental and perhaps moral stability? With what infinite pains do we toil upwards from the lethal abysms of fatuous self-wonderment to the glowing heights of vivid and efficient self-consciousness; with what enormous travail do we extricate ourselves from the ancestral bog whose flux has mercifully covered up the record of our piteous flounderings. Even now there are spewed up from time to time such grotesque and misconceived shapes of error as would

inevitably drag us down could we not exorcize them with conceptions of a fairer and more radiant hue.

Let us compare the field of consciousness, that which we know most about, to a floor or platform with innumerable trap-doors. At more or less frequent intervals and very often without the slightest obvious cause one or more of the trap-doors will pop open to release, let us say, a sort of Aladdin's genius whose indefinite expansion may fill the entire field, bidden or unbidden, or who may perhaps be promptly squelched as Scrooge longed to extinguish the Ghost of Christmas Past. It is a fact known to everyone that even the violently extinguished apparition of a thought may ooze back through the cracks and about the edges of the trap-door, until it has projected enough of itself up into the field again to tinge perceptibly the atmosphere. In spite of a good deal of weight on the lid this manœuvre may be repeated again and again until it is no longer possible because of complete occupation of the field. It is also commonly known that the best way to keep an unwelcome apparition out is to let plenty of welcome ones in. While this process of substitution has its limitations it is nevertheless of real pragmatic value and has been much exploited by certain philosophical and ethical cults.

An old question sometimes frivolously propounded in childhood runs—"What do you think when you don't think anything?" This world-shaking query has perhaps never been satisfactorily answered, least of all by the practical youngster who sees nothing portentous in it from any angle. Rightly considered,—that is, lying on one's back in the June orchard with the proper amount of cumulus cloud overhead—it has almost no natural limits. What, for example, do we think about when we are asleep and not supposed to be thinking at all, and why is it that something will suddenly pop into our heads entirely different from what we were thinking before? What becomes of our thoughts after we get through thinking them, and what becomes of the things we learn and then forget? With these and similar queries do we "tire the sun with talking and send him down the sky." As a matter of fact what *do* we think when we don't think anything? Is there such a thing as cessation of mental activity even during sleep? Where do dreams come from and what do they mean? Do we ever really lose anything we have once known; and if not, how do apparently forgotten things affect us?

No race is so primitive as not to have a theory or explanation

of dreams. Obviously they are sent by our enemies or by some medicine man or perchance by the Great Spirit for our warning or edification. Since they are beyond our own control they must be within the control of someone not ourselves. If heaven-sent they must of course be taken seriously, and if strange and exotic they must have a correspondingly deeper significance than our ordinary waking thoughts. It is only in a state of culture that we venture to think lightly of dreams, and now we are beginning to feel conscience-stricken at our levity. Is it possible, after all, that these sleeping fantasies, these vagrant and irresponsible ebullitions of unconscious fancy have any real relation to our concrete selves? Heaven forbid that we should be forced to acknowledge any responsibility for them, much less admit that we could have actually wished them into being; because no matter what our dreams may be when superficially considered, they will wear a quite different aspect when profoundly analysed. We are great symbolists, to be sure, in every-day life; but we do occasionally attach the name *spade* to an implement wherewith we dig in the garden. Not so during sleep. No matter how rigorously the censor may watch over our thoughts and our expression of them during the day his vigilance is redoubled at night except that he sometimes naps. The censor protects us during sleep because we cannot then protect ourselves, but at the same time he grossly betrays us even while by means of distortion, condensation, and symbolistic conversion he is pretending to bury our real selves fathoms deep. Nevertheless we do not commonly recognize what passes the censor.

The day censor and the night censor are assumed to be essentially the same,—that is, they consist of our conventional selves. The day censor sits on the lid, as it were, and does his best to keep unwelcome visitors from forcing the various trap-doors. They will get through occasionally, of course, but we can have something to say about how long they shall remain. The night censor gives access to certain visitors, but dresses them up beyond all casual recognition. Some of them we will remember when we awake, others we can bring into consciousness only by an effort of memory and perhaps through a process of association. The ones we remember easily are relatively harmless and unimportant, so insignificant that the censor did not take the trouble to disguise them. Such are the frank wish realizations of childhood, the little red wagon, the box of candy, the visit to the zoo. Having

no complex desires, no vaulting ambitions, and no guilty consciences we can then afford the luxury of dreaming that we have actually acquired the thing that we want. Once in a while we may think that we gain such an end even in adult life, but the thing is not really so simple as it seems. Although after eating something salty we may dream of drinking from bubbling springs and babbling brooks of clear cold water this is not because we are thirsty, it is rather that we may think our thirst appeased and thus keep from waking up.

Whatever we may think about dream significance, we must admit that we are all incorrigible wishers from babyhood on. Neither realization nor the lack of it can be expected to cure us of this. However, we should not be judged too harshly for wishing, because in the first place we cannot help it and in the second place oftentimes we are not aware of our wishes. In fact we may remain in a state of ignorance until someone analyses a dream for us and shows us up in all our native disingenuousness. In other words we may cover up our wishes in spite of ourselves and very successfully, too, that is, so far as unconscious wishes are concerned. Conscious wishes may be repressed, pushed out of consciousness, trapped under a lid somewhere, but not necessarily thereby rendered *hors de combat.*

Perhaps nothing in modern philosophy has been more thoroughly discredited than pigeon-hole psychology. We no longer waste words on the faculties of the mind. Mind is a hazy term at best, but roughly speaking the mental part of us may be divided into three parts—the conscious or that part which is in evidence at any given time; the subconscious or fore-conscious or potentially conscious, a sort of twilight zone; and the unconscious where reside things that may be brought into consciousness with difficulty or not at all. We know the unconscious only by inference and by such fragments as come spontaneously or otherwise to the surface. By invitation they may come at times through the trap-doors or they may spontaneously alter or affect something else that does come through and thus reveal to some extent their character and propensities. The oft-quoted simile of Stanley Hall likens the mind to an iceberg floating one eighth out of water and seven eighths underneath. The conscious appears above the surface of the water, the fore-conscious is at or near the surface, and the unconscious is below. The unconscious is assumed to be a very large and very rich field;

and just as no ordinary wind playing upon the upper one eighth of the iceberg will influence its course in opposition to the ocean currents, so our ordinary actions or reactions, though conscious, will be determined most largely by submerged forces. Perhaps a hurricane may drive the iceberg out of its course just as we may be driven by the winds of apparently conscious and particularly vivid desire, emotion, or judgment to act with unusual energy or in an unusual direction.

However effectually we may free ourselves on occasion from the dead weight of our submerged selves, whatever independent flights we may succeed in making, it is probable that the unconscious acts as so much ballast and eventually brings us back to our usual level. In fact it has been likened to the tail of a kite, which does not keep the kite from flying, but steadies it in the wind. Nevertheless the unconscious is something more than a balance-wheel or a governor, and performs far more than a mechanical function. It is profound, but not ponderous, sprightly but not trivial, aggressive at times, but not utterly lawless. Although we do not seem to be able to live without it, we are sometimes hard put to it to live with it. It is not in any sense a static affair, but is essentially dynamic. It might be likened to an intricate piece of automatic machinery busily engaged in working over materials or to a well-equipped laboratory where delicate but powerful ferments and reagents are constantly employed in analyzing or synthesizing the stuff of which our lives are made. That this stuff may eventuate in something strange and unfamiliar is illustrated by certain dream material and by examples of the results of free association of ideas as a psycho-analytic method. We think, feel, act, and let the product fall into the unconscious. Later, *mutatis mutandis*, behold something we have never seen before. It reaches the surface apparently as much out of its element as some grotesque deep-sea form drawn gasping, struggling, or perhaps stupefied into the upper world. To be sure some of this apparent strangeness may be due to a disturbed state of our consciousness at the time, but we cannot be sure that this is not also determined by something in the unconscious.

The unconscious as a hypothesis contains all of our past experience and epitomizes our history, perhaps racial as well as personal. How much may be there that is handed down in the germ plasm we do not know, but instinct must reside somewhere,

and why not in the unconscious? The unconscious must be nearly coextensive with ourselves. It is true that we do not make use of all of it; there is much of it that we never call upon, but in general it may be said to constitute the fabric of our lives. It must contain the untapped reservoirs of which William James said we made so little use. How dependable is the unconscious and how much is it to be trusted in an emergency or even in routine matters? In a comprehensive sense it is precisely as dependable as ourselves, in fact any other conclusion would be a *reductio ad absurdum*.

But what has all this to do with abnormal psychology? Strictly speaking, perhaps, there is no such thing as abnormal psychology or, at any rate, perhaps what we are in the habit of calling abnormal would seem just as natural as the normal if we fully understood its genesis and development. Do we think the insane person strange in his thoughts and in his actions? If we were able fully to explore not only his conscious but his unconscious as well, might we not find his ratiocination and his behaviour precisely as logical as we assume our own to be? Doubtless his prepossessions and his affects are having stronger dominion over him than we like to think ours have. We say he is reacting abnormally to his environment and failing to adjust himself to it, but what if we are witnessing in him simply a manifestation of ill-timed or over-emphasized activity on the part of the unconscious? Irrational as they may seem at times, the acts of insane persons have significance just as those of sane persons have. The determiners may not be in evidence and they may not be in harmony, this lack of harmony resulting in an incoordination of activities and apparently senseless behaviour. Because the conscious and the fore-conscious seem often sterile of material for the explanation of insane actions, the unconscious has been drawn upon with more or less success for a rational understanding of disturbed mentality. Our present knowledge constrains us to believe that the insane differ from the sane only in degree and not in kind.

There is, of course, one difficulty always to be borne in mind, and that is the fact that concepts dragged forth from the unconscious may suffer a sea-change in the very act of emerging or filtering into the field of consciousness. They may take on hues corresponding to their brighter environment and thus give us but a poor idea of the depths from which they came. It is seldom

possible to relive an experience or to reproduce an emotion with all of its original intensity. We get a representation of it in consciousness conditioned in large measure on the vividness of our imaging power. Now imaging power implies the use of symbols and the reproduction of past emotions and experiences is to a great extent a symbolic representation of the original event. This does not imply that the original affect or experience was free from symbolism, it simply means that when it comes to be recapitulated in consciousness it partakes more of the intellectual and perhaps critical character and is correspondingly more pictorial and less moving. Part of its pristine freshness and heat has been diffused through surrounding media, colouring them somewhat, to be sure, but reducing tension and reactiveness in the original storm-centre. It has lost some of its immanence and is more histrionic, more consciously dramatic. It is not often the case that an impulse, a will to act, occupies the field so fully that all thought in the ordinary sense, all critical consideration, is extinguished, and this fact illustrates the many-sided character of consciousness. We remember, we think, we feel, we act as manifestations not of different things, but rather of different aspects of the same thing. What we call the mind may be likened to a kaleidoscope or to a screen upon which dissolving views are thrown, but any two-dimensional or even three-dimensional figure is scarcely adequate. It is rather like an ever-changing mass of vapour or a body of light throwing, like Browning's star, "now a dart of red, now a dart of blue," with as many different colours and as many variations of intensity as there are angles to view it from.

If it is difficult to understand and almost impossible to define the conscious (and everyone knows that it can be defined if at all only in terms of itself), what are we to think of the unconscious, a region so obscure that we can only predicate its existence upon such intangible shapes as are projected from or by it into full consciousness? Since we must have a hypothetical resting place for that which is no longer conscious, but seems not to be lost, we say that our past experiences have gone not entirely out of our lives but out of the daylight, past even the crepuscular border zone and into the darkness where they glow, if at all, with only the faintest of cosmic light. The unconscious is not a gratuitous assumption, though it may seem a difficult one. In point of fact all philosophy is difficult except in the purely descriptive sense,

and all life is difficult in the sense that every line of reasoning or of investigation brings us sooner or later to something we do not understand and cannot explain. The obstacle may be defined, perhaps, but this is not equivalent to getting around it.

It is not hard to believe that dreams come from the workshop of the unconscious, though their symbolism is often not clear, but how about our waking thoughts and feelings, our everyday actions? Surely they are influenced by the unconscious only when or to the extent that we call upon it for material. Not so, if we are to believe the Freudian school of newer psychologists. Multiple personality, dissociation, splitting of consciousness as in hysteria were pretty thoroughly dissected a good while ago by Janet, Freud, and others; but not content with conventional explanations of "nervousness," neurasthenia, doubts, obsessions, and insanity itself, Freud and his followers have attempted by means of psycho-analysis to go deeper and deeper into the unconscious. They have laid bare much new matter, explored some new fields, and produced a body of literature appallingly large. By some, at least, their theories have been exploited in a manner to make the judicious grieve, and, as is usually the case with any comparatively new doctrine, many of the followers have far outstripped the master both in zeal and lack of discretion. More temperate, more moderate than most of his disciples, he has often suffered misinterpretation and has not hesitated to modify his theories according to accumulated evidence. Starting cautiously and apparently conservatively he reached, in the course of years, a point where it seemed to him that all neurotic manifestations rested on a sexual basis, that is, that they were due to the unconscious influence of some sexual experience, a psychic trauma of injury, occurring in childhood. These cases he investigated by having the patients relax, putting them at times in a semi-hypnotic condition, and having them relate to him all, literally everything, that came into their minds. This method of "free association" usually brought to light the forgotten experience, the psychic trauma. Once brought into the open its tension was relieved, by a process of "mental catharsis" the patient's mind was purged of its effects and he went on his way rejoicing. Partly because the sexual in the ordinary sense of the word did not seem to fit all cases and partly, no doubt, because of a widening outlook with greater experience, Freud has attempted to broaden the term *libido* until, as Jung puts it, it

practically covers one's interest in life, the *vis motiva* as expressed through hunger, the reproductive instinct, the instinct for self-defence, ambition, and so on. Naturally if *libido* means all of these things it largely lessens the force of any narrowly sexual experience or phenomenon as the efficient cause of a neurosis. By extension of the *libido* to other instincts and desires we get away from the frankly sexual, and perhaps it would be better to use the term only in its more limited sense. Words are only symbols and do not have the same associative colouring in all minds, or under all circumstances in the same mind, but substantial consistency in terminology is one of the fundamentals of intelligent discussion.

Wishes, then, may produce dreams by day or by night, and they may also produce neuroses. Was it prescience in Tioka, child of the neurotic Marie Tarnowska, that led him to say: "Tell me, mother, when one is ill with nervousness, doesn't that mean that you want something you haven't got? Then if you get it you are well again, aren't you? . . . I think I am ill with nervousness too. I am nervous for a bowl of gold-fish; and for a hunting dog like that one." Poor little Tioka, lacking the knowledge of the Olympians, innocent of the mechanism of repression, thus naïvely propounds his theory of the neurosis. But let us not fall into the same error and suppose that openly wishing with all our hearts for something we haven't got is going to make us neurotic. It may make us fretful and discontented, irritable, and hard to get along with, but it will not split our personality in twain. It may lead us to work incessantly for the thing we want, but it will not result in parts of our minds "going off on their own," so to speak, and trying to lead separate and distinct existences. These things do occur and we are told that the prime mover in such a case is a wish or a thought that we cannot live with, something so intolerable that we have ruthlessly forced it into the unconscious, whence it may come up if it can to torment us and take revenge in whatever fashion it will. It may lead to nothing more serious than a feeling of intense anxiety or a sense of impending danger with depression of spirits, but on the other hand it may eventuate in major hysteria or a grave psychosis. No one at the present time is able to say why one person develops a neurosis and another one becomes insane, but both the intensity of the disturbing emotion and the make-up of the patient are assumed to have something to do

with it. Freud himself is of the opinion that the so-called anxiety neurosis is always dependent upon some disturbing element in the sexual life of the individual, and in general he finds it hard to give up the sexual theory as applied to all dreams and all nervous disturbances.

Day dreams, night dreams, hysteria, and some forms of insanity are assumed to furnish a sort of surrogate for reality, a compromise with realization. We cannot have the thing itself or we may even realize that it would not be good for us if we did have it, and so we accept something else in place of it. That something else may be only a dream or it may be a disturbed physical state, as in the reported case of a patient at the Neurological Institute in New York who became temporarily blind (functionally, of course) because he unconsciously wished that he might no longer see his wife, who was distasteful to him. This man cleared up and took a fresh start after the mechanism of his trouble was explained to him. From this point of view also are explained delusions of grandeur in the functionally insane, as in some paranoid cases, for example. It is supposed that scattering of thought and incoherent speech could be readily explained if the unconscious groundwork were visible; in other words we get the benefit of only the high points in the train of associations, the rest being submerged.

We all have prepossessions and prejudices, constellations and complexes of thought and feeling which often control us more than we control them. These groups or clusters of associated ideas and emotions largely determine our habitual modes of reaction and therefore our character and personality. In a state of health we succeed in compelling our various constellations and complexes, in spite of a certain amount of incompatibility, to maintain reasonably harmonious relations. We may even succeed in harnessing them together and making them pull in the same instead of in opposite directions. On the contrary, when mental health leaves us we fall into a state of disharmony and perhaps a condition of profound dissociation. There are all possible degrees of disintegration of personality in insanity; but to use an old expression, when reason is dethroned we lose something of our hold upon reality and take sanctuary, so to speak, in a world of our own. When incompatible complexes or desires coexist in the individual and will not be repressed he may finally in his desperation give himself over to a process of dissociation. This

is what is meant by taking refuge in insanity. The individual sometimes effects a compromise between a repressed complex and the sentiment which compelled its repression, with the emergence of an intense prejudice or even a delusion. By a process of "projection" the undesirable quality may be transferred in the individual's mind to some other person, regardless whether that person possesses the quality in question and even regardless whether such a person really exists. Bernard Hart in *The Psychology of Insanity* cites the following as an example of projection:

"An excellent illustration of this mechanism is to be found in Hamlet, in the excessive aversion with which the Player-Queen regards the possibility of a second marriage, although a secret desire for such a marriage is already present in her mind.

> 'The instances that second marriage move
> Are base respects of thrift, but none of love. . . .
> Nor earth to me give food, nor heaven light,
> Sport and repose lock from me day and night,
> To desperation turn my trust and hope,
> An anchor's cheer in prison be my scope,
> Each opposite that blanks the face of joy
> Meet what I would have well, and it destroy,
> Both here and hence pursue me lasting strife,
> If, once a widow, ever I be wife.'"

It may well be doubted whether the Player-Queen is really deceiving herself, but at any rate it is probable that some hyperconscientious states of mind are really excessive reactions to the opposite or refuges from fear.

Such is, in part, the newer psychology as elaborated to explain certain hitherto obscure phenomena in nervous diseases and insanity. That it contains much truth is altogether probable. Nothing has been said here of the "Œdipus complex" or of the theory of infantile sexuality, but the original sources are easily accessible. The rapidly increasing literature suggests that nothing in human development or human relations nor anything human or divine can hope to escape the scrutiny of the psycho-analyst. It is doubtless well that it should be so if truth is really served and if the constantly changing hypotheses prove to be increasingly fruitful. William McDougall calls psychology the "study of behaviour," and certainly no true friend of truth can wish to hamper the development of an understanding

of human conduct. Of course psycho-analysis as a dissection of human motives is as old as philosophy or literature and how much older than that we don't know. Bergson is claimed for it now; and all philosophers, novelists, and historians might as well be. It was suggested at the beginning of this paper that human relations would be smoother if we appreciated our motivation, that is if we understood ourselves better. It cannot be gainsaid that if we always knew why we did things we should have a very fair understanding why other people do things more or less similar. Sometimes we remain in ignorance simply because we neglect to look within. There is an old Turkish fable called "The Syrian Priest and the Young Man," which says:

"A Syrian Priest, good and wise, and an Armenian were engaged in a dispute. The Young Man, at last enraged, said to the Priest:

"'I will drive this stone down your throat, in order that your thirty-two teeth may choke you.'

"The Priest returned hastily to his house, lost in astonishment, and said to his wife:

"'In the name of God, wife, light a candle, and count how many teeth I have.'

"She counted them and said:

"'They are just thirty-two in number.'

"The Priest at once returned to the Young Man and said:

"'How did you learn the number of my teeth? And who told you?'

"'Sir,' replied the other, 'I learned the number of your teeth from the number of my own.'

"This fable shows that from my own bad qualities I am able to guess yours, for all faults are common."

L. B. PILSBURY, M.D.

STATE HOSPITAL FOR THE INSANE,
Lincoln, Nebraska.

A PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

The compensation which unconscious being has for its pure materiality is a superior stability, a power to remain itself under a great variety of stresses. The defect of conscious being is its incompleteness, the fickleness or shiftiness of its organization, its dependence for selfhood on the existence of conditions relevant to it exclusively. Hence, any integral knowledge is a knowledge first and foremost of those things that are and those things that are not helpful to the organic self as enduring in the world. The first philosophy is therefore personal; feeling and the cause of feeling coalesce; the world of things is thought of as a world of many spirits, each with a specific nature known in the feeling it causes as beneficent or malevolent. The first philosophy is a vast pathetic fallacy in which the continuum of existence is not yet broken up into qualitative elements. Such spiritism becomes modified through a developed woodcraft which leads to the conception of non-personal existence, plastic to the conscious hand that shapes it for the uses of the soul. It is because of this plasticity that the world splits into the animate and the inanimate, the unknown and the known. The unknown, being more ominous, retains the character of the self; man continues to sustain to it a moral relation. It works magically, is overlord of men and things, and is propitiated by sacrifice and invoked in prayer. In these active bargainings, speculation, hardened through custom, becomes religion, while in relation to the known and mastered inanimate, it is hardened through experience and becomes commonplace commonsense, the most elementary known science. In both cases, the environmental flux has been resolved into constants the definition of whose nature serves as an instrument by which man lives and moves and maintains and increases his being. Of not-being he has no conception at this time. To be dead is simply to be absent. Since life, being, is the instinctive end of desire, the world becomes understood as maintaining the satisfaction of that desire; spiritism implies teleology. The organic essence of primitive world-view is a conceived society of malevolent and beneficent spirits incarnate in a plastic and

serviceable matter. It is a deathless society of which man is a part, in which he ultimately finds his eternal place among those things he most desired,—*i.e.*, those things that maintained him best. To die is to go to a happy hunting ground where one persists in the more delightful activities of sublunar life,—nutrition, hunting, wiving, and fighting.

This conception is common to all primitive thinking,—irrespective of race or climate. It is the core about which the instinctive fancy (whose burden is the inertia of self-maintenance, the "will to live"), outrunning actual experience, weaves all the variations in folk-tale and theogony that are discoverable. It is essentially the induction from an experience which has failed to order the confusion of feeling and things. It expresses the soul, its desires, and its instincts, far more than the environment; personality dominates the world. Sophistication, which is in this respect clarification, breaks the unitary nature of this moral conception of the world into a dual one, each having laws and characters of its own,—one moral, personal, supernatural, the other unmoral, physical, natural. The domination of spirit gives way to the domination of matter; there is discovered an impersonal fate which administers impartial law to men and gods alike. The progressive but never completed depersonalization of the world gives rise to that construction of experience which is called science. Being progressive and profane, it becomes opposed to religion and implies the tyranny of things over souls. Where gods have been able to grant or to frustrate human desires in defiance to the laws of matter, they now must obey them. They themselves will pass.

The aim of science is, however, none other than the aim of its sister, religion, or of speculation, the mother of both. Its history shows,—from the inductions of the Milesian schools to the deductions of the German,—a continuous and indefatigable persistence of mankind in its search for the definite nature of that philosopher's stone, that ultimate fate, that substance or process by the knowledge of which man shall be at home in the world. For the good of mankind, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged, is to maintain human life. For this good, most of all, its history shows speculation to have striven; and in acknowledged knowledge of the nature of the world in which man lives, he possesses the one great instrument for ensuring his endurance therein.

We find, therefore, the world defined generally in a few simple, facilely handled terms. Thus in the beginnings of philosophy Anaximander hints at the character of organic evolution; Heraclitus declares the pervasiveness and eternity of change, Democritus defines constants which underlie change. Recent observation has sufficiently verified these insights. The essential concern of the Greek physicists was, however, physics. Their interest lay in the nature to which man must adapt himself in order to live. Where the struggle to live is constant, continuous, difficult, and without pause, there a cosmogony and a morality alone seem to develop. Attention is directed only upon the satisfaction of the demands which the environment makes as the price of survival. A physics and a morality and a religion emerge spontaneously therefore, expounding laws or descriptions of the behaviour of things, of men, and of spirits.

A theory of knowledge, on the other hand, demands the leisure to return upon oneself; it demands a certain assurance of survival, the achievement of safety and comfort, in no small degree. Barbarous people have no critique of knowledge; neither have highly civilized peoples whose culture is attained by dint of great conflict. Of these the environment demands too much to admit a doubt of its real or its seeming character. The ancient Hebrews notably accepted the world as common sense and religion had envisaged it, without a question of its truth, and with the Greek such questioning does not begin until the state has achieved a high degree of stability and comfort. Then, in the consequent exuberance of the Periclean era, arose the question, how do men know all they believe? The movement of the Sophists, expert teachers of those who sought for power in a comfortable democracy, raised that problem. Their attempts to answer it served only further to upset all the old certitude which had made the world so comfortable a place and which had been upset by the confrontation of East and West. Religion and physics gave way to psychology and epistemology. To know the world, know thyself, taught Socrates; and Protagoras might have added, as the very ground of the Socratic dictum, for man is the measure of all things. To Plato, heir though he was of the Socratic enthusiasm for a morality whose instrument was knowledge, the notion of the universal idea, the core of all knowing, as instrument, formulated clearly enough by Socrates, was repugnant. Still more repugnant was to his somewhat mystical and poetic

nature the notion that the character of things was defined, if not constituted, by the nature and needs of man, and that being and morality depended on human idiosyncrasy. Such a doctrine seemed to him to shake existence at its very foundations; morality is overturned, and survival endangered; all that made life worth living, all meanings and values were swept away by the flux. The heart of the idealistic movement of which he is the father lies in the hope of saving mankind from this terror of chaos and destruction. In it, hence, the eternities are again reasserted, only indeed in a suprasensible heaven to which fallen man might philosophically aspire, and by whose aid he might escape from the elusive world of flux. Despite appearances, the good, the beautiful, the real, the noble things which enriched human life must not be touched by death. The ideas must be eternal, comforting harbingers of life from the source of life, God, the Good, in seeking and contemplating whom the soul lives and moves and has its being. So the happy hunting grounds, Valhalla and Elysium, were refined and intellectualized, but human survival, as the myth of the Phædrus shows, was still among such objects and activities as on earth were most certain and most delightful.

The subsequent history of ancient philosophy is the record of an attempt to establish the ultimate victory of man over the flux, in the face of scepticism. It is the record of a conflict between what might be called the Platonic and the Protagorean camps—the one asserting the existence of and seeking an eternal good for man, the other contenting itself with such relatively constant good as the flux would permit. For Aristotle with his empiricist temperament and Platonic education to attempt a conciliation between the two camps was inevitable. For him as for Protagoras the world was anthropocentric, but anthropocentric not because the world could not be described otherwise by man than as man was fitted to describe it, but because man mediated between the flux on the one hand, and the God, that pure and eternal and self-sufficient form, on the other. The goal of nature was rational man, the essence of man, God. And man's happiness was assured and eternalized in the degree in which he partook of the contemplative self-sufficiency of the divine.

Now by the time Aristotle had begun to teach, that safety which made possible the "Greek Enlightenment," had already

been much reduced; the characters of the times changed for the worse. The Greek states degenerated or were destroyed by civil war, the struggle for existence resumed that pristine fierceness, and life that uncertainty which the Periclean generation had given pause to and had dominated. Again attention became fixed on the objects, life among which was to be secured and warranted. Sceptics and believers alike subordinated the theory of knowledge to the fixing of the nature, and attainment of the possession, of the good,—of that which should make life stable, certain, rich, and happy. And therefore the problems of knowledge were abandoned entirely and men were advised to depend on the certainties of practice. The culture and the moral code which Rome took over then—Rome already herself showing signs of diremption and decay,—was a group of systematic moralities, notably Epicurean and Stoic, which tended to bolster up man in an actual world which was hardly favourable to him, but in which he must save himself somehow.

The decay of the Greek polities had already suggested to Plato the notion of a fall from high estate. Plato, however, was too wise a humanist, had too much respect for the human spirit, nor had his times gone so far upon the way to social disintegration, to make acceptable to him the conception of metaphysical evil as sin. The flux was after all a copy of the highest good and that was after all to be attained by a normal moral life under normal conditions. Evil was rather ignorance and forgetfulness than innate turpitude. It needed the cataclysmal mutations in the Roman state to form the background of a doctrine of fall and sin. Accordingly the Neo-Platonism which develops the hints given by Plato in the Timæus and the Republic takes the chances of mankind for eternal safety and happiness entirely outside the existing world and the actual conditions of human life, these being felt so bad, so terrible, that nothing desirable was to be attained among them. The transmundane location of the good had already been asserted by Plato and by Aristotle. But for both, after all, it was operative in the natural world and achieved for man his happiness in this world as well as beyond it. And, actually, they were much more interested in sublunar than in translunar happiness. Neo-Platonism ravished the world of immediate experience of all possibilities of happiness. To enter it was a fall,—to return from it to God, the greatest blessing. The world was a discipline and a purge, a weary

bridge over which man must walk back to the ecstasy from which he had waned.

Neo-Platonism was a metaphysics, a generic description of a situation, a definition of the constants to which man must adapt himself and the good by which he may live eternally, admirably expressing the need of a disillusioned and world-weary civilization. Better than that, it stated in new terms and gave philosophic sanction to the elementally simple dramatic account of existence rendered by a people who had been too busy in the struggle to live, to have time for any account of their situation beyond the principles of conduct by which they lived. Neo-Platonism coincided wonderfully too, with the joyous story of a Redeemer who doffed his godhead to become man, who was crucified to save man, and was restored to his eternal heaven. Redemption was what the world most of all needed. Truth, accordingly, became Hebraism without its good sense, this being replaced by Neo-Platonism. Philosophy became a metaphysical drama, in which the story of the prodigal son, of a fall from the good and a return by the grace and loving kindness of a saviour, was told in iridescent mysteries of abstraction. More than ever the pagan mind could have conceived it, existence in the world was evil. Safety and happiness could be found with God in heaven and only there. The one secure moral regimen was abandonment of nature and flight to God. So the actual world was condemned as evil for beyond a thousand and five hundred years. The mind of the race was diverted from its comprehension and conquest to a scheme of escape from it, and the mind of the race still suffers from the habits of world-sickness the diversion generated.

Had the influence of Plato not centred the interest of speculation in the transcendent and thus destroyed the possibility of a fruitful natural science, the disillusion concerning the world might have been washed out by knowledge rather than by mythology; the uncertainty of social conditions might have been mitigated by the security concerning the natural laws of their existence and the existence of things, which would have given assurance of normal survival and natural happiness; the doctrine of a fall would have gained no adherents in competition with a physics whose principles led to success in the world. For a disillusioned civilization is consciously most interested in those matters which lead to its own stability, and happiness and truth

can have no other or self-sufficing concern for it. By truth mankind might indeed have been saved, but Plato seduced mankind to ignorance and dialectic for two thousand years. In Christianity the irrelevance of speculation to existence reaches the maximal point Eastern thought had attained long before. With more than sufficient reason are the purely Christian ages called dark; the actual environment from which the soul must take fire to illumine its way was neglected for the morbid nursing of a pallid glow fed by the soul's hope. Discourse became a monster which lived on its own vitals, where it should have been a steed broken to the rough road of experience over which its native destiny is to draw man.

The transition from mediævalism to modernity is a slow return from God, His angels and His saints, to nature, her laws and her forces, from superstition and magic to science and mechanism. The mediæval hiatus is a bridge between the moral Platonism and Epicureanism and Stoicism of the ancients, and the similar philosophies of the moderns. Christianity, which superseded these systems in the days when the world felt old and sad, was deposed by them when the world had recovered from its prolonged melancholia. The advent of Pletho in Florence, the work of Ficinus, Pico della Mirandola, and Pomponazzi, rehabilitators of Plato and of the real Aristotle, prepare the way for the naturalistic ethics of Montaigne and Gassendi and the more mystical naturalism of Bruno. In theory, as long before in practice, the good, that which maintains man's stability and happiness as a living organism, is again defined as in the actual environment and not beyond it. An interest in the environment as it is develops. As life becomes safer and more comfortable vision becomes truer and visions fewer; in astronomy Ptolemy is replaced by Copernicus and Kepler; Aristotle, by Galileo and Newton in physics, and in logic by Bacon.

The new method and the new outlook constitute natural philosophy; but once, however, before the nineteenth century did they attain the dignity of being "philosophy" proper. They went upon a way of their own, while metaphysics and ethics and æsthetics continued, irrelevant dialectic starting with a natural need and ending in a transnatural satisfaction of that need equivalent to no satisfaction at all; and even in the nineteenth century physics has only in a few cases been made the ground of dialectic and the matter of criticism. For, when in the Renais-

sance truth and metaphysics were declared as antithetical as they really had been throughout the Middle Ages, the momentum of the Christian impulse had not been spent. Official philosophies continued to make the locus of perfect adjustment to the environment transmundane, placing man's greatest good, his eternal persistence in happiness, outside the world. Neither the successful adaptations and control rising upon natural philosophy nor the unbroken misfortunes of mediæval plagues and crazes of reformations and counter-reformations could bring the majority of philosophers to see that metaphysics was continuous with physics and not in an alien and incommensurate region. The metaphysics of Descartes, great physicist though he was, is still as mythological as that of the schoolmen. With him, as with Leibnitz, with Malebranche, with Kant, with the transcendentalists, the soul of man is not native to the world which it knows, but is a citizen of supernal regions, with God and the angels and other noumena, and its eternal salvation is to be found, not in the world which conditions it actually, but in that transcendent region the happiness of which, for some unaccountable whimsy, it forsakes, only to strive, once it becomes incarnate, to recover the everlasting good it had abandoned.

Indeed, from Bruno to Schopenhauer, there is only one thinker whose insight revealed the continuity and mutual dependence of physics and metaphysics; who restored man to nature and asserted explicitly what other thinkers had assumed as the motive and guiding interest in speculation. This man is Spinoza. His system was definitely determined by the efficacy of the physics current in his day. In his work dialectic becomes once more relevant to physics and criticism to existence. He is *par excellence* the modern philosopher. With the schoolmen, with Descartes, with Kant, with the other mediævals, he recognizes the patent fact all speculation starts with,—that mankind finds itself in an environment to which, failing of mastery, it must succumb. This environment is nature and man is a part of it, its slave. What life there is for man can be only in nature, what happiness, what safety, what certitude, can be only natural. Nature is all. Philosophy consists in understanding nature and man; what is certain, constant, trustworthy in each, and in so establishing their relations as to ensure man's survival, perfection, and happiness. And survival, perfection, and happiness come through freedom, and freedom, in this deterministic world of ours,

is control. Freedom is control; it is to view things *sub specie æternitatis*, it is to see things as they really are,—to discover and understand the character and laws of nature,—in a word, so to possess truth, that existence, perfection, and happiness may be secured. Man lives by truth alone; the more he has, the more stable, perfect, and happy his life; and it is a devotion to truth that is the intellectual love of God.

So Spinoza, Bacon excepted, was the first philosopher since Aristotle to make explicit the need and assumption all philosophy starts with: to define clearly its organic function and high place in human life. Had his lead been followed, his plain meaning been plainly understood, civilization might have been today much closer upon the more concrete and workable definition of a natural ethic and relevant metaphysic than was possible to him. But he was born two centuries too soon. Men were still too much subject to the intellectual seas of mediævalism, feared the unknown too much; so were bound to speculate upon securing the magical intervention of God and the translunar, immortality of heaven, rather than, as honest merchants should, to traffic sincere experiment and endeavour for a knowledge of nature and a possession of truth. Spinoza was accused of atheism and forgotten. When late in the eighteenth and in the early romantic days of the nineteenth century he began to come into his own, the anthropomorphic and Platonizing habit of those who came to love him—notably, Lessing and Jacobi of an earlier generation—made them value the merely verbal and incidental part of his thinking more than the essential. The atheist became a "God-intoxicated" man. That, after two thousand years, he had recovered for the world the fact of man's naturalness, the pertinence of speculation to the actual conditions of his existence, the specific function of truth; that he had laid the foundation of, and had presented in an almost final form, the basis of a natural, rational ethics, that he had rehabilitated human happiness in nature by showing how natural were the goods humanity needed and sought,—these things were not thought of. Only very recently have they begun to be considered at all. For whatever the practice of mankind has been, speculation has moved steadily upon its supernal and irrelevant but pleasant way.

The discrediting of speculation was an inevitable outcome. The first half of the century following Spinoza's was a period in which laws became firmer, safety more certain, life more com-

fortable and longer. Attention turned, as in the days of the Sophists, from the objects known to the knowing process. In England, particularly, where, all in all, upper-class humanity was most prosperous, an efficient and careful empirical psychology developed, which, with an efficacious natural philosophy apparently defined nature and man in such a way as to make adaptation definitely successful. Ontology, being too aristocratic for this efficacious physics and being explained away by this new psychology, became an object of scorn. The one consistent "idealist" of history, Berkeley, had his psychology turned to ridicule because he invoked it to reinforce a current theology; its ontological aspect was ignored. The eighteenth century is positivistic and moralistic. Hegel calls it, as Windelbrand calls the fifth century B.C. in Greece, "the Enlightenment." Religion and science hold the field; metaphysics appears relegated to the noumenal limbo with which it deals. Theories of knowledge and systems of ethics naturalistic or religious are opposed to each other. There are controversies concerning the origin of society and the nature of the good given in the environment. The outcome is a general victory for positivism and a new methodology which should undermine the solid foundations of that very positivism, as once before had happened in Greece. The method is that of epistemology. Upon an analysis of how the mind knows, begun at first in the interest of morals and science, follow the theological sensationalism of Berkeley and the transcendental Christianism of Kant. Ontology, become bankrupt by trying to define objective nature without relevance to her experimentally ascertainable constitution, comes by an analysis of the knowing process, into possession of an instrument, the doctrine of the transcendental, which justifies its irrelevance and carries it on, once more the chief arbiter of man's fate, conserving him and his happiness in the transmundane regions so dear to its consistently wayward heart.

In the work of Immanuel Kant metaphysics and natural philosophy become divorced in a sense in which divorce had been impossible except in the most impossible of patristic systems of early Christianity. Indeed, Kant's interest was the interest of a devout Christian. Didactic by profession and theological by instinct, he was reluctantly convinced by the epistemological analyses of Hume that it was utterly hopeless to maintain an ontology in the face of a precise and efficacious psycho-physics to

which that ontology was irrelevant and beside which it appeared mythical. On occasion he saw more clearly than most modern philosophers except Spinoza, the patently practical motive which is the matrix of speculation. "All interest," he writes, "is ultimately practical, and even that of the speculative reason is merely conditional and only complete in its practical use." But to him the practical interest was an interest not so much in the actual temporal self-maintenance of mankind in happiness, as in the subsistence of a certain "noumenal" nature which was free and immortal and lived with God. Without this transcendental nature the world could not be. The play of its forms invested the poor phenomenon with such efficacy as the phenomenon had. All that was worthy, all that was desirable and good, was eternal and transcendent. One could not go from the world to the good but from the good to the world. This world was but a fiat of some transcendental ego of apperception, which was one of the hierarchy of eternal spectators of their own created dance of plastic circumstance. The locus of metaphysical reality was transferred from nature to man. Innate categorical imperatives, eternal subsistence of a "self" on whom the world's subsistence depended, constant forms into which the slavish "non-ego" was harnessed, these became the furniture of a new ontology which could no longer be attacked in the name of human decency or repudiated by physics. For both nature and human nature become the play of a transcendent will, or mind, or ego, or spirit, or idea, which might be One or many, but the essence of which was anthropomorphic, immortal, and blissful. So the happiness and everlasting life of human nature was again metaphysically assured—and in a dialectic more irrelevant, farther removed from actual needs and conditions common to all existence than ever in the history of philosophy before.

Transcendentalism expresses an aspiration far more than it represents a fact. Its method, its irresponsibility, and its outcome are subjective: to the fancy, delightful; for the will, futile. The ten years which followed the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* were years of turmoil and of labour for the whole of Europe. The French Revolution had attempted to establish in the world of men and things what Kant had asserted theoretically of the other side of that world,—freedom, equality, fraternity. Germany, overrun by Frenchmen, seems to have felt the strain and to have responded to the stress more richly and

vitally than any other region in Europe. Society seemed never so fluid, fortune so fickle, the soul so pregnant with possibilities. The soul's fond adventures became the dearest subject of romance; and that great autonomous cosmopolis became the dream of the romantic moralist which had been the confiding belief of the faithful theologian, Kant. He had uncovered the secret of the eternal, free soul, creator of worlds. Society might crumble and custom wane, governments might lapse and nations perish, the self-sufficient and unchanging Ego endured. In the transcendent self all the stability and eternity which the time lacked would be found abiding. Indeed all changes were its changes, the world was its figment; it realized all man desired to be and was not. The spirit of this outlook is poetic and religious; it reconstructs but does not register experience. Had it laid no claim to being true there would be no quarrel with it, but by claiming truth it subverted the aims of the life it came to express—it defined the environment falsely and belied the nature of man. So in the pristine purity of its character is Transcendentalism. When it made concessions to physics and identified the process of nature with the dialectical development of the Ego or the world-soul, then it encumbered thought with a useless mutation of one description of the environment into false and misleading terms. Whatever its method or form, its outcome is, nevertheless, not different from that of any other philosophy—a definition of the eternal traits of the environment, an ordination therein of the maximum of human life and human happiness its nature permits. The successors of Hegel and Fichte and Schelling and Schopenhauer reconstructed the universe of natural philosophy still more conservatively: for one the Absolute is the refuge and the redeemer from the flux of opinion, from the contradictions of experience and logic; the locus of ineffable and eternal truth; for another it is the fulfilment of all frustrated purposes, the satisfaction of all lapsed desires, the victory of all defeated ideals. Mankind is, as usually, dialectically eternalized, but a more rigid or a less discriminating selection is exercised than by other supernatural systems. Either "Reason" as freedom from contradiction only, or as the realized "Good," or as indiscriminately evil and good together, is conserved and everlasting, because conserved and harmonized in an all-enveloping mind or an all-embracing will, no other in its nature and activity than the human mind or will, and in truth nothing else than anthropomorphized matter.

In the meantime natural philosophy has gone upon its plodding and painstaking way, measuring its every step, squaring its definition of reality with reality itself,—justifying its function and its existence by contributing in its few centuries of activity far more to actual human preservation than have all the ages of philosophy and religion. Science has meant control of the actual environment, not flight from it; it has meant a longer and richer life, a more reasonable morality, a profounder insight into nature, a more brilliant and happier future for mankind. It has defined the good as no philosophy has succeeded in defining it; it has co-ordinated man with nature, has shown him where his happiness lies and furnished him with the means of its attainment. Never in history has human life had at its command so many instruments to make and keep it stable, richer in successful operation, fuller of comfort for body and spirit. Science has meant control of the flux, where few philosophies have meant more than an escape from its uncertainties into regions of unverifiable certainties sought by hope and refused by experience. Philosophy has, like religion, run with desire while science has plodded with occasion. Both have aimed at the same thing—so to define reality as to achieve by means of these definitions final and masterful adaptations of it to mankind. But all in all philosophy has failed because it has acted as the fancy moved it or the heart desired; it has persisted in a primitive method which experience demonstrated to be unworthy because its outcome was untrue; it was irrelevant. Science has succeeded because it has dealt with actual natures and conditions and not with those imputed so pathetically and fallaciously. In a word, most philosophy has been anthropomorphic as well as anthropocentric. It sought to endow the soul with all that it desired, irrespective of whether the environment could grant it or no. It was bound to establish immortality, eternity of the good, the true, and the beautiful. Whether its propositions were true did not matter; they were immediately satisfactory. In what they asserted there was compensation for the wounds and the defeats, the doubts and the danger of experience. And one way to escape from experience is to belittle it, to deny its power and its value, to make it a transition to inexperiencing, because eternal, godhead. But the world is none the better, nor is mankind more master of it when the high-priests of human desire, the philosophers, paint its image as the image of man. Such work is delightful

and inspiring as art, but it is not a description of fact. And it is by truth alone that man can live, for it is truth that gives power and mastery. In the long run dialectic has defeated its own ends. More often than not attempts to act upon its account of the universe have led to the destruction rather than the conservation of the actors. Cherishing a dramatic figment, it has for ages deprived science of its function, belied nature, and betrayed man. Now that science has come into its own, dialectic maintains itself by opposing existence with aspiration, the necessary with the desirable. Who shall wonder at its disrepute? To return to its ancient status of being a love of wisdom, it must descend from the empty spaces in which it moulds verbal mirages to satisfy the heart, re-wed its ancient spouse, Existence—become, in a word, relevant to the actual needs and actual conditions of life. It may not, as Transcendentalism has done, make physics a soliloquy in the Ego's farce; it may not, as most rationalisms do, start with a desiderated ultimate and work to the actual. Its task is so to describe the whole environment as to make facile its actual use and control, to render possible a real mastery of it,—that the years and the happiness of men may be lengthened in the world. Philosophy must become in reality what it set out to be in its youth—the love of wisdom, which is the science of happy living. So, understanding the actual reasons of life, it may properly envisage the life of reason.

HORACE M. KALLEN.

University of Wisconsin.

Statement of the ownership, management, circulation, etc., required by the act of August 24, 1912, of *The Mid-West Quarterly*, published at New Rochelle, N. Y., for October 1, 1916.

Editor, P. H. FRYE, post office address, Station A, Lincoln, Neb.

Publishers, G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York City.

Owners, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, Lincoln, Nebraska.

Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders, holding 1 per cent. or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities, None.

P. H. FRYE, *Editor*.

Sworn to and subscribed to before me this 16th day of October, 1916.

MAX WESTERMANN,
Notary Public.

Annual Subscription, $2 Single Number, 50 cents

The Mid-West Quarterly

Vol. IV. January, 1917 No. 2

I. *American High Prices and European Loans*
W. O. L. Taylor
II. *The Conversational Ceremonies in Hitzouri*
Harold S. Quigley
III. *Professorial Accreditation* Samuel Avery
IV. *A Shakespearean Festival at Stratford-on-Avon*
Clarence Stratton
V. *The Women in Shenstone's Allegory of Love*
Frederick Morgan Padelford
VI. *Our Literary Conventions* Margaret Lynn
VII. *Justice* William Chandler Hastings
VIII. *Reviews*
Poetry
Topics and Miscellanies

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New Rochelle, N. Y. London New York
The Knickerbocker Press

Entered as second-class matter, October 1, 1914, at the Post Office at New Rochelle, New York

The Mid-West Quarterly

Is owned and controlled by the University of Nebraska

P. H. FRYE, *Editor*

HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER
PHILO M. BUCK, Jr.
MALCOLM G. WYER
Associate Editors

SAMUEL AVERY,
Chancellor of the University
CHAS. SUMNER ALLEN,
President of the Board of Regents
Advisory Committee

T. A. WILLIAMS, *Business Manager*

The *Quarterly* is issued during the months of October, January, April, and July

Annual Subscription $2.00

Single Numbers . . . . . 50 cents

Address the Publishers, Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons
New Rochelle, N. Y., or
2, 4, and 6 West 45th Street, New York City

All contributions and editorial communications should be directed to the editors of The Mid-West Quarterly, Station A, Lincoln, Nebraska

THE
MID-WEST QUARTERLY

Vol. IV] JANUARY, 1917 [No. 2

AMERICAN HIGH PRICES AND EUROPEAN LOANS

I

Prices occur, they happen, not exactly fortuitously, as the wind is supposed to blow, where it listeth, but still as other natural events occur, externally to the householder, the tradesman, the farmer, the merchant, if not the banker. And men complain, sometimes that prices are low and sometimes that they are high, according to their several interests. To-day prices are too high, growl consumers in chorus. High prices are become matter of public concern. The morning paper reports the President of the United States as stating to the convention of the National Grange that middlemen are to blame for the high prices of food. The New York district attorney says there is no doubt of a widespread conspiracy to raise the price of food.

A ray of hope is emitted by declarations of certain department officials at Washington (October 25th):

> "They have found no evidence of price juggling and say high prices always go with prosperity—in itself an evidence of a demand that, in the case of labour, boosts prices. They declare wages of other classes, those generally known as consumers, always lag behind, and will rise gradually—very gradually—with prices. Prices, they maintain, will drop gradually with the end of the war or with bigger crops and an increase in manufactured goods."

Evidently these strange officials are not canvassing for re-election.

But governments and departments of justice are unconvinced. On November 11th, we read a dispatch from Canada: "Combining to enhance prices of necessaries of life has been made an

offence by the Canadian government. . . . Penalties are $5,000 fine or two years' imprisonment." Action has been taken by the United States: "Chicago, Nov. 1st.—Drastic and immediate action will be taken in the federal investigation of the soaring prices of food products," Charles F. Clyne, United States district attorney announced to-day. Mr. Clyne said that he had information that jobbers in Peoria, Springfield, and East St. Louis hold daily conversations over long-distance telephones and fix the prices of foodstuffs.

"We are informed," Mr. Clyne said, "that these same jobbers control prices of foods throughout Ohio, Missouri, and Iowa and the southern and central portions of Illinois."

Well, I suppose the prices of food have to be fixed by somebody. Has it come to this, that dealers are to be forbidden to use the telephone in making their deals?

The National Housewives' League has declared a nation-wide boycott against the egg. The consumers' clubs of Chicago have investigated the rising price of bread, but have found that the bakers are not to blame. Doubtless it will also be found that the millers are not either; and it is even possible that the middlemen, the buyers and graders at the grain centres, are not so black as they are painted.

The retail prices of foods have advanced since 1907, more or less along with those of other commodities, and somewhat in proportion, perhaps, to the bountiful supply of gold.

INDEX NUMBERS:

1907,	81	1911,	90
1908,	83	1912,	96
1909,	87	1913,	98
1910,	91	1914,	101
		1915,	100

But it is not till the present year that high prices have disconcerted and deteriorated the American dinner. The full story is not yet released, but we have some comparisons by months: thus let us take the relative retail prices for food on July 15th since 1912:

INDEX NUMBERS:

1912,	94	1914,	101
1913,	98	1915,	99
		1916,	109

"A comparison of prices from July 15, 1913, to July 15, 1916, shows an advance in the price of all articles combined of 16 per cent., each article for which prices were carried for the five-year period showing an advance. Round steak advanced 24 per cent. . . . and sugar advanced 41 per cent. From July 15, 1915, to the same date in 1916 there was an advance in all articles examined of 10 per cent. The only article which made any noticeable decline in price was flour, 7 per cent. Sugar advanced 25 per cent. and all meats advanced from bacon 7 per cent. to hens 17 per cent."

A local investigation held recently in a city of the north-west is so conclusive as to the astonishing rise in prices of the last three months that it deserves quotation at length.

"Economists blame the increased cost of living and high prices on the cheapness of the dollar. The cheap money theory is born out by interest rates, and the ease with which loans can be made. The politician says that high prices are due to the war, if he is a republican worker.

"Citizens who have been paying 40 cents a pound for butter and 35 cents a dozen for eggs, to say nothing of meat, can well understand how prices have risen in almost every business. Where grocery prices have not advanced, in such items as package and canned goods, the container has been reduced in size until the increased cost of the raw product was met.

"One year ago this month commission firms were paying 10 cents a pound for springs and hens. This year the price has advanced to 14 and 15 cents, wholesale. Potatoes at $1 a bushel are twice as high as they were during the first two years of the war. Butter and eggs are higher than any time in recent years. It is worthy of note that in October, 1914 and 1915, food prices were much alike, but that the big increase has come within the last year."

At the time at which I am writing, a month later, every householder knows that the above prices have been put in the shade.

The present article is an attempt to expound the trenchant opening statement of the above quotation, that the increased cost of living and the high prices are to be blamed on the cheap dollar. The only conspiracy that I can see is a conspiracy of district attorneys, ignorant of economics and anxious to make political capital, or subservient to a misguided central authority.

Led rather prematurely to speak of food prices, I do not wish without further protest to abandon the subject of administration regulation. The supposed remedies have been abundantly announced in the papers for the past two years. When meat prices went up, we were told that the district attorneys were instructed to prosecute wherever conspiracy to raise prices might be ferreted out. Quasi-public bodies and societies have been, in their minds, running down engrossers, forestallers, and conspirators. The

contagion of high prices has, nevertheless, spread steadily and surely until it has infected every commodity. All are at last tainted and forsooth we should abstain from all, for are they not the product of extortion and of monopoly? If the administration view—and in this I include that of numerous consumers' societies—is correct, then truly are the producers of this land, the merchants large and small, the middlemen, the manufacturers, and even the farmers, all guilty and all melted down into one criminal conspiracy.

We have yet to learn of a single conviction as the result of all this pother and superstition. But if all kinds and manners of men are not by sorcery and deviltry turned into engrossers and forestallers, it remains a patent proposition that all have been influenced by a single cause, a financial cause, the principle of which also finds application in time of peace, but which has recently been extraordinarily potent in Europe, in the form of war loans. Our officials are sadly deficient in originality. Similar troubles have been administratively doctored by similar medicines and surgery during all history, and always without success. The repetition unceasingly of the same blunders by high authority must be the result of a mental bias, of an *a priori* assumption, which no ordinary experience can dispel. The real remedy, therefore, lies in reason. Let us, then, appeal to Reason.

II

It is only too evident that inquests into high particular prices do not find what they seek. What the inquisitors really want to know is the cause of general prices; but they go at their task with lack of preparation, and in ignorance of what they really want. It is the common cause of a common deviation from the prices of ordinary times that lies at the bottom of the curiosity. The mere variations of the prices of the several commodities compared with each other, the more ostensible object of inquiry, may, in a few cases, be rather conspicuous, but they are temporary, due to the fact that the general rise strikes some commodities before it does others. They do not, therefore, justify any extraordinary solicitude.

It is in the nature of private business to centre attention upon a single line of merchandise traffic and for a period of time equal to a single turnover. The habit of mind so engendered spreads

through a community essentially commercial and prejudices men against the larger viewpoint. Men are not interested, as they should be, in general prices. If they momentarily admit the principle at issue and the larger domain behind their narrow horizon, their minds too readily relapse into the hand-to-mouth psychosis.

Academic logistics are far from the present purpose. It is important, however, that the public learn to put a just importance upon the close connection between loans and prices. This connection established, the public will be in position better to judge the value of various propositions for relieving the purse of the consumer. The plain question is: Is it greater consumption that has sent up copying paper and boots and shoes as much as wheat? Clearly, wheat does not exchange for more boots and shoes—nor do boots and shoes exchange for more wheat. If we carry this reasoning out to the end of the list, we find that all things have risen in money; and in paper money, bank deposits, and all forms of credit, more than in gold. The world's crops are but little below the average of the last ten years, millions of consumers have been killed, so that, by and large, one would not expect wheat to buy many more shoes than a year ago. But they both buy more dollars. That is the point I desire to make clear. I believe therefore that a simple statement of the pertinent facts of recent history will force upon the reader the conclusion that prosecution for conspiring and forestalling can give no relief, but that high general prices are inevitable under the circumstances of war and loaning which are in presence.



Not long before prices rose precipitously, the war broke out. Let us see whether we can connect the two, the war and prices. The year 1914 had so far been one of depression. A glance at the chart, showing the fluctuation of the average prices of "all" commodities, indicates a significant recession in the year. Railroad gross earnings had fallen off "in the first six months of 1914, which was decidedly a period of shrinking trade."

The balance of trade for July was "unfavourable," quite a usual experience at that season, and gold was moving out of the country. The year ending July 1, 1914, showed a net loss of $98,589,330 gold for this country. War was declared August 1st. American securities, already homesick, came back with a rush. The stock exchange in New York was closed to prevent the otherwise inevitable discrediting of American industry. The paralysis of exchange was completed by the temporary stoppage of the oceanic mails. For, payment of balances due internationally by the United States is made by the discounting in London of bills drawn in furtherance of the movement abroad of grain and other exports, which increases with the autumn. The dealer, purchasing here and discounting in England such time bills, sells against them sight bills which serve the present purpose of importers of goods or securities. That is, the dealer sells if the rate of interest is stationary or falling, or, what is the same thing, if the rate of exchange is rising, for it is no object to him to want to recover only the same or less than he paid. If interest is rising, however, he defers the transaction till maturity, for obvious advantage of the higher price of sight bills.[1] The stopping of mail communication blocked exchange operations. Gold could not be exported; there was no way to pay for imported securities.

England was impatient for the gold that was due her; but, even when the seas were opened, American bankers repeated their foolish policy of 1907 and refused to let their gold leave the vaults. Instead of acknowledging their inefficient control of international finance, they put up the feeble argument that they would not send gold if Europe did not return the compliment. They pretended that they were afraid England would also hoard gold. As soon as the balance of trade turned the other way, however, England sent us her gold, freely, munificently, so that we are now choking with it, choking with the high prices partly due to English gold.

Fortunately, the reserve board was already organized, although the reserve banks were not. The board brought the bankers together and founded a hundred million fund to pay trade balances; the English Government established a subtreasury at Ottawa, whither we could send the gold.

Here it is well to pause to remark on the need of a big central

[1] O. M. W. Sprague, "The Crisis of 1914 in the United States," *The American Economic Review*, Sept., 1915, p. 505.

store of gold, as explained by Mr. Warburg of the reserve board in his address before the American Bankers' Association, September 29th. Every enlightened banking project has made provision for it—the Aldrich plan, the Fowler plan, etc. But the public is jealous of its local institutions, and vested interests call for pause, so that the principle was slurred over in the reserve board law. But the legislators avoided overt rejection of the principle and waited for better days, when recognition of the good works of the board might favour its further recommendations. It may be that, as Wall Street organs assert, the concentration would be excessive. There should, perhaps, be more gold "in the pockets of the people" than at present or at least a considerable quantity should be left in the local banks. But when provision has been made for that, no valid argument is left against the central store of gold, ready for export at a moment's notice, when necessary to preserve the country's credit, and also subject to salutary restrictions on export, when the stock is so low as to imperil domestic credit. If it had existed in July and August, 1914, the interruption to business would have been less, the extraordinary gold funds for financing the securities sales, the New York City notes coming due in London, and the cotton crop, temporarily a drug on the market, might have been spared. It was of good omen that the reserve board was able to take the initiative in much of this improvised work of adjustment to extraordinary circumstances. The crisis of 1914 was strictly a war crisis, although the United States was not at war. It was also a true crisis of the variety which some writers have denominated a "money" crisis, and did not arise from unsoundness in either industry or finance. It was not a reaction from high prices, and least of all was it an occasion of high prices.

III

But high prices and inflation were not long to wait. During the first year of the war, England sent some three or four hundred million dollars gold to the United States. England paid in coin abroad and in paper at home. American exports rose with giant strides. As to gold exports, after the net loss for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1914, of $98,589,330 cited above, the calendar year 1915 showed a gain of $212,925,875, and eight months of 1916, another gain of $202,744,207. At that rate, 1916 should show a

plus balance of three hundred millions.[1] As to exports, whereas, in August, 1914, our total exports were but $110,367,494, there being for that month a net balance over imports of $19,400,396, in the same month of 1916 our balance of exports over imports equalled $310,531,289. "This aggregate (of recent exports) stands as a high-water mark for any country or empire of the world by a considerable amount, as do all the totals, beginning with February, but in less degree."

"Furthermore, the mark the United States has now set up exceeds the combined monthly outflow of goods in 1912 from Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. Finally, the August exports at $510,000,000 is at a ratio that maintained would show the outward trade of the United States to be about one-third of that of the whole world in normal times."

But I anticipate. How does Great Britain finance the war? Briefly, by paper and taxes. So much one would expect. By moratoria or reprieves granted to debtors, that country effected on its side of the water what the closing of the exchanges and the gold funds did on this. The government then proceeded to authorize the Bank of England to guarantee exchange, accepted prior to August 4th, and to give credit for the same till a year after the close of hostilities.[2] Strong with this guaranty, as soon as the seas were opened, dealers discounted in London again as of old, and the guaranty funds collected in America soon fell into innocuous desuetude. They had been little used; but did their part in restoring confidence.

A year ago, it was stated that "the borrowing of the English Government from the English banks has resulted in an increase of something like one billion dollars in the circulating medium of England—a billion dollars of currency expansion."[3] Between June and November, 1915, "the deposits of the joint stock banks of the United Kingdom, including the Bank of England, have increased from $4,055,000,000 to $5,220,000,000."

Now, the purchasing power of a society of credit-using men consists of notes and deposits. Money, metallic money, is

[1] "The net imports (of gold) for December have been sufficient to raise this (year's) total to not far from $500,000,000, and our domestic production (of gold) has exceeded industrial consumption by about $60,000,000." January letter of the National City Bank of New York.

[2] A. D. Noyes, *Financial Chapters of the War*, Ch. III.

[3] H. J. Davenport, "War Finance and American Business," *The Journal of Political Economy*, Feb., 1916, p. 105.

chiefly kept in reserve. If, as I suppose is the case, recourse to the banks and to the printing press has been had by England ever since, the mass of this sort of demand obligation at present in America as well as abroad beggars the imagination. But it is "purchasing power," "circulation," or "medium of exchange," in other words, notes and deposits, that make prices anyhow, and especially where redemption with metallic money is restricted, as it is in all Europe to-day. It is no wonder then that we read the following recent dispatch:

"London, Nov. 15th—The retail prices of foodstuffs compared with a year ago have increased on an average of 27 per cent., says the report of the Board of Trade. They have increased 78 per cent. over prices before the war. The prices of sugar, eggs, fish, and potatoes, however, are more than double the pre-war prices."

When prices have more or less uniformly soared, shall we say that "purchasing power" has increased or diminished? When it takes two pounds paper to buy what one pound sterling used to all through the list of articles on sale, it certainly looks as though the paper pound was weaker than the time-honoured yellow metal used to be.

But the advance in English prices is not confined to foodstuffs. Their rise might plausibly or partially be explained on grounds of scarcity. Whitaker showed that for January 1, 1916, the depreciation of the English pound since the outbreak of the war measured in commodities in general was 25 per cent., of the franc was 33 per cent., of the mark was 43 per cent., and of the dollar was 5 per cent. And so the dollar had depreciated too; and they have doubtless all gone down, down, ever since. Thus we perceive that the same process has been in operation in all European countries. Even countries not in the war are taxed to defend their neutrality. If the full effect of President Wilson's preparedness law had been felt by the American taxpayer before election day, it is a safe statement that he would not have slipped in for a second term.

IV

It is in the nature of social phenomena to spread. Prices form no exception to this law of "imitation." Somehow, when prices are high in Europe, and excitement of war is communicated to us, and in increased intensity, it would almost appear, we cannot escape the conclusion that high prices here are due to the war

over there. Of course, if Europe were still upon a gold basis, one could readily understand that a general and common level of prices would be effected by the competition of the goods market. But that would be a levelling down, and the competition would come from America. But now every American packer or munition maker scales his prices up by the full difference in the pars of gold dollars and paper pounds, adding on a safe margin for further depreciation and concealed profits, no doubt, and the competition comes from abroad. We are nearing an answer to the main question: Where do American high prices come from?

But our high prices are still apparently gold prices, for we are technically on a gold basis as much as ever. Remember, however, that the country contains an abnormal quantity of the precious metals. A dispatch of October 2, 1916, says:

"New York.—Shipments of gold to the United States since the beginning of the European war, in conjunction with the domestic production, brought the total of gold in this country from $1,887,279,664 on August 1, 1914, to $2,636,009,564 on October 1, 1916, the gain in amount in the twenty-six months' period being $748,738,904, according to a compilation announced here to-night. The amount of gold imported during the war, it was pointed out, is greater than that for the full decade preceding the war, and the imports for June, 1916, were greater than in any full year previous to the war, with the single exception of 1908. The gold in the United States is now double that of 1904 and 40 per cent. more than at the beginning of the war, it is said."

With such a stock on hand, the value of the gold itself depreciates. If the credit is depreciated, whither would one export the gold, in these troublous times in order to effect contraction and fall of prices? Moreover, when reserves are overflowing it occurs to no one, unless it be to an exchange broker, to question solvency and redeemability. Even when finances are on a peace footing, gold does not necessarily emigrate the moment the purchasing power of the dollar falls. "Herein lies one of the advantages of the credit system. There is no daily incentive to make the comparison. The guaranty fund (gold) is safely ensconced in the vaults of the banks. The slight fluctuation in its exchange value is perceptible chiefly to cambists, in the large centres." And so, under all the existing circumstances of gold holdings and suspension of specie payments abroad, the way is paved for an American expansion comparable to the European. If and to the extent that American gold is depreciated, American prices must rise. So much is to be considered as settled.

And that is what is going on. While we lack totals for recent months, it is worth while quoting a chart for "all" commodities worked out up to the beginning of the year:

"The bureau's weighted index number for December stood at 105, the highest point reached in any year since the data for the present series of reports on wholesale prices was begun." (*Labor Bulletin*, No. 200, p. 9.)



The rise in prices, the significant rise, is really that which has taken place since last August. Each morning and evening the press dispatches are fraught with new or further rises of prices. Indeed, a Chicago humorist has remarked that purchasers no longer dispute prices, they pay whatever is asked, and are not surprised at any price, however arbitrary. Thus retailers often overreach unwary customers, and shamefully violate the "one price" principle, which is become a part of trade morality. Shoes are expected soon to be $20.00 or even $30.00 per pair and coal goes glimmering. What are the poor to do? In New York it is proposed to introduce economies in distribution. District attorneys are spurred to action. The persecution of middlemen is revived. An universal atmosphere of suspicion is sown by authorities who are helpless but must put on a brave, if futile, air of doing something, and can think of nothing better than the long discountenanced regulations, fines, forfeits, and staples of the Middle Ages.

The engineers are determined to enforce the Adamson law, the objection to which now lies more in its partiality and in the way in which it was procured than in the rise of wages it commands. Undoubtedly, all wages should be raised in some proportion to the advance in prices, not only wages on the railroads,

but in all salaried callings. When food is provided by employers, as in the case of domestic help or soldiers, the rise should be less. Of course, sooner or later, perhaps very soon, prices will fall again; and then wages will come down, whether an act is passed to lower them or not. But, for the moment, wages should go up, and some employers, like the steel corporation, have recognized the inflation by a voluntary raise of wages. It is a defect of our industrial system that wages reflect inflation so much more slowly than do prices.

When gold flows into the reserves, the banks are encouraged to loan; "money becomes easy"; an excessive abundance of deposits is created; "purchasing power" is multiplied, and prices rise. England was glad to send us the gold; it has paid for the first instalments of munitions. It has done more. It has made easy money, so that she could borrow from Americans to pay other Americans for more munitions. Thus more purchasing power has been created, and prices in America have received a further fillip. And more fillips are to come.

Officials are not likely to reach the cause of high prices. In a broad way we may say that the American rise of prices and inflation are in imitation of the European. The economists' view of the process was well stated by Professor Davenport last winter. England spends about six billion dollars a year on the war. The total income of her people is twelve. A fair view of the case leads to the inference that, after exhausting the resources of taxation and domestic loans, she must obtain over two billions a year by foreign loans. Now comes the critical part of the argument: In order to do this she has two courses open to her, says Davenport: either to sell bonds "directly to the people," or to obtain loans from foreign, mostly American, banks, on collateral of bonds. She has chosen the latter course and has chosen wrongly, for loans inflate prices; sales do not.

Without refinements of theory, it is plain that private purchasing is done with bank deposits. Governments also purchase with the same instruments, deposits. Prices are the ratio of "dollars on deposit" offered for units of goods sold. More such book dollars, higher prices. The thing is plain as a pikestaff. If England had obtained money in the United States by straight sale, purchasers of English bonds would have offered deposits already existing, dollars already inscribed at the banks to their credit. Instead of that, England went to the American banks,

obtained from them new dollar inscriptions or "deposits," and thus added so much to the previous deposits, which have been the chief part of our circulation or purchasing medium. With these new deposits she has paid the manufacturers of munitions. When ordinary mercantile loans are granted, there is prospect of speedy retirement of the new deposits so created, through repayment of the loans. But the government loans we are now contemplating with a sort of terror, are never to be paid off. Consequently, for so much circulation there is no prospect of retirement. It will continue permanently saddled upon the existing or current deposits arising from trade and industry.

But the full inflational effect does not appear at once. The country is now prosperous, the exchanges are enormous, the foreign trade is unheard-of, as suggested above. It may be well to add figures for exports for a series of years, those for November, 1912, being the highest figures up to that date:

November, 1912	$278,244,191
February, 1915	300,000,000
December, 1915	350,000,000
February, 1916	400,000,000
May, 1916	475,000,000
August, 1916	510,000,000

Part of this increase is inflation; most is not.

Railroad earnings tell the same story of enormous business. "These (forty-nine American) roads earned in gross fully $324,219,430 more in the first six months of 1916 than in the first six months of 1915." However, the corresponding periods of 1915 and 1914 were below the average. As to prices for the year 1915, Professor Fisher, who has carried exactness to its limit in the computation of changes of general price level, shows that in that year the increase of circulating medium was fairly neutralized by that of trade, deposits having increased only 6 per cent., while trade volume was 19 per cent. larger than in 1914. There were other factors that we do not need to go into, but a large part of the increase of 19 per cent. in the volume of trade was undoubtedly due to the resumption and great expansion of trade in securities.[1]

At last, however, the inelasticity due to the outstanding,

[1] Irving Fisher, "The Equation of Exchange for 1915," *The American Economic Review*, June, 1916.

unretirable government security for the deposits, is more plainly showing itself. The following table of total deposits of national banks gives the clue:

1880	$ 833,701,034
1900	2,458,092,758
1913	5,953,461,551
1914	6,268,962,430
1915	6,661,581,843
September 2, 1915	6,762,182,000
May 1, 1916	8,136,018,000
September 12, 1916	8,362,000,000

On conservative estimate, there has, then, been an increase of say 23 per cent. in deposits in the year ending in September last; and while these figures include the more innocent time deposits, their subtraction would not greatly alter the proportion. The evidence all goes to show that war loans are raising our prices very materially.

The press dispatches give the following figures for European war loans placed in America up to date:

United States	$1,460,000,000
Canada	335,000,000
	$1,795,000,000

A glance at the figures for deposits shows that we have been expanding since the war began, at two or three times the previous rate, which was itself already excessive. The volume of war loans is quite sufficient to account for the luxuriant expansion.

No one can deny that general price conditions have greatly changed, that the expansion is there to account for the change, that it is partly concealed by a deceptive war prosperity, and that when that prosperity ceases there is likelihood that our prices will go up like a rocket and come down like the stick.

But it is very doubtful if the boom and expansion could have been avoided. The Davenportian formula leaves out of account many practical difficulties.[1] Davenport admits that the English Government probably issued paper money in order to create an artificially low rate of interest, thus obtaining a favourable market for its bonds; *i. e.*, in order to be able to place 5 per cents.

[1] Allowed for by Professor Davenport in a recent article in *The Annalist* for December 4th.

And there are doubtless many considerations that made it impossible to sell "directly to the people" in this country. One is the item of expense of sale. It has usually proven cheaper for governments to make use of banks in placing their loans.

At the close of the Civil War, the astronomer economist, Newcomb, argued with much force for early retirement of the greenbacks. He maintained that they never ought to have been issued, on account of their inelasticity, the very ground given by Davenport for objection to bank credits to government; and he also argued that direct sale of bonds "to the people" would have obviated the inconveniences of inflation from which this country was then suffering. But it would be hard to prove that the government could have obtained funds needed for quick action at the outset, without the forced loan implied in the issue of paper money. Doubtless the excessive depreciation which followed might have been averted by a more vigorous policy of bonding and contraction. In reading American financial history of the post-bellum period, our sympathy does not go out to the Greenbacker.

No, I doubt much whether it was possible for this country to evade the grinding mill of the sociological law of "imitation." Wars are frequently followed (sometimes a few years intervene) by world-crises proportional to their size; that is to say, proportional to the borrowing and inflation. Whether the United States is in or out of the war does not make so much financial difference as those imagine who innocently or selfishly swallow the argument, "he kept us out of war."

V

Corollary to the discovery that prices are builded of loans is the other discovery that they are to be controlled by stock issues which are the collaterals of loans. In ordinary times the fluctuation of deposits on which prices so closely depend is caused by business loans. Government borrows either not at all or not in controlling quantity. And yet prices fluctuate greatly in times of peace. Expansion, prosperity, crisis, and depression succeed with rhythmic regularity. The long upward trend noticed on the first chart of prices shown above is probably due to abundance of gold, in considerable degree, although it is also to be credited partly to money economies, or to more rapid circulation. But

that slow gold movement is much less important to business men than the annual variations, which are evidently due to the extent of the loan market. Control of private and corporation loans will in such humdrum times have all the effect that control of government loans might have in war times. And such control is now well-nigh universal in legislation and in administrative practice. Let us glance, as a matter of curiosity, at the origin and development of this modern and most important branch of social control.

The question of corporation control is a part—the larger part—of capital control. And since, politically, control always comes from the opposition, we find that the political and quasi-political movements against capital come, quite naturally, from two classes of opponents, whose interests are far from identical, the artisans and the farmers. The latter have for a long time insisted that they must be paid good prices. The movement has regularly reappeared whenever new areas were open to cultivation and the supply of products was enlarged. The greenback movement, the grange, populism, were all based upon a demand for dollar wheat. Whether wheat was to be sold for a paper dollar or a silver dollar did not make any difference. In fact, knowing he could not get a gold dollar, the farmer clamoured for a paper or a silver dollar. He must be paid something called a dollar, no matter how little it was worth.

After the defeat of Mr. Bryan and the gradual break-up of populism, its leaders began to see a new light; they were half willing to admit that, in attempting to stretch the silver dollar in a golden bed, they had been repeating the foolishness of Procrustes. They somehow felt that they had mistaken their mission, which was really against capital and not against the dollar, and they promised that next time they would tackle the problem in a more scientific spirit, all of which gives comfort to the economists, who had been saying nasty things about the mental calibre of the free-silver people.

But the labouring class followed entirely different lines of approach in their trench warfare against capital. The labourer cannot hitch up with the farmer, for the latter is an employer of labour. Moreover, he is apt to be in debt for his farm, or at least to carry a mortgage on it, perhaps for a Ford, whereas the labourer is typically a creditor and interested in being paid in a really precious dollar, although he has occasionally failed to see

his interests. But labour leaders have done so, and have, on the whole, refused permanently to identify their people with a cheap money movement. The labourer has organized to strike for higher wages. He has generally kept out of politics, but has confined his efforts for favourable legislation to diplomatic pressure upon legislators already elected, and has been much more successful with the lawgivers than the farmer, as the statute books are loaded with restrictions and obligations laid upon capital with respect to labour. The culmination is the Adamson law raising the wages of a few classes of railroad employees. Thus the national government is brought into direct relations with the guilds, which are hereafter to fight each other on the floor of Congress, and the Middle Ages are restored—a perilous renovation, unless we choose to say: "Whatever is is right." Shall we say that about the war, also?

There are at present fifty-five public utilities commissions in the United States and Canada, besides the Interstate Commerce Commission in Washington. It is fair to ask whether, as a matter of historical development, the commissions, which pass under various names, are not really the joint outcome of the populist and labour movements. In other words, the principle of controlling the corporations—sometimes public service corporations alone—directly by supervision is the only one that works and fits the conditions.

The important point for our present purpose is that the chief function of this control, and the one which least collides, perhaps, with private management, is to pass upon corporation loans and stock issues. Now it is precisely stock and bond issues which, like government bonds, may be hypothecated and are habitually hypothecated in order to enter the market for equipment of railroads, for equipment of soldiers, and, in general, for all sorts of goods, even consumption goods, like automobiles. The query is therefore pertinent, whether the blind fury and gropings of populism have not at last entered the port of destination, whether the popular movement have not finally succeeded in effecting, deviously, a price control better than malcontents dreamed, but only effectual in times of peace. Thus, after much travail, do popular seethings congeal into rational law.

Should not the reserve bank board pass upon foreign government loans, even as the public utilities commissions of the various states are required to pass upon new issues of stocks and bonds of

corporations? The board has sounded a timely note of warning in its recent advice against investment in exchequer bills. But it should have more authority in the premises. At any rate, its proclamation justifies my admonition that expansion has gone too far. It is safe to assert that if the inflation due to the inelastic war loans were absent, the whole pestilence of suspicion and persecution of rumoured monopolists would disappear.

W. G. LANGWORTHY TAYLOR.

University of Nebraska.

THE CONGRESSIONAL GERRYMANDER IN MISSOURI

During the campaign of 1910, Mr. E. P. Prentice, chairman of the New York State Republican Committee, sent out the following notice to men deemed likely to be willing to make contributions to party funds:

"The election is unusually important. . . . The election of the Democratic ticket will enable the Democrats to redistrict the Congressional districts so that for the next ten years, twenty-five Congressional districts will probably be Democratic instead of twelve as at present. . . ."[1]

This statement appears to indicate that, following the decennial Congressional Reapportionment Act which since 1872 has uniformly laid down that congressmen "shall be elected by districts composed of a contiguous and compact territory, and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants,"[2] the successful party is expected to shape the districts from which members of Congress are to be elected in such a way as to ensure the maximum return of its own members. This reshaping of districts was practised long before it received the euphonious name it now bears. It is said to have been first employed in America when William Penn gave to Philadelphia an inequitably small representation as compared with surrounding rural districts in an effort to equalize representation.[3] That great colonial benefactor has escaped the odium, which another statesman of a later period now has attached to his memory. It was the least significant thing, perhaps, that Elbridge Gerry ever did in public life which has come to be the best known of his acts. The gerrymander lives on in a million shapes, it is amorphous, it belongs to no party. So widespread are its manifestations that to think of apportionment is to bring gerrymander to mind; this perversion of justice in districting has been succinctly defined as the "arranging of districts of representation by a political party in power so as

[1] Quoted by Griffin, H. F., "The Gerrymander," *Outlook*, cixvii, 186–93.

[2] 37 Stat. L., Law of 1911. The Law of 1842 provided only that the territory composing a district be contiguous.

[3] Griffith, E. C., *Rise and Development of the Gerrymander*, p. 26.

to concentrate its opponents' majorities and scatter its own, thus giving itself small majorities in many districts and its opponents large majorities in a few districts."[1] An evil which President Benjamin Harrison in his annual message to Congress, 1891, declared to be an element in our chief national danger, viz., "the overthrow of majority control by the suppression or perversion of the popular suffrage," is one which will require the study of others than politicians in order that public interest may be awakened and public knowledge increased.[2]

The material used in this essay is chiefly the election returns by counties in congressional districts. The method pursued is to take the districts separately and to examine as closely as possible the election returns, in order to determine the extent to which the minority party has been disfranchised. In the nature of things no writer without first hand knowledge of the ins and outs of political intrigue can hope sufficiently to exhibit those features of the situation in another locality than his own which are most interesting because of their personal appeal; there may, however, result a compensating absence of bias.[3]

The subject of this study is the congressional apportionment of 1910 in Missouri. It loses none of its interest from the fact that no redistricting took place in that state after the census of 1910, since it is obvious that failure to reapportion indicates simply that the majority party is satisfied with the *status quo*, and the investigator has before him the same problem, viz., to attempt to determine the degree of inequality in representation which the districts as they exist bring about. It will be possible also in some degree to compare results in late elections with those in different years of the preceding decade. The small returns from other than the Republican, Democratic, and Progressive parties make it possible and desirable to disregard them.

The investigation of gerrymandering in a particular state is aided by keeping in mind certain questions. These are: What is the population in the various districts? What was the poll of each party in each district at a specified election? What was the total state poll of each party at the election? How many

[1] Griffin, H. F., *op. cit.*, p. 187. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

[3] Through the courtesy of members of Congress from Missouri and of a former state senator of Missouri, information not available in the ordinary sources has enabled the supplementing of statistical data to some extent in this essay.

votes did it require to elect a congressman from each party? How many congressmen did each party elect? Are the borders of the districts regular or irregular?

The law, as has been noted, requires that the districts be of as nearly equal population as is practicable. In 1900 the census basis of apportionment was *194,182*, in 1910 it was *211,877*.[1] A comparative table of district populations for 1900 and 1910 will show how little attention was paid in Missouri to the law's recommendation.

Dist. No.	Pop. 1900	Pop. 1910	Dist. No.	Pop. 1900	Pop. 1910
1	183,590	174,971	9	197,370	190,688
2	183,358	171,135	10	290,187	416,389
3	182,960	159,419	11	182,667	203,667
4	221,885	179,707	12	152,424	149,390
5	195,193	283,522	13	218,970	167,188
6	162,629	150,486	14	265,264	296,316
7	215,629	218,182	15	231,659	226,374
8	142,254	142,621	16	158,173[2]	163,280[3]

These figures, and especially those in bold type speak for themselves. What they import will be brought out when the districts are separately considered for electoral statistics.

Before taking up each district by counties it will be useful to obtain a sort of bird's-eye view of the situation by comparing the Democratic and Republican votes in 1912 by districts. As this was the year in which the Progressive party first appeared in any importance, it is possible to compare the Republican vote with previous years. From this comparison the writer has drawn the conclusion that the Progressive vote did not weaken the Democratic party, and he has therefore in every case added the Progressive vote to the Republican wherever the Progressive party had a candidate, as occurred in a half-dozen districts. Such districts are starred.

Dist. No.	Dem. Vote 1912	Repub. Vote 1912	Dist. No.	D. V. '12	R. V. '12
1	20,874	17,830*	9	21,782	16,283
2	22,786	16,908*	10 R.	31,227	33,242[4]
3	19,213	14,900	11	19,653	12,448
4	20,232	16,631*	12	11,249	11,981
5	33,396	26,622*	13	16,079	13,406
6	17,858	15,881*	14 R.	26,081	32,863*
7	23,178	22,990*	15	21,000	12,850
8	16,219	11,965	16	15,908	10,811[5]

[1] *Statistical Abstract* for year 1914, p. 623.

[2] *Legislative Manual of Mo.*, 1903–4, p. 406.

[3] *Ibid.*, 1913–14, pp. 483–4.

[4] Normal Republican vote larger by ⅔. Heavy Prohibition vote in 1912.

[5] *Legislative Manual of Mo.*, 1913–14, pp. 1117–1124.

The striking thing immediately noticeable is the comparative equality in the returns of the two parties. The Republicans, however, won but two seats, the Democrats fourteen. In order, however, to eliminate the factor of possible error due to adding together Republican and Progressive votes, the figures for 1910 should be considered.

Dist. No.	Dem. Vote 1910	Repub. Vote 1910	Dist. No.	D. V. '10	R. V. '10
1	19,953	15,572	9	23,124	19,105
2	21,090	16,122	10 R.	28,054	53,298
3	19,213	14,900	11 R.	18,695	20,089
4	20,231	15,825	12 R.	13,121	15,965
5	31,026	23,982	13	16,020	15,386
6	17,504	14,374	14	23,612	22,463
7	22,433	21,951	15	21,259	20,443
8	16,642	14,349	16	16,239	14,763[1]
	Total Dem. Vote	328,216	To elect one Repr.		25,247
	Total Repub. Vote	318,587	To elect one Repr.		106,196

The practical equality of the great parties' strength in Missouri makes it a cause for congratulation to the districting party that they have accomplished their questionable work with such unquestionable success. A glance at a map will show also that only two districts, seven and fourteen, notably violate the rule of compactness. It is probably of the latter district, changed only slightly by the reapportionment of 1892 and 1901, that Bryce was thinking when he wrote: "And in Missouri a district has been contrived longer, if measured along its windings, than the state itself, into which as large a number as possible of the negro voters has been thrown."[2] To take up the several districts separately[3]:

In district 1, the counties were about equally divided with the exception of four in which the vote stood:

Putnam	D. 980	R. 1,837
Schuyler	1,241	771
Scotland	1,546	885
Shelby	2,459	861

The three latter counties thus rendered it safe to include the first, a strong Republican county in district 1.

[1] *Legislative Manual of Mo.*, 1913–14, pp. 1117–1124.

[2] Bryce, James, *The American Commonwealth*, vol. i., n., p. 126.

[3] All references to figures for 1910 and 1912 are to be found in *Legislative Manual of Missouri*, 1913–14, pp. 1117–1124. Unless exception is noted, figures used are for 1912. Figures for other years will be accompanied by individual references.

In district 2, the votes in Monroe and Randolph counties evidence the reason for destroying the compactness of the district:

Monroe	D. 3,686	R. 571	Progr. 214
Randolph	4,277	1,122	

In district 3, Mercer County gave the Republicans and Progressives 1987 votes, the Democrats only 739. Clay, Clinton, and Ray counties, however, swamped this majority.

To attempt an apportionment which would attain greater compactness and contiguity, let us suppose Mercer and Putnam added to district 2 and Randolph and Monroe cut off. District 2 would then contain the following counties: Mercer, Putnam, Grundy, Livingston, Carroll, Sullivan, Chariton, and Linn. In all of these counties in 1912 the Democratic vote was larger than in 1910 despite the advent of the Bull Moose party. If then we add together the Republican and Progressive votes, the result is a Republican district by a 3000 majority. It is clearer, now, why the compactness of the three districts has been allowed to remain slightly infringed.

In district 4, Buchanan and Platte counties provided a 4000 majority for the Democrats.

District 5 contains Kansas City and was allowed to remain undivided in 1910, though in the decennial period the previous close approximation to the basis of apportionment had been destroyed by a growth in population of some 90,000.

District 6 is a very close one, with a Democratic majority in 1912 of but 1527.

District 7 from its shape might be denominated a cross for the crucifixion of the Republicans. Here Greene, Polk, Hickory, and Benton counties, which polled a 3500 Republican majority, were overwhelmed by the adding on of Howard and Saline with a nearly identical Democratic majority, Pettis and Lafayette counties being very evenly balanced. In this district the split of the Republicans and Progressives just saved the Democrats in 1912, when the Democratic plurality was 7493, but their total vote lacked 1100 of having an absolute majority over all parties, and only exceeded the combined Republican and Progressive votes by 188.

In an editorial of the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* of May 1, 1911, this district is described as beginning not far from the southern

boundary of the state and running north in a single string of counties until it reaches the Missouri River,

"where it suddenly bulges east and west, jumping the river to take in the heavily Democratic county of Howard, without which the district would be strongly Republican. The seven counties south of the river, including the city of Springfield, give a Republican majority of 1000, but the acrobatic feat at the river to get in Howard County, the Bourbon Gibraltar, Democratic by 1600, sufficed to elect Mr. Hamlin last year by the scant plurality of 482."

In district 8, Boone County returned 5020 votes for the Democrats, 2090 for their opponents. The remaining counties were so evenly balanced that if Boone were cut off, the Republicans and Progressives combined would have had in 1912 a 1500 majority, while in 1910 the Republicans alone would have had a majority of six hundred votes over all parties.

In district 9, the figures reveal how Gasconade, Warren, and Franklin counties are rendered harmless by being added on to an easy Democratic district, these counties being grouped together in the southern part of the district and forming an excrescence upon the district.

Audrain	D. 3,390	R. 1,323	
Callaway	3,608	1,527	
Gasconade	569	1,042	
Warren	486	1,168	
Franklin	2,483	2,603	(1910 D. 2, 643 R. 3, 636)

The most notable fact running through these figures is the Democratic strength in the counties along the Missouri. An examination of the data shows how these counties were used to overcome such Republican majorities as those of Mercer and Putnam counties. These river counties are largely Democratic because of a strong influx from the south into that section. On the other hand, several river counties near the city of St. Louis, St. Louis, St. Charles, Franklin, Warren, and Gasconade are Republican because the Germans preponderate. These and other politically homogeneous sections of the state, such as the Republican community in Mercer and Putnam counties and the group of Democratic counties in the south-east, illustrate the influence of economic and racial factors upon politics.

Districts 10, 11, and 12 comprise the county and city of St. Louis. The situation in these districts is best described in the words of a former state senator of Missouri[1]:

[1] Received in a personal and confidential communication to the writer.

"The reason Mr. Dyer's district (12th) has so small a population as compared to the 10th district is obviously as follows: in 1900 the population of Missouri was 3,106,665 and under the Federal apportionment she was entitled to 16 congressmen, making 1 congressman for each 194,166 people. The city and county of St. Louis are each separate political subdivisions which had a combined population in 1900 of 625,278, that of the city being 575,238. By reason of their large German population, St. Louis county and the northern and southern parts of the city of St. Louis are overwhelmingly Republican. The city had within 7260 people of enough to make three times the unit of population apportionment, but instead of giving the city alone three congressmen, the county was thrown in with the city to make the three districts. And then, to get all of the Republicans in one district, north and south St. Louis and St. Louis county were put into the tenth district with a population of 290,187 which was overwhelmingly Republican.[1] This left the 11th district with a population of 182,667 and the 12th with 152,424. In 1902, the next election after the apportionment, the vote in these three districts was as follows:

District	Total Vote	Plurality	Nature
10	39,079	6,254	Republican
11	25,930	4,836	Democratic
12	24,506	6,618	Democratic

My impression is that in 1902 the election was fraudulent. At any rate in 1904 the pluralities were 12,983 Republican in the 10th, 692 Democratic in the 11th, and 957 Democratic in the 12th. If the city had been given three congressmen. and St. Louis county had been put in another district, the result would have been to make the other district and all three districts of St. Louis Republican, In other words the net result was only one Republican district in place of four, or a gain of three Democratic congressmen at that time (*i. e.*, a prevention of a gain of three Republicans). Or if the 10th district had not been made so large (and the 11th and 12th districts so small) the result would have been to make all three of the districts Republican."

In 1906, the Republicans carried all three districts (10, 11, and 12)[2]; in 1908, they carried districts 10 and 12.[3] In 1909, the ward boundaries were changed; they have again been altered in the present year. These changes have not, however, affected the congressional district boundaries.

In 1910, Congressman Bartholdt's magnificent constituency of 416,389 (district 10) again elected him. The 11th returned Mr. Theron E. Catlin, a Republican, but on August 12, 1912 he was unseated by a resolution of the House of Representatives and

[1] The nearest points of the northern and southern city portions of the 10th district are just three-quarters of a mile apart. They form peninsulas stretching out toward the Mississippi from the rural portion of the district.

[2] *Legislative Manual, Mo.*, 1907–8, pp. 622–23.

[3] *Ibid.*, 1909–10, pp. 815–16.

his opponent Patrick Gill was installed.[1] The 12th district also chose a Republican to Congress in 1910.

In 1912 and 1914, the 10th continued Republican, even the split with the Progressives failing to effect a Democratic victory in that Republican dumping ground. The 11th went Democratic in both years. Republican Congressman Dyer, chosen by the 12th district in 1912, lost his seat to Michael J. Gill as the result of the contest over his election on June 19, 1914, but won it back comfortably at the succeeding election.[2]

District 13 is assured for the Democrats by Reynolds County; the counties in general are very evenly balanced politically.

District 14 like district 7 is built on the combination of the hoestring and the crucifix. Separating the component counties into an eastern and western section we find the following to be true:

Christian	Republican plurality in ordinary years	900–1200
Douglas	" " " " "	" "
Howell	" " " " "	400
Ozark	" " " " "	600–700
Stone	" majority " " "	700–1000
Taney	" " " " "	300–400

The eastern section tells a different story:

Dunkin	Democratic majority in ordinary years	1200–1400
Mississippi	" " " " "	800–1000
Pemiscot	" " " " "	400–500

Ripley, Scott, and Stoddard are about equally overbalanced on the Democratic side.

Between the two sections lies Oregon County with a Democratic vote about two and one-half times the Republican. This district is perhaps as bold and as obvious a gerrymander as could be found.

"It is another example of the art of the Missouri gerrymander contortionists. It takes almost the entire width of the state to render the 14th district 'compact and contiguous.' It is a spindling succession of counties East and West, and would be Republican but for its inclusion of a bunch of Democratic counties in the south-eastern corner of the state."[3]

In district 15, Vernon County is the deciding factor for the Democrats. In 1910 that county polled 3559 Democratic to

[1] *Congressional Record*, 62nd Congress, 2d Session, vol. 48, Part II, p. 10782.
[2] *Cong. Rec.*, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., vol. 51, Part II, p. 10756.
[3] Ed. St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, May 1, 1911, p. 8.

1932 Republican votes; in 1912, 3516 to 1683 Republican and 615 Progressive. Its position makes it more naturally a part of district 6, supposing the line to be drawn along its southern boundary and that of Cedar County, leaving Dade County in district 15. Considering the new and compact district as made up of Dade, Barry, Barton, Jasper, Lawrence, M'Donald, and Newton there would have resulted in 1912 a Democratic vote of 18,849 and a Republican vote of 20,251, counting Progressives as Republicans. But to those who are doing the districting for Missouri, Vernon County is more useful in fifteen than in six where the Republican votes of Cedar and Dade counties are nullified by the Democratic majority of Cass.

In the last district, 16, Maries and Shannon counties, both on the edge of the district and both forming projections of the district rather than parts of a compact whole, provide together the required Democratic majority of 1100–1600.

To direct attention to gerrymandering in a single state may be to make invidious distinctions. The situation in Missouri is of special interest because of the part her representatives took in the discussion of the Reapportionment Bill of 1911. At the time there was the unusual number of three Republican congressmen from Missouri, including the senior member from that state, the Honorable Richard Bartholdt. In 1908 the constitution of Missouri had been amended so as to admit the use of the Initiative and Referendum. Since 1875 the Republicans had been deprived of just representation in Congress by the existence of a state senate elected in gerrymandered districts. The senate had prevented both a fair reapportionment of its own districts and of congressional districts. Article IV, Section 7, of the state constitution provides for a reapportionment (of senatorial districts) every ten years on the basis of the federal census, to be made by the legislature at its first session after such census, and if it fails to do so, the apportionment must be made by the Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney-General. As the legislature had continuously refused to act, the apportionment had been made by the above-named officers.[1] As these reapportionments had all been gerrymanders, the Republicans in 1910 circulated initiative petitions apportioning the state for senators to be voted for at the November elections. When these petitions were presented to the Democratic Secretary of State,

[1] Missouri Laws, 1881, p. 238; Laws, 1891, p. 227, and Laws, 1901, p. 273.

however, for filing under the law, he refused to receive them. He was then mandamused and a Democratic Supreme Court upheld his action.[1]

The legislature of 1911 followed precedent, failing to make the reapportionment for the senate. Governor Hadley refused to accept the apportionment framed by the Democratic Secretary of State and Attorney-General, and the Supreme Court of the state set it aside as unconstitutional[2] leaving the 1901 apportionment in force.

This summary of state history makes clearer the motives which prompted Missouri Democrats to favor the original Apportionment Bill reported to Congress early in 1911. This bill provided, as had previous bills, for reapportionment in the states "by the legislatures thereof." Its most ardent and somewhat vitriolic supporter was Representative Hamlin from the 7th district of Missouri.[3] He replied to Dr. Bartholdt's criticism of the Democratic congressional gerrymander in Missouri thus:

> "The 10th, 11th, nd 12th districts of Missouri are now represented in this house by Republicans . . . and have an *average* population per district of 208,426, but the 7th, 14th, and 15th districts are represented by Democrats . . . and contain an *average* population per district of 233,646, being an *average* of 25,220 more to the Democratic districts than to the Republican districts."[4]

He charged the Republicans with having no real interest in the Initiative and Referendum, and with the intention of using the ambiguous sections 6616 and 6617 of Missouri laws (which provide that the districts for the choice of presidential electors shall be the same as the congressional districts and that whenever a new apportionment of members of Congress *whereby the number of electors* . . . shall be increased or diminished shall occur, "the Governor shall lay off the state into as many districts as shall be equal to the number of electors to which this state shall then be entitled, so that the said districts contain as near as may be an equal number of inhabitants") to gerrymander the state for the Republicans.

Bartholdt in reply might have said that these sections were not in point, since the number of congressmen was to remain

[1] State *ex rel.* Halliburton *v.* Roach, 230 Mo. 408.

[2] State *ex rel.* Barrett *v.* Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433.

[3] Vide *Cong. Rec.*, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 47, Part I, pp. 701–2.

[4] Italics mine.

unchanged. He preferred to say that they were immaterial, since the Republicans proposed to leave the matter of redistricting to the people themselves. You cannot, he said, get pure water from a poisoned spring. It was also pointed out with emphasis that the argument for retaining the provision of previous bills failed in the presence of the fact that in 1900 the Initiative and Referendum was nowhere in use, whereas since that time an appreciable number of states had incorporated it into their constitutions.

The bill passed the House but was amended in the Senate so as to lose the disputed clause. Senator Burton introduced the amendment, partly at the instance of Governor Hadley. Missouri's senators were conspicuous for their absence from the debate, but half of her congressmen were continuously on the floor of the Senate.[1] On August 4, 1911, the Senate passed the bill as amended and the House accepted the amendment.[2] It has been pointed out to the writer by one of the leading lawyers of St. Louis that the last clause of Section 4 of this Act is susceptible of the construction that a state must keep its present congressional districts until by reason of an increase in the number of its representatives, it can be redistricted under the Act of Congress. While agreeing with this authority that if this be true the Act is vicious and should be amended, the writer regards the clause mentioned as simply providing means of reapportionment if the number of representatives is not increased. To quote the entire Section:

"That in case of an increase in the number of Representatives in any state under this apportionment such additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected by the state at large and the other Representatives by the districts now prescribed by law until such state shall be redistricted in the manner prescribed by the laws thereof and in accordance with the rules enumerated in Section 3 of this Act (it provides for compactness, contiguity, and single member districts); and if there be no change in the number of Representatives from a state, the Representatives thereof shall be elected from the districts now prescribed by law until such state shall be redistricted as herein prescribed."

In 1912 the Republicans again circulated initiative petitions for a reapportionment of the congressional districts, but the leaders were indifferent and failed to get the required number of

[1] St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, August 3, 1911, p. 5.

[2] 37 Stat. Law, 13–14.

signatures.[1] In the strongly Democratic legislatures of 1913 and 1915 reapportionment bills were introduced but died in committee. The collapse of the project for reform by popular legislation, coupled with the increased Democratic majorities in both Houses of the State Legislature, creates a situation less hopeful for a just reapportionment of Congressmen than has existed for a number of years.

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY.

Princeton University.

[1] The failure of the 1912 movement for reapportionment is ascribed (in an article quoted in "Equity," October, 1912, p. 145, from the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*) to the realization that direct legislation is not suited to measures involving the complex details of an apportionment scheme. This would be especially true in a state where parties are as nearly equal as they are in Missouri.

PROFESSORIAL ADVANCEMENT[1]

Certainly anyone who can determine professorial fitness for advancement fairly and satisfactorily to all the interests concerned would be the most valuable official in any university in America. Classifications are necessary but hardly ever satisfactory. A professor's value to the institution has been classified in three ways: first, his class-room value; second, his scholarship and investigational value; third, his value to the student body, the community, and the public at large,—in general his public value. These three values are, of course, not separated by water-tight compartments, but rather, let me say, by semi-permeable membranes, and there is a good deal of osmosis from one to the other.

It is neither the desire nor intention that one measure these qualities on a score-card basis; for example, class-room value—sixty points; scholarship value—thirty points; general public value—ten points. Besides, because of the fact that scarcely any of these values, particularly scholarship value, has a limit, such a classification would be an obvious impossibility. If a professor's scholarship value be great enough, his class-room value and his general public value may be zero, and yet that he may be the most valuable man in the institution. For analogy, if wealth were divided into real estate, chattels, and securities; a man might score zero in two of the classes and still be the richest man in the community.

If we assume that this classification, with its admitted limitations, is approximately correct, the question naturally follows,—who is to do the evaluating for each class, and how is the appointing power to know?

Let us take the class-room value. Who are most able to judge? If the instructor has been in service for some little time, probably the ablest judges will be the alumni who have gone further in their studies, particularly in other institutions, or those who have gone out into active work. Alumni are usually

[1] A paper read before the National Association of State Universities, Washington, D. C., November 14, 1916.

inclined to speak freely, but are not without some prejudices. Still on the whole their opinions are of value. The student sentiment, as it drifts into the executive offices through students and parents, is also of value. The opinion of one's colleagues, especially those who have allied subjects, is of much value. Thus in a variety of ways, without personal supervision of the work of a professor, it is possible for the appointing power to gain some knowledge of his worth and effectiveness in the class-room.

When we turn to the value of a professor in the world of scholarship, the problem is somewhat more difficult. As concerns the value of his investigations, this difficulty is even more apparent. Anyone can tell whether a man is working or not. But it is not so easy to tell whether the work is of any value. Much of our investigating is of little use to humanity. Many of the research studies are about as desirable as the Latin poems ground out in the Middle Ages and later when it was considered good pedagogy to put students through a course in Latin verse. Nevertheless it is an important function of the university to encourage research, and it is highly important that a distinction be made between mediocre and first-class investigation. On the whole there is perhaps no better way of arriving at a fair conclusion as to the ultimate worth of a man's investigations than through the consensus of opinion among the professor's colleagues, both inside and outside of the institution he is serving.

The professor's value to the public is the most obvious part of his work. In this connection I am reminded of a little boy who used to pray to the Lord to protect him through the night. When asked why he didn't pray for protection in the daytime, he said it wasn't much of a boy who couldn't look out for himself in daylight. My own feeling is, that, although one may be groping in the dark to get at the exact value of the investigation being done by a professor and of his power of teaching, still he is not much of a president, dean, or head of a department who can not discriminate in regard to a professor's community-value in the daylight of publicity.

In nearly all state universities all legal authority is vested in the Governing Board; the Board appoints only on the recommendation of the president; the president nominates with the approval of the dean, and in cases of subordinate positions with the approval of the dean and of the head of the department concerned. The various officers concerned in the appointment

will act according to their best judgment on the recognition of merit.

The question will naturally arise, to what extent should promotion in rank or salary be in a sense automatic; and whether instructors should be at first on probation for a certain number of years, then advanced to an assistant professorship at an increase of a definite sum per year until a certain maximum is reached. Should he remain in this position until it seems desirable to give him a higher rank and again start him along the pathway of financial progress? In a state institution, where no one can tell definitely how long in advance the funds will be available for salaries, it seems to me unwise to have any rules pledging the institution to make specific increases. It is perhaps indisputable that the duty of the Governing Board is so to manage the affairs of the institution that it gets the best possible service for the money expended. One factor in getting the best possible service comes from keeping the faculty contented and making them feel that merit is appreciated. In my own experience, this feeling is not produced by establishing rules which give to faculty members a claim for advancement, either in rank or salary, as a result of merely remaining in the service of the institution. It is believed that a careful consideration of their merits, in order that they may feel that merit is recognized, is of greater advantage.

Long and meritorious service should always, of course, be recognized in rank and salary. Equal merit and equal length of service should also receive as nearly as possible the same recognition in the various colleges of the university. Although it is not possible for any institution to escape entirely the law of supply and demand, still the fact that one college is popular and students flock to it in great numbers, and it is eulogized by the newspapers and in public addresses and legislative halls, should not induce the Governing Board disproportionately to recognize the men who work in the well advertised field.

The question of meeting calls from other institutions is a perplexing one. It is, I suppose, a matter of common knowledge that calls usually come more through the activities of a professor than the activity of the institution extending the call. With the limited funds available, I have always made an effort to satisfy the best men in the University of Nebraska, so they would not be looking for calls to other institutions. When I find it possible so to increase the rank and salary of a worthy man that he will

not seriously consider working in another institution, I am always much happier than when I am "held up," so to speak, and am compelled to meet the "flattering offer" from a sister institution in a neighboring state.

I would conclude this paper in a word. Automatic, mechanical devices and fixed rules do not lead to economy and efficiency. To meet calls from other institutions while practically refusing to consider requests for promotion except where there is imminent danger of losing members of the teaching force, seems crude and mercenary and tends to make the teaching force restless and disloyal. The equal and sympathetic consideration of each individual case by those who have the power of appointing is more likely to settle in a satisfactory way the question as to the worth of each individual for promotion.

SAMUEL AVERY.

University of Nebraska, Lincoln.

A SHAKESPEARE FESTIVAL AT STRATFORD-ON-AVON

In August of 1914, at the time when the declaration of war made every Englishman thrill with the bigness of his country's part in the gigantic struggle, more than the mere acting ability of the Shakespeare Company at Stratford was exhibited. A stray visitor from a far-away land could feel the tensity of the situation, for even a foreigner could realize how difficult it must be to go on with stage battles and mimic wars, when all Europe was rushing to real bloodshed. It was at such a time that the larger power showed itself in Sir Frank R. Benson and his associates.

Because of a Conference of Teachers of English during the first two weeks of August, the little Memorial Theatre—it seats only nine hundred and fifty, using even the peculiar "window-seats"—had been sold out for every performance, and the prospects for the remainder of the month's run were roseate. With the threat of war the cancellations began to pour in, and the box-office reminded one of funeral parlors. Fifteen plays had been announced, twelve by Shakespeare, and in addition, *She Stoops to Conquer*, *The Return of the Prodigal*, and *The Importance of Being Earnest*. These last two were performed by the Birmingham Repertory Company, the others by the Benson Company.

One was struck immediately by the scope and variety of the Benson repertory. There were six Shakespeare comedies, three tragedies, three histories. This surprising versatility, I was assured later by both the star and the manager, is really nothing to what the company can do and has done. During several seasons it has produced every Shakespeare play except three, *All's Well That Ends Well*, *Titus Andronicus*, and *Troilus and Cressida*. When the organization is on tour, towns may request certain plays, and if the scenery and costumes have been left at Stratford-on-Avon they are sent for, and the play produced. In educational value alone, here is a fully adequate reason for the existence of the Benson Company. One member informed me

that *Richard II.* was played during the American tour in response to a request from a boys' school.

The Shakespeare Festival at Stratford-on-Avon has been a gradual growth. At first there was the celebration on the twenty-third of April, consisting of the unfurling in High Street of the flags of various nations by their Ambassadors and other representatives, and the charming floral procession, when thousands walk to the little Trinity Church to deposit upon the grave in the chancel some flower so lovingly enrhymed by the great poet. To that was added a week's performances by visiting companies, then the regular run by the Benson organization.

The Benson Company unites the best features of the training of a stock company and the independence of a continental subsidized theatre. The Board of Managers guarantees salaries; any surplus goes to maintenance and improvement. The enveloping atmosphere is scholarly, Shakespearean; a spectator feels sensibly the influence of a cultured, critical, but sympathetic, and appreciative audience. And the actors feel this as well. The people before the footlights know the text almost as well as those behind, they are as conversant with stage traditions, they are quick to resent changes for mere novelty. They are anxious to welcome alterations for improvement. It is this accord that makes Shakespeare at Stratford-on-Avon one of the marked experiences of a lifetime.

The system of stage management in the Memorial Theatre is not Elizabethan, nor is it entirely modern. On the programmes there are no divisions into acts, as there are none in the early quartos and folios except for a few dramas. The place is indicated, then follow the scenes numbered from 1 to 13 in *Much Ado About Nothing*, from 1 to 8 in *Merchant of Venice*, 1 to 12 in *Hamlet*, etc. After certain scenes intervals are announced, as of five minutes, ten minutes. This gives a combination of almost continuous presentation and of relief for breaks in the story. Certainly a continuous presentation of *Hamlet* is a strain on the attention and the emotions, and the brief breaks are welcome. In order to have six scenes succeed in rapid continuity, use is made of a front and a back stage by lowering and raising front drops. In America we are accustomed to seeing street scenes as front scenes before a painted drop, in the Memorial Theatre street scenes usually occupy the entire stage, with gabled and timbered houses extending far into space, giving an accurate idea

of an actual irregular crossing of ways. This is one of the minor details of realism characteristic of English staging. A second, much easier in cases of many changes and short scenes, is used often in *Henry IV.* Here the street scenes are indicated by rather low walls, ends of houses, all of which can be easily set and struck, while behind hangs a sky-blue curtain. By merely replacing the movable parts with different ones a great many new effects can be secured in a minimum of time. To the audience a charming impression of height and distance is offered, and a delightful relief from the crowded and inartistic back drop, which wearied your eye because it gave you definite details to look at. This simpler scheme may be applied to a score of things. Set a back balustrade some three feet high, a flowering hedge, a few small shrubs or trees against such a blue back drop, and in *Much Ado About Nothing*, *Twelfth Night*, and *Merchant of Venice* you have gardens overlooking valleys, much more Italian than the tawdry statue-dotted, green smeared garden drops we usually see. And even in the histories or the tragedies, the sight of a few rocks, a clump of gnarled oaks, would give an impression of bleakness on a high plateau.

The business manager discussed with me the possibility of setting an entire Shakespeare play within a series of curtains of pastel or neutral shades, and then so devising colour schemes for the costumes that a contrast or harmony between characters and background, or between action and setting, might be secured. This would be artistic, economical, and, quite contrary to first thought, spectacular. In *Henry IV.* the Jerusalem Chamber was hung with dark purple. There was upon the stage only the couch upon a dais to which the weak king is assisted before the young Prince Hal apostrophized the crown. The gorgeous crimson, orange, and brown of the costumes and drapery made the two actors stand out like an Italian coloured carving. It was almost marvellous in its beauty. In the *Merchant of Venice* the hangings could so markedly reinforce the action, ranging from deep purple in the trial scene, through moonlight blue in the last act, to old rose for Portia's home at Belmont. There are possibilities in this which have never been exploited.

In many places the Benson Company may be thought to have adopted this scheme, but any such conclusion is an erroneous one. Even the setting for the Jerusalem Chamber is not the result of modern stage decorative craft, but the outcome of a regard for

historical accuracy about which the scholarly Sir Frank and his colleagues know a vast deal. During Shakespeare's time, and his plays reproduce his times faithfully, no great hall, no audience chamber, displayed its bare walls to its occupants. The stones were covered by the tapestry and arras, as the floors were strewn with rushes. In settings to represent a hall of Westminster, an apartment of the palace in London, the French King's palace, the apartment of Hamlet's mother, producers err when they show walls of masonry. Not only did these hangings decorate the room, but they kept from the occupants the dampness that oozed from cold stones. As this same dampness would have rotted the valuable tapestries had they hung close against the walls, they were hung upon arras frames which extended out some distance. When one knows this, two scenes in *Hamlet* become much more poignant and understandable. The first of these is the eavesdropping of the King and Polonius when Ophelia is "loosed unto" the young Prince. The two conspirators never betook themselves to a curtained alcove to which suspicion would be attracted at once by the drawn hanging. They stepped behind the arras which perhaps draped the lobby. The other scene should show an arras, first because it is the Queen's apartment, and second, because Shakespeare says it is there. How could Polonius hide behind a wall covering without being discovered at once? The space between tapestry and wall makes the scene perfectly clear. Imagine the disappointment, then, to see Polonius conceal himself, not behind an arras, but retire into a curtained alcove, from which he comes tumbling out after Hamlet has run him through. He usually rolls quite into full view rendering absolute nonsense the Prince's astounding exclamation,

> Nay, I know not: is it the King?

and the five lines that intervene before Hamlet discovers that he has killed not the King, but Polonius.

> Thou wretched, rash, intruding fool, farewell!
> I took thee for thy better: take thy fortune.

Here is the chance for a remarkable effect to be secured by the American producer who has the brains and courage to do the correct thing. If anyone ask if the space was large enough

for concealment, I need quote only two lines from *The Woman Hater* by Beaumont and Fletcher:

> I have of yore made many a scrambling meal,
> In corners, behind arrases, on stairs.

At Stratford-on-Avon next to the versatility of the director, Sir Frank Benson, and the remarkably high attainments of the entire company, one was impressed most by the consummate versatility of all the individual actors. Scholars have often maintained that the minor rôles of Shakespeare are so exquisitely drawn that a perfect representation would demand as finished an impersonator for, let us say, Paulina as for Hermione in *A Winter's Tale*. Dr. Howard Horace Furness used to insist that Juliet could never be adequately played, for any actress young enough to look Juliet would not know enough to enact her, and any woman old enough to know how to portray her emotionally would be entirely too old to look like Juliet. The charge that minor rôles are entrusted to incompetents is only too often true, but in the Shakespeare festival often the minor characters carried off half the honours of the drama. To Sir Frank's eternal glory let it be said that with him the prime object is the art of Shakespeare. When that art requires self-abnegation he practises it with no feeling of self-sacrifice on his part. Exactly as he moves up and down the casts so do all his associates; and the Bardolph of *Henry VI.* becomes the French King of *Henry V.* Some idea of the range of a single man may be gained from the list of characters this single actor succeeds in, besides the two already mentioned. He sings the songs of Balthasar and Feste in a beautiful voice, he is the wooing Biondello, the dignified Duke of Venice, the bitter Casca, and the meddling Polonius. Another man has an equally wide range,—the country justice Shallow, the willing ass Dogberry, the bungling Grumio, the shrewd Launcelot Gobbo, the sweating Roman First Citizen, and his greatest success, Fluellen. With perfect ease they drop the character of any rôle, to assume that of the next with such conviction that repeated glances at the programme alone suffice to convince the puzzled intelligence. What is true in striking manner of these two is true of all the rest in more than an adequate degree.

The second part of *Henry IV.* is hardly a history, the scenes that touch the King are few, and comparatively insignificant,

while the roystering situations involving the young Prince and his companions carry the play. The poetry at places makes up for the lack of dramatic grandeur, and Sir Frank delivered the soliloquy on insomnia as beautifully as it could be done, while in the Jerusalem Chamber scene with his erring son he was inimitable in pathos. The light of this play, however, is Falstaff, who shines through himself and by reflection in the most attractive group of rogues and imbeciles ever conceived by mortal mind: the Page, Bardolph, Pistol, Poins, Shallow, Silence, Davy, Mouldy, Shadow, Wart, Feeble, Bullcalf, Fang, Snare, Hostess, Doll Tearsheet are unmatched even for names anywhere in an existing cast. Dignity of Kingship makes little impression in juxtaposition with the doings of these rapscallians,—Doll Tearsheet brawling and ranting in the Boar's Head Tavern, and Silence mellowing into volubility over the little round jug, then relapsing into beaming inebriation, while old Justice Shallow evokes pictures of the dare-devil past when he was a gay buck: these are the scenes that remain longest with the spectator, and one must declare that in the originality, the verve, and the excellence of these scenes lies the true justification of the revival of this drama. The two scenes before Shallow's country house were masterpieces of *genre*, setting, and acting.

Henry V. gave another side to history. When Richard Mansfield offered this chronicle, there were two outstanding features, the glorious poetry of the choruses, so long as the actress was permit tedto recite them, and the spectacular pageant of conquest. The entire fourth act was changed into a procession beginning with children scattering flowers and working up to the climax,—the entrance through the London streets of the returned victor from France. At Stratford, to general disappointment, the beautiful choruses are omitted. It was a greater loss this year than ever before, since on the third of August, just the day before England declared war, this play was substituted for *Merry Wives of Windsor*. With English patriotism surging high, how thrilling would have sounded the martial calls of Shakespeare! As it was, the house was tense when Sir Frank appeared before the curtain, begging the audience not to transfer the utterances of the sixteenth century to our times, not to apply to a sister nation and probable ally the sentiments uttered by an invader in 1415, but to wait until the end of the evening for the expression of Britain's present feeling

for France. When that last scene came, and gallant Henry had wooed and won the pert and coy French Katharine, the Queen of France delivered with deep feeling the prayer to which every person there added, "Amen."

> So be there 'twixt your Kingdoms such a spousal,
> That never may ill offence, or fell jealousy,
> Which troubles oft the bed of blessed marriage,
> Thrust in between the paction of these Kingdoms,
> To make divorce of their incorporate league;
> That English may as French, French Englishmen,
> Receive each other. God speed this Amen!

Later in the same week at the conclusion of *Henry IV.*, three actors stepped forward to revive an old Elizabethan custom, that of delivering the prayer for the safety of the Kingdom, taken from the end of the early comedy, *Ralph Roister Doister*.

> The Lord preserve our most noble King of renowne,
> And his virtues rewarde with the heavenly crowne.
> The Lord strengthen his most excellent Majestie,
> Long to reigne over us in all prosperitie.
> That all his godly proceedings the faith to defende
> He may stablishe and maintaine through to the ende.
> God graunt him, as he doth, the Gospell to protect,
> Learning and vertue to advaunce, and vice to correct.
> God graunt his lovyng subjects both the minde and grace
> His most godly procedynge worthily to imbrace.
> His Highnesse most worthy counsellers God prosper
> With honour and love of all men to minister.
> God graunt the Nobilitie him to serve and love.
> With all the whole Commontie, as doth them behove.
> Amen.

The comedies gave us fewer instances of novelty, less assurance of difference in ideals and methods between American and English production, less distinction of acting. *Much Ado About Nothing* must remain at the last a character drama of only three parts, with a plot entirely spoiled by the unacceptable last act with the substitution of a sister for Hero. In this Shakespeare was certainly not "for all time." *Twelfth Night* presents no difficulty of staging or acting, so we need not consider it here, except to add that it is always to be regretted that Sebastian should be so much taller than Viola that she is forced to wear high-heeled shoes while he is torturing himself to slump down to

her stature. Here is Shakespeare again quite in his own time, with the chance for two boy actors of exactly the same build.

When Mr. E. S. Sothern first essayed Petruchio he was severely criticized for his noise and roughness, but he successfully defended his interpretation by repeating the title,—for the tamer of a shrew must be a "tall fellow,"—and quoting Shakespeare's own lines describing poor Katharine's marriage. In England the tradition must be all for rowdyism, for such a roystering, swashbuckling swaggerer it was almost impossible to associate with "gentle Shakespeare." The effect was successful, however, so Sir Frank Benson is entirely justified in his yelling, his whip-cracking, and, most surprising of all, his vaulting upon the supper table and off again! With such details in mind I went to *The Merchant of Venice* quite apprehensive. I went to object, I stayed to wonder and admire. Never in America have I seen so great a trial scene, never has the marvel of the Shylock conception been borne in upon me, never have I really heard Portia's plea for mercy, as at that performance. Henry Irving was powerful in this scene, but as Shylock stood, stripped of everything, and then tottered from the court, some characteristics of the grotesque miser hung about him still, not much, but enough to keep you in your seat anticipating the delightful situation of the gifts which was to follow. But when Sir Frank's Shylock felt his all going, greatness after greatness, he gradually was transformed into what all persons are essentially in terrible suffering, into a man, and every heart in the audience followed him out upon the stones of Venice and heard him again called heathen Jew, and saw him spat upon. And Portia,—the same actress who also was Viola, Katharine, Beatrice, Doll Tearsheet, the French Princess, and Kate Hardcastle, was a better Portia than any known in America for a long time. Simply, unaffectedly, with no tricks of so-called elocution, seeming to love the speech as it should be loved, she delivered the plea for mercy. Doubtless, it is merely the old case of the prophet in his own country, but both Sir Frank Benson and Miss Green are not usually accorded high praise in Great Britain for these rôles, where critics admire him more as Richard II. and Henry V., while they consider Miss Green best as Beatrice and Doll Tearsheet. Here in *The Merchant of Venice* was that highest and sincerest art, simple, unaffected, perfected, sincere, that carried conviction directly into the emotions.

Delightfully surprised by this play, I was disagreeably disappointed by *Hamlet*. In its totality I should sum it up as "fair"; in certain scenes it was as effective as other productions, in other situations it fell far below the average. I had regretted the omission of the choruses from *Henry V.* because they are the supreme achievement of patriotic utterance, but after all the play is as complete without them as *The Taming of the Shrew* is without the "induction" of drunken Christopher Sly and the joking huntsmen. Mr. Sothern once told me that every omission from his *Hamlet* had been objected to by letter from people all over this continent, "but," he continued, "what shall I do? Something must be omitted—we finished tonight at eleven ten —or we'll keep people out of their beds all night." We shall grant the actor his cuts, we can understand Mr. Sothern's cutting the parting advice of Polonius to his son for Mr. Sothern is a star, although we like the Benson arrangement better. He retains this popular speech and later shortens the lines of Polonius by omitting from the dialogue with Hamlet the discussion over the shape of the cloud. Even though it be a digression I must insert here what happened at Stratford during the old man's enumeration of wise old saws. No actor has ever been applauded except at the end,—everyone has repeated the platitudes in school, and knows them perfectly. But England had just declared war after a long and anxious wait. So when the actor recited:

> Beware
> Of entrance to a quarrel; but being in
> Bear 't, that the opposed may beware of thee,

like a thunder clap came the applause, startling the performer almost out of his pose.

Omissions, are necessary for economy of time. But certain "cuts" must be avoided, lest they destroy dramatic effect,—and just this lessening of power results from the excisions made in the Stratford version of *Hamlet*. Around the family tragedy in Denmark, lending it wider scope and deeper significance, is a national struggle up through which wins the gallant Fortinbras, whose warlike deeds give the young Prince the text for his soliloquy, "How all occasions do inform against me, and spur my dull revenge." Dramatically no star can afford to dispense with the support of Fortinbras. It is not enough that Hamlet sink

dead upon the vacated throne and Horatio reverently place the fallen crown upon his brow;—soldiers must enter and salute the dead, and to the strains of martial music, place him tenderly upon a shield and bear him forth, as Shakespeare intended.

> Let four captains
> Bear Hamlet, like a soldier, to the stage.
> For he was likely, had he been put on,
> To have proved most royally; and for his passage,
> The soldiers' music and the rites of war
> Speak loudly for him.

Yet all this was omitted at Stratford.

The climax of the action is the prayer scene of Hamlet's uncle-father. In a New York theatre after Hamlet had vacillated and passed on without killing the King, and the murderer had sighed that merely his words flew up while his thoughts remained below, I overheard an unlettered woman exclaim, "Oh, he ought to have killed him then!" This scene, the crux of the entire plot, was not presented at Stratford.

When Polonius comes to announce the players, Hamlet retorts with "Buz, buz"; the text gives it only once, but Mr. Benson continued to repeat it during the entire time Polonius attempted to talk to him. This is quite unnecessary, because Shakespeare knew perfectly the knack of "filling in," and wrote enough tantalizing replies and interruptions for the actor: "Then came each actor on his ass—"; "O Jephthah, judge of Israel"; "Nay, that follows not"; etc. At another point, in order to delude Polonius into believing in his madness, Mr. Benson vaulted between the arms across the seat of a half-round chair. This may do in *The Taming of the Shrew*, but not in *Hamlet*, for from this same chair Mr. Benson had previously delivered the two soliloquies, and the contrast was a shock to the sense of fitness.

As a tremendous tragedy such as *Hamlet* sweeps to its inevitable catastrophe, no extraneous element must be permitted to intrude upon our notice. Most of us gasped, therefore, when Hamlet and Horatio entered the graveyard together, for the former bore in his hand a fish-net. At least that was what it resembled most, and that was what everyone in Stratford proclaimed it to be. During the entire scene Hamlet was bothered by this eight-foot staff with the threefoot ring and net at its end, for he had to lean it against gravestones as he examined Yorick's skull, he had

to move it aside when the funeral cortège entered, and he had to pick it up again at his exit. No one could give his entire attention to the burial of the drowned Ophelia and the struggle between her brother and her lover,—everyone was puzzling his brain to decide what that thing was and what a prince was doing with it. Hamlet had been shipwrecked and set naked upon the kingdom, but that could not account for the implement. We thought we had seen the last of it, but no, it appeared with Hamlet as he made ready to duel with Laërtes. Would a royal prince carry such a thing into the palace? Nor was all this incongruous preparation excused by the result. After Laërtes had confessed to his opponent his own treachery and the villainy of the King, Hamlet seized the net, and pursuing his slinking uncle, caught him under its meshes, before he ran him through the body with his sword.

Not in that manner does the spectator desire the catastrophe to be consummated. He has seen the doubts, the vacillations of Hamlet through all the long series of scenes, his hero has suffered all that human heart can bear, but in his dying hour there is revealed to him in a blinding flash of clear certainty what he has darkly groped to find, and he becomes a strong man in his assurance of justice, and kills his enemy in noble, dignified power,—even though it be born of desperation. Any other kind of Hamlet is a craven, and we'll none of him.

These objections aside, the August festival at Stratford was an achievement of first rank. Nowhere in England could so many plays be witnessed in so short a time; nowhere could such uniformity of excellence be assured. Sir Johnston Forbes-Robertson presents only *Hamlet* now, and that at rare intervals; Sir Herbert Tree has allowed years to pass since his last Shakespeare triumph as Bluff Hal in *Henry VIII.; Othello*, recently revived, has disappeared from the London boards; and Mr. Granville Barker's original and bizarre *Midsummer Night's Dream* around a mature, fiery red Puck was a novelty rather than an artistic production; so to Stratford-upon-Avon and to Sir Frank Benson's company all Britain must turn for the sincerest, most competent, noblest service to the memory of her immortal Bard, to the greatness of his genius, and the lasting enrichment of her stage.

CLARENCE STRATTON.

Saint Louis, Mo.

THE WOMEN IN SPENSER'S ALLEGORY OF LOVE

Like every other noble monument of the Gothic spirit, the Faerie Queene is constantly rewarding the student with the revelation of fresh and unexpected phases, novel sources of delight. Quite a new aspect of the poem thus presented itself to me in a recent study of the allegory of love in Books III., IV., and V. Hitherto, such characters as Amoret, Florimell, and Belphoebe had always seemed mere repetitions of the conventional heroines of romance, but in this fresh survey delicate and refined distinctions between the characters began to appear, and I then came to feel that in these very distinctions resides much of the meaning of the allegory. Accordingly, this paper is an attempt to throw fresh light upon the teachings of the poem through an exposition of the characters of Amoret, Belphoebe, Florimell, Radigund, and Britomart.

The proper background for these characters is of course Spenser's theory of love. This is essentially the theory of the early Renaissance, an adaptation to more modern conditions of ideals that maintained in medieval days. It demanded an aristocratic society, for worthy love exists only among those of gentle birth. The court is therefore defined as "the great school-maistresse of all courtesy," and the country as a stranger to "all civile usage and gentility," with its rude rusticity tending to deform even gentle spirits. Thus when a courteous damsel is found among the lowly, she invariably proves to be of gentle blood and rearing. The Squire of Dames does indeed testify that the only woman whom he had ever found to be chaste for chastity's own sake was a damsel of low degree whom he had discovered by chance in a rural cottage, a maiden who was fair, and in whose countenance dwelt simple truth, but the Squire of Dames is a blasé man of the world, a jester and breaker of idols, a captious cynic. Among the lowly, then, only vulgar love exists, but in the gentle heart love breeds desire of honour and even brings forth bounteous deeds.

In theory, men who are "wise, warlike, personable, courteous, and kind" love women who are gracious and modest, adorned

with chastity, whose lives are given to deeds of courtesy and kindness.

Such is the ideal society. Spenser devotes his allegory to men and women who are striving for this ideal, opposed by defects within themselves or by evil forces without. Against this background any particular character in the allegory of love must be viewed.

As already stated, Amoret, Belphoebe, and Florimell seem, at first blush, mere repetitions of a common type. All three are praised in extravagant terms for their grace, beauty, and chastity. Of Amoret it is said that Psyche

> her lessoned
> In all the lore of love, and goodly womanhead.

Of Florimell it is said,

> The surest signe, whereby ye may her know,
> Is that she is the fairest wight alive, I trow.

So great was her chastity that it was carolled by the angels in heaven.

Of Belphoebe it is said:

> In so great prayse of stedfast chastity
> Nathlesse she was so courteous and kynde,
> Tempered with grace and goodly modesty,
> That seemed those two vertues strove to fynd
> The higher place in her heroick mynd:
> So striving each did other more augment,
> And both encreast the prayse of woman kynde,
> And both encreast her beautie excellent:
> So all did make in her a perfect complement.

Though all three of these characters are made to conform to the neo-Platonic conception of the harmony of grace, beauty, and chastity, if attention be fixed upon points of dissimilarity rather than of resemblance, it will be apparent that Amoret is made the special embodiment of Grace and Charm; Belphoebe, of Chastity; and Florimell of Beauty. This differentiation is more or less suggested by the epithets and descriptive terms applied to the characters, and is the key to the parts that they play in the allegory. Thus Florimell is always "the fair," with "face as cleare as christall stone." When Prince Arthur and Guyon start in pursuit of her, fleeing as she is from the lustful forester, they

are said to "follow beauties chace." When Prince Arthur beholds her beauty, she seems to him so lovely that he forgets the vision of the Faerie Queene herself, and ardently hopes that Florimell herself may prove to be the Queen. So fair is she that, at the contest for the girdle, though the face of Amoret

> plainly did expresse
> The heavenly pourtraict of bright Angels hew,

the face of the false Florimell, who bears but the outward semblance of the true Florimell, "once seen did all the rest dismay."

Similarly, Belphoebe is so completely the embodiment of chastity that such lustful creatures as instinctively pursue Amoret and Florimell, instinctively shrink from her presence, and the story of the divine origin of chastity is appropriately told while her praise is being sung.

A review of the respective adventures of these characters will show how complete and careful is the differentiation.

Amoret was the daughter of a nymph, Chrysogonee, made pregnant by the sunbeams as she rested from her bath. While yet an infant she was found by Venus, and was reared in the garden of Adonis. To Psyche was committed the care of the child, who brought her up with her own daughter, Pleasure, and her lessoned "In all the lore of love and goodly womanhead." The darling of Venus, the pupil of Psyche, the playmate of Pleasure, what can she represent but the charm, the glowing, love-compelling power of woman? And this conception of the character is abundantly substantiated by her subsequent career.

Amoret is the type of physical beauty, physical beauty not at its worst but at its very best. Amoret is not Lilith, who

> Draws men to watch the bright web she can weave,
> Till heart and body and life are in its hold;

but no more is she the Sibylla Palmifera, beauty enthroned

> Under the arch of life, where love and death,
> Terror and mystery, guard her shrine.

This physical beauty, uncorrupted though it be— is yet removed from that soul's beauty and loveliness which is the ideal of womanly perfection, that spiritual beauty of which the beauty of the flesh is but the outer vesture. Amoret must therefore suffer and be schooled ere her beauty can be transformed

into this nobler type. Spenser portrays the process of this discipline.

Psyche had

> brought her forth into this worldes vew,
> To be the ensample of true love alone,
> And lodestarre of all chaste affection
> To all fayre ladies that doe live on ground.

But much training was needed ere she was ready to serve as this "ensample."

Betrothed to Scudamour, who had won the shield of love with its motto,

> Blessed the man that well can use this bliss:
> Whosoever be the shield, Faire Amoret be his;

led forth, remonstrant with "tender teares" and "witching smiles," from the temple of Venus, where she had been seated in the lap of Womanhood, at the feet of the veiled figure of the goddess; at the marriage festivities she is carried away by the enchanter, Busyrane, with a masque of love "by way of sport as oft in masks is known." For seven months the beautiful victim is confined in the castle of this wretch and daily tormented until at length rescued by Britomart, the maiden-knight of Chastity. Britomart it seems had chanced upon Scudamour, asleep by a fountain, lamenting his bride. Thereupon she had offered her aid and together they had sought the castle, but only the chaste Britomart is able to penetrate the suffocating smoke and fire by which it is guarded. On the first night Britomart sees a pageant of love, with fair Amoret led by Despight and Cruelty, her breast bleeding from a wound and her heart laid in a silver basin; on the second night she sees Amoret chained to a pillar, while Busyrane writes enchantments with human blood. Then it is that Britomart attacks the enchanter, forces him to dispel his charms, and restores Amoret to liberty, while all love's insignia throughout the castle disappear. In the edition of 1590, Amoret and Scudamour are reunited outside of the castle; in the edition of 1596, the love allegory having taken more complete form in the poet's mind, the version is changed and Scudamour, disheartened, has departed for further aid.

For a season thereafter Britomart and Amoret proceed together. One evening they came to a castle where a knight

without a lady must lie outside the gate. A young knight contends for Amoret, but is easily overcome by Britomart. Riding again, they meet Blandimour—Blandishment in love, Até—Discord, Paridell—Lustfulness, and Duessa—Falsehood. Afraid to oppose Britomart himself, Paridell asks Blandimour to do so. Him Britomart easily overcomes. At the contest for the girdle of Florimell, Britomart presents Amoret, and she is the only one upon whom the girdle will remain.

All goes well with Amoret until, straying through the wood one day while Britomart sleeps, she is carried off by Lust. Once she escapes from him, only to be chased again. Finally she is rescued by the young squire of Belphoebe, Timias, but not until she has been wounded, for whenever the squire strikes with his javelin, Lust holds the lady in front of himself to receive the blow. Long Amoret lies in a swoon, while Timias sits beside her, wiping her eyes, kissing them, and "handling soft the hurts which she did get." Amoret, however, is shortly left alone, for Belphoebe chancing to find her squire showing such marks of tenderness, angrily reproves him, and he, distressed by her reproach, follows hard after when she flees in anger. Amoret is not left defenceless, however, for she is straightway succoured by Prince Arthur, the Grace of God.

Amoret and Prince Arthur now ride together, though the identity of neither is disclosed. As they proceed, they behold afar six knights engaged in arms, and the Briton Prince, indignant that two of the knights are assailed by four, hastens to the scene. The two knights prove to be Britomart and Scudamour —for Britomart had come upon Scudamour again and joined him afresh in his search for Amoret—who are attacked by stern Druon, lewd Claribell, love-lavish Blandimour, and lustful Paridell. Prince Arthur separates the contestants. Peace restored, the knights journey together and, as they ride, Scudamour is prevailed upon to tell the story of his wooing. Nothing is said to indicate what becomes of Prince Arthur, but presumably he rejoins Amoret. Apparently Amoret had been left at a distance by the Prince, but at this point the character abruptly drops out of the narrative, and does not reappear in the entire course of the poem. The reunion of Amoret and Scudamour is therefore not formally accomplished. It would seem to have been crowded out by the press of other episodes.

Despite this abrupt termination of the adventures of Amoret,

what the poet is trying to express through this character is sufficiently evident. No sooner is Amoret wed to Sir Scudamour than the enchantments of love separate her from her lord, and only the solicitous aid of Chastity, extended now to one and now to another of this estranged couple, is able to expedite their reunion. Amoret had yet to learn that real union must be based upon spiritual, not physical, love. Intense and spirited, Amoret thus becomes the victim of love's enchantment, but against it she struggles, knowing it to be unworthy of her. When Chastity first appears to Amoret, she does not recognize her deliverer therein, and fears her until she learns that Chastity is the very essence of peerless womanhood. Even after Amoret has been thus liberated from the shows of lustful love, she is not able to rely upon herself. Attended by Chastity, she is so secure that Paridell, a knight typifying lust, does not even attempt to gain her; from the assaults of Blandishment she is equally secure. With Chastity her champion, she can even wear the golden girdle. But no sooner does she venture forth alone, Chastity asleep, than she is snatched away by Lust and then grievously wounded by the very squire who seeks to rescue her. Such is the compelling power of her beauty, that even this Squire of Belphoebe forgets the conduct becoming his station. Finally the Grace of God comes to her rescue. Without Chastity and the Grace of God, says Spenser, the beauty and charm of woman are powerless to protect her, and attract men only to her harm. Without Chastity and the Grace of God no real union of man and woman can be consummated.

If marriage found Amoret unprepared for such a spiritual union, equally unprepared was Sir Scudamour. He desires an ideal union, but he lacks somewhat in energy, and somewhat in stern chastity. He, too, needs to be schooled. Britomart finds him asleep by a fountain, lamenting for Amoret, when he should be at his quest. He cannot stand the test of fire, nor has he sufficient faith in Chastity to believe that she can rescue his lady from the castle of Busyrane. He is induced to believe the tales of the soft-tongued Blandamour against the purity of Amoret. He even suspects the integrity of Chastity, and thinks that she has played him false. But Scudamour, like Amoret, grows, and in this growth is revealed the intent of the allegory. Though he struggles against Chastity she triumphs over him, and he then is rewarded by learning that Amoret is still a maid.

Finally, when Chastity vows never to leave him until Amoret is found, his weakness is replaced by strength, and the allegorica intent becomes completely manifest. Thus Scudamour, like Amoret, is seeking after true fellowship in love.

Opposed to Amoret, thus carried away with the shows of love, thus provocative of passion, thus ardent, thus helpless, thus prompting passion in men, is Belphoebe; Belphoebe, in whom chastity is combined with austerity and aloofness, an austerity and aloofness that mar the completeness and harmony of her character. The poet carefully contrasts her with Amoret.

The twin-sister of Amoret, she was the darling of Diana and the pupil of Phoebe. Lust, which had taken captive Amoret, at once recognizes in Belphoebe his mortal enemy, and flies in terror from her presence, straightway that he sees her. A false knight like Blandamour rides a course for Amoret and the cunning Busyrane readily deceives her, but when Braggadochio, the blustering pretender, thinks to embrace Belphoebe in his "bastard arms," she bends her bright javelin against him, fiercely menacing, turns her about, and flees apace, while he stands amazed, fearing her wrath. She is as self-reliant as Amoret is helpless. Yet with her composure and austerity she is harsh and ungenerous. To be sure, when once she has recovered from the shocking sight of Timias ghastly and pale from his conflict with the forester, symbol of lust, she nurses him tenderly, but when she comes upon him kissing the cheeks of the fair unconscious Amoret, she "was filled with deepe disdaine and great indignity," and thought to kill them both.

In the succeeding canto she herself is made unwittingly to condemn her own severity, for when she discovers the squire, all changed in aspect through harassing sorrow, and so unrecognized by her, she invokes "fowle rebuke and shame" upon the author of his misery. Then, when she learns that she is the cause of so great woe, her heart softens, and she receives him once more into favour. Thus did Belphoebe learn that austere virtue is itself unlovely and wrong, and that chastity must be softened by mercy.

Florimell, as already suggested, is the embodiment of beauty. In her first age's flower she was "fostered by the Graces (as they say)," and when she came to the court of the Faerie Queene he brought with her the goodly belt, Cestus,

> Dame Venus girdle, by her steemed deare
> What time she usd to live in wively sort,
> But layd aside when so she usd her looser sport.

This girdle gave the virtue of chaste love and true wifehood. At the court the Fayre Florimell was admired of many knights, of Satyrane, of Paridell, of Calidore, of Peridure, but she loved only Marinell; Marinell, who, warned by the prophecy of Proteus that "a virgin strange and stout him should dismay or kill," became "loves enimy." When rumour reached the court that Marinell had met death at the hands of Britomart, Florimell straightway set out from the court, vowing to find him. Never was woman less prepared to set forth on such a quest, and her adventures in this search are designed to show the dangers with which beauty in woman is beset and the helplessness of beauty. Ready to die in defence of her chastity, she lacks the judgment, self-control, and knowledge of the world which Spenser, in sympathy with the Renaissance, quite as much as with the medieval ideals of woman, recognized as essential to complete womanhood, that resourcefulness and mastery of circumstance which Shakespeare portrayed with manifest enthusiasm in Rosalind, in Viola, in Beatrice.

Florimell first appears pursued by a forester, "breathing out beastly lust her to defyle." They are perceived by Prince Arthur, Guyon, Britomart, and Timias. Prince Arthur and Guyon instantly set off "to reskew her from shameful villany," while Timias pursues the forester. Florimell is lost to sight, but finally Prince Arthur gains view of her, and strives to overtake and comfort her. However, so overcome is she with fear that she cannot recognize the noble intent of even such a knight as Arthur.

Her next adventures are designed further to show the pitfalls that threaten beauty: she is assailed first by rough, loutish love, churlish and coarse; then by violent, rapine love; then by subtle and insinuating love, love working through flattery and feigned kindness. Fleeing from Prince Arthur she takes shelter in a lowly cot, where dwell a wicked hag and her boorish son. The hag takes her for a goddess, the pure embodiment of beauty;

> And thought her to adore with humble spright:
> T'adore thing so divine as beauty, were but right.

When Florimell perceives the son's boorish efforts to win her, she takes refuge in flight, only to be pursued by a beast of horrible aspect that the hag creates by magic to pursue her.

Florimell takes refuge in the boat of a sleeping fisherman. When the fisherman awakes he greedily assails her, for her beauty. From the violence of the fisherman she is rescued by Proteus, "the Shepheard of the seas." Proteus tries to comfort her, but in vain, and takes her to his watery abode and tries to win her by his craftiness. He woos her as "an immortal mote a mortall wight"; he woos her as a mortal, as a knight, a king; he transforms himself into a Gyaunt, a Centaur, a raging storm; but all to no avail. Finally he throws her into a dungeon. Thus is beauty seen to be exposed to every kind of evil love.

Confined in the dungeon for seven months, her laments are by chance overheard of Marinell, who is straightway filled with remorse. Marinell now wastes away through love, until finally, through the aid of Neptune, the release of Florimell is accomplished. Beauty is at last safe, protected by a knight of nobility and wealth.

Contrasted with Florimell is the False Florimell, outwardly resembling her, but in reality a licentious courtezan and flirt, who deceives most of the knights, but who cannot deceive Britomart and Artegall, the knights of Chastity and Justice. When placed beside the real Florimell she vanishes completely away, for beauty of body that has not beauty of spirit for its counterpart is fleeting and ephemeral.

Marinell, the lover of Florimell, also plays an interesting part in this allegory of love. He is a knight of great riches, and of doughty courage and prowess, but his original attitude toward women is not merely an attitude of indifference, but of actual hostility; an attitude neither natural nor chivalric. For while it is better to be love's enemy than to lust, best of all is to love chastely. Therefore Britomart, the Knight of Chastity, lays low the presumptive pride of Marinell, and the poet approves the deed, for while the mother of Marinell curses the hand that smote him, none of the curses overtake the conqueror. And not until he conceives his great love for Florimell is Marinell a worthy exponent of the courtly gentleman.

As Florimell typifies beauty in woman, so Radigund typifies strength. This bold, aggressive, masculine woman strikingly contrasts with the delicate, romantic, highly-feminized Florimell.

Radigund possessed many qualities that the Renaissance prized in its women: she was beautiful, so beautiful that her fair visage, bathed in blood and sweat as it was, seemed to Artegall "a miracle of natures goodly grace"; she bore herself with distinction, "with stately port and proud magnificence"; she was brave, "fild with courage and with joyous glee." But just as the delicacy of Florimell needed to be infused with hardening alloy, so the superb strength of Radigund, so admirable in itself, needed to be tempered with gentleness and modesty. Since she tried to break those bonds which very nature imposes upon woman and which "vertuous women wisely understand," since, in violation of justice as well as of nature, she wished woman to usurp the rôle of man, quite properly her career ended in disaster, and quite properly at the hands of woman herself. The Renaissance had expressed its ideal of a strong woman in the gracious Countess of Urbino, who ruled her court with distinction and without the sacrifice of feminine sweetness and modesty.

Since, then, Amoret is the embodiment of charm in woman, Belphoebe of chastity, Florimell of beauty, and Radigund of strength, a character is required in whom all of these qualities shall be harmoniously combined. Such a character is supplied in Britomart, Spenser's example of perfect womanhood. Britomart is at once charming, chaste, beautiful, and strong, so that the Third Book might properly have been termed, "The Legend of Britomartis, or of Perfect Womanhood."

The beauty of Britomart is so overpowering that when, her armour laid aside, men behold her beauty, they worship her as a divinity. Thus, when she doffs her armour at the castle of Malbecco,

> they smitten were
> With great amazement of so wondrous sight.

Likewise, when Artegall had cloven the helmet of Britomart, and saw

> That peerless paterne of Dame Natures pride
> And heavenly image of perfection,

he fell humbly down,

> And of his wonder made religion,
> Weening some heavenly goddesse he did see.

The beauty of Britomart embraced both feminine delicacy and masculine strength, so that to Guyon

> Faire lady she him seemd, like lady drest,
> But fairest knight alive, when armed was her brest.

Thus, while she fascinated men, as did Amoret, she had abundant protection within herself:

> For shee was full of amiable grace
> And manly terror mixed therewithall.

The chastity of Britomart is constantly illustrated. She recoils at the first improper touch; she wins the tourney of the Knights of Maydenhead; she alone detects the impurity of the False Florimell at the contest for the girdle; she vindicates the superiority of chastity to coldness by overpowering Marinell, and its superiority to temperance by overpowering Guyon; and the giant Ollyphant, type of Lust, flees from her presence, as Lust, in the person of the wild man, fled from the presence of Belphoebe.

Not only is Britomart chaste herself, but she is strong enough to help many other men and women to be chaste. She enables the Red Crosse Knight to resist Malecasta and thus to remain true to Una,—in other words, holiness to withstand the temptation to worship delight instead of truth; she penetrates the smoke, enters the castle of Busyrane, and liberates Amoret; she assists Scudamour and Amoret in their search for one another; and she delivers her own dear knight from the bondage of Radigund.

Innumerable are the triumphs in arms that vindicate her strength; not even Artegall can stand before her, not even when aided by such knights as Cambell and Triamond.

Her self-control is the more to be admired because of her ardency. Her passion for Artegall, once she has seen his image in Merlin's glass, knows no degree, and when at last she finds herself actually in his presence,

> Her hart did leape, and all her hart-strings tremble,
> For sudden joy and secret feare withall.

Yet such is her self-command that even at this moment her innate reserve does not desert her.

Britomart is thus, I take it, a very carefully matured study of the ideal woman as Spenser conceived her, a woman in whom winsomeness and reserve, beauty and strength, intensity and self-control, grace and chastity, were happily combined, the crowning character among the women of this allegory of love.

It should perhaps be remarked in conclusion that, idealistic as is the character of Britomart while playing the rôle of the knight, no sooner is she betrothed than a very real woman, very real in her feminine jealousy on learning that her lover is infatuated with another, very real in her feminine impulse to reserve her lover, despite the obligation of his quest, wholly to herself, a very real woman replaces the heroine of romance. The Britomart who rescues Amoret and overthrows knights in tourney is borrowed from the tales of chivalry; the Britomart who flings herself upon her bed, consumed with grief and rage at her lord's remissness, the Britomart who clings to her lord hesitant between duty and love, is borrowed from an Elizabethan hearthside. This transformation is a curious commentary upon the limitations of romance.

FREDERICK MORGAN PADELFORD.

University of Washington.

OUR LITERARY LIMITATIONS

There has recently been set on foot in some of our magazines the beginning of a neat controversy over the final merits and absolute position of American literature. Some English critics threw the gauntlet and it was immediately taken up by certain American writers, who came dashing to their own vindication and the defence of the honour of their country. But in these days of greatest controversy who has heart for any mere battle of books? When one of our momentary best-sellers proved finally the hopeful position of our literature from the type of his own success, no opponent seemed to have interest to answer him and he was left crowing on the field.

The greatest issue overshadows everything else in these days, and questions of relative literary merit seem for the moment negligible. It is probable that even the reproof for our own good of James Stephens and Richard Garnett will easily be forgotten, along with the retorts upon them, because criticism at the best is secondary to action. And yet comment has ceased merely to ask who reads an American book, but has gone farther to imply that whoever does will be the worse for it. The result of such criticism is not to make us think more humbly of ourselves than we do—we could scarcely do that—but to ask ourselves how long this state of things is going to last. When will our 'prentice days be over? Is two hundred years long enough for a novitiate? When will great literature begin for us?

But after all it is not an apprenticeship or a novitiate. That was over long before our period. We forget that we began literature equipped with the standards of all our ancestors. We did not have to discover verse form or prose form or learn to fit thought to the moulds of mental processes. Chaucer and Swift and Fielding were as much ours as if they had written on this side of the Atlantic. For us they had trimmed and formed the sentence and discovered the homespun virtues of composition. They found the great standard forms in which men will receive thought. What remained for us was to discover the relations of our own life to what the world already knew, and to express ac-

curately our understanding of ourselves. Our literature cannot be judged alone, but only as a development from its inheritance.

Our faults and our limitations are our own then, and neither patriotism nor egotism should keep us from knowing them. There may be patriotism in "American goods for Americans"; but there can be none in "American literature for Americans." Patriotism should demand constantly greater and still greater work from our writers. But we do not seem to have that sort of loyalty. Instead we buy a million copies of the worst book in the world and order a quarter million of the next worst before it is off the press. The faults of our literature are at the door of readers as much as at the door of writers. We make no demands. When foreign critics tell us that our workmanship is bad and that we don't know a craftsman's conscience, our writers can find easy excuse in, "But no man required it of me." If they were further told that they knew no reverence for language, no precision of form, none of the everlasting yea or nay of the artist, many of them would not even understand what was meant. It is not that we tried to reach a great standard and failed. We have the greater failure of never having seriously tried.

But after we are through finding fault with the technique and purpose of our literature, there is still left the matter of content and its relation to ourselves. Even here, after making allowance for the wholesomeness and fineness of spirit of our best work, we have to acknowledge a lack of real greatness. It is not merely that two hundred years have given us no great epic or tragedy, but that they have not given a formulation of life and reading of it that is finally valuable. We feel the reproach that any one may lay on us, of the lack of maturity and reality in our work—and why is it?

The blame is to be divided, apparently, between the writers and the nation—not merely as readers but as a race—and a large part of it is not blame at all but merely reason. It is doubtful whether at the present moment we could have literature greater in some points than we have, and whether we shall have greater until many of our conditions and relations change.

It is usual to ascribe our failure to our preoccupation with practical affairs; to say that our creative force and invention has gone into material results instead of artistic or intellectual. This is true in part, doubtless, but it is answered by pointing to our great body of writing, such as it is. No material preoccupation

has limited publication. Many hundreds of men and women are at this moment earning a so-called honest living by writing. Authorship has become a recognized business for profit. The discovery, on the part of crowds of vocation-seekers, that money may be made by the writing of books, was one of the worst things that ever happened to literature. A man chooses writing for an occupation as he would choose any other means of livelihood. His choosing it means that he must begin an incessant search for material, not as thought, not as anything valuable in itself, but only as something that may be transmitted to others—in exchange for money. He is not necessarily a thinker or creator but only a manufacturer, of a salable commodity.

Or it may be a man engaged in some other legitimate occupation follows some creative impulse—a genuine one—to the making of a book. He immediately gives up his vocation, whatever it is, and assigns himself to the eternal writing of books, confident in the expectation that he will always have thoughts worthy of preservation. After that, instead of being impelled to write he is compelled to write. The greater his need for spending, the oftener he must put forth a book and the more hours a day he must write. He may even contract with a publisher to produce a book periodically for a term of years. A man regards his powers with great confidence when he says that he will be able to produce a book every year or half-year for a term of years. Was ever great work so manufactured? Of course this professional contriver of books does not prevent others from writing greater ones, but he does put his mark on the general type of our literature. While writing as a mere profession grows, it will almost inevitably fall off, not necessarily in technique but in nobleness and creative motive. It becomes less a means of putting thought before the world than of getting money from the world. And essentially literature must be a giving, not a getting. It has always been a gift to the world, not material for barter or profit. To choose authorship as one chooses railroading or paper-hanging is in itself anomalous.

But another modifying element, perhaps more important than this, is the limited point of view of our writers. There is a provincialism that is great and a provincialism that is small. Literature may reflect attachment to place and condition—Carlyle called Lamb "cockney to the marrow"—but at the same time be flavoured, proportioned, by the writer's awareness of the outside

world. It may represent its own conditions, and yet be poised absolutely with relation to the universe. It may recognize the scale of importance and significance, know what is particular and what universal, use unconsciously a background of general human life behind its own special example. Our writers too often—not always—write as if the particular social condition they represent were normal and universal. "What should they know of England who only England know?" finds ready illustration among them. They don't know America because they know no other country. There is nothing affected or un-American in asking for a degree of cosmopolitanism in the attitude of every writer.

Instead of that, in many cases we do not even have national quality. Writers often are not acquainted with conditions and social classes within our own country. It is often as if one wrote of a wild West without knowing that there is an East, or of New Orleans without knowing that there is a New England. It would be easy to give ridiculous illustrations of this fault. The proportions of our country and its national isolation limit our knowledge. Among ourselves we are in no degree cosmopolitan. Almost any European may have a wider knowledge of neighbouring countries and relations in the world than the American of average experience. Much of our writing lacks the placing which might result from wider knowledge—even from a book-knowledge of the world.

Another limitation laid on our writers is due to our own unformulated social conditions. Our very desirable lack of caste and defined classes means also lack of social organization and of definition of types. Our life is still fluid and heterogeneous—not yet sorted out and tabulated. We have no classes of expectations regarding types. The format of life is not determined as yet. Society does not appear in layers, or strata easily showing cleavage. No set of circumstances calls for certain qualities or degrees of fineness. That strikes any one making a comparison of classes in Europe and America. In an older country there is a much larger basis of uniformity before differentiation of the individual begins. The author meets in his reader a certain degree of expectation or knowledge regarding members of classes. But an American writer, whether he pictures senator or newsboy, builds his type up almost from the beginning. There is no natural uniformity of manners, no absolutely recognized set of conventions belonging to corresponding social groups. At any moment

a change of their fortunes or circumstances may throw outsiders into any group, who are novices in its ways. Our very absence of class means absence of tradition and makes the writer's task the harder. Many Americans actually read more easily, with less mental adjustment, a well-written English novel than a corresponding American work. The English themselves have throughout all classes a knowledge of the customs of each other which surpasses any in this country. Their servants, their tradesmen, know what their manners and conduct should be as well as they do themselves.

An occasional writer grasps fully this unformulated condition here. Howells makes this very heterogeneousness into a fabric for a basis of his work; and that is one thing which makes the conventional reader think Howells difficult and indeterminate. But Howells brought international experience to his recognition of the miscellany of our life and an understanding of it. The most of our writers have not had a remote enough point of view to understand in what manner it is miscellaneous. Fiction ought to reflect not only the emotions and actions of individual persons, but the social conditions that made them—to show society crystallizing, organizing, forming custom and tradition and belief, hedging about the plastic character of a man and moulding it. Our novels too seldom show a whole section of any type of life. To the gigantic form of *Vanity Fair* or *Tom Jones*, for instance, they are as a single thread would be to a fabric—as singled out, as thin. Compared to the network of causes and effects in Meredith or Victor Hugo, they are simple, unreflected.

This same fluidity of condition interferes in another way with the ultimate value of American creative literature. For universality of representation a certain superficial fixity of life is necessary. But in our fiction we get snapshots instead of portraits, detail instead of principle, local condition instead of national tradition. Each generation stands almost isolated, linked somewhat by inheritance to the preceding but far too little by training or education. A great writer may find beyond the transiency or evanescence or normal growth of life, permanently true human principles or qualities—the truth that is the permanent in change. Once in a while we do have a piece of work in which the writer seems to have his eye not merely upon the moving life, but upon the fixed thing which measures its movement. Such a one knows not only the current form of the thing he is setting

forth, but human life in history and in great general social relations. He knows other history and other civilizations than our own. He is able to place his facts in wider and more important human settings and to use not only the nearer but the more remote view.

Too few of our professional writers can do this. And far too many of them have as their preparation for writing only a meagre knowledge of the larger world. This fact accounts in part, doubtless, for the inability of some of our most popular authors—and we have only ourselves to blame for their popularity—to discriminate between the melodramatic and the dramatic, the sentimental and the genuinely emotional, the fantastic and the real, between bad taste and good taste, and between accepted social custom and utter crudity. It would be easy to give ludicrous proofs from widely circulating authors to show that they do not seem to understand even the bearing of persons of gentle manners. That the taste of such books is accepted by thousands and hundreds of thousands of readers shows, as I said before, where the real blame for our literature lies.

The fact is, our literature is not bookish enough and our writers are not men of letters. They have not gone to school to the literature of the world any more than they have to the history of the world. Some of the most prolific show no hint of any background of reading. Unfortunately they meet in many readers a feeling to which they can easily cater, a fear of erudition, a self-protective distaste for bookishness. But who should be bookish if not the writer of a book? How else is one to get scrupulous and severe judgment of his own work, love of language, fastidiousness in accepting and recklessness in discarding, taste that constantly scourges itself and will never be satisfied, insatiate longing for truth and excellence?

Another element which affects seriously the quality of our literature, especially of our fiction, is its incorrigible optimism. This too follows as much from the taste and demand of the reader as from the limited sight or purpose of the writer. The American reader loves a God's-in-his-heaven book, an everyone-may-be-happy book. He loves a book which turns out well, neatly and featly and completely. To prove this one need only point to the commercial success of recent groups of stories of this sort, as sentimental and absurd and melodramatic as books can be, but having for their theme the steady light-hearted insistence that

this is a happy world. It will be a wonder if they are not followed by others of their kind, so joyous and profitable has been their welcome. This might perhaps show only that the public needs such works and finds them a contrast to the conception of life usually held before it, if they were really quite different in temper and result from our fiction in general. But in fact they differ only in degree.

Where is tragedy in American literature? And where is the reader who chooses tragedy for his reading? In our poetry, our drama, our fiction, how often have we reached the height of real seriousness? We have sometimes the pathetic or the sentimentally sad, but how often the scale of tragedy? It is a remarkable lack in a literature as a whole, not merely the absence of deepest feeling but neglect of what is regarded as the highest type of literary creation, of that in which alone man can be shown at his greatest. No great literature is so lacking in seriousness as ours. In our yearly publication of fiction, story after story has as its objective point merely a fortunate happening—scarcely more. The great necessities and imperative causes of life furnish little motive. The result is that, except when Hawthorne inquired into life and learned serious and sad things about it, our fiction has been an invention of circumstance far more than a creation of character. Our ideal *motif* has been less man meeting with eternal law than man controlling events. Destiny is kindly. It does not wrench man and try him and finally cast him down; it gently listens to him and in response to his manly struggles meekly acquiesces in his desires. The reader ends in no awe at the mystery and irrevocableness of destiny, but in pleasant satisfaction at the prowess of man. And it is a truism, of course, to say that man never shows his utmost strength in a winning as he does in a losing struggle. The weakness—or mildness, rather—of characterization in our fiction goes with its cheerfulness.

This element also can doubtless show for its excuse not merely a weakness in American writers but a prevailing mood and expectation in American life. It is a platitude to say that the expectation of undertaking and of success in the undertaking is a fundamental thing in all practical life in America. It has all progressed in that way—a new thing to do, a new place to clear, a new structure to build, a new region to occupy and make habitable, a new mechanism to invent and create, new material to adapt for human use, a new life to organize. In it all we have

been successful or have failed to perceive where we were unsuccessful. The tradition of accomplishment, whether valuable accomplishment or not, colours all conditions of life. We are sustained in our assumption, to be sure, by the view of practical results. Things *have* turned out well. Man has gone out to do a thing and has apparently done it. Why should he not continue always to do it?

The surprising thing is that the very bigness of undertaking, the gigantic mastery of physical conditions, has not in kind or degree passed over into our literature. Even the view of nature there rarely shows the element of awe or mystery. No people has had better opportunity to feel these elements. Within the period of modern literature a people has come into contact with primæval natural conditions, on a tremendous and awful scale. Surely that should have affected their thought, their national mood, the motives of their writing. Should not the untouched conditions of this country have been to the new Americans what the sea was to the men of *Beowulf*? But they had scarcely come into view before they were also a thing to control or adapt. There was a continent of endless breadth—to put a road across; a mighty river—to cover with a bridge; a grey and mysterious forest—to cut down; mountains on a scale of sublimity—to dig into. Man has felt awe or wonder at nature less often than power over her. At the same time that he looks at the grandeur of a mountain, he sees the railway that has scaled and crossed it. Africa has in recent years more often inspired an emotional view of nature than has America.

There is an optimism that is courageous and an optimism that is cowardly and an optimism that is merely ignorant. What dominates our literature is not the first but a combination of the other two. The fault is partly that we do not see and partly that we will not see. It is largely an optimism that is puerile, empty. Along with the tradition of material prosperity and success, we have also the tradition of comfort of life, of social contentment, of domestic placidity. The comfortable, undisturbed reader expects the most of this also to be carried into the fiction he reads. An optimism that is based on the possibilities, the unfulfilled ideals of life, may yet look its worst actualities in the face and write nobly of them; a cheerfulness that ignores actuality will never see significance or necessity in it. Nor will it know how conscienceless its own attitude has been.

To this as much as to anything else the incompleteness of characterization in American fiction is due. How incomplete that is, is shown by the fact that we have contributed scarcely a character to the great group of created men and women who are world acquaintances. Whom have we to put beside even the characters who have come to life in the last fifty years in English literature alone? We have to acknowledge how much our literature is lacking in subtlety, in complexity, in close analysis, and above all in the recognition of the failures and discontents of man. In our popular novel the hero and the villain are alike without modification. Simplicity marks them, an out-and-outness which calls for no effort of understanding on the part of the reader. And they are both intended to give satisfaction to him.

To measure the degree to which our literature is weakened by this tendency, we have only to compare it with a current foreign literature—with recent Russian fiction, for instance. This great burst of self-expression on the part of a people has been a remarkable gift to the world. A race has been laying bare its discontents, its consciousness of futility, its thwarted efforts, its failure in manner of living. And it has been doing so with a rare awareness of these very things, an acuteness of understanding which we, with far greater national unity and national feeling, have not approached. These books may not give us pleasure, but we are horribly convinced by them. And apart from any sympathetic satisfaction in them, one must admire to the point of pleasure their precision, their forthrightness, their conscientiousness, their terrible accuracy. No desire to charm or to picture charm comes between them and the thing they are to set forth. But they do attempt an awful truthfulness, not merely a picture of the enjoyments or successes of life or its pleasurable emotions. They try to show, not what they wish life to be, but what they find it. So they deal, not with desirable happenings, but with the restrictions of life and the futility which makes it tragedy. To the average American reader they are irksome books, with their grey background, their physical sordidness, their unbathedness, their vague struggles and indefinite disappointments. Our life does not furnish the conditions for any such picture. Our little stories look bright and clean and open-faced in comparison. But theirs give an impression of racial completeness which ours have never attained. Not merely individual characters but controlling elements are marked by national quality. The combination of dis-

content and hopelessness, of acute purpose and prohibition—that element alone would connect them with national condition and history.

A contrast of this sort sets off a meagreness in American literature—a lack of perception of larger elements of life, of causes and controlling forces and things which make or deny man. Our literature, as it now stands, is less an inevitable expression of the race than it is a toy of the race. We eternally ask entertainment, not truth. No one man is to be blamed if this is true of his writings; a hundred taken together must bear heavy blame.

Of course we are not entirely without recognition of wrong or suffering among our social conditions. It would be absurd to ignore the works that deal with them. Even these, however, bear such modification of their theme as to reduce the artistic or creative value. They might almost be divided into two classes. In the first one the wrong is merely an untoward starting-point for the hero, a thing for him to put under his feet or to conquer and escape from. In the end it merely furnishes a background for his success. In the other class the picture of misfortune is given for altruistic or social purposes. The reader is expected to say, "Something ought to be done about this." Such a book exists not for literary but for didactic purposes. What truth our optimism has left to us our didacticism has adapted for its own ends. And in fact in many cases the two combine. The propagandist and the optimist meet and literary creation goes begging. The possibility of tragedy is set forth only that it may be averted, not that human nature may have its greatest chance. A general evil is shown only as a temporary misfortune, to be corrected presently by general good sense or moral responsibility. The most serious social pictures are likely to deal not with Americans but with foreigners, immigrants bringing with them their trail of tragedy from their hard life overseas. Even here the most promising are as likely as not to drop from a race problem to a private love story. Some of the novels biggest in conception, such as those dealing with labour-questions and conditions, emphasize individual happiness at the expense of the background of general wrong. Our hero is happy in the end—we can forget the misery of the rest of his class. Those among us who see deepest into our social questions are generalizers rather than creators. They can discuss social life but they cannot represent it.

Suppose a play were written on the Colorado miners, of the

purport of Hauptmann's *Weavers*. One can easily conceive what the difference would be between its quality and the awful poignancy and hopelessness of *The Weavers*. We should all read it with pity and vigorous indignation, but at the same time with a comfortable remoteness from the condition and the satisfactory expectation that eventually something would be done about it. Or if it did not convey such a promise, it would suggest and perhaps emphasize the need and form of correction. In either case the creative and dramatic value would suffer. It is notable that our best novelists have avoided the larger social and economic questions, as if the conditions were not yet right among us for putting them into literature.

We are really in a sort of dilemma. The very conditions that make life agreeable and comfortable among us, make it also less adaptable for literary use. Our optimistic expectations, our frank moralizing, our lack of caste, our open chance of social and material advancement, all go to make a pleasant condition for living. The very thing that makes us pass prohibition amendments and establish welfare boards, may be what limits the quality of our literature. Perhaps what we need most of all is an honest understanding of what we are.

MARGARET LYNN.

University of Kansas.

JUSTICE

"How then to find the happiest spot below
Who can direct where all pretend to know."

So sang Goldsmith's Traveller. Somewhat the same difficulty meets us in defining justice. The definitions are at once too various, too vague, and too authoritative. For many centuries the definition standing at the head of the Roman *Corpus Juris*, given by Ulpian under Caracalla, has been sufficient for lawyers and legislators. "Justice is the constant and fixed purpose of rendering to each one his own."

The definition is complete enough if we apply to it the two legal presumptions that all which has conceivable existence, tangible or intangible, has an owner, and that every person at his peril must know who that owner is. Under these assumptions you must recognize that the Universe is disposed of; and it remains for us only to conform to that disposition, assumed to be known. But, evidently, you must not stray out of your lawyer's own system of law or you may find yourself in contact with another and different adjustment with the same assumptions of knowledge and responsibility. Under such assumptions, so far as concerns that portion of the Universe with which we personally come in contact, justice will be simple conformity to rule, as John Austin, the legalist, defines it, and as the derivation of the word itself would indicate. Austin cites with approval Hobbes's declaration that no law can be properly styled unjust, but says that Hobbes only means that no law can be *legally* unjust. If justice is conformity to legal rule of course an unjust law would be a contradiction in terms. Austin says that the phrase unjust law can only have meaning in the sense that human laws may be contrary to the law of God, which he says for us is identifiable with the highest recognizable utility. He admits that human laws are liable to come into conflict with such a standard. Of course they are, or with any other which could be set up outside of themselves.

As a matter of fact the legalist, not Austin this time but Blackstone, proceeds to describe his laws "as prescribing what is just and forbidding what is unjust." He evidently believes that

something more is necessary to make an action just than mere conformity to whatever he may require. If his law is not merely to command, but to command the just, then there will have to be farther inquiry as to how we may know that the things prescribed are just and the things forbidden unjust.

No argument is needed to show the complete artificiality of the assumptions that all things belong to someone, and that everybody knows to whom, and that there is only need to assign to each his known right, *Suum cuique tribuere.* The very fact that the legist takes such a position, and demands the vantage ground of such a pair of palpably untrue assumptions from behind which to administer his system, excites the suspicion that behind them is some perennial difficulty. If he can only work his laws by being relieved from all need to justify them, it is fair to conclude that such justification is difficult, and that leave to question them would be dangerous. If in fact peace may be maintained and justice successfully administered in modern states, only by assuming that everything has an owner prescribed by law and that everyone subject to that law is acquainted with its requirements, and at his peril must conform to it, and render to that owner what is his, the question as to what is justice must be difficult and dangerous indeed.

The mere honest investigator, of course, can make no such assumptions. He has no responsibility for the practical administration of affairs, or, if he has, has shed it for the occasion, and is concerned only with knowing what is this quality whose presence and absence are indicated by the words "just" and "unjust." He will be compelled to throw aside at once the assumption that everyone knows. If all do, then their knowledge is liable to be like Hennessey's "all wrong." For whether we take the question abstractly or concretely, whether we seek a definition or an application of the terms, there is nothing on earth about which there is more disagreement. For an unanswerable demonstration of this, we need only to turn to the professional ministers and institutions of justice themselves and their work. What is the main business of organized social agencies, indeed their exclusive business, in the view of the *laissez-faire* school of political thinkers? Evidently and simply the fixing of the line of justice between conflicting interests and contending disputants, each and all of whom are vociferously asserting that the state should leave them in full possession of the field. And we do not have to

go to the political theorizers to find this out. For ourselves and our neighbours what is the function of the state with which all of us personally come in contact? The tax collector, the magistrate, and the court, and I suppose here at all events we should not forget that institution of ours which puts the *laissez-faire* champions among us to rout, the school. Of these features the indispensable one, if the state is to remain a state, is the court and magistrate. The absolute necessity of the tax collector is for their maintenance. The school is an adjunct whose enforced maintenance can only be justified on their account. "To govern a free man you must instruct him." Madison, confessedly the master architect of our national constitution, declared in the *Federalist:* "Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it is obtained or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." This justice, which sometimes so inflames pursuit, we concede must be, for the lawyer and for the magistrate whom he helps to guide, conformity to the legal rules existing at the time of the transaction in dispute. Those rules however are constantly shifting. "Past politics," said Maitland, "make present law." No American can dispute him. A succession of state constitutions, to say nothing of the amendments, and seventeen amendments to the Federal Constitution, are recorded to support Maitland's dictum. Present politics, too, is making future law among us today as rapidly as ever.

For the politican as for the reformer or the mere moralizing investigator some other standard of justice must be found than that which the lawyer and the magistrate profess to follow. In making future laws the politician is by no means simply affirming what is. In fact there is no one else in the world quite so sure of the newness as well as of the importance of his propositions as is the political reformer, who hopes to gain power on the strength of them. What does he mean by justice? We have come to know pretty well what he means by "advantage" or by "utility." What promotes the general welfare is, as Spencer shows, whatever increases or tends to increase the volume and breadth of human life by augmenting the means for sustaining it, or by reducing the strength of influences that work against it. This is something which can finally be brought to a sensible experience test.

Mr. Beard, in his recent *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*, seems to think that something like

the same can be done with the idea of justice. He attacks the lawyers thus:

> "The characteristic view of the subject taken by American commentators and lawyers immersed in practical affairs is perhaps summed up as finely by Carter as by any writer. 'In free popular States,' says Carter, 'the law springs from and is made by the people and as the process of building it up consists in applying from time to time to human actions the popular ideal or standard of justice, justice is the only interest consulted in the work. . . . The law of England and America has been a pure development, proceeding from a constant endeavour to apply to the civil conduct of men the ever advancing standard of justice.' In other words," comments Mr. Beard, "law is made out of some abstract stuff known as 'Justice'. What set the standard in the beginning and why does it advance?"

His own answer would be economic needs and adjustments to them. It is true that Mr. Carter in his pamphlet against David Dudley Field's proposed code of New York Law, from which this passage is taken, was not indicating exactly what he understood by justice. His conception of it, however, as Mr. Beard could easily have found, is not that of mere "abstract stuff." His conception is the actual standard employed in English and American courts under the pressure of actual demands of parties and with the business world looking on with deep interest to approve or disapprove, and if need be to change. What he means by justice is conformity to the rule so fixed in the forum by contending social forces, among which, and not the least of them, are popular ideals, a factor which Mr. Beard seems to disbelieve in.

The lawyer is not to be blamed if he takes the standard as he finds it so fixed for the moment and defines justice as conformity to such standard. If he gets his case settled or decided in accordance with such an established standard he says he has reached a just result. But no such conformity with established rule, as before suggested, avails the legislator, far less the reformer. When the latter condemns the existing law or standard as unjust and proposes one that shall be at least nearer justice what does he mean?

If he proposes a change which is merely useful we know what he has in mind. We know that he proposes to make it easier to sustain and dignify human life, and to do so by improving its conditions either through better supplies or the overcoming of depressing agencies. But when he tells us that his change is toward a more just distribution of such advantages or a more

just apportionment of such evils what does he mean? Evidently not conformity with existing rules. He is avowedly changing these. We are assuming that the proposition does not relate to any recompense or retribution for the past, but is a mere social adjustment for the future. For instance, if he is enacting, or proposing to enact, a new employer's liability law that shall make all risky employments bear in carrying them on the charge for injuries that come about by means of blameless casualties, pure accidents, due to unforeseen and practically unavoidable conjunctures of events, not chargeable to any carelessness on the part of the injured person nor to any negligence on the part of the employer, what does he mean by saying that his proposed law is more *just* than the three judge-made rules that the common law has established for the protection of the property owner. The three rules, which so awakened Mr. Roosevelt's ire, are: 1st, that the employee engaging in a dangerous employment assumes all evident and necessary risks pertaining to it as ordinarily carried on. This is called the rule of assumption of the risk by the employed. 2d, the rule that the employer shall not be liable for any injury received through a fellow employee engaged in the same work, known as the fellow servant rule. 3d, the rule that no compensation shall be due to any employee to whose injury his own carelessness has in any degree contributed, no matter how negligent or culpable the employer may have been, known as the contributory negligence rule.

We can, as I say, readily understand what any advocate of the new plan means when he says that his scheme to make every employment that involves unusual risks pay for them as they occur, instead of throwing the burden upon the employee, is on the whole more advantageous for all concerned. Do we grasp his meaning when he says that it is more just?

Take another case. Two partners have worked together through a long generation in a profitable business. They have carried it on in a building worth $25,000 situated on a lot worth $5000.00. At the beginning of the partnership one of them was owner of the lot and building and turned that into the firm, deeding it to the partnership at the price of $30,000.00 and with a provision that on the dissolution of the firm it should be taken back at that price. For more than thirty years they work and prosper. A fire comes from no fault of either and the building burns, becoming a total loss. There is $14,000 of insurance on it which the

firm collects. They decide not to rebuild but to go out of business. The lot is still worth barely the $5000 at which it was put in. His partner says to the onewho put in the real estate, "Your agreement was to take this back at the price of $30,000.00. I expect you justly to perform that agreement." The other says "I was to have back the property and five sixths of it has gone up in smoke. Your demand is not just." What do they each mean by the term?

Take another case, the one given by Mr. Murdock in a lecture, of the two smugglers sentenced by Judge Archibald. The Broadway merchant had smuggled silks and gloves worth $1,250,000.00. The Greek fruit vendor had brought in $2500.00 worth of bananas without presenting them to the customs inspector. They both pleaded guilty. The wealthy culprit was permitted to retain his forfeited goods, paid a few thousand dollars fine, and was discharged. The fruit seller lost his bananas and spent some months in jail. Mr. Murdock declared the sentences unjust and rejoiced that the judicial crook, who he said had abused his official position, had since been impeached on other grounds. What did he mean by justice; and was it the same quality which Mr. Roosevelt had in mind when he denounced the assumption of risk rule and praised the employer's liability law; and do both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Murdock have in mind the same quality which the two partners were each asserting for their respective contention over the burned building?

How are we to decide that it would be more just to charge the business with the casualties growing out of it, than to let them fall upon the man who with his eyes open undertakes the work at an agreed wage and at his own risk? How are we to settle that Goldberg's fine for smuggling, while he retained his goods, was unjust when compared with Callas's loss of his bananas and his long term of imprisonment for the similar but smaller offence? Are we going to rely on simple intentions of justice to decide whether the retiring partner shall take back his cinder blackened lot and bear alone the loss of the building according to the letter of his agreement, or that the loss shall be thrown on the firm through whose use and under whose ownership the fire happened? In all of these cases is it some simple quality, the same in each and immediately recognized by a moral sense, which leads us to attach the characterization of just or unjust to the proposed law, the delivered sentence, and the disputed adjustment of the loss? If it were a question as to white or black or any of

the varying shades between, we should simply look and see. If necessary we would compare with some admitted standard of colour and perhaps call in an expert on shades of tint in order to be sure, but that standard would have been fixed by inspection and by instinctive use of the sense of sight.

Can we determine justice or the want of it by any such immediate use of any native powers of perception anywhere within us, and does the word imply any such perception of quality in the three applications of it which have been suggested? Is that capability of distinguishing the just from the unjust, which Aristotle declared belonged to man alone among living beings, a direct and immediate power of telling the moral complexion of social adjustments, of legal penalties and of individual contendings, such as is the eye's ability to distinguish and identify colours?

Such is the position of some distinguished thinkers of our time. Perhaps the one of them who would today be listened to with most respect when he asserts such a proposition is the Italian Delvecchio. He cites a great line of names for his doctrine of the immediate intuition of justice. He seems to me to assert too much, though even he admits that in the beginning this intuitive power, this *sentimento giuridico* as he calls it, existed only in germ and has required for its development the long discipline of recorded history, at least, and of how much longer he knows not. The characterization of human actions as just and unjust can hardly be the work of simple intuition however cultivated. It seems to be a judgment in which a comparison of elements is necessary and their relationships expressed. In each of the three cases above given, the employer's liability, the smugglers' sentences, the partners' dispute, the answering of the reasonable expectation of those concerned satisfies, at least in a greater degree, the conclusion which we denominate just, and is our ground for the term's adoption.

But the analysis ought not to commence with three problems, in the answers of each of which experts differ. "Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings proceedeth perfect praise." Perfect condemnation should come from the same source. Our educators tell us often enough that every child passes through all the stages of civilization. What happens with children in this regard? A notable thing in the child while its own individuality is its most recent and immediate discovery, is its sense of ownership. I knew one small person whose beginning pronoun

for self reference was the word "mine." "Mine wants that." "Mine wants gloves." The conception of self had come not only in connection with things but with the proprietorship of things.

I knew another one a little older. Just old enough to go gaily and enthusiastically to kindergarten. One day she had been told to bring a luncheon and all would go for a picnic in the grove. Probably she received somewhat definite suggestions as to what was necessary to bring, for she displayed much anxiety that the luncheon contain certain definite things and in a certain quantity. With all her usual cheerfulness she trudged away in the morning. She came back surprisingly early, her face completely clouded. She showed some disposition to be uncommunicative, but she finally broke out, "They just took my pail and put it right in with all the rest and I never got one thing that was mine out of it all." When it was suggested that it was for the school and she ought to be willing to have it go into the general supply, she exclaimed, "But they never asked me for it." She was quite willing to be generous, had only the opportunity been given.

Not so very long ago a friend who had incurred responsibility for two families asked how he was to adjust their relations. A widower with several children, he had married a woman with two more. He declared that he had always found his children generous and liberal enough in dealing with others till the two little strangers came into the family, and he had tried his best to have them treated generously, but as he said, all sorts of meanness kept cropping out. Upon asking him about details I found he had been enforcing a division of various childish things. I asked him if he had not in fact been outraging the sense of justice of his own children, by taking from them practically by force what they had learned to regard as their own and giving it to strangers. No appeal to generous sentiments would apply under such circumstances. Let the children feel safe in their possessions and their dominion be recognized and he would find they would be liberal and generous in dealing with others. They considered their title good against the newcomers. To give the latter a share, without compensation to those who were convinced of their own right, would surely breed quarrels and trouble. He could not expect any enforced generosity nor any permanent peace unless both parties accepted the result as just. Such an action would be a reasonable meeting of their expectations.

Above all he could expect no liberality in dealing with a disputed right. He has for some years succeeded in adjusting a difficult situation and shown once more that justice is the basis of peace.

The first book I ever had for my own was a Sanders's *Second Reader*. My mother had taught me to read at some time and by some means of which no recollection remains. The little country school to which I was sent did not grade its pupils by age or size or number of years' attendance. The woman in charge tested my acquirements and said that I needed a second reader. There was none among the books at home because she insisted upon a Sanders's *New Series* as the only one which would do. I recall yet running out into the back yard when my father came home with a large load of lumber, long after dark on a chilly November evening, to ask him if he had got my reader. "Oh, yes," he said. "It is in that bundle fastened to the chain on the lumber. Take it into the house." I carried in the bundle and finding the book proceeded to find out what was in it.

I have somewhere seen the statement that at the end of a hundred years, of all the works with which men are now concerning themselves, there will remain in use a few songs, a few roads, and a few laws. Certainly of the things relative to that early occurrence something of the sort is true. The road over which the book had come on the load of lumber still crosses the prairie with its gravel turnpike at the point where I had watched the men during the preceding summer heaping up the gravel till the line across the marsh was filled. Of the book I recall a few verses which it contained and the story of a little boy called Cyrus, who came home from school one night looking very serious. An inquiry as to the cause brought out the fact that he had been punished that day for an unjust judgment. At his school the pupils sometimes acted as arbiters for each other with an appeal to the instructor. One lad who was quite small had a long coat much too large for him. A larger lad whose coat was becoming altogether too tight proposed an exchange, the smaller boy resisted, and it had been left to Cyrus to say what was right between them, and Cyrus decided that the larger boy should take the larger coat and the smaller one should go to the other. Only long afterwards did I learn that the story is in Xenophon and that the mistaken little judge was Cyrus the Great.

I think, however, that the story whether true or a mere fable represents the demoralization incident to his royal position. If

little Cyrus really did make such a judgment it was because already the despotic oriental legislator was stirring in him, and had spoiled him for a judge. Not a schoolboy who has ever read the story, as I did, with no suspicion of his rank, ever thought of endorsing his attack upon property rights. He had outraged reasonable expectation in denying in the face of its assertion the ownership of the smaller lad in his large coat.

The little girl who got nothing that was hers at the picnic, and had her own dinner pail ravished from her, was correct from her point of view. She only lacked proper instruction as to what was in her case a reasonable expectation. Children's expectations have a keenness proportioned to the simplicity of their relation to the things in question, and to their freedom from the notion of any special adjustment. Their very ignorance of limiting considerations gives energy to their feeling of proprietorship. But whether the feeling is childish, simple, and strong, or is sophisticated, and matured, and mingled with other considerations, it is the compliance or uncompliance with what we regard as reasonable expectation that we call just and unjust.

The question, then, about our employers' liability act is simply, what in the way of justice the workman has to expect. Should he assume the risk when he takes the employment, or should it be a charge upon the earnings of the business and his compensation measured by a fixed scale? I think most of us would say that there would be no injustice, strictly speaking, in merely legislating for future relations that should be fully understood on both sides when entered into. The adjustment should be made then according to the principle of greatest social advantage, that is it should produce on the whole least irritation and most productive returns. This, too, would go to show that justice consists in harmony with reasonably established expectations. In regard to Mr. Murdock's attack upon the sentence of the two smugglers, the injustice of the sentences consists in the failure to meet established reasonable expectations of impartiality.

To turn again to those children, "well favoured and skilful in all wisdom," of whom mention has been made, I recall when a slender black-eyed girl, daughter of a Scotch-Irish farmer in a neighbouring school district to the east of us, came as teacher to our little brown schoolhouse among the tall oak trees. I have always remembered her with gratitude for she got me past the multiplication table where I had been sticking and showed me

the mysteries of vulgar fractions. Keenly intelligent, and intensely energetic, with a temper as warm as her complexion was bright, she raised murmurs by actually giving us problems "not in the book." I remember that she demanded: "How many are ⅔ of ½ of 11" and kept us at it until we really knew, and knew how we knew. But her affectionate soul was her downfall. There was some jealousy between the East and West ends of the school district, because the Westenders believed that the more wealthy Eastenders had secured an advantage in locating the schoolhouse. She had close social relations with the Eastenders for she lived out "Harmony way" beyond them. The last family but one towards the west were from Canada and had a French mother and a tall, dark daughter of fifteen, whose face, deeply pitted by smallpox, expressed as vigorous an energy as did the little teacher's own. Before the end of the first week she broke forth in her denunciations. "Teacher shows partiality." Unfortunately there was foundation for the charge. It, however, only wakened the resentment of the teacher. The French girl persisted in the accusation. She got a majority of the pupils with her before long and after an open rupture and defiance of the teacher she left the school. The attendance fell away. The little teacher grew still harsher towards the mutinous Westenders, and before the end of her second term gave it up and closed her school. Absolutely the most gifted instructor I have ever known, she was a failure because she disappointed the sense of justice of those children, their reasonable expectation of absolute equality in administering the school. How thoroughly we learned that it was a *public* school, and that we ourselves and *our* parents had as much ownership and as good a claim for consideration in it as any one.

I experience no necessity for distinguishing current justice from ideal justice, as did Mr. Sidgwick in his analysis of the word in his *Methods of Ethics*. He thinks that current justice is meeting current established expectation, but that ideal justice is something more and different. So it is, indeed, but only a variation of the same thing. If current justice is the meeting of fairly established expectations, ideal justice is the meeting of ideal expectation.

When the time comes that observance of the Golden Rule is even as nearly a matter of course as obedience to the ten commandments is now, and as much a matter of reasonable expecta-

tion, the Golden Rule can and will be made the basis of legal requirements. The progress that has been made in historical times does not indeed encourage the hope that we shall see it during our natural lives; but progress there has been. Do you not think that the fact that Glanville's first English law treatise in the twelfth century declares that the law cannot take account of so frail and unreliable a thing as a mere verbal agreement spoken or written, has some significance when compared with the justice of today? Does the difference show no progress towards the keeping of engagements?

I think I hear someone saying, in his mind at least, "Well what of it, what if, when we call an act of legislation, of adjudication, or of personal conduct just, we do mean that it meets reasonable and reasonably established expectation? Why not just say of each, it is just and be done with it?" Well, it is something to shift a persistent problem one step back and resolve it into several. Long ago occurred my first visit to a physics laboratory where some disconnected chains of films on glass tubes were being used to make visible the current between galvanic batteries. The exhibitor explained that the current was due to the generation in unequal quantities of electric energy by chemical action at the poles and that the current was simply the flowing over of the result of the stronger action so as to equalize the two. We duly rejoiced at learning the cause of the galvanic current, and turned to look at other things. It was only on reverting to the matter some hours later that it occurred to us that a whole flock of new difficulties were raised. Was it true that the chemical action at the poles was different in the different substances. Why? Did varying degrees of chemical combination and reaction really cause variations of electric energy to accompany them? Was the current really due to the tendency to flow out and equalize itself in the poles and the connecting wires, and if so, why was that? Meanwhile, however, my own attitude towards the matter had wholly changed. It was no longer a mystery to be gazed at and pondered over, but a set of problems to be investigated, and, as far as might be, understood.

If I cannot show definitely and once for all what expectations are reasonable and established, I am no worse off than those who would define what is beautiful or good; and like them I will fall back on the consensus of mankind until some better result of observation or analysis, or of both, suggests itself or is suggested.

Meanwhile at least I have connected justice with the broader conception of "reasonable" which applies in many fields into which "justice" does not enter.

If any one asks why the consensus of mankind regards as reasonable the expectation of and the demand for equality, or else requires a distinct and imperious reason for its failure to be granted, I can only say that human activity seems to demand such a sort of equalizing as distinctly and mysteriously as does the electrical energy in the batteries, whatever that may be. If I am asked why it is that we all feel bound to answer the expectations which we recognize as established, unless we can distinctly show they are unreasonable, I can only answer by means of faith or of speculation. I do not find even charlatans who claim any other kind of information about it. I do know that there is such a feeling, strong or weak, but strong enough in every human being of my acquaintance to produce an expectation of, and sympathy for, a like feeling in every other individual. We all carry it from the time we begin to carry anything, until the time when all things are laid down.

WILLIAM GRANGER HASTINGS.

University of Nebraska.

SCREENINGS

TAGORE

In 1913, the Nobel Prize of $40,000, conferred each year on one of the world's great poets, was given to the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore. The award came as a surprise to the Western world. Men asked, "Who is Tagore?" They learned that he was the greatest of Indian poets and one of the most revered leaders in the Indian renaissance. "We have other poets," said a distinguished Bengali doctor, when questioned about the matter, "but none that is his equal; we call this the epoch of Rabindranath. No poet seems to me as famous in Europe as he is among us. He is as great in music as he is in poetry, and his songs are sung from the west of India into Burmah, wherever Bengali is spoken."

Previous to 1913 he had visited both England and America to study the school systems and had made a deep impression on those who met him, but not until 1912, when a volume of poems entitled *Gitanjali* was published in English, was it possible for a world-audience to understand the enthusiasm of India for her great poet and spiritual leader. In 1912 and 1913 he again visited England. In this latter year, in which he received the Nobel Prize, two more volumes of poems, *The Crescent Moon* and *The Gardener*, and a volume of lay-sermons, *Sādhanā*—delivered both in England and America—were published. These works were not merely translations from the Bengali, for Tagore possesses a rare command of English. He had not only "learnt English at home, but he came to England when he was a student of seventeen, with a keen curiosity about western poetry and the finer usage of the tongue that had become the *lingua franca* of East and West." It was the *Gitanjali*, according to Mr. Ernest Rhys, that won for Tagore his audience in England.

"The wonder is," writes Mr. Rhys, "that a poet born abroad with another mother tongue than ours should have been able to use English with so sure and spontaneous a cadence. Indeed, the recapture of the original spirit in the English page surpasses anything else that we have seen in Oriental verse since FitzGerald metamorphosed Omar Khayyam."

But Tagore was not simply a literary artist; he was a great spiritual leader, a personality that profoundly impressed all who saw him and heard him speak.

"It is easy," wrote an English woman, "to call up at any moment a mental picture of that tall and graceful form in the loose coat of grey-brown; the white, sensitive hands, large, serenity-lit eyes, noble features, and curling hair and beard, dark and lightly touched with grey. Above all, the stately simplicity of his bearing struck me, for it implied a spiritual quality that diffused itself about his presence."

Mr. Rhys, referring to the impression made by the lectures contained in *Sādhanā*, noted that, "listening to him, one realized that he who spoke was one who had been living in the eye of the sun, communing with the air, the stream, the spirit of the forest, and the hearts of men and women."

A Bengali said of Tagore, "He is the first among our saints who has not refused to live, but spoken out of Life itself, and that is why we give him our love." To teach the youth of India to live, Tagore revived, in 1901, the idea of the ancient forest school of India. On an estate that had been his father's and had been called "Shanti Niketan"—the Abode of Peace, because in this place remote from cities his father had retired to meditate—Tagore opened his school with two or three boys; there are now two hundred pupils. To the support of the school he gave the Nobel Prize, the royalties from his books, and he is now lecturing in this country to secure funds for the same purpose.

The school is quite unlike any school of the Western world. It is situated on high ground in the middle of a wide plain open to the horizon on all sides and a mile and a half from Bolpur station. Much of the school work is done out of doors under the trees. "Early in the morning, at 4:30, a choir of boys goes round the school singing songs and arouses the sleepers up into the beauty and calm of early dawn." After the boys have set their rooms in order, they engage in physical exercises in the open air, followed by a bath. Then, clothed in robes of white silk, "they take up a place under some secluded tree for the fifteen minutes of meditation which follow. There was something strangely moving," wrote an eyewitness, "in the sight of these little figures in white, pricking out the scene all around, each under his several shrub or tree. Then, another gong, after which they all move reverently into the school temple." After the

morning meal they gather about their teachers, in little groups under the trees, for instruction. This lasts from 8:00 until 11:30. In the afternoon the lessons are prepared, and then come the games, drilling, and gardening. They lead a democratic and simple life, and are required to harden the body to endure heat and cold. In the evening, after the games, come the bath, meditation, the chanting of a hymn, and the evening meal. After the meal is over there is an hour of story-telling, music, and acting of dramatic scenes. The boys give Tagore's plays and he frequently plays a leading rôle.

The personality of Tagore

"permeates the whole atmosphere of the school and inspires every member of the Institute with the divinity and nobility of his character. When he is in the school, he meets the boys twice a week regularly in the *Mandir* or temple and speaks to them simply and in his own homely way on the great ideals of life."

He has a great affection for his boys, declaring that he is "happier there with them than anywhere else." This affectionate care of them is a powerful spirit in the school; it was its birth-spirit, and it sustains the place and all who live and work there. The boys call him *Gurudu*, which means revered master."

It is in this school that Tagore and his teachers are educating "men, not machines," who shall be the spiritual leaders in the new period that is opening for the people of India. In Shanti Niketan he "has sought to develop the idea of a House of Peace, a boy's republic, a school-house without a taskmaster, to serve as a model to young India."

F. M. F.

TAGORE AND THE NEW ORIENT

I

It is strange what awkward neighbours nations can be in so small a world as ours. Folks eye one another suspiciously; communicate diplomatically and with mutual concealments; chaffer and bicker in the market-place; missionize, with a vague feeling that the different is somehow the sinful; and finally fall lustily to fighting. Out of the fighting—and this is the sad commentary on human nature—eventually come the best of our

international understandings, or at any rate the best-mannered of our understandings. Take the present European war. It has enough of tragic disaster in it, heaven knows; but viewing it, for the nonce, as cheerfully as we can, is it not evident to every man that it is wonderfully contracting this small globe of ours? Not only are all the nations of Europe jostling one another with uncomfortable familiarity, but they have succeeded in waking up the remote continents to some consciousness of the mutual propinquity of all mankind. Here in America are we not poring over maps of strange lands and lexicons of strange tongues as never before, bringing the whole vista of the foreign into our very doors as by the magic of binoculars? And is it less so in Asia—that, to us, most mysteriously foreign of all earth's quarters? Why, the very fact that Turk and Sikh and Gurkha, Annamese, Tonkinese, Bhutanese, are fighting Europe's battles on Europe's fields means more toward the near fellowship of races than would a century of commerce. The barriers 'twixt East and West are breaking down, and the quarrel which began with the rape of Helen is nigh conclusion.

And after all, haven't "Occident" and "Orient" been mainly but words to conjure with? Kipling is very downright about East being East and West West, and if I recall rightly he draws a moral longitude through Suez. But this is surely solemn nonsense. Our earth is a complacent sphere, turning on its own middle; it has directions no more than has a kitten which is chasing its tail. Anything can be anywhere, if you but give it time, and if you take away a bit of external unfamiliarity (one distinguishes cats mainly by their coats) the kernel of human life and human nature and, alas, of human ideas is everywhere much the same.

I am led to these reflections by the present revelation of my own fond ignorance. For I confess that I had rather cherished the illusion—derived I know not whence—that Oriental ideas are in some subtle and balsamic mode of another fashion than our own, and more especially that what goes in the books as Eastern philosophy contains a wisdom undiscovered in the Occident. I knew, of course, that Blavatsky couldn't bear daylight reason, and I was of the opinion that Schopenhauer and Emerson, when they went to the East in quest of inspiration, had each caught an unmanageable Tartar. But I still permitted my fond and ignorant imagination to dream of Oriental edifices of the intellect in their own sort as fantastically stately

as the pleasure palaces of Kubla Khan. And the disillusion, I must own, brings with it something of regret. The world's stock of ideas is not great, at best. One cannot see even the habitable physical globe shrink into a mapped and "contract let" promoters' paradise without a pang for the lost thrill of exploration. How much less can one endure the shrinking of that realm of ideas which is henceforth the main outlet of human adventuresomeness! Truth is a fine thing, no doubt,—but there have been unions of souls that have become close only to reveal mutual poverty, and surely it would be a disreputable world in which all the citizens were ogling one another with the sly sophistication of Roman augurs. The fact is, glamours are often dearer to us than jewels.

Rabindranath is the agent whom I must thank for my disillusion. He has shown me the East in a beautiful coat of many colours; he has left in my mind some haunting and lovely images of Oriental life, seen in the diminished theatre of a long perspective; he has shown me things delicate and wistful and sinuous, in some confused way recalling the striped and spotted and serpentine creatures that prey and are preyed upon in a tropic brake. But he has seemed to show me, too, that most of my preconceptions as to Eastern thought are misconceptions,—that where I had expected asceticism and renunciation and remote eyes, impassive to the exhalations of things of sense, there is rather sensuous exuberance and a moil of dancing passions. "Deliverance is not for me in renunciation. I feel the embrace of freedom in a thousand bonds of delight." It is all very strange and confusing—such a passage as this. Is the East after all, with its coat off, just the same strenuous pugilist as the West, with *its* coat off? I hate to think of them as just two stokers, brotherly naked in the same sooty grime. I hope there is something better in it than that. We of the West have our Don Quixote, valiant with windmills,—and that is much, much better. Perhaps, after all, Tagore, in his own wise way, is the Don Quixote of the East; perhaps he will show us giants worth fighting. I, at any rate, am eager to see!

II

Along with other Lincoln citizens, I have heard Sir Rabindranath Tagore lecture on "The Cult of Nationality."

Along with other Lincoln citizens I was charmed by the man's lovable personality and his genius for expression. But unlike many of those listeners whose comments on the lecture I have heard, I departed from the lecture with curiosity piqued rather than with feelings soothed.

As I understand Tagore, his discourse was fundamentally a criticism of institutional government, on the ground that it is impersonal and soulless, and correlatively a plea for anarchic individualism, of the Tolstoyan, non-resistance type. Tagore would prefer, for example, in his own Orient, the decisions of the wise cadi to the unremitting justice of courts of law, and if the cadi happened to be bigoted and blind, or cruel and perverse, he would still prefer him to law, for the reason that the soul of man is freely adaptable (where no law constrains) to any sort of pattern;—like a bare foot, it becomes calloused to earth's rough evils, suffering no repugnance to those wrongs which prick so cruelly when once the shoe of lawful restraint has been tight laced. Concretely the India of the *suttee* and the *Juggernaut* and of Khond sacrifices of maidens to the goddess of fertility was better than the India in which such worship is restrained by British law, for the good reason that the old native customs were more complaisant of the local whims and idiosyncrasies of men; they set no patterns of humanity.

I must confess that my curiosity was piqued. I should have liked to ask Tagore—who comes, I believe, of the Krishatriya caste, the caste of princes and legislators and warriors—what the men of his kind would do were India restored to them in the matter of caste rigidity and caste prejudice, which British law is slowly breaking down. I should have liked to ask whether his own individualism would extend to the freeing of the Sudra castes from the "blank wall" imprisonment which Brahmin and Krishatriya imposed upon them centuries ago, and which have been maintained more inexorably than any similar human institution has ever been maintained. Perhaps the men of Tagore's caste would break down the caste walls (now that they have been made to feel the harshness of law)—perhaps they would extend the rights of humanity even to the *pariah*, the outcaste! I should have liked an answer to this.

There is another question I should have liked to ask Tagore. He spoke of China—the great whale, dangerously near the shore where wait the butcher nations with their whetted knives. What

advice would Tagore give to the Chinese people? Will he say to her, "When they have cut from your body an hundredweight of blubber, give them two hundred"? Will he say, "In the face of oppression and injustice and greed, lay down your arms and smile amiably up into the faces of extortioners and thieves and murderers"? Will he say (as our pacifists here at home are forever saying): "War is bad; *therefore*, lay down your arms. Resist no evil; there is nothing worth fighting for. If a thief come upon you, demanding your goods, render them to him! If a lecher come, seeking your wife, yield her! If the devil come, calling for your soul, to the devil your unresisting soul should go!" Tagore only adds to this, "Yield all—and with a smile!"

In a certain broad essential Tagore is unquestionably right. The problem of true government is the proportioning of law and license, of social restraint and individual desire; and I should agree with Tagore and Jefferson that "the best government is that which governs least"—if this proposition carry with it the implication that that minimum of law is sufficient to insure that justice which is founded upon truth and that liberty which is bred in self-restraint. But it is not going in the direction of such government to restore again the judge sitting beside the temple gate—no, not though his wisdom be the wisdom of Solomon. In paradise there is no law; in hell there is only anarchy, but here on earth, paradise can be sought and hell avoided only through the establishment of such institutions as shall teach men the ways of righteousness—and only, I may add, by such devotion to those institutions, when once they are established, as shall make men willing to die in their defence.

As I listened to Tagore I thought of the great discourse in which Plato shows Socrates, when about to die, arguing for the immortality of the soul. Socrates prefaces his argument with a warning to his friends, lest they be too readily convinced out of their love of him and their sorrow for him: "Bethink ye of the truth rather than of Socrates." We were all charmed with Tagore's personality; no man of sensibility could fail to be moved to sympathy, even with his personal desires. But if Plato—the greatest of the philosophers of statecraft—had been a hearer, surely he would have said at the last: "Bethink ye of truth rather than of Tagore."

H. B. A.

NEO-ORIENTALISM

Once upon a time there was an island, isolated completely from the rest of the world. Here dwelt the race of the Cards, Aces, Kings, Knaves, Nines, Threes, and Twos, each after its kind and in its order. Regulation was complete to the most minute detail and perfect. There was no happiness nor unhappiness; for each, whether king or knave, knew its place and its duties. To this perfect island an unfortunate shipwreck brought a prince, young, romantic, and a poet. He burst into the well-ordered life of the perfect community like a wild whirlwind. Who should succour his distress, who give him shelter, who give him food? To all these questions there could be no answer, for no one knew—least of all the prince and poet—to what order he belonged. So, impelled by necessity, he took from right and left, and to their wondering question why he did so, merely replied that it was his *Ichcha*, his desire. And from accepting him as a pleasant vagary, they began to imitate him, until when he had won the heart and hand of the Queen of Hearts, the whole island was by its ears. "And the citizens are no longer regulated according to the rules, but are good or bad, or both, according to the *Ichcha*."

Such is the theme of a short story, *The Kingdom of Cards*, in Sir Rabindranath Tagore's latest collection. And in a measure it may serve as the theme of most of his work and as the spirit of what we may call the Neo-Orientalism. The old Orientalism was different—quite different. Orderliness was to it the first test of godliness. "There can be no government without sovereignty," so wrote Saadi in the *Gulistan*. That was in Mohammedan Persia. But Vedic India crystallised into the caste system with its Kingdom of Cards, Brahmin, Krishatriya, Vaisa, and Sudra, between whom there can be no intercourse. The second test of the divine in man was the banishment of desire. And in full accord with this spirit the last blessing the rajah Dushyanta sought from the sage and wonder-worker, in the Sanscrit drama *Sakoontala*, after he has been reunited to his beloved and lost bride, was that now desire might cease, and his soul enter the emptiness of Nirvana. The classic Orientalism sees in desire and its concomitant activity the one obstacle to the soul's union with the cosmic spirit, the fatal flaw that drives with resistless urge from transmigration to transmigration. The

new Orientalism sees its heaven and God in desire, fulfilled or unsatisfied. Its theme is "Krishna, the lover God, and Radha, the beloved; the eternal Man and the eternal Woman, the sorrow that comes from the beginning of time, and the joy without end." This last is no more the spirit of the earlier India than John Masefield or Oscar Wilde is the offspring of Milton or Spenser. And it is necessary to know this if we would see aright the new literary movement in India.

To understand the moral vagaries under a mystical apotheosis of desire we need to turn only to the lucubrations of some of the votaries of the Romantic School in Germany. The practical workings of the creed are not unknown in India. It has been made to excuse assassination and bomb throwing. "God in me made me steal," pleaded an Indian culprit. "God in me makes me send you to jail," interrupted the English magistrate.

But the mystical worship of transcendental desire has in the poems and stories of Sir Rabindranath Tagore something wonderfully enticing—when was desire other than enticing? Not long ago I sat beside the bed of a most intimate friend. I knew, he knew, his end was not far off. On his table was the playlet *Chitra*, translated into that excellent rhythmical prose of which Tagore is master. I read aloud, as best I could, while he marked time with his hand, and at the conclusion whispered, "Wonderful, and yet so simple!"

It is wonderful, and yet so simple, how Tagore can create for the reader a realm invisible, yet almost tangible, parted from us by the thinnest and most opaque of veils,—a forbidden realm into which we would fain enter, but——. And here I quote again from his latest book:

"But it came back to me at once that I was in very deed Srijut So-and-so, son of So-and-so of blessed memory, and that while our poets, great and small, alone could say whether inside or outside the earth there was a region where unseen fountains perpetually played and fairy guitars, struck by invisible hands, sent forth an eternal harmony, this at any rate was certain, that I collected duties at the cotton market at Barich, and earned thereby Rs. 450 *per mensem* as my salary."

. . . . . .

I have just been rereading *Sādhanā*, Tagore's collection of philosophical essays. They are charming, though in places it is

a little difficult to follow the thought through the mazes of his luxuriant imagery. For he reads the riddle of the universe in pictures. His pantheism is not intellectual like Spinoza's, but full of the intoxicating perfume of a lavish symbolism, as we should expect of a poet. He confesses his inability to clothe his supreme thought in words, so pours it out in a glittering stream of allegories and metaphors. And our minds are not uncongenial to this Oriental gift of poetic embellishment. We have had our poets, like Keats and William Butler Yeats, who have turned their back on the thought and played beautifully with the thing. But the final worth of Tagore's essays is to be measured, not by the beauty of the embroidery, but by the clearness and consistency with which they disclose the author's answer to the question of the meaning of life. To use a figure ourselves, when boring for water it is not of immediate significance that the drill inadvertently disclose a pocket of precious stones, the need of water is instant and vital, the matter of ornament can wait until a further occasion.

Tagore is a pantheist, not of the ancient and strait sect that drew its inspiration from the Indian *Upanishads*, but a poetic brother of Shelley and the Neo-Platonists. He would recognize a congenial soul in Porphyry and Plotinus, even in Bruno and Scotus Erigena. But it is idle to trace relationships in so large and variegated a family.

As to all of the Neo-Platonists, the infinite is to him the sole reality. But man usually loses himself in the irrelevancy of the finite; and "then it is that man measures his greatness by its bulk and not by its vital link with the infinite, judges his activity by its movement and not by the repose of perfection—the repose which is in the starry heavens, in the everflowing rhythmic dance of creation."

And thus at the very outset of his book we are wrecked on a paradox. The infinite of the *Upanishads* is an idea of which nothing may be predicated, for it is everything and nothing, it is the all in all, and any attempt at a definition *per se* is a limitation, and hence inconsistent with its serene wholeness. Tagore's infinity is the character man of a stock company, it can assume any part it chooses, to it the repose of an everflowing rhythmic dance is mere child's play.

It is infinite, but finds its infinity too heavy and too lonely a load; so it sets itself limits and imaginary lines.

"It is its own will that has imposed limits to itself, just as a chess player restricts his will with regard to the moving of the chessmen. The player willingly enters into definite relations with each particular piece and realises the joy of his power by these very restrictions. It is not that he cannot move the chessmen just as he pleases, but if he does so there can be no play. If God assumes the rôle of omnipotence, then his creation is at an end and his power loses all meaning."

But here again when we ask for meaning we are given an image and a paradox. The chess player devises rules only because he is finite and has an antagonist, often a very persistent and irritating one whose purposes are obscured by the shifting advance of his pieces; and the rules are not a mere playful convention that might by a slight change transmute the game of chess into hockey or skittles.

The truth is, infinity is an exceedingly dangerous weapon to play with. If we take it seriously, as did Spinoza or the classical Sanscrit philosophers, our fingers are on our lips and we may say nothing lest we limit its grandeur. If poet-like we approach it on more familiar ground and talk of it in figures, we raise a cloud of paradoxes which, though they may have the tints of the rainbow, permit little passage of thought. And the perennial quarrel of science with metaphysics has been due entirely to this refusal of metaphysics to give up airy vapourings and come to close grips with reality.

. . . . . .

"Only he has attained the final truth who knows that the whole world is a creation of joy." Here we have the secret of the workings of Tagore's infinity. We cannot say that it joys in the labour of its hands, lest we introduce an unworthy anthropomorphism. Rather we should say that it joys in itself, like the child playing with its own fingers. But even this figure is hardly consistent, for its joy is in a constant flux of creative activity. To describe this we lack words, for no words can permit us to picture the creator as the thing created. Nor does the ideal of infinite joyousness and goodness allow us to comprehend the next thought: "Man's mistakes and failures have by no means been trifling or small, they have strewn his path with colossal ruins; his sufferings have been immense, like birth pangs for a giant child; they are the prelude of a fulfilment whose scope is infinite."

Such difficulties beset the Neo-Orientalist who refuses to allow

full weight to the classical oriental conception of *Maya*. The classicist considered all progress, even all individuality, as *Maya*, illusion, and hence sought to banish error and bring perfect peace by reducing life to the state of bliss felt in dreamless sleep. Tagore attempts to reconcile the occidental doctrine of evolution and the oriental pantheism, with the result that he flaws his infinity. "The real misery of man is in the fact that he has not fully come out, that he is self-obscured, lost in the mist of his own desires." But these desires, by the fact that man is an emanation of infinity, are also the expression of infinity in man. It is as though we had an infinitely perfect machine with flawed cogs that insisted on following their own mistaken devices and strewed the workshop with colossal ruins and failures.

An approach from another angle is no less difficult. The perfect life "is to live the life of the all." But if the all in man and beast and nature in the present state of the universe is full of flaws, and each individual, plant or man, is pushing for its own misty desires, the best of goodness we may achieve is a state of benevolent neutrality with misty desire, a miserable compromise, and final goodness is pushed again—into infinity.

So long as he remains on the ground of compromise with the western idea of progress Tagore is full of painful paradoxes. To escape these more than once he is compelled, as were his Sanscrit predecessors, to deny individuality and take the high road to Nirvana. "Our will cannot be free towards the limitations of our self, not where it is *Maya* and negation, but towards the unlimited, where is truth and love." And it is passages like this one, and such passages only, that the authors of the *Upanishads* would recognize as sound of doctrine.

. . . . . .

The same difficulties beset us when we attempt to explore his doctrine of love and beauty. It does not help us a whit to understand the ravages of Belgium, for example, to say that "Beauty is omnipresent, therefore everything is capable of giving us joy." And when he defines love we have got beyond the scope of words. "Love is motion and rest in one. Our heart ever changes its place till it finds love, and then it has its rest. But this rest itself is an intense form of activity where utter quiescence and unceasing energy meet at the same point in love." Motionless movement, quiescent energy, this is

parallel with "the fulness of *disinterested joy* which belongs to Brahma." When we soar to infinity we may use what words we please, any combination, the more paradoxical the better.

So he turns to music, as has many a Neo-Orientalist in Europe, to express what is beyond mere intellectual words. For "music never has to depend upon any obvious meaning; it expresses what no words can ever express." Precisely; and so one may say of it what one chooses. One may have even a metaphysics of music. "We seem to feel that the manifestation of the infinite in the finite forms of creation is music itself, silent and visible." And now we have it at last: infinity is silent and visible music!

. . . . . .

The heart of Tagore's mysticism seems to lie in the thought that the infinite is unsatisfied desire. "So long as the hunger is not satisfied it is a pleasure to eat. For there our enjoyment of eating touches at every point the infinite." "In the music of the rushing stream sounds the joyful assurance, 'I shall become the sea.'" "That we cannot absolutely possess the infinite being is not a mere intellectual proposition. It has to be experienced, and this experience is bliss. . . . Our soul must soar in the infinite, and she must feel every moment that in the sense of not being able to come to the end of her attainment is her supreme joy, her final freedom."

The poor clerk at the ribbon counter who dreams of becoming a duchess rejoices in her freedom to dream and desire, and in that unsatisfied soul-longing expresses her infinity. If she by some chance captures a duke, she is back again in *Maya* and illusion. And if I long for a powerful eight-cylinder car I am merely asserting what my infinite nature commands. But if the impossible should happen and a relative give me one I am spiritually in a morass and unredeemed. Tagore has given us a full philosophy of castles in Spain. Infinite freedom is infinite desire, and its partial satisfaction in eating, courting, or study is all equally divine and laudable to the votary of the cult of castles in the air. The infinite is the unsatisfied in us. Let us extend its boundaries to the stars.

But if Tagore finds God in the infinity of desire, Schopenhauer finds in it the Devil. In the same restless urge which inspires Tagore with Optimism, the German romanticist can see only the crassest Pessimism. It is no wonder that when

philosophers thus are unable to distinguish white from black, the uninitiated turn away with a profound feeling that the foundations of metaphysics are laid in the liver.

Nor has Tagore neglected to embellish his philosophy with erotic embroidery. The Shivite proclivities of Neo-Orientalism are known in the West, but under a franker name. I shall borrow for the last time from his imagery:

"And now goes on the endless *lila*, the play of love. . . . When the soul bride understands this well, her heart is blissful and at rest. She knows that she, like a river, has attained the ocean of her fulfilment at one end of her being. . . . Then all her services become services of love."

And it is this mixture of paradoxical imagery, unsatisfied desires, and poetic eroticism, that we are called upon to crown with bay.

P. M. B., Jr.

Annual Subscription, $2 Single Number, 50 cents

The Mid-West Quarterly

GENERAL LIBRARY
OCT 14 1918
UNIV. OF MICH.

Vol. IV. April, 1917 No. 3

I. *The Purchase of the Danish West Indies*
Lauston Taylor Jones
II. *Verse* — Philo M. Buck, Jr.
III. *The Hero of Tolstoi and Previous Epidemic*
Herbert N. S. Thompson
IV. *The Poetry of William Vaughn Moody* — Bert Ashley
V. *Goethe's Faust into the Translations*
Albert William Davis
VI. *Romantic Opera Music* — Lawrence Gilman
VII. *The Trial in American Fiction* — Philip Lovell Hall
VIII. *Poetry in Africa* — Hamilton Wright Alexander
IX. *Art* — Hamilton Wright Alexander
X. *Studies for Tomorrow* — Lucretius Tarbell
XI. *The Rise of the Crowd* — Charles Tarbell
XII. *Reviews: Elements of Language; The Lesser Arts—Nationalism—The Theatre of the Open*

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New Rochelle, N. Y. London New York
Knickerbocker Press

Entered as second-class matter October 1, 1914, at the Post Office at New Rochelle, New York

The Mid-West Quarterly

Is owned and controlled by the University of Nebraska

P. H. FRYE, *Editor*

BARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER
PHILO M. BUCK, Jr.
MALCOLM C. WYER
Associate Editors

T. A. WILLIAMS
Business Manager

SAMUEL AVERY,
Chancellor of the University
CHAS. SUMNER ALLEN,
President of the Board of Regents
Advisory Committee

The *Quarterly* is issued during the months of October, January, April, and July

Annual Subscription $2.00

Single Numbers . . . . . 50 cents

Address the Publishers, Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons
New Rochelle, N. Y., or
3, 4, and 6 West 45th Street, New York City

All contributions and editorial communications should be directed to the editors of The Mid-West Quarterly, Station A, Lincoln, Nebraska

THE
MID-WEST QUARTERLY

Vol. IV] APRIL, 1917 [No. 3

THE PURCHASE OF THE DANISH WEST INDIES

Somewhat less than two decades ago the Philippines came into the control of the United States, and the purchase at once became a party issue. We had "bought 10,000,000 brown men at two dollars a head!" To-day we are asked to take 28,000 black men at about $900 a piece. It sounds like a wholesale quotation on a slave market. Yet this proposal, unlike the acquisition of the Philippines, is little likely to cause a real political division. The price may be high; but on principle there can hardly be a partisan protest, for the Republican party for almost a decade and a half has followed a policy leading logically toward the proposed step, and the Democratic party is the present advocate of the annexation.

It is clear to all, of course, that we did not in fact purchase the population of the Philippines, nor will we buy the people of the Danish Antilles, but at first sight it is not so clear why the United States should want this new responsibility to the southward. Considered in themselves the Danish West Indian islands are not of great value. They are interesting historically for their chief harbour is, at least in tradition, the rendezvous of the pirate Blackbeard; and their picturesque scenery and population make them an attractive stopping place for tourists visiting the Caribbean, but these are not reasons why any nation, great or small, should covet their possession.

All these factors would be theirs to quite as great a degree if they remained under the Danish flag or were transferred to that of some other nation. In fact they might have for many of us an increased attraction from the very fact that they were under

foreign control. The inhabitants already speak English; they use United States currency; and Charlotte Amalie is a free port, so that not even the usual troubles of tourists with language, currency, and tariff officials would bother us if Denmark continued in possession.

Financially it appears they will be a doubtful blessing to the country which owns them. If Denmark succeeds in selling, she will have freed herself from a colony which contributes almost nothing to her commerce, to her treasury, or to her national prestige. The local government is now, it is asserted, self-supporting; but as a rule in recent years it has not been able to pay its own expenses and the balance has had to come from Copenhagen. Local economic conditions are not prosperous, though now that the project of sale to the United States is in the foreground many of our magazine writers would have us believe the contrary. Living—even at the standard of life of the average West Indian negro—is comparatively high and the demand for labour is fickle. The population as a result is declining. The labourers are slipping away to the more favoured West Indian communities, notably to Porto Rico.

Lying off the east end of Porto Rico—almost within sight of Crab Island and Culebra, our most eastern holdings in the neighbourhood, these islands, St. Croix, St. Thomas, and St. John, comprise an area of 138 square miles. The 28,000 inhabitants, mostly negroes, cultivate sugar-cane, gather bay leaves, and raise some cotton, fruit, and vegetables. Of the three islands St. Croix is agriculturally the most important. It comes much nearer than the others to raising enough to support its population. There is a fair live-stock industry which supplies mules, lean cattle, and goats, and black razorback hogs for the local demand. But the supply is never sufficient and must be supplemented by shipments from the other West Indies and from the United States. The agricultural importance of the island is not great. In good years the chief exports are about 5000 tons of sugar and about 80,000 gallons of West Indian rum.

St. John, the least important island of the group, is largely uncultivated. There are occasional windswept cattle ranches, but it has no important industries, and is practically abandoned to its 900 black inhabitants. Communication with the capital is infrequent except by the small boats which market the scant surplus products of the island, notably bay leaves cultivated on

about fifty acres. St. Thomas, so far as self-support is concerned is perhaps the worst off of the group. The soil is shallow and never produces even enough fruit and vegetables for the local demand. The hard dry guinea-grass, the only kind that can withstand the local droughts, gives sustenance to about 3000 cattle and 800 goats—the chief agricultural interest. The only manufactured product of importance is the bay oil distilled from the leaves of the bay tree. The production of this oil is the most important industry in St. John and the most important article of export from St. Thomas. From this island it is estimated there are exported about 60,000 cases of twelve quart bottles of bay rum annually. St. Thomas bay rum is in fact considered the best grade on the market. It is shipped to all parts of the world but most of it finds its way to Jamaica and Panama, whence it is distributed to the west coast republics of South America.

In spite of its unfertility and its dependence in manufactures on a single article of luxury still St. Thomas is by far the most important of the islands, for it contains the town of Charlotte Amalie with one of the best harbours in the West Indies. Here was formerly the trading centre for a considerable portion of the Antilles, but the establishment of steamship lines and the building of better port facilities have now destroyed its former transshipment trade, and its commerce except in coal is practically reduced to supplying its neighbouring islands. Coal and water are still sold in considerable quantities to passing steamers bound to Europe and the United States, but there is little likelihood that St. Thomas will ever again become relatively as important as it once was. So far as their economic resources are concerned the possession of the islands is a negligible advantage.

We must look in another direction if we would explain the continued interest of the United States in the group. Our government has long realized that the harbour of St. Thomas even though the possibilities of developing an important commerce there are nonexistent, might be made of great importance as a naval base. The harbour is well protected from hurricanes. The natural conformation of its shores is such that it can easily be fortified. It shares with Mole St. Nicholas in Haiti the honour of being known as the "Gibraltar of the West Indies." This once made us desirous of possessing the group for our navy's uses. But changed conditions now make it of comparative unimportance to us.

Our interest arose first in the period immediately following the Civil War. One of the lessons taught by the operations of the blockade running ships, which took cotton from the Southern States to West Indian ports for reshipment to Europe, and brought back military supplies, was that if our navy was to operate effectively in West Indian waters it must have a convenient outlying harbour to use as a base. Secretary Seward grasped this lesson of the Civil War, and in President Grant's administration sought to purchase two of the islands for $7,500,000, or more than was paid for Alaska. The inhabitants were overwhelmingly in favour of annexation. But Congress was not disposed to embark on further territorial purchases. Opinion crystallized against the scheme, and after being under consideration for five years it fell through.

By the end of the nineteenth century, however, new developments had occurred in American foreign policy which again turned our attention toward the islands. Our foreign trade was starting on the rapid development which has since brought it into so important a position in international commerce. We were anxious to extend the markets for our manufactured goods and secure new sources of raw materials for our industries. Our relations with Spanish-American countries were becoming of greater moment. The Republican party declared in its platform of 1896 that "by the purchase of the Danish islands we should secure a much needed naval station in the West Indies." Soon, too, interests other than these involving trade expansion drew our attention southward. The Spanish-American War brought Porto Rico into our possession, but no port in the island proved acceptable for the purposes of the naval base which our new position was seen to render even more desirable than before. In addition we assumed certain obligations in Cuba as a result of the war and the isthmian canal project was already far enough advanced to indicate that the United States should assure itself a commanding position in the Caribbean.

Meanwhile in the islands themselves things were happening. A German company, Die Kolonial und Handelsgesellschaft St. Jun in 1899 was planning to develop Coral Bay in St. John as a port of call for the steamships of the great German lines. Later the harbour of St. Thomas was chosen as better suited for the purpose, and the Hamburg-American line planned to construct the extensive docks there which have since become so important

a feature in the life of the colony that it has frequently been dubbed a colony of the Hamburg-American Steamship Company.

Denmark was apparently not ill disposed to sell the, to her, profitless colony, and when our government offered $5,000,000 for the islands her representatives accepted. The treaty was signed January 24, 1902. Our Senate hesitated and finally approved, but this time the home country at the last moment withdrew from the bargain. The lower house was favourably disposed, but powerful influences were at work in the more conservative Landsthing, corresponding to our Senate, for the defeat of the treaty. A majority of those in regular attendance wanted to sell. Germany, it was said, was putting pressure upon the conservatives to block the project, and at the last moment it was beaten.

This second defeat is now almost a decade and a half past, and once more conditions in American international affairs have changed forcing us into still another attitude concerning the purchase of the islands. In 1867 we needed a base for our fleet, in 1902 we needed this and an outpost from which our expanding commerce might be fostered, but in 1917 we are no longer in need of either. We now have acquired the use of Guantanamo, Cuba, as a naval station and we hold Colon, Panama. Our treaty arrangements with Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti are such that it seems as if no added holdings were necessary to assure us proper military and commercial influence to the southward. There seems at first sight to be little reason to covet the Danish islands. Yet we have again negotiated a treaty for their possession. What is the reason?

As our interests and responsibilities to the southward have grown we have come to realize that the fundamental feature of American foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine, is involved in this matter of the Danish West Indies. That doctrine involves an opposition to farther European colonization in America and collaterally opposition to any transfer of possessions already held to any non-American power. How sensitive American public opinion is on this point is shown by the feeling which at once arose when five years ago there was a report that a Japanese corporation which might have relations with the Japanese government was seeking control of Magdalena Bay in Lower California. We have also come to feel uneasy whenever any of the weaker American powers seems likely to become involved in disputes with European powers. The gradual absorption of the economic

resources of the Danish West Indies also by any European power might create a similar suspicion that economic control there might come to involve questions of political control.

It is from this viewpoint, then, that we should consider our treaty recently negotiated with Denmark. The islands are of no appreciable commercial advantage to us, and outfitted as we already are with locations for naval bases and treaties concerning those we do not own, the islands are of no great value to us in building up our national defence. On the other hand, if they should pass into the control of one of our great maritime rivals they would constantly be a source of embarrassment to us. For this reason primarily we are justified in undertaking for a third time to secure the transfer of the Danish islands to our possession.

The conditions under which the recent negotiations for the Danish islands were carried on seemed to promise better than in the case of either of the former failures. The Danes were said to be willing to sell. Mr. Hageman, Danish Councillor of State and reported to be connected with the largest sugar plantation in the islands, was reported in January, 1916, to have said: "If the question of selling the Danish West Indies should arise again I am sure that it would receive favourable consideration, as it is useless to continue spending large sums without gaining any benefit."

In addition the United States Senate had recently shown its feeling toward new Caribbean responsibilities by concluding important agreements with Nicaragua and Haiti, the former involving the payment of $3,000,000 for rights much less tangible than those concerned in the proposed Danish cession. The discussions once under way proceeded without serious difficulty. Widely varying sums were suggested as the price of the transfer, ranging from $4,300,000 to $25,000,000. Either figure, in view of the fact that King Christian VI. purchased St. Croix in 1753 for $150,000, would make the transfer on its face a bargain for Denmark. Evidently both parties seem to have agreed that a very appreciable increment of value was to enter into the calculations, for the price finally settled upon was the larger sum mentioned. On August 4th the Danish lower house by a vote of 62 to 44 with 7 not voting approved the sale and on the same day the treaty was signed at New York by Secretary Lansing and Constantin Brun, the Danish minister. The Senate ratified the treaty as one of the

last acts of the session of 1915–16. There were only some half-dozen votes in opposition.

In Denmark action was less prompt. The reasons for delayed action were somewhat involved. One section of the American press assumed at first that the cession must be meeting the opposition of Germany. Another group of papers pointed out that German influence would at this time be less powerful in Danish affairs than at almost any time in recent history. This point was later cleared up by the definite announcement by the German Foreign Minister Von Jagow that "Germany is not antagonistic to anybody's intention as to the distribution of sovereign rights in these parts of the world." It appears that there is no reason to allege that Germany was disposed to place serious obstacles in the way of the cession. The true stumbling-block must be found in Denmark, not in Germany.

It appears that the real reason for delay lay curiously enough not in the opposition of any important faction in Denmark nor in any outside foreign influence but in a complication of Danish party politics which did not directly involve the policy of ceding the islands. The Danish Landsthing, the conservative body which defeated the cession in 1902, appointed a committee to consider the sale. On August 24th a resolution passed that if the question could not be held open till after the war then it should be settled at a general election. The vote was 39 to 7 with 16 not voting. King Christian was personally in favour of the cession and the Danish treasury, especially in the strain to the country's finances during the present war, "needed the money." The monarch and his advisers tried to arrange a coalition ministry which would be willing and able to put the project through without a general election. But all these efforts failed due to the refusal of the Socialists to enter such a ministry except with the understanding that the agreement should be on the annexation issue alone and that the new government would not change the position of the nation on the question of neutrality. On August 24th, by a vote of 39 to 7, the Landsthing decided not to proceed to a sale until after a general election and this no party welcomed in the midst of the European War when the international situation especially for small neutral countries, like Denmark, was acute.

In the present state of affairs, when the Philippines are fretting because the United States flag floats at Manilla—though somewhat apprehensive, too, concerning what flag would float there if

Old Glory came down, it would be interesting to know whether we are asking now only for the control of another group of islands which might find our supervision unwelcome. In 1867, as already stated, the people of the islands which it was then proposed to acquire from Denmark were overwhelmingly in favour of annexation. The interval which has elapsed does not seem to have changed their feeling. The children of the men who voted for annexation in 1867 seem quite as willing to be adopted by Uncle Sam as their fathers were. To be sure no formal vote has been taken but the governor of the islands has reported that at two mass meetings called to talk over the desirability of annexation there were 4727 votes in favour to 7 against. The local legislature has passed a resolution declaring,

"As constantly recurring sale negotiations paralyze all enterprises in St. Thomas and great depression, with public deficit and private misery, has already been caused by the war and by disappointment from the Panama Canal, the mother country is earnestly requested to hasten the present negotiations and implored not to reject the sale unless the entire nation demands it and be willing to take the consequences afterward."

If these votes can be taken as a fair sample of public opinion it is clear that no opposition would come from the islanders. The large property holders seemed equally enthusiastic. Twenty-one planters telegraphed from St. Croix to the Danish minister of Finance, "All the planters are highly in favour of a conveyance to the United States." Of course in their case the advantage which would come is easily seen. It would not be a change involving only sentimental preferences, for their sugar, rum, and other products would presumably, on annexation, secure free entry into the United States, with the result that they could pocket what they now pay out in customs charges.

The events which have brought us to the position we hold in the Caribbean prompt still further advance. We have entered and are entering a series of agreements intended to insure that the weak Caribbean powers shall not do anything which will endanger their independence and cause the Monroe Doctrine to be questioned. It will be good policy to do what we can to remove the possibility that the weak European colonies may pass into the hands of more powerful European owners. We may not need another naval or a commercial base in the Caribbean, but so long

as these islands are held by a country which might transfer them to one of the great maritime powers of Europe, there is always the possibility that the transfer may be attempted or made. If attempted it would force us to decide whether we would allow the new or farther entry of an unwelcome rival into a region we are coming to look upon as peculiarly our "sphere of interest." If made, it would bring an unwelcome intrusion of the European system into American affairs. Under such conditions, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" even if "the ounce" costs $25,000,000.

That extension of American control and the gradual withdrawal of European influence is not a new development or one which may startle European chancelleries is evident from the recent course of international developments in the Caribbean region. Eighteen years ago, Spain lost the last of her new-world possessions to the United States, France has long ceased to be a Caribbean power, her island colonies and the convict colony on the mainland of South America are all a burden on the home treasury, and of negligible commercial and naval importance. The greatest of French investment enterprises, the Panama Canal, passed under the control of the United States in 1903. In 1904 the British ministry openly announced in Parliament that it no longer intended to keep an important force in the Western Atlantic, the change in policy having been brought about by the growth of the American navy. The tariff policy followed in her Caribbean colonies in recent years has been one in which great care has been taken not to risk interruption of friendly relations with the great republic to the north on which their prosperity depends. The Netherlands government looks with apprehension on the continuing deficits of her American colonies. Their precarious condition would be even more serious but for the advantages of the American market, which holds over a fourth of the foreign trade of Dutch Guiana and half of that of the island colonies. And, last and least of the European powers in the importance of her Caribbean territories, Denmark now recognizes the logic of events and wishes to sell.

These are not conditions which of necessity point toward the end of European holdings in the Caribbean. France and Holland might be more willing to relinquish their holdings but for the claims that these remnants of empire have upon the national imagination. Great Britain has not only the most far-flung of

Caribbean holdings, but will naturally cherish her island and mainland holdings because of their relation to her world-wide commerce. But though European possessions to the southward do not disappear, the trend of events is clear. The future will see the still farther extension of American influence in Caribbean affairs. All parties in the United States are one as to the general policy to be pursued; and the purchase of the three islands over which the Danish flag now flies will be only another step by European powers in recognition of actual conditions.

Looked at from the American point of view, the logic of the transfer is no less compelling. Our commerce with the Caribbean region dwarfs that of all other powers,—we take more than any other country of the sugar, coffee, chocolate, fruit, and asphalt which constitute the chief exports. We furnish more than any other country of the things they import from abroad. All in all, in fact, we take more of the trade of the Caribbean region than all the rest of the world combined, and the importance of our exchanges there is increasing in a more rapid ratio than in any non-American section of the world. Our Caribbean trade grew three hundred per cent. between 1902 and 1914. Our export trade to Asia, Africa, and Oceania together increased less in that period than that to the Caribbean, and our imports thence have increased more rapidly than those from even South America and Asia. We are little likely to neglect the opportunities to increase the strength of our position in a region which to such an extent contributes to our present commerce and holds out prospects for even greater exchange in the future.

Our political position is as dominant as our commercial interests. Our southern coastline binds our fortunes to those of the Caribbean; we own Porto Rico. We are already bound by treaty engagements which make us the sponsors in varying degrees for Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. The Panama Canal makes this region of paramount importance to us, both because of its relation to our navy and to our rapidly expanding overseas trade. To allow any condition to develop which would endanger the normal development of our interests to the southward would be to show a signal lack of national foresight. It is for this reason that the purchase of the Danish West Indies has a significance far greater than at first sight appears. It is a step in the consolidation of our position in the Caribbean, a region in which we can not allow any nation to

question our primacy, for no nation has a stake in its future comparable to ours.[1]

CHESTER LLOYD JONES.

University of Wisconsin, Madison.

[1] A plebiscite on the sale of the islands to the United States was held in Denmark on December 14, 1916, which resulted in 283,000 votes for sale to 157,000 against. On December 20-21 both houses of the legislature voted by large majorities to transfer them to the United States, and on January 17, 1917 the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged. A bill was introduced in the Congress of the United States to carry out the provisions of the treaty, which passed, and was signed by the president on the last day of the session

CURBS

"Why do we need a literary tradition?"

Nevius tossed away his cigarette before he looked up at my question. Then with irritating slowness,—he was usually only too quick with his replies,—drew out his tobacco pouch and rolled and lit another cigarette before he replied. And even then it was with a question as irrelevant apparently to our discussion as it was astonishing: "Why do people wear clothes?"

I tried to recall the answer made to the same question in a book now less than a tradition.

He did not deign a reply, but waved his hand to the host. Then he turned to me. "Yes and no. To keep warm—yes, in a way; but more to cover their ugliness. Look at that fellow," pointing to an adjoining table. "Now how would he look, were we able to see his spindly calves? Most men are not much better. Now the disciples of this *vers libre* movement in poetry and these futurists and post-impressionists in painting and music, are all alike in this, they want to put on clothes."

"Take them off rather," I interrupted.

"None of that, my dear fellow," he broke in. "No they put on these fantastic clothes to cover their naked inability. They dress themselves in this free and easy costume, so that all may look alike; so that the man who can't say what he wants to say in rhyme and regular metre may get his little say said, and thus be considered free of the guild poetic; so that the painter who can only daub may not be reproached for his failure to make lines and obey the laws of perspective. They call it democracy in art. And we might get used to their new fashions if they would give us a degree of consistency; but they are constantly in a quarrel about the latest design. The post-futurists are at daggers with the futurists, so that——"

"But," I objected, "the plea of the *vers librist* sounds at least plausible. He says that the requirements of regular rhythm and recurring rhyme restrict the choice of words, and thus detract from the immediate effect of the imagery. Poetry is an emotion," I went on lamely, "and the more direct its appeal, and

the more nearly it calls up the actual images in nature, the better it must be. Ezra Pound has something like that to say, I believe."

"Effect, appeal, nature,—fiddlesticks," he snapped. "If poetry is nature, then go to the woods and fields and the cinema. Poetry is human nature, not damp sunsets and miasmatic fogs. Their effect is rheumatism." And he rubbed his knees. I had persuaded him to take a walk in the park the evening before. He was as inveterate in his love of the urban as any Doctor Johnson. "You will never get me out here again," he had said.

"No, though their plea is plausible, it is beside the mark. Poetry must first show what the author feels, better, what he thinks; and thought must be coherent and feeling rhythmical. You can't make a poem out of a flash of lightning—any succession of words would limp far in the rear of nature there; and no set of words can put before you directly the ἀνάριθμη γέλασμα, the multitudinous laughter of the sea. It simply *is*, words must become and cease. The thought and the emotion must persist, and if rhythmical and coherent, will forge for themselves rhythmical and coherent verses. The anvil chorus is more than a rain of ledges, that alone would be a damned irrelevancy. I have long wanted some poet to put into verse the song of the pneumatic hammer on a tall building. The sound, however, is only for devils and their victims." He rolled another cigarette.

"You were quoting to me Shelley's *Cloud* the other day. Now what I particularly like in Shelley is that he does not call up any specific images. To me he is all thought and emotion—too little thought and too much emotion perhaps,—you once called it cosmic emotion, I liked the term. It takes a cosmic man to have cosmic emotions—only gods breed gods. But how would the *Cloud* read if reduced to its lowest terms?

> " 'Silvery darkness,
> Orbed moon, star spangled,
> Fleecy clouds, tented firmament,
> Sparkling seas, lines of silver streams,
> Floating chalices of silver,
> Whirling silver butterflies.' "

I burst into laughter; but he looked hurt. "Not a bad imagist poem, what; though I have a metaphor or two to delay the image. Miss Lowell might have done it better; but she doesn't try com-

position in surroundings like these. To tell the truth, I enjoy some of her poems, though I can never tell what they are about until I have read the titles. They look like conundrums with the answer in the titles—which ought to be printed on the next page. Her poems are not half-bad, though they do look like note-book jottings later to be worked up into real poems. I like some of Masters's stories, too. But why should we call them poetry, unless we want to break down all meanings of words? There are some who advocate a fluid vocabulary.

"No, all imagist poetry, like all futurist painting and all futurist music, is not bad. Get the notion out of your head, that all violation of tradition is *per se* to be condemned. Tradition is not meant to restrict genius. Think what Shakespeare would have been had he followed the tradition of his time. And in my wayward moments I suspect that Molière and Racine would have been greater had they filled their lungs a little fuller with the breath of their own inspiration. Why even this fellow Shaw is at his best when he defies tradition, so is Tolstoi. But men always defy it at their peril.

"After all what is tradition? That was your question. Æschylus broke with tradition and was plentifully abused by his time. Sophocles broke with Æschylus, and Euripides with Sophocles. We praise Sophocles and blame Euripides. Why? Why is *Hamlet* greater than *Everyman?* Surely not because it followed tradition, but because the writer's genius was greater than tradition, and became tradition, which we some day shall break—when we are strong enough."

"Then you favour the anarchy of these imagists and futurists?" I said a little dolefully.

"Try again," he commanded. "You have only half heard. I don't like them because they pretend to discard all tradition, and childishly seem to say that there can be no such thing. Whether it be old tradition or new tradition, some tradition there must be, and one in keeping with the *best* modern thought. Now why I dislike this new stuff, though it often does give us good things in spite of its deliquescent theory, is that it panders to the *worst* in modern thought. It worships the slipshod, the easy, the thing that any scatterbrains can do almost as well as the genius."

"But wouldn't it be well if everyone were able to write poetry of a kind? Would it not be better if everyone were enabled to write poor poetry, than if a few should write good poetry

which everyone would not read?" I thought this paradox a poser.

"God forbid." And for a moment I thought his temper was ruffled. To tell the truth I rather enjoyed his tempests, which were not a few. He had his hobbies, and I had uncovered one and stepped on it. "There is a kind of poetry, as well as a kind of art, that every Tom, Dick, and Harry can appreciate. It must be simple and easy, like the simple melodies which simple people enjoy—*Home Sweet Home* and *Annie Laurie*—and like the simple pictures they decorate their homes with. Do you know why Firuzzi's Madonna is more within the reach of such people than Leonardo's Lisa? or why they would rather put up with a chromo than a Ruysdael or Corôt? When you can answer that, then come to me with nonsense questions. Sometimes you talk as though I had never been. You were abusing *Tolstoi on Art* the other day, and I let you go on, for you were hugging a half-truth, and the obvious half. Any one can see where Tolstoi went wrong in his argument. But I shall have to tell you where he is right."

I was delighted. He would brook no interruption so I waved away a lingering waiter.

"Simple minds are the very ones that desire the greatest amount of regularity and uniformity. They are never anarchistic. That is why they are so intolerant. All their tight-laced propogandas, like prohibition and universal suffrage and the worship of the practical and efficient, are the work of essentially simple minds, that must see their little formulas writ large everywhere. That is why I hate reformers—but we shall speak of them later. They are nearly all of them a simple-minded brood, and generally as selfish as the rest of us."

"But what has this to do with Tolstoi and the argument?" I put in mildly, as I did not want him to wander too far.

"Everything; I thought I had said enough to show the colossal error of your position. Tolstoi was right when he said that universal poetry must be simple. He would, were he here, have also added 'and perfectly regular and also rhymed,' because rhyme makes poetry more easy to repeat and sing. Personally I don't care much for the tintinabulation of rhyme, it can too easily become irritating. It expresses too great simplicity and regularity; but that is why simple-minded people like it. As we grow more complex in our ideas of art we are glad at times to forego its

charm. But can you imagine a Burns without rhyme and an obvious rhythm?

"But these *vers librists* and these futurists are breaking away from simplicity, not returning to it; because simplicity is always regularity. They are as undemocratic in their ideas of poetry as a modern gaping evening gown is undemocratic in clothes. The peasant, wherever you find him, dresses simply and uniformly, that is from the ankle to the neck and to the wrists. As you discard clothes and rhyme and regular rhythm you lift the heel against democracy. They may call it a return to democracy and ease; I call it a flight to eccentricity and nerves. If they want democracy let them begin with dress reform. Did you every try any of their stuff on the so-called common people? It is only among the very advanced that eccentricity is allowed to flourish. The plan of these writers is the very opposite to a democratization of art—to do that we should have to reincarnate Robert Burns and Longfellow and Whittier."

"What about Whitman?" I suggested.

"I knew Walt Whitman. He spoke and wrote democracy, but his manners were all aristocratic. I saw him once, here in the Mercantile Library. He was dressed all in white, and smelled of soap and water. Fancy a true democrat in the seventies dressing all in white—a pretty working man he would make. No, no. Though his tastes were simple, Whitman was the patron of class privilege, and exacted it, too, in all he did and said. How many of the great American democracy bought and read his poems? There was after all only one poem that he wrote for universal consumption, his *My Captain*, and it has deservedly become popular, even though it is only second rate; and it is in rhyme and regular metre. There is some excellent poetry in Whitman—you know how I enjoy *When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloomed*—but it is good in spite of its defects and its irregularity."

"Then Whitman would have been still greater had he written more in accordance with the accepted literary tradition?" It is easy to ask such questions.

"I fear not," Nevius answered a little slowly. "No, I rather think he would have been a nobody had he followed the general tendency. He was one of those arch-rebels, who insist that they alone are sponsors for their conduct. They revolt against tradition, are born to be wild-eyed protestants—and at their own peril. If their work be good they become catholic themselves, and are

acclaimed as a new tradition; but in Whitman, I suspect we have again one of those melancholy sights—all too common, alas —of a great man following his own bent, one who by nature could not do otherwise, and, like the fig tree in holy writ, under a ban he can nowise understand.

"Like the modern imagist, and *vers librist*, and futurist, Whitman spurned at certain accepted, traditional rules of art which he could not understand. Now these rules probably do not express the highest truth of art, they shall doubtless undergo many a transformation in the course of time; it is not for us to say more than that they are; but the new followers of novelty, like Whitman must discover that—. Do you recall the serious effort made by Sidney, Sir Philip, and his friends to turn the hands of the clock backward and return to the classical system of versification? The new poetry—it was a thousand and more years old, but they forgot that fact—had the Gothic system of stress and rhyme; their tastes were all for the sonorous vowel quantities of Virgil and Catullus; and they longed to turn English poetry back to the old tradition. It was a sad effort in the main; but still I strongly suspect that we should never have had the sonorous blank verse of Milton, had they never called the English attention to the value of vowel quantities in verse. I suspect that English blank verse, the greatest triumph in English poetry, is a compromise between the Gothic and the classical tradition. The reason the rhymed couplet of the Augustan age in France and England seems so irrelevant is precisely this—it broke the back once and for all of the old classical tradition and definitely committed poetry to the later and northern tradition. There has been little blank verse worthy of the name since Milton. Tennyson attempted to cover up his defects by a copious use of imagery, that of Wordsworth and Browning would be better if rhymed."

"And that of Longfellow?" I interrupted.

"My dear fellow, we were speaking of poetry. But we have got away from our muttons. Whitman was a great man in spite of his defects. He had a vision, as lecturers to women's clubs call it. He had a theme for the age, and it lent dignity to his verse.

"'Henceforth I ordain myself free from all limits and imaginary lines.' Prometheus and Satan might have so spoken, probably did. But Whitman only made himself futile in the process.

These new versifiers who would do as he did, only in another way, and without his genius or his vision, come nearer to making themselves ridiculous. They remind one of a child in the kindergarten playing teacher. Heaven knows, in its game it takes itself seriously enough, but we elders smile tenderly while we look on. You can't be angry with a child. I am reminded of this when I see a serious critic, like one not long ago in a serious journal, turning on the offenders with a meat-axe. You know that I do not believe in corporal punishment for children, especially when they are only pretending. The only persons who take these writers seriously are their critics and themselves."

There was a long pause, while he looked at me quizzically. "But they do take themselves with abysmal seriousness. And like the child again, they are hurt when we laugh at them—the spankings they seem to court and thrive upon. Someone should teach critics the French or classical method of laughing at precocious ridiculousness, instead of attacking it in the German fashion with a pile-driver. Think what Lessing might have done had he been armed with Voltaire's wit—he might have spared us the dreary debauch of the Romantic School.

"But it is a little hard, I confess, to keep your poise when you hear them airing their trumpery little nostrums as serious measures of reform. It is true that modern poetry the world over is futile and quite irrelevant. Perhaps poetry is never relevant—Plato thought so, once. But to insist that abandoning the merely external trappings of poetry will better poetry, is like compelling a general to strip off the uniforms of his soldiers to make them less cowardly under fire.

"If only we could get our reformers to take themselves a little less seriously, or if we could legislate into them some measure of humour, we should have a reform of cosmic significance. These *un*versifiers want to reform poetry, so they write staccato prose, and legislate verbs out of the language. Pretty soon someone will advocate an abandonment of language, and insist that true poetry consists in the rhythm of gestures and facial expression. Then in truth we shall have poets making mouths at each other. The symbolists have already reached the point where they are careful never to call a thing by its name. Thus anything that is difficult or disagreeable they at once, in the modern half-baked method of reform, like the irritable Queen of Hearts, order to the instant headsman. Would it not be much better, and far

more logical, if, instead of taking up these disabilities and disagreeablenesses piece-meal, we should make a sweeping order that everyone and everything shall be good and easy and happy?

"Jack London thought he saw the whole solution of the drink evil in breaking the habit of treating. Others see it in forbidding people to sit and drink while they converse. But all this is wandering from our subject, we can have an afternoon with reformers later."

He stretched, yawned, and looked out of the window. An automobile was turning the corner at high speed, and the pavement was wet. Suddenly the hind wheels skidded and came up with a shock against the curb. There was a moment's confusion in the street, a policeman ran up, the driver explained, and the machine went on. "There," he exclaimed, "we have the whole answer to our discussion in a parable. 'Healthy traditions in this world are likened unto a strongly built curb for a slippery street. Let him that hath ears——'"

"I don't quite catch the significance," I spoke as he was rising.

"No?" He looked at me curiously. "Well in this case the automobile is the poet, the street is poetry and the poetic, and the curb is tradition. The automobile has the freedom of the street, so long as it obeys the traffic laws. If the street is too narrow—that is if the tradition is too unyielding—perhaps the congestion of traffic here will cause the officer yonder to recommend that it be widened. They can widen streets, you know. The driver of the machine we saw just now thought he was on a Nebraska prairie, and not in the midst of a complex civilization where there are curbs and policemen. Only he will have to explain to the police judge in the morning, and pay besides for the damage to his car. These art reformers get off scot-free—and yet I am not so sure about that either."

As I put on my hat and nodded good-night to the host I asked one more question, "But what is tradition to a reformer?"

He glanced up quickly. "Only a curb to protect us from his half-baked theories."

PHILO M. BUCK, JR.

University of Nebraska.

TOLERATION IN PURITAN ENGLAND

Among English speaking peoples the freedom of the press seems a requisite for all healthy intellectual life. Only the censorship of plays remains in England to bring to mind the days when the licenser's *imprimatur* was affixed to all books and pamphlets. Accordingly, Milton's *Areopagitica* stands out as a great landmark in the progress of human thought. One might fancy that the great truths so nobly uttered in that address would have been the rallying cry to hundreds, like Milton, who felt the intellectual bondage in which they lived. No such response, however, followed this appeal; since the demand for a free press was only one issue in the general struggle for toleration of belief, and, as a rule, was brought but incidentally into the controversy. So Jeremy Taylor in his fine treatise, *The Liberty of Prophesying*, wrote:

"Of the same consideration is mending of authors, not to their own mind, but to ours, that is, to mend them so as to spoil them; forbidding the publication of books in which there is nothing impious or against the public interest, leaving out clauses in translations,. . . burning books by the hand of the hangman, and all such arts, which show that we either distrust God for the maintenance of his truth, or that we distrust the cause, or distrust ourselves and our abilities."[1]

To this view the broad-minded Fuller subscribed, while John Selden, in his cold, dispassionate way, declared in Parliament that the censorship of the press was the work of the Star Chamber alone and had therefore no legal sanction.[2] John Saltmarsh handled the question more largely in *The Smoke in the Temple*. "Let there be liberty of the Presse for Printing," he exclaims, "to those who are not allowed Pulpits for Preaching; let the light come in at the window, which cannot come in at the doore."[3] Saltmarsh was one of the few who followed Milton. It was not until the eighteenth century, in the debates on the libel laws, that the freedom of the press was generally discussed; the earlier age

[1] Epistle Dedicatory.
[2] Gardiner, *History of England*, vii, p. 50.
[3] Ed. 1646, p. 3.

had a larger right to contend for—the right to think without restraint and without fear of the consequences.

At that time, the great principle was considered in England chiefly as it bore on religious thought. More truly humanistic minds have recognized toleration in its universal application. "The sun," said Socrates, "might as easily be spared from the universe, as free speech from the liberal institutions of society." And Demosthenes affirmed that "no greater calamity could come upon a people than the privation of free speech."[1] But in England, where Hellenism ever was tempered by Hebraism, freedom of thought and speech was a need chiefly of religious life. This narrower claim was emphatically made by Erasmus, who asserted that, if we wish to attain to the peace which is the ideal of Christian teaching, we must cease to lay stress on dogma, and permit each individual, on most points, freedom of judgment. This great leader of the English Renaissance would, in general, recognize toleration in the broad, Hellenic way. But it was exclusively the craving for religious freedom that moved the Parliamentary orator of King Henry VIII's time to assert:

"Because the chief business of man's life is to inquire into the means of being happy for ever, it is fit he should not resign himself to chance, but carefully compute upon the qualities and conduct of his spiritual guides. . . . Every man may collect the more essential and demonstrative parts of his own religion and lay them by themselves. . . . His next business will be to find out what inward means Providence has furnished for a test of truth and falsehood."[2]

Years later, John Milton used almost these very words in justification of his pains in compiling his treatise, *Christian Doctrine*. To the English mind in Stuart times this was toleration.

Cogent reasons, however, have always existed, or seemed to exist, for denying to individuals this freedom of thought, especially that which the English people most desired. In Utopia, according to Sir Thomas More, it was "lawfull for euery man to fauoure and followe what religion he would, and . . . he myght do the beste he cold to bryng others to his opinion; so that he dyd it peaceably, gentelye, quyetly, and soberlye."[3] For King Utopus saw that "the trewthe of the owne powre woulde at the laste issue owte and come to lyght," and that "it is in no mans powre to

[1] Quoted from May, *Constitutional History*, ii, p. 1, n.

[2] Underhill, *Tracts on Liberty of Conscience*, p. xiv.

[3] *Utopia*, chap. ix.

beleue what he lyst." Yet this was only More's splendid vision of an ideal country, and in the actual world he shrank before the dangers of such liberty of conscience. King James, also, when he took the throne, was in theory not averse to toleration; education and environment alike had recommended it to him strongly. But, with the messengers of the church party posting in haste to meet him as he crossed the border, and with the bearers of the Millenary Petition stopping his royal progress, what was the poor king to do? Should he deal leniently with the Catholics, or listen to the disputations of the Presbyterians, his throne would totter. Even the great Puritan leader, John Pym, argued in Parliament that the state was bound to stamp down even the first seeds of sedition, and that these were often "buried under the pretences of religion."[1] Dangers, real or apparent, constantly thrust back freedom of thought and speech among the ideals impossible for this world.

Nor has the present world advanced in liberality far beyond the position of the seventeenth century. That the church no longer demands coercive power, is due partly to the fact that the state has relieved it of the police duty that once devolved upon it. Many of the sectaries who suffered persecution in the seventeenth century would face prosecution to-day in the criminal courts. Any country, threatened as England then was, by conspiracies at home and abroad, would call for repressive measures. Only a sense of strength breeds tolerance. A united Protestant body in those days would have been less fearful of Roman error, and it was mistaken diplomacy on the part of English Catholics to foment dissension among their foes. We enjoy intellectual liberty to-day because of our sense of national solidarity and our trust in the force of law.

The cause of toleration was then championed by men of widely different minds. There were first the sectaries themselves, who, under the burden of oppression, demanded liberty of thought; theirs was the instinctive gasp for freedom in the fetid air of persecution. Roger Williams, Cartwright, Katherine Chidley, and Bunyan all belonged to this group. At the other extreme were the liberal, philosophic thinkers who saw a universal, less accidental, reason for toleration. Bacon, with his wide intellectual horizon, Richard Hooker, with his fine vision of a law universal, Milton, the arch-idealist, sought freedom of this sort. It

[1] Gardiner, *History of England*, iv, p. 242.

was an ideal born, for them, in the "calm and pleasing solitariness" that Milton loved, where the philosopher could see "the bright countenance of truth in the quiet and still air of delightful studies."[1] Between these two extremes stood the peace-loving churchmen, who, rather than disrupt the harmony of the church, or forget the charity preached by Christ, would have come to some sort of accommodation with the Dissenters. Richard Baxter, if he can be counted an Episcopalian, Hales, Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, and the general favourite, Tom Fuller, were of this liberal temper. Toleration, therefore, was not a vision of the Puritans alone. The Catholics in Maryland actually granted it, and churchmen in England were ready to recognize it as a condition possible, although unfortunately remote.

Amid the many discussions of liberty of thought, the fundamental principles of the question were largely obscured. Yet King James, at the time of his coronation, was not without sound guides. He could have sought enlightenment in Richard Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*. That great treatise was conceived and carried almost to completion with the undaunted reach of mind and the sure grasp of basic truth that characterize the Elizabethan age. What Bacon saw in science of universal law; what Shakespeare read in individual man as a microcosm, Hooker perceived in the laws of ecclesiastical system. The quiet English priest knew that a less systematic and comprehensive treatment of the vast subject would be more popular and more immediately influential; a beholder, he admitted, admires a stately house or a goodly tree, but the unearthing of the foundations of the one or the roots of the other is a labour that few will undertake. But he had seen a clear vision of the great, universal law behind and above all special rules of church and state. By searching out the very foundations of that law, as a rule of action for all created things, and by so learning to distinguish between natural law and positive law, between laws eternal and laws mutable, he reached his own conclusions, and faced the dissensions in his church with an originality and surety that amaze the reader to-day.

Such largeness of view leads inevitably to toleration. One thinks here of Hooker's own confident assertion[2]: "no doubt if men had been willing to learn how many laws their actions in this life are subject unto, and what the true force of each law is, all these controversies might have died the very day they were

[1] *Reason of Church Government*, Book 2. [2] Book 1, 16.

first brought forth." So Hooker sought to determine these laws, or these dictates of reason, that, as simply separate phases of the eternal law or reason of God, work together for man's good. In thus seeking a broader and surer basis for human conduct and thought than that which satisfied the dogmatic controversialist, Hooker set himself squarely against the Puritan position. Protestantism had established the *Bible* as final authority, and the Puritan, especially, among the Protestants regarded Scripture as the sole guide of human action, from which there could be no appeal. The *Ecclesiastical Polity*, however, insists that man has been provided with a variety of sources for his knowledge—Scripture, reason, the general consent of men, and experience, and that all should concur, or co-operate, in the right ordering of life. If we are to accept only what Scripture commands, Hooker argued, we ought not to accept even that; for no book can give authority to itself. Scripture, then, or the law supernatural, is meant simply to extend and correct, but not to supplant, the natural laws of experience and reason. Man lives rightly only when he utilizes all the means given him for ordering his conduct in relation to himself and others.

On this foundation Hooker built up the broad and sane view of church government that is presented in the second and third books of his treatise. Since man is supposed to hearken to all the divinely ordained guides of conduct, no definite form of church government is prescribed in the *Bible*. Just as man has been left to clothe himself and to provide shelter, as need may dictate, so he has been given freedom to order his own ecclesiastical law. Many rites and ceremonies not mentioned in the *Bible* are sanctioned by long usage. "To allege reason," Hooker declared, "serveth as well as to cite Scripture." So a verse wrenched in Puritan fashion from some Old Testament historical narrative carried less weight with him than a rule justified by reason or experience. Such doctrine gave room for diverse forms of worship. Hooker himself believed the English church to be best; but he saw good in Catholicism, and would condemn no system that served the needs of man and was not opposed to the general principles of Christian teaching.

The *Ecclesiastical Polity* is far more sane and liberal than the other tracts issued on either side. Hooker resorted less to misapplied Biblical texts and trusted more to sound reason and logical arrangement of his thought. He wrote, too, with a fine

sense of style, composing what must ever be regarded as one of the first specimens of artistic English prose. But we may not dwell longer on his effort, for another treatise claims attention. If Hooker's treatise might have been for King James a text-book of liberalism, Francis Bacon, among living men, might have been his surest guide.

To recommend to his sovereign the same wise tolerance that Hooker had justified, Bacon wrote an address called *Certain considerations touching the better pacification and edification of the Church of England*. He was in a position to write sanely and moderately. Knowing that "a man that standeth off, and somewhat removed from a plot of ground, doth better survey it and discover it than those which are upon it," he felt that he "as a looker on might cast . . . eyes upon some things which the actors themselves . . . did not or would not see."[1] Besides this disinterestedness, which the author can modestly claim, the reader is at once aware of the long study given by Bacon to the subject and of the impartiality of his views. The tract gives proof of sound statesmanship.

On two points Bacon insists at the start as fundamental. Like the Puritans, he denies "that it is against good policy to innovate in church matters"; but with the Episcopalians he rejects the Presbyterian claim "that all reformation must be after one platform." Reformation in the church, he argues, is as necessary as in the state, and there should be some legislative body to arrange ecclesiastical affairs, as Parliament, from time to time, alters and adjusts the complex machinery of civil government. But Bacon does not believe that a fixed system is prescribed by Scripture; reform must be made to meet modern conditions. A church, therefore, is not only free, but even compelled, to order its rites and ceremonies as it deems expedient, provided it holds immutable its "substance and doctrine." The rule should be, "one faith, one baptism, and not one hierarchy, one discipline."[2] On the fundamentals of faith, "he that is not with us, is against us"; but, on less vital matters, "he that is not against us, is with us." Bacon had confidence enough in the power of law to propose this latitudinarian policy.

Bacon was equally liberal in his discussion of specific points under dispute. He regarded the episcopal system as best adapted

[1] *Letters and Life of Francis Bacon*, iii, p. 103. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

to the English church; but he thought that the bishops ought to be controlled, as kings and chancellors are, by advisory boards, and that they ought not to be allowed to delegate their powers to others. Bacon likewise approved of set prayers and other fixed forms of worship; but he felt that a powerful church might well yield on this point to the dissenters. He was ready, furthermore, to listen to their demand for more preaching ministers; but he added the warning that "every man that can take unto himself boldness to speak an hour together in a church upon a text" is not necessarily a fit person to preach, "though he mean never so well."[1] Thus in all "humbleness and sincerity of heart" Bacon offered his advice to the perplexed king. The plan suggested was too moderate and conciliatory to prove steady in a crisis. But Bacon had sensed, at least in a dim way, the possibility of spiritual liberty in a state where law rules supreme. This would have sufficed the majority of Puritan dissenters; for it is all that we enjoy to-day.

Directly opposed to the liberal philosophers, like Hooker and Bacon, stood the militant champions of toleration, the sufferers. But the separatists were not all of the same mind. Most of them agreed with the supporters of episcopacy that the state should take steps to repress heresy or dissent that seemed subversive of public safety. Bullinger, for example, like an orthodox Protestant on this question, argued in 1535 that all sects that break from the national church must be suppressed, since even apparently harmless separation may lead to grievous error. For those who persisted in their independence, he advised persecution and even torture. Less cruel means of repression were sanctioned in Parliament by John Pym. This was the ordinary view even of the party of toleration—concession, in other words, for themselves. A few more radical sectaries, however, asserted that the state had no jurisdiction in spiritual matters. A church might punish ruthlessly any offender who had voluntarily joined it; but the civil law had no just claim, for the church was an assembly of saints, gathered by the moving of the spirit, and subject to Christ's laws alone.

In the arguments of these extreme sectaries there was a good deal of sameness. A typical example of their reasoning is found in the *Most Humble Supplication*, presented to the king in 1620. The author argued that the true rule of faith is revealed solely

[1] *Letters and Life of Francis Bacon*, p. 119.

in the *Bible*, instead of in the edicts of kings or councils. That book, moreover, is the exclusive interpreter of this rule, and all men are equally blessed with inward light to read the *Bible*, since the "simple, poor, despised" are apt to see more of divine truth than the rich and powerful. Persecution, furthermore, has been condemned by Christ himself, by earthly princes, and by many wise philosophers, while toleration, on the other hand, can in no wise endanger the state.[1] In such disputation, where Biblical texts serve largely as authority, the parable of the tares was often bandied back and forth. John Cotton argued that the tares symbolize hypocrites within the church, so nearly like the godly in man's eyes that they can not be punished without danger to the righteous. Hence Christ's command, "Let both grow together until the harvest," does not forbid the restraint and punishment of sectaries outside the church. In reply, Roger Williams asserted that hypocrites in the church can not be intended by the tares; for cockle, darnel, and tares could never be mistaken for corn. The field, therefore, must denote the world, and the tares, those antichristians to whom toleration must be shown, "lest while ye gather up the tares ye root up also the wheat with them." The church may punish its members, who have of their own accord submitted to its discipline; the state may punish civil offenders; but neither church nor state can punish those who conform to no ecclesiastical system.[2] To such fine-spun distinctions the use of Biblical argument inevitably led.

A reader will be somewhat disappointed who expects some new line of reasoning in the answer of sturdy Katherine Chidley to the learned Presbyterian clergyman, Mr. Edwards. She keeps largely to the beaten track of argument, and falls back for authority upon the well-worn Biblical texts, whereas she might have expressed the woman's point of view. She begins the *Justification of the Independent Churches of Christ* with apologies for her temerity in opposing one of the other sex; but she feels that "the way of separation is the way of God," and that she can frame her argument, if not exactly in "a Schollerlik way," at least in accordance with God's word. So she clings closely to the authority of the *Bible* in the unshaken belief that "whatever government is not commanded by God is accursed." Yet at times her feminine nature will manifest itself. If the Independents of New England, she asserts, have refused toleration, it was

[1] Chap. 4. [2] *Bloudy Tenent*, Book 2, chaps. 18–28.

through fear of being recalled to the mother country to be committed for nonconformity to "some stincking prison here in London." She complains, also, of the heavy fees exacted by the church for burial; "before (I say) they can have such a child buried there, it will cost the poorest parent seven or eight shillings." This is a woman's sympathy, and one wishes that she had dogged Edwards less closely with masculine argument; even Jael, whose exploit is cited on the title-page as a precedent, was content to drive a single nail.

The style of all these sectaries is awkward and unpolished. Roger Williams wrote his long tracts hurriedly, sometimes in this man's house, sometimes in that, or often in the fields. Richard Baxter regretted in late life that he had not taken his wife's counsel and written more carefully. He confesses to a sacrifice of "durable usefulness" for "urgent necessity." Simply because the need of the moment was so great, care for the niceties of expression seemed to him, as it did later to Wesley, unpardonable.[1] Many of the sectaries were incapable even of appreciating the literary art. But all were in deadly earnest, and wrote occasionally with real inspiration. How like, for example, a fine passage in the *Areopagitica* are the words of Leonard Busher:

> "Why, then, should those that have the truth, be afraid of error? Seeing truth discovereth dark and dangerous ways of error, though abroad in open books, even as light discovereth dark and dangerous places, though abroad in open highways. . . . The more dark and dangerous the errors be, the more needful and profitable will truth be found of all that would travel to heaven."[2]

To such an occasional vision as this, the earnest following of a high principle inevitably leads its champions.

So the sectaries themselves struggled for freedom. Separation seemed to them "the way of God," and, with no broad, philosophical view of ecclesiastical policy, and with no inclination to compromise, they demanded the right to worship as they would. The regular clergy distrusted and condemned this cry of the untutored sectary for liberty of utterance. Certainly, no establishment could be expected to accept Katherine Chidley's assertion: "Well-meaning Christians be the fittest on the earth to make Churches, and to choose their Officers; whether they be Taylors,

[1] *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*, ed. 1696, p. 124.
[2] *Religious Peace*, 1614. See Underhill, *Tracts*.

Felt-makers, Button-makers, Tent-makers, Shepherds, or Ploughmen. . . . But ill-meaning Priests are very unfit men to make churches."[1] Nevertheless, some liberal-minded men of culture were in those days ready to give a partial assent to such radicalism. Milton pleaded for "a little generous prudence, a little forbearance of one another, and some grains of charity"; for he knew that the quest of truth could not be safely entrusted to a chosen few, and he felt confident that "truth is strong, next to the Almighty" and "needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensings to make her victorious."[2] Another man of culture to look without fear on toleration was Lord Brooke. In training and temperament he was very different from the scholarly idealist, Milton; but human sympathy brought him the same tolerant spirit and won for him the praise of Milton in the *Areopagitica*.

Lord Brooke wrote his *Discourse opening the Nature of that Episcopacie, which is Exercised in England* during the intermission of Parliament in 1641, and dedicated it to the Lords and Commons. He is far more conservative than Mrs. Chidley, and, as an experienced statesman, sees danger in absolute toleration. But he condemns the bishops unsparingly for their oppression. "In a word," he says, "through the whole Kingdome, Preaching, Praying, expounding, and the like exercises, both in publick & private are severely suppressed, and in many places altogether forbidden."[3] To this policy he attributes the ever increasing non-conformity and heresy of the day. It would seem more reasonable to listen to the demands of the Puritans, that all men be privileged to preach on whom God has bestowed "gifts of Understanding, Memory, Judgment, and Utterance, and an Earnest Desire to doe good with these."[4] These men, he has been told, "follow their Callings, (not living idely, or going up and down tatling as Busie-Bodies) but being diligent to serve God." From his own experience on the bench, when Dissenters were brought to trial, Brooke thinks well of them. He would not "abet the least miscarriage in any of these poore men," or even "countenance any of them, in a way of exercising those Duties that are too high for their parts and abilities." Yet he refuses to condemn them without a hearing, and trusts to restraint rather than to prohibition; for "oft-times in the midst of thickest ore

[1] *Justification of the Independent Churches*, 1641, p. 22.
[2] *Areopagitica*, pp. 92, 96. [3] Section 2. [4] Page 106.

we finde the purest gold," and "no truth can shine in its perfect lustre at the first: light is darknesse when it first appeareth."[1]

The general spirit of Lord Brooke's work is finely revealed in its closing words.

"I confesse there are many now that turn the Light of Truth, into a Life of loosenesse, vanity, and profanenesse. . . . But let not all suffer with the wicked. . . . When God shall so enlarge his Hand, and unveil his face, that the poore creature is brought into communion and acquaintance with his Creator; steered in all his wayes, by his spirit; and by it carried up above shame, feare, pleasure, comfort, losses, grave, and death itself: Let us not censure such tempers, but blesse God for them. . . . My desire, prayer, endeavour shall still be, as much as in me lies, to follow peace and holinesse; and though there may haply be some little dissent betweene my darke judgment, weake conscience, and other Good men, that are much more cleare and strong; yet my prayer still shall be, to *keepe the Unity of the Spirit in the Bond of Peace.*"

Of this high resolve and this unwavering confidence in the power of truth, Milton must have thought when he penned his fine tribute to the nobleman whose life had just been sacrificed in the close of Lichfield cathedral. Lord Brooke naturally took the nobleman's point of view. He distrusts not simply the unlicensed preachers for their ignorance and zeal, but also the bishops for their quick rise from lowly station, and their consequent greed of wealth and power. He lacks the comprehensive philosophy of Hooker, the broad statesmanship of Bacon, and the finest idealism of Milton. Nevertheless, the best portions of his treatise remind the reader of the *Areopagitica* more strongly than do any other of the Puritan tracts. His inferiority to Milton in the statement of fundamental truths is largely compensated for by his greater warmth of heart. "Can we not dissent in judgment," Brooke asks, "but we must also disagree in affection?" So he seeks toleration as an accommodation, and like the latitudinarian divines, Hales and Chillingworth, asks for peace within the church.

Much this same attitude toward dissent was taken by influential divines of the established church. Hales and Chillingworth would have sacrificed much for peace, and Jeremy Taylor, in his early life, even more. In 1644 Taylor severed his connections with the royal household at Oxford, and, going to the king's forces in the west, was one of the prisoners taken when Colonel Gerard surrendered to the Parliamentarians. After a short con-

[1] Page 115.

finement, Taylor went to live with Lord Carbery at Golden Grove. "In this great storm which hath dashed the vessel of the church all in pieces," he wrote, "I have been cast upon the coast of Wales, and in a little boat thought to have enjoyed that rest and quietness which in England in a greater I could not hope for."[1] Amid such unfortunate circumstances, he naturally inclined to toleration; for, as he says, men "preach for toleration when themselves are under the rod, who, when they got the rod into their own hands, thought toleration itself to be intolerable." Through such a transformation he himself passed; but at this time he saw sound reasons as well as real need for toleration.

Possibly the fundamental idea of the *Liberty of Prophesying* would be scarcely broad enough to-day. Since uniformity of belief, Taylor argues, is impossible, all opinions not at variance with the Apostles' Creed should be allowed.[2] In his day, however, there was little need of greater liberality, and his general attitude is charitable. Of course, if Papists are taught that the Pope can annul all oaths taken to God and man, and all allegiance due a king, and all faith in compacts with Protestants, the civil magistrates must take steps to safeguard society. But on speculative matters, such as the real presence, Papists should be tolerated. So in general Taylor condemned persecution, save when free expression of opinion provoked evil-doing. For persecution, he believed, will either strengthen the cause it would suppress or produce hypocrisy. Insistence should be placed not on articles of belief, but on holy living.

Taylor's position, therefore, was more tolerant than that of many Puritans, who, after establishing the *Bible* as sole authority, would permit only their own interpretation of its laws. Taylor had learned that the *Bible* lays down no definite commands on most matters, and that, in consequence, there can be no course of action universally and eternally right. "There is," he said, "in many Scriptures a double sense, a literal and a spiritual"; and he insisted that "there are divers places of Scripture, containing in them mysteries and questions of great concernment, and yet the fabric and constitution is such, that there is no certain mark to determine whether the sense of them should be literal or figurative."[3] Had Milton accepted this principle, he never would have compiled *Christian Doctrine*. It seemed to Taylor that the

[1] *Liberty of Prophesying*, p. 1. [2] *Ibid.*, section 1. [3] *Ibid.*, section 3.

Bible, used in that fashion, can be made to prove anything; for "the Scriptures look like pictures, wherein every man in the room believes they look on him only, and that wheresoever he stands, or how often soever he changes his position." No individual, therefore, should impose his interpretation of the *Bible* on others; but all who live holily and accept the basic doctrines of Christianity, should enjoy the liberty of private judgment.

The *Liberty of Prophesying* was written during the darkest days of the English church. Some years later, after the monarchy had been restored and after Taylor had assumed the duties of an Irish bishopric, he wrote the *Via Intelligentiæ*. Times had changed. He found himself in the seat of authority, with a recalcitrant populace to deal with; the rod, in other words, was in his hands. According to tradition, he then repented of his charitable words and wished to recall them. Be that as it may, the sermon, *Via Intelligentiæ*, certainly qualifies, although it does not actually retract, the liberal views of the *Liberty of Prophesying*.

The essential distinction between the two works seems to be that the first recognizes a philosophical reason for toleration, whereas the second sees only the need of compromise, or an accommodation, between the disputants. The *Via Intelligentiæ* begins finely: "Peace is so great a blessing, and disputations and questions in religion are so little friends to peace, that I have thought no man's time can be better spent than in propositions and promotions of peace, and consequently in finding expedients, and putting periods to all contentious learning." This course might impress some as the way of peace rather than of truth. But Taylor's belief is that truth like peace can be attained by the exercise of simple piety. "Let us betake ourselves to live holily, and then the Spirit of God will lead us into all truth"; for "the way to judge of religion is by doing our duty: and theology is rather a Divine life than a Divine knowledge." In short, righteousness is the source of peace and truth—the divinely appointed way out of controversy in religion.

Such an idea gives occasion in the sermon for many fine thoughts. "That which best pleases God," the preacher declares, "that which does good to our neighbour, that which teaches sobriety, that which combines with government, that which speaks honour of God, and does him honour,—that only is truth." Or again:

"We see other persons, not so learned, it may be, not so much versed in Scriptures,—yet they say a thing is good and lay hold of it; they believe glorious things of heaven, and they live accordingly as men that believe themselves; a nod is sufficient reproof; the crowing of a cock, the singing of a lark, the dawning of the day, and the washing their hands, are to them competent memorials of religion and warnings of duty."

Thus something of the fine liberalism of the earlier tract, with an occasional outburst of poetic feeling worthy of *Holy Dying*, runs through the sermon of the Irish bishop.

But Jeremy Taylor was anxious and fearful under the burden of responsibility, and the Presbyterians were stiff-necked. "Sweet reasonableness" was hard to maintain. "Our light is like a candle," the preacher sighs, "every wind of vain doctrine blows it out, or spends the wax, and makes the light tremulous; but the lights of heaven are fixed and bright, and shine for ever." He feels sure, too, that, since God is a God of order, he is to be found in churches and pulpits and in doctors' chairs, rather than in "conventicles and mutinous corners of a house." Possibly men should not be persecuted for their opinions, but they must be kept from instigating disorder, heresy, or sedition. Taylor now can see only "the infinite unreasonableness of the popish religion," which he condemns as contrary to common sense, experience, and Scripture. So his fine tolerance vanishes into the light of common day. He still realizes the futility of contention. "The Holy Spirit can teach us how vain a thing it is to . . . trouble the world with foolish questions, to disturb the church for interest or pride, to resist government in things indifferent, to spend the people's zeal in things unprofitable, to make religion to consist in outsides, and opposition to circumstances and trifling regards." But all this is merely equivalent to a plea for the recognition of his own beliefs and a denial of others; for Taylor speaks uncharitably of the Romanists, and of the republicans he says: "No man that intends to live holily can ever suffer any pretences of religion to be made to teach him to fight against his King. . . . Perfect submission to kings is the glory of the Protestant cause."[1]

Change of environment and the pressure of official cares had cramped Taylor's views. He was not robust and courageous enough to face the world without faltering. Forced to extremes by enemies in Ireland, he stood bravely at bay in defence of his convictions. He was born, though, to render other service—to

[1] Page 34. See also pp. 18, 42.

revive holiness, not to beat back assailants. *Holy Living* and *Holy Dying*, therefore, represent the true Taylor. But, despite his ultimate shrinking from early liberalism, the fine spirit of the *Liberty of Prophesying* and the *Via Intelligentiæ* warrants Taylor a place among those who saw the vision of an untrammelled intellectual life.

The progress of Taylor's life, nevertheless, brings to mind the ever growing sweetness of Richard Baxter's character, as he aged in the service of his fellowmen. He noticed it thus in his autobiography:

"I have perceived that nothing so much hindreth the Reception of the Truth, as urging it on Men with too harsh Importunity, and falling too heavily on their Errors. . . . In controversies it is fierce Opposition which is the bellows to kindle a resisting Zeal. . . . To confess the Truth, I am lately much prone to the contrary Extream, to be too indifferent what Men hold, and to keep my Judgment to my self."

In spite of possible harm, he commended, in general, such moderation; for "in a learning way Men are ready to receive the Truth, but in a Disputing way they come armed against it with Prejudice and Animosity." Hence he would treat all liberally. He would not narrow the Church more than Christ commands; he would not lay stress on external forms of worship; and, however conscious he was of the evils of schism, he was "sensible of the Sin and Mischief of using Men cruelly in Matters of Religion, and of pretending Men's good, and the Order of the Church, for Acts of Inhumanity or Uncharitableness."[1]

To this generous attitude Baxter was brought by the sufferings he endured for nonconformity and by the service he rendered the oppressed. "Having most to do with ignorant, miserable People, I am commanded by my Charity and Reason, to treat with them of that which their Salvation lyeth on; and not to dispute with them of Formalities and Niceties, when the Question is presently to be determined whether they shall dwell for ever in Heaven or Hell." Such a concern for the poor lay beyond the thoughts of the scholar, Milton; Taylor, despite his lowly origin, was an aristocrat among churchmen, and seldom expressed a sympathy for the masses; but Baxter never rose far above the humble home that he so faithfully described, or outgrew the simple piety of his

[1] *Reliquiæ Baxterianæ*. See closing pages of Book I.

father. Experience gave him the tolerance that was wrested in part from the bishop. Baxter belonged to neither party; for he was too moderate an Episcopalian to be one of them, and too chary of absolutism to harbour with the Presbyterians. He stood on middle ground, sympathizing with the good men of both parties.

Baxter's tolerance was the outgrowth of a life of cheerful service and personal suffering. A more instinctive charity guided the genial, large-hearted Tom Fuller. He was by nature a man of compromise, who invariably saw arguments on both sides of a question. In his great-heartedness he sympathized with men of diverse views, and with his sanity he declined to ratify all that any party believed in. So among tolerationists he stood as the man of compromise. There were good men, he believed, in both armies, or, as he quaintly expressed it, "I never knew nor heard of an Army all of Saints, save the holy Army of Martyrs; and those, you know, were dead first." For this want of partisanship let him give his own explanation. At Achurch, one and a half miles on one side of his birthplace, Aldwinkle, lived the founder of the Brownist sect; in Lavenden, at the same distance on the other side, lived Francis Tresham, one of the gunpowder conspirators. Consequently, Fuller assumed that he was destined by birth to be a conciliator, and he prayed that he might not prove false to his mission.[1]

Such a determination was not easily held to in those days. After telling the story of a jailer who treated a prisoner harshly because he belonged to no faction and would therefore have no friends to aid him, Fuller adds: "This is an affliction attending moderate men, that they have not an active party to side with them and favour them."[2] Fuller learned the truth of this from his own experience. He was once interrupted after a prayer, in which he had petitioned God for a settlement of the nation's affairs on a true foundation, by a royalist sympathizer, who asked what that true foundation was. Fuller discreetly answered that he was no lawyer or statesman, and could not be expected to answer with any authority. And when the zealot still pressed for an opinion, Fuller replied that in his prayer he had remitted all to the wisdom and goodness of God, whose knowledge on all things was greater than his own ignorance. The incident taught

[1] *Mixt Contemplations on these Times*, no. 43. [2] *Ibid.*, no. 33.

him that "when men come with nets in their ears, it is good for the preacher to have neither fish nor fowl in his tongue."[1]

Fuller, however, offended many persons by his candour in the pulpit. During the years 1642 and 1643 he preached in London three sermons on peace that greatly offended his Puritan audiences, and he was forced to resign. Going then to Oxford, with a reputation for royalism so established, he was invited to speak before the King. His sermon on that occasion, unfortunately, setting forth the need of compliance on the part of the King's followers, proved as offensive to the court as his former sermons had been to the city. To convince men of his loyalty, Fuller was obliged to leave Oxford and enter the army as chaplain and take his part in the famous defence of Basinghouse. He had well earned the name often given him of "downright Fuller."

The first of the London sermons is a plea for peace. The second address, which is a more daring appeal, is filled with the author's tolerance, worldly knowledge, and quaint humour. Starting from the text, "Let him take all, forasmuch as my Lord the King is come again in peace unto his own house," Fuller urged that all loyal subjects ought to welcome the King again on his return. Some would object, he foresaw, that this would be to attain peace at the expense of truth. He replied characteristically: "I would to God men did talk less of truth and love it more." Some of the principles under contention impressed him as "flat falsities," while others seemed too trivial to warrant attention, since reason and not force should be the safeguard of truth. He recognized many obstacles to peace; but the King was ready to proffer it, and the people might obtain it, would they only "desist from sinning" and "persist in praying." Of such an end he hoped his day's address might be the harbinger.

Fuller's third London sermon was equally outspoken. Although he denied the truth of the saying that Elizabeth "swept the church of England . . . and left all the dust behind the door," he admitted the need of further reformation. But that reform, he insisted, should be made "with all due and Christian moderation." Consequently, like Bacon, he spoke tolerantly of both sides. Though the Fathers may not have been infallible, they deserve our reverence; though Papists forget their duty to us, let us remember our duty to them; though early Protestants erred occasionally, still they "bare the heat of the day, indeed, [they] which

[1] *Mixt Contemplations on these Times*, no. 40.

were burnt to ashes." This glint of humour is characteristic of its quaint author. But the sermon in general displeased the Puritans, especially that part of the discourse which denied the existence of any divine, miraculous light in those days. "The worst I wish the opinion is this, that it were true," the preacher said. The sermon was displeasing, too, for its moderation. A Puritan would take as an affront this statement: "The highest clamour doth not always argue the greatest earnestnesse." A protest was at once raised, the tolerant pastor was bidden take the oath, and, on his refusal, was dismissed. Only a few months later the royalists at Oxford were offended by another plea for charity in the conflict then raging. Fuller was too willing to consider the dispute in a liberal spirit.

In word and deed Fuller thus worked for an accommodation between the contending parties. He was not statesman enough, however, to formulate a definite plan of compromise; indeed, he disapproved of the arrangement finally made in 1688. To establish a national church, yet to tolerate voluntaryism, seemed unsafe to him; for, "if we should live to see churches of several governments permitted in England, it is more than probable that many offenders, not out of conscience, but to escape censures, would fly from one congregation to another." Fuller, apparently, could not conceive of a church relieved of its police duties, or, in other words, of spiritual freedom under the protection of an external, civil law.

The first man to defend the maintenance of a national church with the toleration of nonconforming churches, was Henry Burton, who, in 1641, published *The Protestation Protested.* Establish a national church, he argued, if it be deemed expedient; "but let not this exclude and barre out the free use of such congregations, as whereof the spirituall Commonwealth of Israel consisteth." Such independent bodies would not be "separate from the Civil State"; but "peaceable members thereof, subject and obedient to all the good and just laws thereof." Burton was remarkable among the men of his time for a firm faith in the power of civil law to curb excessive radicalism. Hence he could justify his demand, that "a due respect be had to those Congregations, and Churches, which desire an exemption and liberty of enjoying Christ's ordinances in such a purity, as a nationall Church, is not possibly capable of."

This was the provision for dissent finally made by the Revolu-

tion of 1688, save that even then toleration was withheld from Catholics and Unitarians. At best, it is but a working plan, less broad and less philosophical than Bacon's idea of a church, or Hooker's, and less finely conceived than Milton's ideal of liberty. It seems a trust in the power of the law, rather than of truth, to repress false doctrine, and its chief recommendation is its feasibility. Consequently, we should still think of Roger Williams and his outspoken faith in absolute toleration, and of John Milton,—whose *Areopagitica* rests on the great principle, "Let her [Truth] and falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter,"—as the great defenders of freedom among the dissenters, as Richard Hooker and Francis Bacon were among the supporters of the church.

Thus many men, of widely different temperaments and ways of life, groped in the dark for the freedom that they instinctively craved. There were philosophers and statesmen, like Hooker and Bacon; there were the sectaries themselves; and, finally, there were the liberal men within the established church who would have greatly modified the rigours of ecclesiastical discipline. And the greatest, most idealistic of all, John Milton, stands in splendid isolation. A principle so universal and so essential as this of intellectual freedom will naturally be apprehended from different points of view and from different needs. It is hard, also, ever to establish it in its entirety; one group of men will have one sort of compromise to recommend, others will have another, and almost no one will accept it without some restriction. Men of the present day, therefore, ought not to think of toleration as the desire of any one party, or the gift of any one group of men. All that we now enjoy of intellectual liberty is the harvest of what many minds have thought and many men have done.

ELBERT N. S. THOMPSON.

University of Iowa.

THE POETRY OF WILLIAM VAUGHN MOODY

William Vaughn Moody lived from 1869 to 1910; he published his poems only during the last decade of that time, in three small volumes. The collected works fill two octavo volumes, one of poems and poetic dramas, the other of prose plays. Sufficient eulogy has been made of Moody's restraint in excluding all but his best from publication, and of the pithy compactness of the single volume of poems; but what of the variety of ideas expressed in them? Imperialism, social problems of labour and machinery, provincialism, Old World culture, woman, art, evolution, paganism, mysticism,—these are the main subjects which called forth Moody's poetic arguments, arguments—for Moody was not the poet to confine his verse to music, pictures, sentiment, or even passion; none but his earliest imitative poems are thought-free.

And in what various poetic forms and languages did he write. Lyric, ode, monologue, narrative, allegory, satire, dialogue, play in prose and verse; symbolism, imagery from all sources, religious and secular, classic epithet, literary allusion, literary echo, slang!

In all this variety of ideas and gorgeous eclecticism of style Moody is typical of the generation which lived through the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. His poetry points backward in so many ways, and forward in so many. Reflect on his religious poems, with their baffling mixture of the flesh and spirit, and their all-pervasive melancholy doubt; and you call him a belated Matthew Arnold. Then you recall *The Brute*, a genuine poem standing out from a pile of journalistic versifying, on a subject at least a generation ahead of Arnold's point of view. Read *The Great Divide*, with its wholesome unprovincial Americanism, and you say, "Here is a native dramatist of the stock of Whitman and Mark Twain, one who has lifted our crude 'Western melodrama' to the level of enduring literature." Then you remember the last stanza of *The Moon-Moth*, the poet sinking himself and his America, like any romanticist of two or three generations past, into the Olympian Greece of legend and poetry, that never was on land or sea.

Moody's ideas on private and public questions may be con-

sidered separately. The first kind, which includes his personal, artistic, and religious beliefs, is by far the more important and larger part of his poetry; but the second, which includes his opinions, expressed or implied, on political and social issues, is more concentrated and clear. After examining everything in Moody's work that bears upon his attitude toward public questions, we may come to four conclusions: 1. He is unusually free from local attachments and prejudices, and the express enemy of provincialism. 2. His national patriotic utterances, provoked by particular crises, are decidedly opposed to Eastern aggression. 3. He is deeply concerned by social problems of more than national significance. 4. His worship of Old World culture is typical of one class of American poets, foreign in their inspiration.

In all his published poems Moody made but one reference to his Indiana home region, in *A Prairie Ride;* and his interest is decidedly in the ride, if not in his fascinating companion, rather than in the home. "Home-come yet alien" he calls himself. When, quickened by the romance of the occasion, he pays a dilatory tribute to the prairie, it is "my mother's country." *The Daguerreotype*, Moody's well-known poem in praise of his mother, contains no reference to his birthplace.

But this indifference is not unexpected; there could be little in the country home to hold a man of Moody's highly cultivated tastes. We might rather expect, in such a devotee of Old World culture, an affection for the Boston and New England which he came to know in his Harvard student days. His letters do show great affection for Boston. But the poems which are laid in the New England background do not linger on the local place, but use it as a kind of symbol or starting point for expansion to nation-wide, or wider issues. *An Ode in Time of Hesitation*, which begins at the Robert Shaw monument on Boston Common, is national in its sweep. *Gloucester Moors*, in the image of a ship putting into port at Gloucester Town, envisages the ship of the earth.

The Great Divide is an acute representation of provincial conditions, and especially of provincial ways of thought; but of course it reconciles East and West. I say "of course," because, contrary to a general opinion, the conclusion of the play seems to me quite as convincing, and dramatic, as the beginning. The

Puritanical New England girl comes to her senses and forgives, because, *once back again among her own kind*, she sees the narrowness of her ideal. The setting of the last scene is quite as true and essentially dramatic as that of the first, though it lacks the picturesque melodrama. But this is not the place to eulogize a great American play; the upshot of it is that extreme types of East and West are reconciled; the reconciliation is the theme of the play.

So much for localism. Moody's purely national patriotism found utterance in poetry only under the spell of particular crises. Such has been the case with many great patriotic poets,—to be sure, Lowell, Wordsworth, Tennyson, for example. On the other hand there is always a host of minor versifiers, more genuine in their intentions than their poetic inspiration, who are for ever ready to put out Odes to America in large headlines. Moody showed his regard for his country, not by such bombastic and impertinent glorification, but, when the times called for it, by uncompromising criticism. *An Ode in Time of Hesitation*, *On a Soldier Fallen in the Philippines*, and *The Quarry*, the only poems which bear directly upon political issues, are all critical, and to the same point. East is East and West is West, but with a difference from Kipling. The East is not to be conquered by the West, but to be let alone. Hawaii, the climax of the spectacular review of the empire of the United States, in the third stanza of the famous *Ode*, crystallizes the issue:

> " far Hawaii crowned with palms
> Where East and West are met,—
> A rich seal on the ocean's bosom set
> To say that East and West are twain;
> With different loss and gain;
> The Lord hath sundered them; let them be sundered yet."

Like Kipling also is Moody in calling upon the Almighty to justify his argument; but Moody has the better right to call upon the Almighty, as one whose whole poetry is burdened with religion, not of the political sort. The *Ode* warns against meddling in the East, and sings the oneness of the West through its appeal to the memory of Robert Shaw, a Northern hero in the Civil War, and of the late war in behalf of Cuba, in which North and South were firmly reunited.

On a Soldier Fallen in the Philippines strikes at the Eastern problem in a more personal lyric note:

"Praise, and never a whispered hint but the fight he fought was good;
Never a word that the blood on his sword was his country's own heart's blood."

And *The Quarry* repeats the message with regard to China. The poem is a pointed and telling allegory, but unintelligible without reference to its occasion, the threatened dismemberment of China by the Powers in 1900. The danger that the United States might be one of the plunderers aroused Moody's indignation. China is symbolized as an old man, "With frozen gestures and unfocussed eyes," fleeing on a white elephant before various beasts of prey. The one winged pursuer, presumably the American Eagle, evokes a cry of agony from the watcher:

"Alas! What dost thou here? What dost *thou* here?"

But happily the bird gives up the chase.

East and West within the United States must reconcile; Orient and Occident, the world-divisions, are eternally sundered, and we must keep our hands off. Such are the purely political doctrines in Moody's poetry.

But if a man's interests are intellectual rather than sentimental, much of his energy which might be radiated in praise of his country goes into the study of more profound problems of less popular interest. It is fair to reckon Moody's stirring poems upon social issues, *The Brute* and *Gloucester Moors*, and his services as a teacher in Harvard and Chicago Universities, as evidences of a larger patriotism. *The Brute* sounds an appeal for the mastery of machines by men, and though not with the same exuberant buoyancy as Gerald Stanley Lee's philosophy of machinery in *Crowds*, there is a note of hopefulness for the time when the mastery is complete. In spite of all its ugliness and injustice, by which it starves the poor and gluts the rich, "the Brute must bring the good time on."

Gloucester Moors, as we have seen, deals with the larger and more directly human issue of the industrial conflict. The ship of earth, whose sails are the summer clouds, and whose masthead light is the sun, carries luxury and indifference in her cabin, and misery and cursing in her hold.

"Then I strove to go down and see;
But they said, 'Thou art not of us!'
I turned to those on the deck with me
And cried, 'Give help.' But they said, 'Let be!
Our ship sails faster thus.'"

Was there ever a more poignant confession of the helplessness of a poet to solve the practical problem? He had observed with delight the jill-o'er-the-ground, the Quaker-maid, the barberries of the Gloucester fields, but

"Who has given me this sweet
And given my brother dust to eat?
And when will his wage come in?"

As a poet, and as a product of a kind of European literary culture which has avoided modern social problems, Moody could never answer his own bewildering questions, either by way of logical solution or practical expedient. But his concern for the problem was deep and genuine; and his utterance was free from cant.

In addition to his creative work, Moody taught English in Harvard University in 1894, and in the University of Chicago from 1895 to 1903. Hence his services to education covered a decade of the best years of his life. In spite of his doubts as to the efficacy of teaching English literature and language, doubts which have beset most teachers of genuine literary taste and inspiration, he performed his academic duties, even to the drudgery of theme-reading, with care and enthusiasm. The importance of such work—the national importance—may be easily underrated. The fundamental dictate of democracy, that every man shall have a voice in government, makes popular education, not a luxury nor an idealistic method of "uplift," but a political necessity. If a citizen is to defend his interests, he must know not only what they are, but how to present them in the language of educated men. Hence the political, economic, and social sciences are not the only studies of political importance in our educational curriculum; language, literature, and self-expression—the business of learning to write decent English—have a direct bearing on the problem of democracy. His gift of poetry aside, Moody might well have spent his life as one of those obscure servants of the state, a teacher of English composition.

But the poet himself probably considered this service the least of his work. He was an artist first of all. He is depressed

by the blatant ugliness of New York, and pines for Italian hills. His love of European scenes, but especially those of literary associations, is embodied in many of his finest poems: *Song-Flower and Poppy*, *A Dialogue in Purgatory*, *Second Coming*, *Old Pourquoi*, *The Moon-Moth*. They revive the Europe, the Italy, Greece, France, Mediterranean of legend and tradition, in the finished epithets of the devotee: "grape-dark Pentelicon," "Gibraltar gates," "Ida's silver caves." Political issues are out of the question with regard to a land that exists only in the minds of the pilgrims to its shrines.

Song-Flower and Poppy and *The Moon-Moth* express this romantic attitude best, for the American scene in the first and the Greek scene in the second arouse nostalgia. *Song-Flower and Poppy* begins in New York; the poet, labouring over his manuscript and looking out over chimney-pots to where a "rag of sunset crumbles grey," hears a boy's song in the "grey gulch of a street" below; he is transported to sunny Apennine slopes, and other storied Italian spots. In the last stanza of *The Moon-Moth* from Greece the poet's mind drifts, self-accusingly, to America.

> "Westward the burning bugles of the day
> Are blowing strong across America,
> New laws, new arts, new gods, new souls of men,
> New hopes, new charities!
> Why do I traffic where no profit is—"

But eternity soothes him again, eternity and the scenes of old Greece.

> "But thou, fled heart, who cling'st here close and true!
> For us the future was, the past will be,
> And all the holy human years are new,
> And all are tasted of eternally,
> And still the eaten fruit shines on the tree.
> —Let us go down. There, in that naked glen,
> Bellerophon played the thief.
> Much lower lies the well where the old men
> Sat murmuring at Medea, and at their chief
> Spoused to the witch. Love, we'll not grieve again,
> We ne'er shall grieve again, not what we could call grief!"

The romantic Hellenism and the Lethean eternal values serve to enroll Moody with a certain class of American poets, similar to the philosophers whom Santayana has characterized as of the

"genteel tradition." Lowell and Longfellow are his famous predecessors both in their poetry and in their part in an education which consisted largely in an attempt to transplant European culture, at a period when that culture was turned chiefly to study of the past. The tradition of that school is still strong in American education, but the opposite tendency is steadily superseding it. In literature, native writers like Mark Twain and Whitman, and a host of others, undistinguished in style but genuinely American in inspiration, seem bound to have the greater influence in the twentieth century. And even in education the native school is already getting the lead by shifting the emphasis in liberal studies toward history, politics, sociology, and modern literature, as far away as possible from "the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome."

The attempt to classify Moody as a poet of the genteel tradition, of a school which has drawn its intellectual and artistic models from Europe, and usually a generation behind, has been only indirectly critical; the main purpose was to place the poet with regard to changing tendencies especially characteristic of the transition between the nineteenth century and the twentieth. Likewise Moody's attitude toward East and West invites comparison with a newer attitude. The hope of an ultimate peaceful understanding between East and West is steadily gathering strength; progress toward this ideal is foreshadowed in the Japanese poems of Alfred Noyes, the translation into English of the works of Rabindranath Tagore, and the cosmopolitan poetry of Cale Young Rice, in *At the World's Heart*. A good single poem on the theme is *A Song of East and West* by Arthur Davison Ficke, a vigorous and radical young American poet.

Moody is behind all this. Whereas the romantic spirits of the present generation turn to the East in commerce, politics, poetry, and art, Moody turned chiefly to the Europe of the mid-nineteenth century for its culture and art. He was a citizen of the Western world.

The bulk of Moody's poetry is of the more personal sort, devoted to the eternal questions of human life, rather than to the passing problems of public policy. The monument of his religious thought and feeling is the dramatic trilogy, *The Fire-Bringer*, *The Masque of Judgment*, and the unfinished *Death of Eve*, dealing with the relations of man and God in terms of Greek

and Biblical mythology. Less directly and from various angles, the same problem is reflected in many single poems: *Good Friday Night*, *Jetsam*, *The Troubling of the Waters*, *The Menagerie*, *Old Pourquoi*, *Song-Flower and Poppy*. Literally interpreted, these poems reveal Moody by turns a mystic, a sceptic, a pagan, and a spiritual idealist. To be sure Moody might have prefaced his poems, as did Hardy in the case of *Poems Past and Present*, with the warning that not all the sentiments were uttered in the author's own character. And yet after making every allowance for histrionics, one cannot escape the impression that there was a continual struggle between doubt and faith in Moody's soul. By birth and early training he was a Puritan; his college studies, especially those in Greek literature, nourished his natural full-blooded paganism; the greater part of his life was spent in trying to reconcile the two characters.

His studies in Dante, Milton, and Rossetti developed his leaning toward mysticism. In *Good Friday Night* and *The Ride Back* this attitude seems the weakest and most hesitating of all his religious moods; certainly it is not to be compared for vitality with the robust pagan spirit of the chorus of young men to Apollo in *The Fire-Bringer;* or for profound sincerity with the utter despair of many of the poems; probably it is quite as literary as religious. The two poems are both highly symbolic and Pre-Raphaelite in manner. *The Ride Back* relates the return of a knight to his bride, or, according to conjecture, the return of the soul to God. In *Good Friday Night* a young unbeliever is converted through the example of a stranger who kneels beside him and who later proves to be the Christ, and the influence of an eidolon of the Virgin in whose waxen face the poet recognizes his own mother.

But without trace of literary imitation the gospel of faith is preached in plain language in the prose-play, *The Faith Healer*. This is based upon an actual character, a certain Schlatter of New Mexico, who became widely famous for his miracles of faith healing. Moody learned of him in one of his rare indulgences in newspaper reading, and became fascinated by the character as early as 1900, though he did not finish the play until 1910. The conflict of the drama depends on a temporary lapse from grace of the healer through his falling in love with a young girl who had led a rather joyous life but had lately been completely sobered by the holy man. They discover that their mutual love is no

hindrance to his divine mission; and the healer recovers his powers through faith.

In all these examples, however, though faith triumphs in the end, it is only after an internal conflict. Doubt is always present, an enemy inside the camp.

This doubt, in various shades, from a gay acceptance of the eternal quest through bitter spiritual struggle to hopeless despair, hangs over many of the finest poems. *A Road Hymn for the Start* and *Old Pourquoi* reflect the eternal mystery in terms of careless and youthful joy in the "boon of endless quest," and a well-nigh hypnotic delight in the weird, symbolic song of a half-crazy old Norman:

> "Pourquoi? Pourquoi? Yes, that was all!
> Only the darkest cry that haunts
> The corridors of tragic chance,
> Couched in the sweet, satirical,
> Impudent tongue of France.
>
> Only the bitterest wail flung out
> From worlds that traffic to their mart
> Without a pilot or a chart;
> With "What?" the body of their doubt,
> And "Why?" the quaking heart."

Jetsam and *The Troubling of the Waters*, both dramatic monologues, are the cries of fighters still struggling against despair and disbelief. *A Grey Day*, *On the River*, and *A Bracelet of Grass*, brief lyrics, are beautiful wails of blank despair. I quote the last stanza of *A Grey Day:*

> "I wonder how that merchant's crew
> Have ever found the will!
> I wonder what the fishers do
> To keep them toiling still!
> I wonder how the heart of man
> Has patience to live out its span,
> Or wait until its dreams come true."

The same mood, in less concentrated lyric expression, pervades the closing scenes of *The Masque of Judgment*, where Raphael and the other archangels friendly to man bewail God's final destruction of humanity.

On the other hand Moody's poetry is full of confident, joyous, and often rebellious paganism. Moody was a pagan by

nature. He was an athlete as well as a student. He loved the open road. In spite of his Puritan heritage, he would not deny the pleasures of the body. Often he prayed for reconciliation between soul and sense, as in *Song-Flower and Poppy*, but he could not renounce either one. This pagan spirit appears in no single poem by itself; it is usually set in contrast to mysticism. In *The Masque of Judgment*, out of the very Valley of Judgment where humanity is waiting to be destroyed, a Youth sings:

> "Oh, for a voice
> Here in the doors of death
> To speak the praise of life, existence mere,
> The simple come and go of natural breath,
> And habitation of the body's house with its five windows clear!"

In the final chorus of *The Fire-Bringer*, the theme of which is the successful revolt of man against the tyranny of God, the Young Men sing a pagan hymn of a somewhat more boastful and rebellious strain to the appropriate gods, Apollo, Eros, and Dionysus.

Moody's paganism is not always rebellious, however; it is directed to enjoyment rather than strife. He derived it from Greek paganism and his own pleasure-loving nature. He was not indebted to the desperate and feverish Nietzschean revolt which is the latest fashion in paganism.

Closely akin to this pagan emphasis upon human happiness is Moody's praise of woman, which is unusually free from the sentimentalism and neo-Platonism of most poems inspired by that subject. *Good Friday Night* is an exception in its attitude toward the Virgin. But the other poems, especially *I Am the Woman*, *The Daguerreotype*, and *The Death of Eve*, present woman as of the earth earthy, and to be valued above all for her fertility. In *A Prairie Ride* we have already seen how the poet's single reference to his native region is bound up with the images of two women, his companion and his mother. The ideas of women and the abundance of cornfields are also closely associated in the poem. *The Daguerreotype*, in praise of the poet's mother, is notable for its accent, of genuine poetic candour, upon her physical womanhood, as mother of a

> "sin-defiled,
> Earth-encumbered, blood-begotten, passionate man-child."

But the crowning anthem to womanhood is *I Am the Woman*. In it woman is man's slave, harlot, wife, mother, spiritual leader, "mute with passionate prophecies," and doomed to taste of the fruit that brings sin and strife into the world. The figure of Eve, indirectly alluded to throughout the poem, is essential to the conception; though it suggests Demeter as well. She is the universal mother. Only her final attribute differentiates her from the Greek mother,—her troubled consciousness of bringing sin as well as good into the world. *The Death of Eve* shows Eve bowed down under this fate, but hoping at the last to reconcile God and "sin-begotten" man. Moody's woman is not wholly pagan, then; sense and spirit are at strife in her, as in all his poetry. But she is not afflicted with modern notions of sex-revolt or a morbid consciousness of her sex.

Strictly modern, in fact, are none of the religious attitudes: mysticism, doubt, and paganism, which we have already discussed. The paganism is ancient and more or less universal; so is the mysticism, though highly coloured by Pre-Raphaelitism; the doubt belongs, in English literature, to the generation of Matthew Arnold and Arthur Hugh Clough.

But Moody broke away from his Old World moorings in his unique poem on evolution, *The Menagerie*. The philosophy of this thoughtful burlesque,

> "There's soul in everything that squirms"

coincides with one of the most advanced interpretations of the world in modern times. It is spiritual idealism, advocated in various systems but in the same general direction by Bergson, Eucken, and the English neo-Hegelians. The conditions imposed upon it by scientific evolution, namely, the kinship of man with the other animals, distinguish it from earlier idealisms. In *The Menagerie*, a slightly intoxicated man who has been shut into the circus tent after closing time recognizes his kinship with the caged beasts, and, ironically, his human superiority to them.

> "Helpless I stood among the awful cages;
> The beasts were walking loose, and I was bagged!
> I, I, last product of the toiling ages,
> Goal of heroic feet that never lagged,
> A little man in trousers, slightly jagged."

He gives his opinion of evolution in unmistakable terms:

> "Survival of the fittest, adaptation,
> And all their other evolution terms,
> Seem to omit one small consideration,
> To wit, that tumblebugs and angleworms
> Have souls; there's soul in everything that squirms."

Such picturesque slang and modern idealism isolate *The Menagerie* from Moody's other personal poetry as a distinctively modern poem, like *The Brute* in his social poetry. But it is a piece of the whole, after all, a blend of mysticism and paganism, of soul and sense. Moody's struggle to reconcile the two cast a cloud of doubt over all his religious poetry, ranging from utter hopelessness to heroic conflict. This conflict, and final reconciliation, make the theme of the dramatic trilogy. *The Fire-Bringer* exalts man; *The Masque of Judgment* debases man and exalts God; *The Death of Eve*, unfinished, was meant to reconcile the two.

The forms in which Moody wrote are like his ideas various and eclectic. In particular his dramatic forms range from the closet-drama on Greek models, through the masque, down to the modern prose-play for stage presentation. These reflect the transition between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but beyond that, Moody's use of them, except in the matter of fitness for their themes, is not especially significant. Besides the drama proper, he also wrote in dramatic monologues and lyrics, narratives, and odes. His metre contains nothing new or exceptional. He used the old forms of regular blank verse and rhymed stanza with melody and vigour. He was an avowed enemy of the "Whitmanic verse-mode,"[1] and never sacrificed both rhyme and strict length of line at the same time, like W. W. Gibson, in *Daily Bread*. His verse has freedom, however; the metre never stands in the way of the emotion.

But the language and style of Moody's poetry are far more interesting and significant in their variety. The Miltonic grand style of *The Masque of Judgment* marks one boundary, the slang of *The Menagerie* the other. Among the many elements and strata the most conspicuous are symbolism, particularly religious, literary allusion, and slang.

Symbolism is the most characteristic feature of Moody's

[1] See *Letters* p. 168, in a letter to R. W. Gilder.

style, and most responsible for its characteristic defect, obscurity. He caught the trick in his earliest imitative attempts based on Pre-Raphaelite models, and continued to use it with more restraint and originality in his mature poems. The published poems are full of symbolism. Open the volume at random; *Gloucester Moors* contains the symbol of the ship of earth; *Good Friday Night* of the Stranger; *An Ode in Time of Hesitation*, of the Miltonic "eagle-nation." *The Quarry* is all a symbol; so are many of the best short poems: *Road-Hymn for the Start*, *The Ride Back*, *The Brute*. And so of course is the whole dramatic trilogy; the Greek and Hebrew mythology is only the imagery of a truth that might be expressed in the language of any age, even the modern. Moody had an undeniable gift for seeing the concrete thing as symbolic of eternal meaning. In many poems he did not evoke the meaning clearly; in *The Moon-Moth* and *The Three Angels*, for example. But *The Brute* is intelligible enough to any one who has thought about machinery in its human relations; and *Song-Flower and Poppy* is clear and penetrating in its cry:

> "How long, old builder Time, wilt bide
> Till at thy thrilling word
> Life's crimson pride shall have to bride
> The spirit's white accord—"

Much of this symbolic imagery is religious; naturally, in a poet of his reading and concern with religion. He read his Dante and Milton as well as Greek drama, and so became well versed in the Christian mythology. I believe that most of this religious imagery is literary rather than purely religious; Moody had a genuine religious feeling, but it was not so vigorous and candid as his paganism. And yet of the trilogy only one play is in the Greek, or pagan tradition; and two are in the Christian. *The Masque of Judgment* is made concrete and spectacular through abundant use of the Apocalyptic figures: the Angels of the Pale Horse, Red Horse, White Horse; the Spirits of the Throne Lamps, the Lion and the Eagle of the Throne, and so on. But the imagery of this sort, far from being confined to the religious poems, is scattered all through Moody's work. In *An Ode in Time of Hesitation*

> "the white Sierras call
> Unto the Rockies straightway to arise
> And dance before the veiled ark of the year
> Sounding their windy cedars as for shawms."

And in *The Brute* that underrated animal at last comes to his own

> "'Twixt the Lion and the Eagle on the armpost of the Throne!"

Many of Moody's poems, especially those dealing with European scenes and subjects, have a decidedly literary flavor. They are full of recollection and allusion to classic traditions of art and culture. *The Fire-Bringer* is a deliberate imitation of the ancient Greek drama; *A Dialogue in Purgatory* recalls a scene from Dante. This literary allusiveness is best exemplified in a device which is characteristic of the kind of poetry which labours to keep the tradition alive; namely, the classic epithet. I mean the epithet which is intended to crystallize the salient features of an historical place, person, or event, or sometimes merely to recollect great names which will be familiar to the cultured reader. *Second Coming*, *Old Pourquoi*, *The Moon-Moth*, *Song-Flower and Poppy* are full of these classic phrases. The third stanza of *An Ode in Time of Hesitation* makes use of the same device upon modern American material. I quote from *Second Coming* several stanzas which contain a string of pearls of this sort.

> "Yonder on snowy Ida, Zeus
> Was cradled; through these mountain haunts
> The new moon hurried, letting loose
> The raving Corybantes,
>
> Who after thrid the Cyclades
> To Thebes of Cadmos, with the slim
> Wild god for whom Euripides
> Fashioned the deathless hymn.
>
> And yonder ere in Ajalon
> Young Judah's lion ramped for war,
> Dædalus built the Knossian
> House of the Minotaur."

All this is exquisitely beautiful to those who understand it at a glance, and well worth the labour of those who have to consult their *Classic Myths*.

The same poet wrote in *The Menagerie:*

> "But something's happened, God knows what or where,
> To freeze your scalp or pompadour your hair,"

and throughout the poem used the poetical colloquialism which Henley and Kipling and Masefield have made familiar,—with

an original and picturesque effect. In *The Great Divide* also he succeeded not only in striking a proper colloquial key for the conversation as a whole, and in varying the language to fit character and situation, but in making his Western characters speak imaginative slang.

> "Look here, I put a nickel in you, you blame rusty old slot-machine. Push out something."
>
> "I'll make the two of ye eat your Adam's apples and swaller the core."
>
> "Done is done, and lost is lost, and smashed to hell is smashed to hell!"

Realism, which is the fundamental cause of the presence of slang in modern literature, is transcended here; these passages are not merely "true to life"; they are imaginative, and hence poetic.

Style is the surest indication of a literary epoch. Moody's eclectic style shows clearly that he belonged to the transition between the nineteenth century and the twentieth. As to his ideas, one may object that many of them are not strictly his own, poets having a hereditary right to be judged according to their expression, and not held responsible for all the opinions set forth in their poetry. Thus Moody might be considered a pagan and a mystic by turns, only as Shakespeare or any other dramatist might be, not in himself but in his created characters. But other evidences bear too strongly against the theory that Moody merely assumed these rôles. He was born into the last half of the nineteenth century, when the struggle between religious faith and doubt which overshadows all his poetry overshadowed all the thought of the Western world. His education in the humanistic culture of Greek literature tended to thwart his Puritan heritage, and tended also to blind him to modern ideas and problems, in politics, science, and social life. His literary apprenticeship to Rossetti and Morris made him a symbolist; his wide reading in Greek, Italian, French, and English literature made him expert in classical allusion and literary echoes. Many a man would have buried his light beneath this bushel. And much of Moody's poetry may indeed be labelled "in time of hesitation." But such was his intensity that he not only revived ancient issues in such poems as *The Fire-Bringer*, but in a few conspicuous instances he broke with the tradition and attacked modern problems. Hence we have *The Brute*, *The Menagerie*, *The Great Divide*, and *The Faith Healer*, distinctly twentieth-century literature; and, if

we accept the modern definition of poetry as marked by intense and imaginative utterance rather than set metrical patterns, twentieth-century poetry.

BERT EMSLEY.

Madison, Wisconsin.

CANTOR'S LEAP INTO THE TRANSFINITE

Philosophy has always more or less concerned herself with things mathematical. Plato would have us believe that the gods geometrize. Kant saw in the validity of the axioms an argument for the subjectivity of space and time. Spinoza would, upon Euclid as a model, fashion his entire system. Descartes gave us analytic geometry as a concrete example of looking upon things as becoming rather than being, thus preparing the way for much of modern thought. When Newton and Leibnitz, more philosopher than mathematician, gave calculus to the world, it was Berkeley who by his criticisms forced a more careful statement of the reasoning underlying the new departure in mathematics. Pascal began the mathematical theory of probability, the real basis of the theory of induction.

Mathematicians have occasionally allowed themselves to treat of matters philosophical lying in a semi-speculative field on the borderland of science. Hamilton, an extreme Kantian, writes of algebra as "the science of pure time" and invents the quaternion as embodying in a single entity the three units of space and one of time. Lobachevsky and Bolyai show how a consistent geometry can be built up even though Euclid's parallel axiom be denied. Theirs is a geometry in which is possible an infinite number of parallels to a line through a point not on it. Later Riemann shows us a geometry in which no parallel can be drawn to a line, every line meeting every other line, as every great circle on a sphere meets every other. Furthermore he shows us that the space of such a geometry though boundless is nevertheless finite, the space bending around into itself as does the surface of a sphere.

Meanwhile there has grown up a geometry of position which does not concern itself with measurement; a geometry briefly describable as investigating the properties that hold at one and the same time of a configuration and all possible linear perspectives of that configuration, howsoever much distorted these may be. Of this geometry Von Staudt was the great master. Notice that a perspective of a configuration may be such that a point, a line, or even a plane lying in or passing through the finite region

of the configuration, may be wholly at infinity in the perspective image. It turns out that the ordinary system of measurement is based upon the relations of the elements of space, the point, the line, the plane, to a certain imaginary circle at infinity, a circle through which all spheres pass and which every circle meets in two points.

Not only is it true that the theorems of this geometry hold at one and the same time for a configuration and all its images, but also it is possible in the geometry of the plane, to so word the theorems that they remain true when the words "line" and "point" are interchanged. Similarly, in the geometry of space, it is possible to interchange the words "point" and "plane." For example: in a plane, a point is determined as the junction of two lines, a line is determined as the junction of two points; in a point, a plane is determined as the junction of two lines, a line is determined as the junction of two planes.

Moreover, Von Staudt has introduced into geometry configurations of lines to represent imaginary points and configurations of points to represent imaginary lines. These he has treated as definite unique entities satisfying the usual axioms. For example, with a point may be associated all lines passing through it, each paired with the line perpendicular to it. Such a configuration is an imaginary circular ray and has the property of making any real angle one pleases with itself.

Thus, in this geometry, when one is demonstrating a theorem, he is really at the same time demonstrating a second and he may indeed be demonstrating a third and a fourth. Nor is this all. Just as there is correspondence between the elements of Euclid's space so also is there correspondence between Euclid's space and Lobachevsky's, between Euclid's space and Riemann's. Every construction, every relation, every movement in the one space, has, in general, a corresponding construction, relation, movement in the other two spaces. To make this plain, Helmholtz has imagined a man and all his movements imaged simultaneously in each of three mirrors, one plane, one concave, one convex. As he constructs his geometry, the men in the mirrors each construct theirs, line by line and point by point.

This correspondence can be extended to other non-Euclidean geometries and to n-fold space. Intuition is quite outstripped.

Since by this idea of correspondence, the same theorem fits so many different entities and their relations, one asks if it is not

possible to dispense with the entities and study only the relations. One comes to the pure mathematics of Russel, "the science in which one does not know what he is talking about or whether what he is saying is true." The problem is to state our theorems in such a very general way as to fit myriads of applications to myriads of sets of ideas. Faintly similar is the condition of him who forever studies house plans but never builds.

Running all through this developement is the conception of correspondence. Ideas correspond with ideas, relations with relations, both relations and ideas with the symbols that express them. Not merely mathematics but language and thought in general are based upon the correspondence of word and idea. It is merely that in mathematics the correspondence is made more simple and precise.

Take, for example, the act of counting. A child puts five fingers in contact with a set of five marbles, each finger touching just one marble. He thus perceives that the set of fingers and the set of marbles have at least one property in common, namely, fiveness. This he can do even if he knows not the name five nor any other number.

He has established a one-to-one correspondence between the set of marbles and the set of fingers. We can imagine him establishing the like correspondence between other sets of things and finally realizing that there is no end of sets having this property fiveness, that is, such that they can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the fingers of one hand. Perhaps he might invent a set of names, one for each finger, and get so that he could test a set for what we call fiveness without ever using his fingers at all.

Certain it is that the race has invented a set of names, the names of the integers by the use of which sets may be classified as having oneness, twoness, threeness, and so on; or as we more naturally say, such that the number of things in the sets is one, two, three, and so on.

In counting, we establish, just as the child does, a one-to-one correspondence between two sets; but in our case, one of the sets is a set of names. Moreover, in the process, we consciously or unconsciously assume that the order in which we count is a matter of indifference. It may be that somehow we have unconsciously been led to infer this fact: certainly no one doubts it. Another fact which we all accept as true is, that if two sets can be put each in one-to-one correspondence with a third set—say a set taken

from the integers—then they can be put in one-to-one correspondence with each other. Counting noses is the same as counting the individuals that possess them.

This is simplicity itself. But let no one imagine that it is therefore unimportant. Starting with this simplicity Cantor has been able to investigate the infinite and to classify and compare its myriad varieties. Let us get a glimpse of how he does it.

Though the sets that we actually count are all finite, yet the set of integers that we use in our counting is a set that goes on forever. Name as great an integer as you please and anybody can name a greater. Thus the number of all the integers is greater than any of them. For convenience let us call this number of all the integers a. Plainly it is no finite number. But what do we mean by finite and infinite?

Long ago Galileo was puzzled because although every integer has its square, yet, the larger the number of integers that one might take the smaller the proportion of them that would be square integers. Thus, in a hundred, one-tenth of the integers are square; in a million, a thousandth; in a million-million, a millionth.

It was Bolzano, however, who was led by such paradoxes to frame a positive definition of the infinite. An infinite set he perceived was such that it could be put in one-to-one correspondence with a part of itself. Thus the set of all integers can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the set of square integers. Likewise it can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the set of even integers, with the set of integers divisible by three, with the set of integers divisible by a million, with the set of integers greater than a million-million-million, with the set of integers that are products of eleven primes. There is really no end to the ways in which a part may be taken that shall be in one-to-one correspondence with the set of all integers. The number of integers in any such part is greater than any integer in the part, is greater than any integer whatever, is a, the number of all the integers. An infinite set looked at in this precise way, as capable of being put in one-to-one correspondence with a part of itself, we call transfinite. The number a is simply the first transfinite cardinal.

Geometry furnishes countless instances of this correspondence of a part with a whole. For example, let there be a circle of one-inch circumference tangent to an infinite horizontal line. Let a second infinite line, tangent to the circle, roll in tangency once

around the circle. In each position of the rolling line take as corresponding points on it the point of intersection with the fixed line and the point of tangency with the circle. In the revolution just one inch of the line comes in contact with the circle, while every point of the rest of the line is at some instant or other a point of intersection with the fixed line. Thus one inch of the moving line has been put in correspondence with all the rest of it. But all the points of the fixed line have been points of intersection with the rolling line, while at one instant the two lines coincide. Take now, as a pair of corresponding points on the fixed line, the point of intersection with the rolling line at any instant and the point which will coincide with the rolling line's present contact with the circle when, momentarily, rolling and fixed lines coincide. Thus the points on an inch of the fixed line have one-to-one correspondence with the points in the whole of it. Likewise we can set up a one-to-one correspondence with the points in the whole line and the points in all but an inch of it. Again, the points in the surface of a square can be put in one-to-one correspondence with those in a small part thereof. In fact, Cantor has shown that points in all space can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the points in a finite line. Thus the number of points in each of these sets satisfies Bolzano's definition, is transfinite. It is indeed a transfinite number far exceeding a.

But Cantor has also shown that many sets which we naturally suppose to outnumber the set of integers—that is, to be greater than a—can nevertheless be put in one-to-one correspondence with the set of integers. Such sets he calls "countably infinite." Thus the set of both positive and negative integers can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the set of merely positive integers by putting the positive integers in their entirety in correspondence with the odd positive integers while also putting the entire set of negative integers in correspondence with the even positive integers as below:

1	2	3	4.....	$2k$	$2k+1$	$2k+2$...
1	-1	2	-2.....	$-k$	$k+1$	$-k-1$...

Again, consider the set of rational proper fractions. If these are arranged in the order of magnitude there is no fraction next to any assigned fraction, and no correspondence with the set of integers reveals itself. But all fractions having been reduced to their lowest terms, let us say that of two fractions having differ-

ent denominators, that with the smaller shall precede, while of two fractions having the same denominator, that with the smaller numerator shall precede. The correspondence will then be as below:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	...
1/1	1/2	2/1	1/3	2/2	3/1	1/4	2/3	3/2	4/1	...

There is a first fraction and always a next fraction, just as there is a first integer and always a next integer. Thus the number of proper fractions is a. So also is the number of proper and improper fractions taken together. Did we choose to distinguish between fractions of the same value, the method of counting could be left unchanged and likewise the final result, merely some terms sets alike would be interpolated, the series running:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	...
1/1	1/2	2/1	1/3	2/2	3/1	1/4	2/3	3/2	4/1	...

A fraction is a thing specified by two integer indices, a numerator and a denominator. Any set of things so specified can likewise be "counted"; for example, the number of points in the plane whose co-ordinates are integers.

Similarly a set of things with three integer indices, as all the points in space with integer co-ordinates can be "counted." The method can be extended to sets with n integer indices, all these sets alike having the cardinal number a.

In all these sets, as arranged for "counting," there is a first object, to every object a next following object, never a last object, to every object but the first a next preceding object. To say that a set has the cardinal number a, is to say that a set can be so arranged as to satisfy these conditions. But the proper fractions in order of magnitude are not so arranged. And we can arrange the integers so that to two or more there shall not be a next preceding integer, as, for example, the odd integers in order of magnitude followed by the even integers in order of magnitude. Here 2 as well as 1 has no next preceding integer. Again, when we arranged the fractions in countable order, to each fraction corresponded a definite integer. Keeping this one-to-one correspondence, let us now restore the arrangement of the fractions in order of magnitude. Then, just as in this arrangement no fraction has a next either preceding or following, so also in the arrangement of the corresponding integers there is no next either

preceding or following. Needless to say there are other ways in which such an arrangement could be made. Nor is it necessary in getting this arrangement to make use of the set of rational fractions.

But in a finite set, howsoever arranged, there is a first object, a last object, to every object but the last a next following object, and to every object but the first a next preceding. To say that a set is finite is to say that it has these properties. The cardinal number of a finite set agrees with the ordinal number of the last object in the set, for this ordinal number of the last object in the set is independent of the order in which the set may be arranged. It is usual to say that ordinal number and cardinal number are the same for a finite set.

The ordinal number of a transfinite set depends upon the arrangement. For suppose the set of positive integers arranged, first the odd integers in order of magnitude and then the even integers in order of magnitude. If one proceeds to count in that order, it is obvious that he never gets beyond the odd integers. There must be a leap and a count over again starting with the even integers. To symbolize this fact, Cantor calls the ordinal number of the odd integers ω. The ordinal number of the even integers is likewise ω. Then the ordinal number of the compound set is ω taken twice or $\omega+\omega=\omega 2$. The ordinal of the positive integers arranged in order of magnitude is of course ω. But instead of setting up a one-to-one correspondence between even integers and all integers, it is possible to set up a two-to-one correspondence, two succeeding integers corresponding to each even integer. From this it would seem that the ordinal of the set of all positive integers was 2ω. But since the order is unchanged Cantor writes:

Similarly $\quad 2\omega=\omega.$
$\quad n\omega=\omega.$

Here n is any integer. Thus a distinction is made between $\omega 2$ and 2ω, between ωn and $n\omega$. Likewise $100+\omega$ is to be distinguished from $\omega+100$; for by counting from 100 one can no more get beyond ω than by counting from 1, while it is easy to see that having leaped to ω one can go on counting beyond it.
Thus:

$$100+\omega=n+\omega=\omega.$$

But no change in arrangement affects the cardinal, for that is

defined as a number independent of arrangement such that all sets having that number can be put in one-to-one correspondence, just as all sets that can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the fingers of one hand are said to have the cardinal number five. Thus for all the sets that can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the set of positive integers, spite of the infinite variety in their ordinal numbers, the cardinal number is a. Yes, spite of infinite variety in the ordinal number. Another sample or so from this variety may serve to make this plain. Arrange the set of positive integers a s follows:

First, Unity followed by all the prime numbers in order of magnitude;
Second, All the products of two primes in order of magnitude;
Third, All the products of three primes in order of magnitude;
And so on for ever and ever.

Counting this arrangement, we get:
A first set containing ω numbers;
A second set containing also ω numbers;
A third set containing ω numbers;

and so on forever, in all a set of sets, the number of all the sub-sets being ω. Thus the arrangement has for its symbol ω^2. But since each sub-set can likewise be grouped in ω sets of ω numbers each, we can get an arrangement whose ordinal number symbol is ω^3. Indeed we can get arrangements whose ordinals are

$$\omega^4, \omega^5, \omega^6, \ldots, \omega^{\omega}, \omega^{\omega^{\omega}}, \ldots,$$

or such more complicated expressions as

$$\omega^{\omega^{\omega}} \omega 2 + \omega^{\omega} 3 + \omega 7 + 357.$$

The number of all these arrangements is greater than any one of them and has its own symbol. Judge then the infinite variety of ordinals for the single cardinal a, the cardinal of the series of integers.

On a finite line can be placed sets of points corresponding to all these ordinal arrangements. Thus the set composed of the

midpoint of the line, the midpoint of its right half, of its right quarter, of its right eighth, and so on, is a set whose ordinal is ω. To the right end of the line, we assign the number ω itself, for it lies beyond all the points of our set as ω lies beyond all integers. Our set of points divides the line into a set of segments which, counted from left to right, has the same ordinal as the set of points. In each of these ω segments can be placed a set of points such as that on the original line. If we now count from left to right, the points that formerly had the numbers

$$1 \quad 2 \quad 3 \quad \ldots \quad \omega,$$

will now have the numbers

$$\omega \quad \omega 2 \quad \omega 3 \quad \ldots \quad \omega^2.$$

And infinitely greater complication is obviously possible.

In the point-sets just considered, the points denoted by ω and multiples thereof are *limiting points*, and are said to close the sets. Without them the sets are *unclosed*. In the neighbourhood of the limiting points the sets are dense, that is to say no segment can be taken enclosing a limiting point, though it be as small as one pleases, that shall not yet contain points of the sets. A set may be everywhere dense, as, for example, the set of all points on our line that are distant from the left end an exact rational fraction of the length of the line. Each point of the set is a limiting point of the set. But the set is not closed. For there are other limiting points, namely, those that do not lie at any distance expressible as an exact fraction of the length of the line. One such point is that whose distance from the left end is log 2 times the length of the line. Add in these points and we get simply the whole line, a linear-continuum. Has this set also the cardinal a? In other words is it countably infinite? Can we definitely pick out a first point, a second point, and so on, always a definite next point, and eventually thus reach, or prove definitely that there will at last be reached, any and every point of the line? Well, Cantor proved in several ways that it could not be done.

Here is one of his ways, the so-called diagonal proof. Take the line for unit of length and represent all distances from the left end by never-ending decimal fractions. If the decimal becomes at last a repetend, a rational fractional distance from the left end is represented, otherwise an irrational distance.

Suppose that the set were indeed countably infinite and that the decimals, arranged in correspondence with the set of integers, were:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
1. & .a_{11}\,a_{12}\,a_{13}\,a_{14}\,a_{15}\ldots. \\
2. & .a_{21}\,a_{22}\,a_{23}\,a_{24}\,a_{25}\ldots. \\
3. & .a_{31}\,a_{32}\,a_{33}\,a_{34}\,a_{35}\ldots. \\
4. & .a_{41}\,a_{42}\,a_{43}\,a_{44}\,a_{45}\ldots. \\
. & \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots \\
. & \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots
\end{array}
$$

Here each a stands for a digit.

Now it would be possible to write a decimal

$$.b_1\,b_2\,b_3\,b_4\ldots.$$

such that b_1 differs from a_{11}, b_2 from $a_{22}, \ldots$, b_n from a_{nn} forever, a decimal differing therefore in at least one place from each and every decimal of the supposed countable set. It is plainly not necessary that a single digit of this decimal should be zero; so, like the decimals of the set, it is never-ending. Thus the supposition of countability leads to contradiction and is false. Yet, as we have seen, the set contains as a part of itself various countable sets, one of which, the rational fractions, is everywhere dense.

We have spoken of the set as a linear continuum and we will use for its cardinal the symbol c.

The set has the following properties:

I. The set is everywhere dense.

II. A Dedekind cut can be made; that is, in whatever way the set be divided into two parts such that every element in the one part precedes every element in the other, there is either a last element in the first part or a first element in the second part.

III. The set contains a countably infinite framework, the rational numbers, such that between every two elements of the set, howsoever close together, there is an element of the framework.

The set of irrational numbers taken by itself has the cardinal c. To see this, take from the set of irrationals the set $\sqrt{2}/10$, $\sqrt{2}/100$, $\sqrt{2}/1000$, . . ., obviously countably infinite. Those in this sub-set that are written with a denominator ten-to-an-odd-power can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the number series and therefore with the set of rational fractions. Those written with a denominator ten-to-an-even-power can be put in

one-to-one correspondence with the entire sub-set. All the rest of the irrationals can be put in one-to-one correspondence with themselves. Thus the discontinuous set of irrationals has been put in one-to-one correspondence with the entire continuum.

There are sets still more discontinuous, if we may use such an expression, that can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the continuum. An interesting example is Cantor's ternary set. Take a line and erase the middle third, then erase the middle thirds of the parts left over, and so on forever. The unerased portion has the length $^2/_3$ -raised-to-an-infinite-power, which is as small as you please; yet the points upon it can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the continuum. Note also that the set is nowhere dense, that is, between any two points of the set, howsoever close together, there is a portion of the line free from points of the set.

Again, consider the set of all the possible infinite successions of heads and tails gotten by tossing a coin forever. This set not only can be put in one-to-one correspondence with the linear-continuum, but in fact is a linear-continuum. We can arrange it as follows:

Of two infinite successions of heads and tails that one shall precede in which first heads occurs at the same place with tails in the other succession.

The countably infinite frame-work shall consist of those infinite successions in which eventually a definite finite succession of heads and tails forever repeats itself.

But you say that such successions are infinitely improbable. To be sure any preassigned infinite succession is infinitely improbable, but if a coin be tossed an infinite number of times some one of these infinitely improbable successions must happen. Similarly, that taking a point at random on a line one shall get some preassigned point is infinitely improbable.

To see how very close is the correspondence between these infinite successions and the positions of points on our line, let us denote heads by the digit 1 while tails are denoted by 0. If now we write our digits and zeros in a line and put a period before them, we get the distance of a point on our line from say its left end expressed as a binary fraction of the length of the line.

Is there an infinite between the countably infinite a and the continuum infinite c? This is the continuum problem and has not yet been solved.

Nor, although Zermelo has given reasons for supposing that the continuum can be ordered, has any scheme of ordering been actually carried out as in the case of the countably infinite.

But that there are cardinals beyond the cardinal c has been shown. In fact there are an infinite succession of them. For example, the number of possible arrangements of the points on a straight line is a cardinal greater than c. We denote it by f. Whether it is the next higher cardinal we do not know. The set of all the possible functions of a single variable has this same cardinal f.

So all that Cantor has done and all that his successors have done is to break the way to infinitely infinite fields of investigation still untilled. And this brief article is a mere peep at what Cantor has done.

And yet there may be those who would ask for the philosophical significance of these investigations. But they must wait until either mathematicians become philosophers or philosophers become mathematicians. Even then it is quite possible that the philosopher-mathematicians may not be understood, may be able after all to quite satisfy only themselves.

Still less shall we concern ourselves with the theological implications, if such there be. Reasoning having carried the mathematician to heights where he begins to be dizzy, he can hardly expect to recover his balance by leaping off into the atmosphere of speculation howsoever beautiful and alluring the clouds of dogma that there float may be.

But of course we cannot keep others from speculating. It was Clerk-Maxwell who once said that "there will always be those who in the story of Jonah and the whale discover anticipatory evidences of submarine navigation."

ELLERY WILLIAM DAVIS.

University of Nebraska.

NIETZSCHE ONCE MORE

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born at Röcken, near Lützen, Saxony, on Oct. 15, 1844. His father was a clergyman in the orthodox state-church. His ancestors, for generations, had been clergymen. Nietzsche's father died when the boy was but five years old. This left the mother, a sister, and some maiden aunts in sole charge of the bright, indeed precocious, lad. Even in his earliest school years, Nietzsche was markedly sedate, decorous, grave, a dreamy, introspective child, disinclined to share in the rough play of his schoolmates. In 1854, he entered the gymnasium, or preparatory school for the university. German gymnasia are, as is well known, the most favourable institutions imaginable for developing a knowledge and appreciation of classical lore and art. They are the cradles of classical scholarship. Nietzsche, therefore, both by predilection and by training, developed marked interest in Latin and Greek, in classic history, philosophy, literature, and art. He steeped himself in ancient culture, absorbed its characteristic spirit and ideals, and enthroned it in his heart of hearts. His favourite line of study naturally accentuated a certain world-shyness, a certain aloofness from his environment. The family, unwisely, humoured his penchant or inclination for solitude, of being free from the companionship of ruder and more vigorous natures. I say "unwisely" because, seemingly, the "solitary wanderer" habit clung to him throughout life. At the university he did not join largely in student life. What efforts he did make to do so, miscarried. In 1864, at the age of twenty, he went to Bonn, having been attracted thither by the noted classical philologist, Rietschl.

When in the following year, Rietschl had a call to the University of Leipzig, Nietzsche followed him. He now entered upon what may be called his really formative period. The eager student found that the training he had received hitherto—training both scholastic and religious—was, after all, but partial and, indeed, unsatisfactory. True, he had absorbed much of the spirit of antiquity, had trained himself into the formal side of the ancient literature and philosophy. But the question of questions, an independent, satisfying *Weltanschauung* or world-view, had

not yet been raised in his consciousness. Quite by chance, he picked up in a bookstall a copy of Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, a book which proved to be of immense importance to Nietzsche. In fact, one may say that three signal factors entered into Nietzsche's training and education, Greek antiquity, Schopenhauer's philosophy, Wagner's music and personality.

Of the first, I have spoken already. Whatever of the spirit of the privileged, the aristocratic, the cultured, the esthetic conception of life can come from the study of the classics had had their influence upon Nietzsche. Tradition and training had done their perfect work. For him the golden age of art and freedom from restraint for superior souls lay in the past. Greece in her beauty, Rome in her might, had dominated the thought and action, yes, had determined the fate, of the ancient world. The civilization of both illustrated what Nietzsche, later in his life, called *die Herrenmoral*—Mastermorality. Both had set inimitable standards of greatness and splendour.

As yet, of course, he but dimly realized how greatly his early training would influence his life. There was in him an emotional and an esthetic restlessness which could not be allayed. "As yet he had not found a philosophic home for himself in the world."[1] This "home" he found in Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer conceived and taught that the tragedy of life arises from the very nature of the underlying sources of all existence. These he perceived to be in Will, *i. e.*, activity, energy, impulse. Schopenhauer's system predicates as the basis of every living form "a blind, irresistible desire for functional activity." But, says Schopenhauer—and here is where Pessimism appears triumphant—this desire for activity is the root and cause of all human suffering; for, no sooner is an object attained than new dissatisfaction and discontent arise and force the soul to renew its struggle. "The goal is only an illusion. Attained, it loses its charm; under a new form the desire, the need reappears; if not, there result desolation, emptiness, *ennui*, the struggle against which is fully as tormenting as that against necessity." This seems to Schopenhauer to be the monotonous and dreary refrain of all existence. Even the joys of philosophic insight and of artistic satisfaction are only dreams and fleeting phantoms. The only salvation, therefore, is the complete and permanent and absolute negation

[1] Havelock Ellis, *Affirmations*.

of the Will, an extinction of all desire, and, hence, of being—an entrance into Nirvana. Life's goal and aim, then, cannot be activity and desire and volition, or the temporary satisfaction of these. At its best, life offers, or consists in, the contemplation of what is beautiful, in the apprehension of what Plato termed "ideas." These "ideas" are the bridge or links between the divine All-Will and the infinite variety of life's manifestations. They are the ***noumena***, the only realities, as opposed to ***phenomena***, the ever fleeting forms.

Thus to Schopenhauer the solution of the riddle of the Universe lay in the close kinship between philosophic "truth" and esthetic satisfaction. Naturally, however, this solution can be only for the highest mind, for "genius," for only "genius" can apprehend these deepest facts of existence. Only in "genius" can be found the

> "bright mirror or reflection of the inner nature or essence of the world. Music, as the most direct art, as the spaceless and timeless art, as the art of all arts, Schopenhauer conceived to be the most direct and purest revelation and image of the Creative Will, and not merely as a more or less adequate objectivication of the Idea of the World-Will."

Thus Schopenhauer, and after him Richard Wagner, the composer of *Tristan and Isolde*, of the *Ring of the Nibelungs*, *Parsifal*, and the splendid operas with which we are more or less familiar, conceived of the nature and essence of all high and true art, especially of music. To Schopenhauer and Wagner, and, as we shall see to Nietzsche likewise, art is the most complete and fullest expression of the *Weltgeist* or World-spirit, the most satisfying answer to the question as to the meaning of the world riddle.

Nevertheless, Schopenhauer felt that the esthetic enjoyment given to the discerning mind was in no wise sufficient to overbalance and outweigh the sufferings of living creation. The deprivations and ills of life are realities that cannot be blinked or denied. Hence, in his system of morals, he places *compassion*, *sympathy* as the very rock and cornerstone. Man's lot and inevitable experience force upon him the ideas of helpfulness, justice, and love for his fellows. Man's very misery is, therefore, the basis and cause of moral conduct. And since even man's sympathy and fellow-feeling for his kind can affect the harshness of nature but little, there is only one logical escape, one door open,

the door of self-abnegation, of quietude, and resignation to the Will of Wills. Thus Schopenhauer reaches a sort of religious, mystical union of the creature with the Creator, a sort of returning of the cosmic particle—man—to the source whence it came.

Nietzsche became acquainted with Schopenhauer's ideas during his Leipzig days (1865). They found a ready soil in his moods and temperament. If, at this time, Schopenhauer's "Will to Live" seemed the key to the world riddle, we shall find that Nietzsche, later on, transmuted it to "Will to Power."

Even before he had taken his doctor's degree, he was, at the recommendation of Rietschl, called to the professorship of Classical Philology at Basle, Switzerland (1869). The University at Leipzig gave him his Ph.D. without examination and without a thesis, an extraordinary honour for one so young. His brilliancy had opened the academic career for him long before the usual years of waiting and uncertainty. Nietzsche had met the great Wagner in Leipzig, and had been captivated by his *Tristan and Isolde* and the *Meistersingers*. The Wagners lived in Triebsch, near Lucerne, not far from Basle, and when he entered upon his professorial duties Nietzsche fell more and more under Wagner's influence. This constitutes the third great and determining factor in Nietzsche's mental development. "I find," says Nietzsche, "in Wagner such absolute idealism, such a deep-stirring humanity, such an exalted seriousness of life that, in his presence, I feel myself in the presence of the divine." During this period Nietzsche wrote his *Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik*. In this book Wagner's operas were conceived of and evaluated as the resuscitation of the art spirit of ancient Greece. From that spirit had been born Athenian tragedy and all that was distinctly sane and wholesome in early Greek civilization.

"The fundamental Hellenic instinct," Nietzsche wrote in the *Geburt*, "was first revealed in the Dionysiac mysteries. What was it the Greek assured to himself in these mysteries? Eternal life, the eternal return of life, the future promised and consecrated in the present, the triumphal affirmation of life over death and change, *true* life or immortality through procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality. . . . Every individual act of reproduction, of conception, of birth, was a festival awakening the loftiest emotions. The doctrine of the mysteries proclaimed the holiness of pain; the pangs of childbirth sanctified all pain. All growth and development, every promise for the future, is conditioned by pain. To ensure the eternal pleasure of creation, the eternal affirmation of the will to live, the eternity of birth pangs is absolutely required. All this is signified by the word Dionysius: I know no higher symbolism than

this Greek Dionysiac symbolism. In it the deepest instinct of life, of the future of life, is experienced religiously; generation, the way to life, is regarded as a sacred way. Christianity alone, with its fundamental horror of life, has made sexuality an impure thing, casting filth on the beginning, the very condition, of our life."

Altogether the book is an extravaganza, an over-enthusiastic tribute to Wagner and Wagner's music. It was born out of unbounded admiration for Wagner's undoubtedly great musical powers. Later on, to be sure, Nietzsche broke with Wagner completely, recanting what he had so prodigally promulgated and attacking the very art he had so fulsomely praised. After the production of the *Ring of the Nibelungs* (1876) all intercourse between the two men was broken off. Nietzsche conceived that Wagner had betrayed art's highest ideals and had debased them for mere temporary and sensational success. The rupture between the two men was never healed. Wagner's production of *Parzifal*, that religio-mystical masterpiece, exasperated Nietzsche beyond measure. To him Wagner seemed a pervert, an apostate from the highest ideals.

About this time (1876) Nietzsche was compelled to give up part of his work at Basle by reason of ill-health. Three years later he resigned his professorship altogether, going to Italy for rest and recuperation. The next ten years were spent in restless journeyings and wanderings, in Italy, in the Engadine, and, occasionally, though only rarely, in Germany. Ill-health was his usual lot, though he let this rarely interfere with his literary labours. He became hopelessly insane in 1889. His sister, Frau Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, devoted herself most tenderly and unselfishly to him until the end came eleven years afterwards, in 1900.

Some writers—Max Nordau among them—consider that Nietzsche even during the period of his greatest literary activity, was suffering from incipient madness. They attribute not a little of the vehemence and tenseness found in his books to this. Others reject such views. His sister—since his death his biographer, editor of his works and defender generally—is especially vigorous and positive in her denials of any mental breakdown during the time referred to, when *Human all too Human*, *Aurora* or *The Dawn of Day*, *Joyful Science*, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *The Case against Wagner*, and *Antichrist* were written. Opinions still differ on this point and will always

differ. The mere fact that his system of thought (if his writings may be called a "system") is so utterly and entirely at variance with generally accepted tenets and views, ought not to be taken as proof that his thoughts are the product of a disordered brain.

As to Nietzsche's teachings, more especially on morals and conduct—for that field is where his most aggressive positions were taken—it is very difficult, if not impossible, to set up any set system. He himself did not attempt to do so. His later writings especially are aphoristic, *i. e.*, they consist largely of isolated, incisive, brilliantly worded aphorisms or pronunciamentos or *dicta* on all sorts of subjects connected with human life and culture. Naturally this mode of composition gave him freedom and range for thought and speculation, but, naturally, the style is entirely unsuited to logically connected discourse. The one theme running throughout his teachings, however, is the theme of Culture, the reason, foundation, and nature of human conduct, of man's attitude towards life's problems and his own innermost being and activities. It is in this sense that one can speak of Nietzsche's philosophy of culture, *i. e.*, of his teachings in morals, in art, in religion, of his search for spiritual verities. Culture, to him, is the sum total of human activity in the domain of conduct and achievement. Nothing in this field escaped his bold and daring inquiry and speculation.

Generally speaking there is nothing metaphysically abstruse or abstract in his teachings. They are concrete, peremptory, with a tone of finality in them. His philosophy is himself, his many-sided personality, his contradictions, his sincerest convictions. He is aware that his teachings are not for the masses—for the "herd," as he calls them. He is aristocratic, selective, the "master." He rejects with contempt the *Herdenmoral*, the morals of the herd, of the masses, seeing in it merely a successful propaganda of moral precepts that favour *them* as against their betters. Thus, humility, meekness, gentleness, altruism, sympathy, patience, in fact the entire system of so-called Christian morals, are spurned, as being destructive of the highest types of the race. These virtues, in his opinion, are the virtues of slavish underlings, not of fully developed master-souls.

To enable us to understand Nietzsche and his teachings more fully, let us recall the three periods or stages of his career; *viz.*, 1—the esthetic, 2—the intellectual and 3—the ethical. In the

first he occupies himself chiefly with the function and nature of art and culture. *The Birth of Tragedy* and *Untimely Considerations* are the chief works of this earliest period. In the *Geburt* he is distinctly the disciple of Schopenhauer and Wagner. Art, painting, sculpture, literature, but especially music, the contemplation of beauty anywhere, are the—at least partial—panaceas for the ills of existence. Life is an evil thing, he says, is something hard, cruel, terrible, enigmatical, an unintelligible, absurd thing. Life is deprivation, toil, and suffering. Art is a healer, it gives relief from the poignancy from the "shafts of outrageous fortune," it is the deliverer from bondage, the enchantress that makes us forget or endure our burdens. Visions of beauty hide from man the hardness and ugliness of his lot. Art offers a counterpoise, an antidote to the ills of man; art is a compensation for the fragmentariness and disillusions of life. Nietzsche sees no reason, no purpose, no goal, in the maze of things called the Universe. To attempt to understand a fleeting phantom is futile. Knowledge, truth, intelligent apprehension of the enigmas around us, are impossible. One phenomenon and only one is incontrovertible, and that is the *Will to Live*. This instinct to be, to persist, is universal and eternal. It is the most fundamental fact in the universe. It is creation's law and deepest secret. And, says Nietzsche, because art, true art, enhances the power to live, because it affords more and intenser life, because it stimulates and calls forth our highest powers, because it braces our wills to action and effort, it is truly moral and redemptive.

Art, in the Nietzschean sense, is that which stimulates the Will by the magic power of ever renewed attraction. It is that which marks the *excess or superabundance of life*. It is the well out of which are drawn the living waters. Thus, he says: "In art man enjoys himself to perfection"; "Beauty in art implies the imitation of all that is happy"; "Where is Beauty? Where I am *compelled to will* with all my will"; "Great art inspires; it does not instruct; art glorifies."

In his second or intellectual period, the period in which he wrote *Human, all too Human* and *Aurora* or *The Dawn of Day* (*Morgenröte*), entirely new questions interest him. He now turns to the question, "What is true? what is false? what is valid in religion and morals? what are the foundations of our beliefs and practices, of our judgments and standards of conduct?"

In answering these and kindred questions, Nietzsche rejects

absolutely all answers hitherto given. Truth *per se* does not exist. There is no truth to be apprehended. All systems of thought, of morals and conduct, of religion, of government, of social organization are artificial, are not based upon truth, if by "truth" we mean a more or less adequate but reasonable understanding of the nature, or warp and woof, of the universe. These systems, says Nietzsche, are mere *conventions*, forged and moulded in the minds of the masses, of the "herd," and are accepted by the race to the detriment of the select and choice and really fit. The race's notions and convictions are based upon superstition, utilitarian considerations, upon fear and ignorance. Our morals make, it is true, for the good of the greatest number, but in that very effect, he maintains, lies the proof of their falsity. For the purpose of life is to produce the master-man, the ruler, the unique, the great. "The goal of humanity must be realized in its highest types." The lines of action and conduct imposed by the multitude hamper and restrain the fullest development of these "highest types" of genius and superabundant individuality. Our "moral laws," Nietzsche teaches, are not founded on reason or the nature of things. They have no authority or sanction aside from man's directing or determining what is "right" or what is "wrong." There is nothing beyond man, beyond his Will.

But naturally and of necessity, the vulgar and weak and ignorant have at all times in the history of man constituted the vast majority; these, by that very fact and for that very reason, have succeeded in imposing *their* ideals of what things are of the most worth upon the consciences and standards of mankind. They have, moreover, enlisted crass superstition in their interests. They have created a God, giving him the attributes of jealousy, hatred, revenge, and love for those who, in servile fear, offer sacrifices and oblations.

It is evident that his source or foundation of morals differs utterly from that ordinarily accepted. Religion is no basis, for religion is a phantasm, a figment of the mind, a creation of man's fancy and imagination. "Utility"—the basis posited by Spencer and the English Utilitarian school generally—is not the basis, for we must first ask ourselves "Useful to whom?" Conscience is no guide whatever; Kant's categorical imperative *Thou shalt* or *Thou shalt not* has no foundation in fact. Morals are a convention of the rabble, the herd, the underlings. The effect of our so-called morals has been to weaken the strong, to interfere with their

completest development. The weak are shielded. Manly virtues are repressed, mediocrity is triumphant. If mankind were really and truly to be guided by their "morals," if, *e. g.*, Christianity were to become a reality, if man bowed to its teachings, it would mean the degeneracy of the race. Virility, strength, power, the assertion of the will, the ascendancy of the capable, would be forever impossible. The impelling force of the universe would become extinct. Society would suffer dissolution. Its leaven would be destroyed. A dead level of mediocrity and decadence would settle upon the race; it would become stifled and choked, its vitalizing forces would become extinct. Religion is, in Nietzsche's view, the child of fear, of anxiety, of childish ignorance and superstition. The fact that mankind at large is "religious" is, to him, proof of the falsity and untrustworthiness of religion. "Religion," the antithesis of science, goes hand in hand with ignorance. It is most authoritative where nature's ways are least understood. The medicine man and the soothsayer and the astrologer and the priest are the mouthpiece of fear and superstition. "Religion" seeks to circumvent the necessary sequence of things, it attempts to allay demoniac powers and incline them in man's favour. It seeks to appease an imaginary deity to induce it to withhold from man the consequences of his acts. It weakens man's personality, saps his faith in himself, strikes low his exercise of will, and benumbs his powers and self-reliance. The ancients, Nietzsche contends, created their gods like unto themselves. Their gods were merely the most perfect patterns and exemplars of their own race. They thus became incentives to their votaries, types to be imitated, ideals to be pursued. Not so with the Christian God and Christian ideals. Christianity by its other-worldliness, by its undervaluation of things of this, the real and substantial life, weakens and debases. It prostitutes man's highest gifts, it abdicates man's rightful claim to power and dominion.

Let us endeavour to be just to Nietzsche, whether we see truth in his contention or not. Let us realize that he is utterly sincere; let us also realize that he seeks to destroy in order to clear the way for greater human achievement. Man, in his view, is the master of his fate, he is the captain of his soul, the shaper of his destiny. Nietzsche strives to create the superman, the dominator of life. Life, at present, seems to Nietzsche paltry, poor, fragmentary, and unworthy. Man, such as we know him,

is only a transition (*Übergang*) to something nobler and greater. Out of the "slave," the cringing fragment, Nietzsche strives to make a *whole* man, a being that shall be free, untrammelled, a being that shall live out his innermost nature and being. This does not mean wild, unregulated license, it does not mean the ascendancy of the brute or brute instincts. "*Learn to command, but first learn to command thyself*," he says. "*Obey thy impulses, but let these impulses make for more and completer life!*" When Nietzsche bids mankind to arouse itself to the assertion of its rightful place, when he preaches the doctrine of the "Will to Power" he does not mean to arouse one state or nation to war and conquest, though war, in his view, is redeemed from its evils by calling forth much of what is best in man, as devotion to a common cause, valour, courage, will, strength. But his call to the Will to Power is sent forth to arouse the individual, capable of heeding such a call, to realize within himself his utmost possibilities. Ibsen has a similar message. Brand declares:

> "From these scraps and from these shreds,
> These headless hands and handless heads,
> These torso-stumps of soul and thought
> A *man*, complete and whole shall grow";

but Ibsen adds significantly:

> "And God His glorious child shall know,
> His heir, the Adam that He wrought."

A significant difference, you perceive. Nietzsche could not have accepted these last lines, because, according to his view, man works out his own ideals, and there are no others.

What the possibilities to human growth may be, Nietzsche nowhere tells us. He seems to have had, somewhere in his consciousness, a conviction that there was a goal or purpose in the universe, yet he never declared himself on the point. He seems to have been forced, practically, to cling to his conviction that a great drama is being enacted in the universe, a drama in which men and women are the actors. But the text or libretto to the play is not provided or prescribed. The "players" improvise their parts, according to their natures. The only goal, in Nietzsche's view, is continued and enlarged activity. If mere

existence were the will of the universe, creation would be stationary, but "conquest is the law of life."

The present man is *human*, all too human. He seeks to escape the irksomeness and the pains of life, seeks ease and animal contentment, or anodynes and benumbing soporifics. And yet it is Nietzsche's profoundest conviction that progress in cosmic life, as revealed in the human race, can only be effected by and through suffering and stern strife. "Verily, I walk among men," he says, "as among the fragments and limbs of men; fragments and limbs and dismal accidents, but no *men*!" Again, "Man is something that shall be surpassed. What have *ye* done to surpass him?" And he teaches that "What is great in man is that he is a *bridge* and not a goal." And he tells us that "a marriage is worth exactly what the two contracting parties are worth"; again, "Marriage: this I call the will of two to create that which is *more* than they who created it."

With still greater incisiveness does Nietzsche develop his ethical and religious views (if one may use that term in speaking of Nietzsche)in his third and last period, the period when he wrote *Thus Spake Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil*. *Zarathustra* was written in 1883–85. In it he sets forth his most complete views of the superman, the future master-soul. The book has a strange fascination for the reader. With oracular fervour, nay, with dithyrambic passion and fire, does he set forth the "New Tables" of the moral law in that book. Witness the sort of topics discoursed upon, or headings of chapters. I choose them almost at random:—*Of despisers of the Body; Of the Preachers of Death; Of Child and Marriage; Of the Virtuous; Of the Rabble; Of Self-Overcoming; The Night-Song; The Grave-Song; Of Old and New Tables; Of Great Longing; Of Higher Man; The Dance Song; The Seven Seals, or the Song of Yea and Amen.*

In allegorical form—somewhat like Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*—Nietzsche sets forth in this book his new ethics and rules of life. The ancient founder of the Zoroastrian religion, Zoroaster or Zarathustra, but lends the name to the Nietzsche-Zarathustra sage. The book is a wild hymn, often entrancingly beautiful in its diction, its music, its poetic qualities, often superlatively captivating in its flashes of insight and high aspirations. Nietzsche is unsparing in his onslaught upon things that are time-honoured and deemed sacred, merciless in his challenges to our conventions. The book is a highly wrought, pulsating new

gospel of the superman, of the master morality (*Herrenmoral*), of absolute and unconditional human self-sufficiency and self-assertion, of the need of joy in suffering:

> "O Man, attend!
> What saith Midnight, thy friend?
> Once sleep my eyes did close;
> I now myself defend
> 'Gainst spectres. Deep lie Life's pains and joys,
> Far deeper than Day kenned.
> Deep lie its pains and woes,
> Yet deeper yet its joys.
> 'Perish, be overcome!' thus bid Life's woes;
> Yet, evermore, in clarion tones ring out
> Imperious summons of Life's deepest joys."

In the same vein Browning's Eben Ben Ezra says:

> "Then welcome each rebuff
> That turns Earth's smoothness rough,
> Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go!
> Be our joys three parts pain!
> Strive, and hold cheap the strain.
> Learn, nor account the pang; 'dare, never grudge the throe!'"

The contemplation of the man-that-is as a "bridge" and a "path" to a more and more perfect human being, the hyper-ecstatic, rhapsodical vision of the to-be-man, constitutes this remarkable book. No wonder that it is regarded as a most notable product of modern German literature. It is an allegory, it is fiction, it is philosophy, satire, a sermon, a poem. The type Zarathustra-Nietzsche exists nowhere; it is an ideal reflected in human imagery, it is an aspiration and a longing, it is a dissatisfaction and a hope. In a sense Nietzsche but reflects his age, its restlessness, its strivings, its questionings, its overthrow of idols, its gropings for greater divinities, its determination to shape its own destiny.

To sum up what I have attempted to set forth, I may say that, in Nietzsche's views, man's individuality, untrammelled and unhindered, must hold sway if he would mount to highest heights. The spectre of authority, whether human or divine, is to flee and recede more and more. Self-determining, heroic Will is to raise man above his present state. Man's personality must be developed until its sanction and self-direction shall lead unto all that

is worthy. "That exactly is godliness, that there are gods, but no God!"

"O my brethren," Zarathustra exclaims, "not backward shall your nobility gaze, but *forward!* Expelled ye shall be from all fathers' and forefathers' lands! Your children's land ye shall love (be this love your new nobility!), the land undiscovered, in the remotest sea! For it I bid your sails seek and seek!

"It is your thirst to become sacrifices and gifts yourselves; therefore, have ye the thirst to accumulate all riches in your soul. . . .

"Remain true to the earth, my brethren, with the power of your virtue! Let your bestowing love and your knowledge be devoted to the meaning of the earth! Thus do I pray and adjure you.

"Let it not fly away from the earthly, and beat against eternal walls with its wings. Ah, there hath always been so much flown-away virtue!

"Lead, like me, the flown-away virtue back to earth—yea, back to body and life: that it may give back to the earth its meaning, a human meaning!

"Awake and hearken, ye lonesome ones! [Those who have the great hope.] From the future come winds with noiseless pinions, and to fine ears good tidings are proclaimed.

"Ye lonesome ones of to-day, ye seceding ones, ye shall one day be a people: out of you who have chosen yourselves, shall a chosen people arise:—and out of it the Superman.

"Verily, a place of healing shall the earth become! And already is a new perfume diffused around it, a salvation-bringing perfume—and a new hope!"

Nietzsche bids men to enlarge their powers, to dominate themselves and the world, to rise superior to all things that would hinder their completest self-realization. For thus only can the race, or rather the best of the race—for it is only them that Nietzsche seeks to win—attain the highest of which they are capable. The mob, the rabble, the "herd," must be left "to wallow in the mire." The "herd" has too long dominated the race's ethical standards and ideals. Religion has made of life a charnel-house instead of a well of delight. Humility, meekness, and self-abnegation are the marks of the slave. Christianity is a religion of and for slaves. Altruism is a phantom, a false idol, immoral and baneful since it tends to undermine strength, virility, and independence in those to whom benefactions are extended. Man must grow "perfect through suffering," he must court and seek pain, loss, and the ills of life. True, life, in its very nature, is tragic, is inimical to happiness and peace. But, for the sake of the tomorrow, for the sake of all the countless future generations each must bear his lot and *glory in it.* Is this not the highest altruism?

It is in this complete reversal of hitherto unquestioned standards that Nietzsche's teachings are most revolutionary and iconoclastic. Other writers, even though rejecting any supernatural origin of ethical standards, or any divine sanction thereof, have, nevertheless, given their assent, on the whole, to their soundness and authoritativeness. The nature and constitution of man as man, of life as life, seem, on purely utilitarian principles, to demand altruism, seem to point to the necessity of co-operation, to the repression of extreme egoism. But Nietzsche rejects the altruistic principle as a panacea for the ills of life entirely. He sees no help to the race in the "virtues," such as love to one's neighbour, self-abnegation, the crucifying of "the flesh," the repression of natural instincts, pity and sympathy for the weak. All these are spurned by him as undermining mankind's triumphant march to victory. To him the *Will* is the only authority, the only reality, the only law, guide, and reason in the universe. Christianity, the "religion of pity," as he calls it, abases and detracts from the possibilities of humanity, makes its votaries dependent, grovelling slaves. By the consolation which it offers, by its pretended promises of compensation in another world for the incompleteness of this world, it but diverts mankind from their true goal.

It is no wonder, then, that Nietzsche tells us that man unites in himself the creature and the creator, that in man there is "the stuff of things, the fragmentary and the superfluous, clay, mud, madness, chaos, but there is also the sculptor, the hammer, the divine blessedness on the seventh day."

Thus, then, according to Nietzsche, must the race be redeemed, redeemed in its highest exemplars. The masses, those who cannot rise to the superstature, are useful only as affording a medium in which the superman shall develop. But more and more unceasingly, through the eternities, *Life* shall realize its ever higher possibilities in Man.

LAURENCE FOSSLER.

University of Nebraska.

THE YEAR IN AMERICAN FINANCE

The world is passing through an epoch marked by such startling changes from the ordinary course of events that apparently all economic law has been suspended and in its stead ruling everywhere a doctrine or theory of opportunism. Noted students of economic law and noted leaders of finance fill the pages of newspapers and journals with analyses and deductions based on conditions presumed never before to have existed. Too often even great leaders of thought are blinded by prejudice or environments; but never before did teachers of men seem to flounder in a sea of doubt as they do now—when trying to cast a horoscope of the future.

Economic law, however, teaches just as truthfully and just as plainly amidst the present volcanic conditions of the world as when all the world was at peace. It is not strange that men's vision is clouded and judgment warped under the appalling waste and destruction that has marked Europe for now more than two years. That the penalty will follow for all this profligate waste is as sure as that there will be an end to this waste, for blood and treasure are not without limit. For more than two years the allied nations and their colonial dependencies have been casting their accumulated wealth and the flower of their manhood before the Juggernaut of War. For more than two years the rulers of the Central Powers have sacrificed their resources and people in the most horrible holocaust of all history. While all this has drained the warring people, the rest of the world has been prospering from their errors and misfortunes. The United States, the South American States, Japan, and the European neutral nations have reaped a harvest while the Powers at war have been destroying each other. The result will be a new order when the war has ended.

Germany, whose initiative and genius were fast making her a world conqueror of commerce, will set her pendulum back for fifty years. For each measure she has lost, neutral nations have gained a measure, and she loses by this war not only what she loses, but what she would have gained without it. Great Britain whose financial genius had made her master of the financial

world has not only wasted the blood of her best manhood, but has seen her financial supremacy slipping away as necessity not only forced her credit to the limit, but forced her to contraband the foreign investments of her people that she might use them in the pawnshops of America to sustain her failing credit.

The old adage that "What is one man's poison is another man's pabulum" is as true of nations as of men. While the warring nations have been battling to destroy each other physically, commercially, and financially, the United States has been holding sponge, towel, and stakes, until today it occupies a position in world finance and commerce that fifty years of peace could not have brought to it. Today the dollar mark rivals, yes, surpasses the pound sterling in the marts of the world. Such a rapid increase in material wealth as has come to the United States in the two and one half years since the war broke out, has never been equalled in its history.

For the ten years preceding the war the resources of the national banks of the United States increased sixty per cent; since the beginning of the war, or in two years and five months, they have increased thirty-five per cent. It is estimated that at the close of the year 1916 the total resources of the national banks of the United States alone were greater than the combined resources of the Bank of England, the Bank of France, the Bank of Russia, the German Reichsbank, the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Spain, the Bank of the Netherlands, the Bank of Denmark, the Swiss National Bank, and the Imperial Bank of Japan. In addition to the resources of our National Banks can be added the resources of approximately twenty thousand state and private banks, and trust companies, all of which have proportionately expanded their resources.

Gold is now the financial standard of measure of the world. It is estimated that the gold production of the world during the last twenty-five years equals the world's production of gold for the preceding four hundred years. The gold money of all countries of the world at the close of 1916 is estimated to have been eight billions of dollars. The gain in the gold reserve of the United States since the beginning of the war is estimated. at one billion one hundred million, bringing its total gold holding up to approximately three billions. When this gold hoard is considered, with the resources of the national banks of the United States as compared with those of government banks of

the principal countries of the world as set forth above, it can readily be seen, so far as resources are concerned, that the United States stands in a position apparently impregnable.

From the position of a financial dependent we have suddenly become a financial giant, and master. Suddenly amassed wealth by an individual is seldom skilfully conserved—will this rule follow with the United States as a Nation? Have we the financial genius, the financial cohesiveness, the financial machinery to use to advantage the opportunity that has come to us as a result of the war; or will we from want of experience and proper financial machinery break down under the not evolutionary, but revolutionary conditions confronting us when peace comes? That peace will produce a financial shock is evident. That a rally will follow the shock is probable, but what of the future?

An analysis of the exports that have brought us the golden stream since the beginning of the war will show conclusively that it has not been so much the amount of our exports as the price that has pyramided our wealth. With the markets of the world no longer listening to the thunder of cannon, there will come a recession in prices that must inevitably be startling. The stream of gold now pouring to our shores will be reversed and with the reversal will come hesitation. The impoverished people of the warring nations will have portentous domestic problems to settle, and a crushing debt to paralyse their productive energies. These and many other questions face them. Our problems will be many; some serious.

Our commercial isolation no longer exists. We are facing a period without historical precedent; and that seer does not live who can divine what tendencies and influences will shape our commercial and financial destinies in the first years of peace. After peace is declared it is expected there will be first a lowering of the price level, especially in agricultural products and in many lines of finished products. The latter will bring more or less labour troubles, as the natural lowering of wages will be followed by a sullen and perhaps rebellious attitude on the part of trade unions.

However, an element that must have far-reaching influence in the readjustments following the war is the fact that the United States has become a creditor country. The amount of our own securities purchased back from Europe added to what

we have loaned Europe since the war began, according to expert authority, practically equals what we owed Europe before the war, so that so far as Europe is concerned, we are practically out of debt now.

The active energy displayed by the Government in preparation for the after-effects of the war will, without doubt, have great influence. So pronounced is this activity that large industrial and commercial organizations are in constant touch with the Federal Shipping Board, the Federal Tariff Board, the Federal Trade and Commerce Board, all of which boards are continually lending every effort to lay a foundation for such unity of action between government and business as has never been seen before. The Federal Reserve Board controlling the banking interests of the country are taking every precaution against inflation, and conserving their resources for the coming crisis, and strengthening the banking interests to such an extent that, it is now believed, whatever shock or recession may come, the country will be invulnerable to serious disaster. In fact so active and practical are the preparations, that sentiment is growing that no serious conditions will come to the country after the war. They have all been discounted so far as human ingenuity can provide. Certainly if the war lasts many months more, so far as Europe is concerned, our financial supremacy for years would appear assured. With the warring nations of Europe already burdened with an annual interest and pension charge, even now greater than their entire government income budgets before the war, the pound sterling, the French franc, and the German mark will play a poor second in the marts of the world to the dollar of the United States.

All forecasts must be taken for what they are worth, but one element that will enter into future conditions cannot be considered now, and that is the psychological influences that may supervene. The war is not yet over. New conditions not now discernible may arise, as for instance it cannot now be foreseen how far submarine operations may paralyse transportation, and arrest commercial intercourse between us and our unfortunate customers. Other grave and unforeseen circumstances may arise. However, as intimated, earnest and active preparations for all contingencies are being provided.

Fortunate indeed is the United States that in this orgy of opulence and wealth its bank reserves are not being poured

into New York, the financial metropolis of the Western World and the home of speculation and hazard. The Federal Reserve Banking System stands now the bulwark of safety. With its unlimited powers of expansion behind its present conservative attitude it will be in position when the recession comes, as come it will, to steady credit and commerce, and will do much to tide this country over conditions that would have scourged it under the old financial system that so often proved a broken reed in time of peril and intensified commercial and financial crisis. It is fortunate indeed that the reserves of the country are no longer in the hands of the great New York banks. The Federal Reserve Banking System with all its minor defects and imperfections came to us most opportunely.[1]

PHILIP LEWIS HALL.

Lincoln, Nebraska.

[1] This article was written before American entry in the war was to most people more than academic speculation. The gigantic war measure of seven billion dollars, however, leaves this country with its financial supremacy unshaken. What the result of American participation in the war will be upon American finance will be discussed in a later article.—ED.

MEDEA IN ATTICA

Before her grot,
Whose rocky portals shimmer hot
With the quenchless sun,
Sits odd Medea, thinking. . . .

As some old eagle, his last flight done,
Perches with muffled plumage on his crag
And stares unblinking
At the still unconquered Sun,
His soul unconquered still,—
While far beneath him in the drowsy glade,
Where yet the lazy shadows lag,
Soft doves do coo and bill
Mid murmurous melody,
Till all the fragrant shade
Is laved in love's antiphony:
He, unafraid,
Starves, gloating o'er his ancient kill.

HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER.

ASIA

Jewels are thine eyes,
O Asia!
Dark jewels are thine eyes,
And ivory sleek
Are throat and brow and the smooth oval cheek,
With flush of lives forgotten deep imbrowned!
Each scented tress is bound
With burnished gold and golden thou art crowned
The Crescent Queen—
Ashtoreth of the Skies—
Immutable, serene,
O Asia!
Dark jewels are thine eyes,
And in them gleam
The smouldering centuries,
Like phosphors on the dusky stream
Of Ocean, or like ghosts
Of myriad tent-fires kindled by thine hosts
On hill and steppe and desert 'mid that Night
Which is thy haunted Past!
Dark jewels are thine eyes,
Whose sombre light,
As lights of javelins battle-cast,
Dartleth thy dread divinity afar,
Till thou dost rule—
Mother of Gods and Men, Mother of War,—
O'er all things passionate and all things cruel
And all things princely that thy womb hath bred
In living soul and soul of dead,
O Asia!

HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER.

WHITHER THE TEMPEST

Out where the sunset dies,
Where the night's last shadow falls,
Out where the cold winds rise
Over the mountain walls,
High on a star-crowned peak,
Crested with stormy snows,
Go, my Spirit, seek
Whither the Tempest blows.

From Creation freed at last,
Where no Creator ruleth,
Out in the lawless vast
Where none pursueth,—
Beyond the walls of Time,
Up from the starry deep,
Whither the tempests climb
I leap, I leap.

CHANDLER TRIMBLE.

THE EAST OF THE WORLD

Cannon of iron and shield of gold
Ye have wrought with the thundering hammer of Thor;
Your molten dreams ye have poured in the mould,
And the crust of the world that was chill and old
Bursts like a black, death-crowded shell,
And the world of fear that we knew so well
Is torn with light! With a golden roar
The red Dawn breaks—on a world of War!

Now storm the crest, ye Nations bold!
The East of the World is a flaming door—
Lo, where the Dreams of the world unfold!
Fight on! for the Dawn's deep drums are rolled!
A red, tumultuous rose, the world;—
'Mid crimsoned leaves our dreams are furled:—
The light that shineth evermore
Unfolds the World, a Rose of War!

There, where the Epic of Time is told,
Where the worlds of the Deep their treasures pour
At the feet of One whom the stars uphold,
Ye bear your dreams, ye warrior-souled;
Ye march where Light is of terror shorn,
Into the deep of the Heart of Morn,
Into the heart of the Rose of War,
Ye march to PEACE—forevermore.

CHANDLER TRIMBLE.

SCREENINGS

UNNEUTRAL AMERICA

America abandons its technical neutrality with a sigh of relief. Late as it is, it is the least we can do. And we shall indulge in no heroics while we arm ourselves for the conflict that is already upon us. There is little of pomp and pride and circumstance in the fighting of today; it is a nasty business at best, nasty because of the cause that has seemingly against our will dragged us into it, and nasty in the method we must employ to vindicate our national prerogatives. In the last two years and a half even the most blatant militarists have rid themselves of the notion of a *frischer, fröhlicher Krieg*. A century seems to separate us from the manifestoes of Bernhardi and the militant poetry of von Münchhausen and Kipling. We are not elated, though a deep throb of conscience tells us we are doing what is right in the sight of mankind.

But are we doing it on the day when the deed would have left American honour untarnished? Are we not like the labourer who came into the vineyard at the ninth hour and set up his claim against him who had borne the burden in the heat of the day? Since that fateful day when Belgium was laid prostrate by fire and sword, when the homes of France were ravished by a merciless soldiery, we have been unneutral in thought and deed. Not all the fine-spun lawyer's arguments can cover our active sympathy for British and French heroism. Our hearts and our hands were deeply engaged. And we were devoutly right, for the blood and ideals of Britain and France run deep and steady in our veins. But we hid behind a pitiful lawyer's plea, and cloaked our active assistance with the mask of a technical neutrality. No one was deceived, we least of all, it was American treasure and American arms—wielded by proxy, and sold for a price—that staved off defeat from our first ally and our mother country. We can be proud of our sympathy, proud that when the test came our hearts were right, proud that in her hour of affliction our hearts bled for Belgium and France. But can our pride be stretched to such exceeding thinness as to cover the refusal to

back our sympathy with arms? Was not the risk to America as great, in the years to come, as the risk to France and Britain? While they fought with weapons supplied by us, we stood idly by, gambled on the result, and made a righteousness of our correct neutrality.

But Germany understood perfectly the worth of our professions, and our provisions. She suffered no illusions over our pharisaical posturings. Doubtless there are firms in this country who, had circumstances favoured, would, also for a price, have supplied the means to make the heaviness of France yet more grievous. Had the British cordon been less strangling there would now be American vessels in Bremen and Hamburg laden with corn and copper. But circumstances were unfavourable. To the German taunt of interestedness we turned with a lawyer's argument. To the British cruisers we spoke a gentle rebuke whose futility none could misunderstand. Legal right was doubtless on our side, we had even the precedent of our own Civil War. But such was not the answer that humanity—even America demanded.

And then the *Lusitania*—In that moment to the dullest of us was born the significance of our entire policy. Had our leaders then seen that neutrality in word does not square with unneutrality in deed, had they proclaimed to the world, what the world then knew, that the cause of the Allies is also the cause of America, we had gladly gone to war; and today American soldiers would be ranged on the battlefields of France; perhaps even by now the war would have been ended. But we spoke of the rights of neutrals, hid ourselves again in the mazes of legalistic cobwebs, and America and the world had many months of weary waiting.

Now we go to war against the common enemy to uphold, as we say, the rights of neutrals, because ships have been sunk and lives lost. Even China sees with more single eye the issue that divides eternal right from eternal wrong. The power that would dismember nations as a gardener lays out his beds, the power that called to its aid the Turk and connived at Armenia's massacre, has naught in common with us or with any people not devoid of respect. Let us even at this late date lay aside our hypocrisy. America is interested, vitally interested, in the reign of national justice and its corollary the complete overthrow of the German idea of the state. Scarce a group of Americans can be found

in the length and breadth of these forty-eight states that does not at once jump to the issue. Let us also speak it aloud in our national utterance. Let us no longer speak of ships sunk and lives lost in defiance of international law. Let us plainly say that it is vital to the tranquillity of America, as of the whole world, that this new and hated obsession, which would make might of equal beam with right, has been tolerated already too long.

P. M. B., Jr.

TWO LETTERS

Two letters that recently came to the editor's desk put the case against Germany so tersely that we cannot refrain from extracts:

"This news of Germany's crude behaviour in this country, this plotting, this intriguing, this vile mediaevalism is the last straw. I can forgive a warring nation in the midst of war the exigencies of battle, but a sneaking, thorough-going knave is an unspeakable nuisance in a civilized community, and ought to have his bad habits licked out of him. This same premeditated selfishness that we have been scourging out of business during the last decade crops up in this Teutonic monster that aims to prosper, as certain businesses have prospered, by sheer lack of anything remotely resembling virtuous and noble character. What we have exemplified in our private business activities Germany has magnified in her imperial activities. It is a set of principles that I detest, wherever they may be found. I believe in the social frame of mind—the social spirit; and I detest selfish, self-seeking unscrupulousness and, in ethics, the individualistic spirit. In art there is a different principle. But in society the ethics of individualism is the ethics of ruin. It is the philosophy of swine, and the justification of the pig. If I were Blake I might write one of those 'Did He who made the Lion make thee?' and I am sure that in the great brotherhood of the world the two-faced monster has no kinship with the American eagle."

. . . . . .

"I am now somewhat reconciled to a theoretic democracy, even though an actual one is decidedly discouraging at times. I am not reconciled, however, to the brute efficiency of the self-seeking, calculating ones and the relative helplessness of the more beautiful forms of life. It is a tragedy too great—and too inevitable. Still, even though they be destined to speedy destruction, there is a deep satisfaction in nurturing even the most fragile forms as far as we may on the road to their perfection. I cannot feel but that man's activities ever tend this way, and, seen through many, many veils, I could imagine war itself as

but an autumn wind, sweeping away the dead leafage of his endeavours that he may put forth anew. Certainly I believe that in this shadow we will be able to discern eternal truths, if there are but watchers of the skies; and also, now that our gyroscopic compasses have evidently gone wrong, we can set our course once more by the stars. Of course, it is true that the golden-winged dream of Universal Peace has been quite ruthlessly slain; but I had always felt that its wings were artificially galvanized during the period immediately preceding the war. They had a mechanical flap. But in spite of the failure of our first tentative efforts I see no reason why we should not ultimately fly. The redeeming strength of ideals lies in their vitality, which in the end quite offsets the more mechanical virtues.

"When Aristotle says that the state comes into existence, 'originating in the bare needs of life, and continues in existence for the sake of good life,' I believe he has made an accurate description not only of the formation of new states but also of the rise of new principles of government; such new principles of government, for instance, as must be in the process of formation even now—originating in the necessities of a reasonable existence and continuing toward the ideal to which the necessity has given birth."

SCHOOLMASTERLY

There was a boy once to whom the victories of Cæsar, the periods of Cicero, the wit of Ovid, the sonorous roll of Virgil, or the lilt of Horace were less than nothing. So he was summoned before the scandalized headmaster, for he had violated one of the sacred traditions of classical culture. But when the sentence of expulsion was passed upon him, and before it was carried out, the amazed votaries of an antique educational creed found that already in his short career the boy had invented a new mathematical puzzle, had classified all the fauna and flora of the neighbourhood, had learned the knack of catching and retaining in his note-book his fleeting glimpses of the life about him, a skill Flaubert strove all his life to acquire,—in short, the fossilized masters of the old school discovered in this abandoned boy all the signs of individual genius. Hence, a fig for your procrustean systems of classical education!

The parable is not a new one, though I saw it only a day or two ago in a reputable weekly—that ought to know better. And the moral that is drawn is such an easy one that only he that runs may read. Genius is not subject to laws; any educational system, especially a classical one, that restricts its free

play—education is and must forever be play—is inherently bad. Such is the moral that the runner with half-averted eye reads in this and a thousand similar parables.

But to him who refuses to run and read, but stands and studies, there will slowly emerge a host of irritating doubts and questionings. It may be—heaven forbid the doubt—that the classics are not well taught. Perhaps the campaigns of Cæsar are only excursions in ablative absolutes and the tactics and strategy of indirect discourse. Perhaps the wit of Ovid and the lilt of Horace are nothing more than exercises in prosody, and Lalage and Corinna merely dactyls and amphibrachs—they were to me, once. Yet I remember also a master who read Virgil with such skill that we boys could scarcely refrain from tears. Poor man, he is dead now,—he left our school to take in hand an Indian *rajah's* brood of sons. They poisoned each other and took the heart out of him.

But all boys are not geniuses. There was a boy in our school whom the modern educator would have loved. In a way he was famous in our little world as an amateur naturalist. Behind his bed he kept an alarming collection of the reptilian fauna of the school bounds—this was in India. At times there would come strange noises from his corner of the dormitory; and we soon learned to leave him and his avocation severely alone out of hours when the lights were out. But notwithstanding his scientific propensity and his hearty hatred of Latin and Greek, the last time I saw him he was wearing the Queen's uniform and blurred his Tommy's accent with a huge quid of tobacco. I wonder what has become of him, and how the new education would account for his degeneration. Did we spoil an embryonic Huxley?

Then there was our irrepressible scholar. I remember he was slow and fat and in a way good-natured. We used to trade our Sunday-evening dessert for Latin verses and originals in geometry. He was a gourmand in Latin and algebra, and Bombay-pudding; he never could get enough of either. He was never quite so happy as when he was at the dinner table surrounded by our weekly toll to his superlative qualities, or when at work on something unusual in quadratics that drove the rest of us to despair. He had no hobbies; he had never been known to take a cricket bat or a football in his hands. But when in the final examinations he won a scholarship at the University, he became a school hero, an object of pride both to masters and

boys. His feat is still recorded in the prospectus of the school Yet when I last heard of him he was wasting his talents upon an unappreciative world as a fourth-rate actor in London. He is another of the multitude of cases it seems impossible to classify according to any scheme of education.

We had discipline in plenty in that school. Latin and Greek almost before we had learned to use our own language. The rod too was not spared, and we were just an ordinary job lot of sons of civilians in the service or of resident clergymen. Yet as I think over the list of my schoolmates there are only a precious few whose stock went to below par. One whom some of us took particular delight in bullying recently surrendered a splendid practice in London to repair the ravages of shrapnel and machine gun. He now has a D.S.O. I have today heard of his death in action. Another as colonel of the regiment to which our school company belonged did his bit at the Somme. I haven't heard from him since. But neither of these ever gave a passing hint of coming heroism.

One wonders how these geniuses of the new education ever came to where they now are, handicapped as they must have been by the tradition of Latin and Greek, that awful old man of the sea. Nor do signs seem to multiply that the new generation which has so miraculously escaped from the land of bondage, is so much better than the old, which did in spite of chains and slavery produce some persons worthy of imitation.

But these seekers after novelties in education turn their faces against Latin and Greek because they are hard and unpleasant and unpractical. But so is a game of football, with the added objection that it is dangerous to life and limb. Surely a dislocated bone or a torn ligament is no less a feeling object lesson for the young man's animadversion than a strained memory or an hour's loss of leisure. But the analogy is hardly fair. In our school only the thought of the impending rod kept all of us to the narrow path of Virgil, while forty rods were all too few to have guarded the realm of goal posts and scrimmage. But had the masters forbidden the one and encouraged the other we should not have been so keen in our likes and dislikes. Perhaps if our new education should forbid Latin and Greek to all except those who, like the players of football, possess the requisite stamina and agility there would be more contests for places on the classical teams. Who knows?

For after all the classics are only for those who have classical minds—there are more of these than the figures in most school grade books would show. We learn to appreciate only those things for which we have willingly paid the price—even in love and war. It is strange how we spurn an easy conquest. El Dorado is only a commonplace valley with queerly coloured rock formations to those who have been born to its secrets. Only the sweated traveller appreciates its alluring mysteries. In the old days when a man must toil for his education he would not willingly forego its prize. But today with it laid beside him in his cradle the child peevishly asks for some new craving. And the new educators are ransacking heaven and earth and the realms beneath for this new inspiration.

They have hit upon the practical, the vocational, as though a child were to be bound out to an apprenticeship before he is freed from his swaddling clothes. My boy recently came home from school asking for a "vocational" book on which he was to make a report. I gave him Franklin's *Autobiography*, but he tossed it aside with a sniff of contempt. He did not expect to be a printer —he, the child only yesterday in his long clothes, had selected electro-chemistry, and he was told to report on that! Then I thought of our old school and the work that was required of us under pains and penalties. At least our masters taught the value of honest toil; the future was long enough to discover to each of us to what end that toil was to be directed.

P. M. B., Jr.

THE HUNTING OF THE DEAN

Regents, Chancellor or President, Super-deans, Deans, Junior Deans, Deans of Men, Deans of Women, Directors of Schools, Heads of Departments, Professors, Associate Professors, Assistant Professors, Adjunct Professors, Instructors, Fellows, Scholars, Assistants—such is the anti-climax a herald-at-arms, or a major-domo, would have to commit to memory before he could marshal in orderly precedence the forces of an American university. Even to students to whom this hierarchy is a daily viaticum, the task of keeping the various ranks separate is so bewildering that I have seen even second year men quite unresponsive when I tried to disclose the subtle difference between an adjunct and an

assistant professor—I forgot to mention the obvious $200 *per annum*. It is little wonder that the general public, the men who pay the taxes and support the university—men to whom the village school superintendent is "The Perfessor"—remain equally unawed before the titles dean and instructor. They are both titles of men that teach in the university; the term "occupy a chair" connotes too much of scholarly leisure and ease to be safe to intrust to our hard-headed constituency.

But it is far from my purpose to make game of college ranks and precedences. It would be far too easy; besides it has been done before. For faculties take them only too seriously. Nearly every instructor looks forward to the time when he may complacently hear himself styled professor; and it is not unknown that there are professors who would be forever satisfied if only they could be called heads of departments or deans. There may even be deans who aspire to be presidents or chancellors. And there would be nothing wrong in such honest rivalry, if the college world were like the military, and each advancement brought a correspondingly wider field of action and a measurable increase of responsibility. The captain commands and is responsible for a company, the colonel has a regiment, and the general a division or an army. Now if the instructor had a dozen students, the professor a hundred, and the dean a thousand, the desire to advance in rank in accordance with one's estimate of one's ability would be quite consistent and even laudable.

Or if the prime duty of instructors were to instruct, of professors to profess, and of deans to dean, why all would be well. The instructor would instruct until he was ready to profess, when he would be given a chair of scholarly leisure until a higher power discovered in him the appropriate germs and he would pass to the deanery. But unfortunately our universities are not so constituted. A class room just vacated by the super-dean may next furnish the unhallowed scene for a mere teaching fellow, and in the same orbit swing also the chairs and benches of professors and adjuncts. The university is not an army or a department store with colonels and foremen and privates and girls at the ribbon counter. And the Prussianizing of chairs, thrones, settees, benches, stools, and standing room is really doing university professors a serious injury.

One would think, if one could get away from the ideals of business organization as applied in the department store, that the

thing that most distinguishes a professor is his ability to profess, and that his usefulness to the university can be measured best by his ability to acquire and inspire scholarship. But the idol of the market place says no; and we set before the professor the ideal of administration, as though a man's worth to the university and community were measured chiefly by the number who call him chief, or by his ability to preside at the meeting of his college faculty. It is thus that we sometimes have the edifying spectacle of the head of a department rattling his sabre and speaking of "my man so-and-so," in the manner of a Prussian *Junker* or the tyrant of a ribbon counter. But fortunately American college faculties have seldom allowed such extravagancies full sway. There is still more or less of democratic freedom in colleges, no matter how strictly departmentalized. To see the aping of Prussian tyranny at its worst we shall have to go to the public schools with their adoration of principals and superintendents. But the danger is with us, and the disease deep rooted.

* * * * *

A university today with its enormous number of students needs organization, and a deal of expert administration. It is a pity that exigencies of providing for its financial support have turned many a president into a wrangler with legislators and politicians, or into a haunter of wills and legacies. And it is true that university governing boards, made up generally of business men to whom administrative efficiency is as a god, have often been unable to see much beyond the orderly working of university machinery, and hence have been tempted to look upon it as the all-important. But it is nevertheless true that much of the internal administrative work of a university could be done by intelligent clerks and office girls. It is possible to think of a university without departments or deans; and in Prussian Germany the office of even university chancellor is honorary rather than administrative. It is strange that in democratic America we should be Prussianized in the one field Prussia has left almost free.

* * * * *

But organization of some sort in the university there must be, and deans and the lower hierarchy are probably here to stay; nor

have I any serious quarrel with them as mere administrative ornaments. There are good deans, and bad deans, too, I suppose. I number some of my best friends among the inmates of the deanery. What is serious for the future of the university is that there are becoming so many of them. Every professor with an ambition aspires to become something, and the only thing possible is a dean. Thus a deanship is the promised land that allows sleep neither night nor day to the devoted professor who has once caught the fatal glimpse of its beckoning shores.

There was a time—and still is for some, thank Heaven!—when the road to preferment lay through scholarship; but there is an easier one through efficiency in administration. For efficient deans are payed a higher salary than scholarly professors, in most institutions, and besides breathe higher honours and dignities. For a dean no longer needs to profess or instruct, he winds and unwinds red tape, uses an official stamp, and has sometimes the making and unmaking of his colleague professors. He sits in the seats of the mighty; but above all he receives a more mighty honorarium. For such a prize modest and self-effacing scholarship is a long and tedious and uncertain apprenticeship. Far easier is it to advertise, to discover new means and new workings of administrative machinery, discover a latent popular demand, and allow oneself to be victimized into positions of honour. The thing is not unknown in American universities. And who shall say how much ill it bodes to American scholarship when such pleasant By-Path-Meadows lead not to Giant Despair but direct by air line to the Promised Land.

* * * * *

And here we have discovered the nub of the whole difficulty. Administrative officers and controlling boards recognize the highest degree of professional efficiency in executive ability. To take up our similes again, because the colonel controls the action of so many captains and subalterns, or because the floor-walker controls the actions of so many clerks, both are of more value to their organizations, military or commercial, than the less experienced underlings; so the university dean or department chief or whatever we may call him, because he winds and unwinds so much university tape, presides over faculties, and uses a rubber stamp, must *per se* be of greater value to the body educational.

But the analogy is utterly misleading. If the duties of the professor were merely to teach, as that of the clerk is to sell ribbons, or of the private to obey orders, and if the executives had as their duty to oversee teaching, and were in consequence better equipped—. But such an obvious generalization is true in only a very limited sense. An executive whose professorial chair was Sanscrit would be hard put to it to discover wherein the teaching of the theory of relativity is faulty. The fact is that the function of teaching is but one of the functions of the university professor. He must also be a conserver of and contributor to the tradition of learning. A university without professors is unthinkable, though there may be deans and sub-deans *ad infinitum;* but a university without deans—there may again be such things as there have been.

The executives of a university are chiefly a means that the professors may carry on their work with less attention to irritating and irrelevant details. They are that the professor might be—quite different this, from the relation of floor-walker to ribbon counter clerks or of colonels to privates. Why, a whole army might conceivably be made up of colonels, as a whole department store of floor-walkers, and the business of fighting and selling suffer not at all; but a university of deans—God forbid!

* * * * *

The remedy for this super-departmentalized, Prussianized university lies easy at hand. Professors are not yet grown tired of professing, and never will; it is only the lure of higher pay and the mirage of dignity that have led them temporarily to forsake the highway of academic preferment. Let their academic attainments be adequately honoured and remunerated, let the professor of attainments be classed in dignity and material considerations with—if it is still unthinkable to add above—the executive dean, and at one stroke we have removed the temptation of straying from academic paths. Only then can he look with eye single at his chair instead of gazing wistfully at the settee of a dean.

P. M. B., Jr.

Statement of the ownership, management, circulation, etc., required by the act of August 24, 1912, of *The Mid-West Quarterly*, published at New Rochelle, N. Y., for April 1, 1917.

Editor (*Acting*), PHILO M. BUCK, JR., post office address, Lincoln, Neb.

Publishers, G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, New York City.

Owners, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, Lincoln, Nebraska.

Known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders, holding 1 per cent. or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities, None.

PHILO M. BUCK, JR., *Acting Editor*.

Sworn to and subscribed to before me this 26th day of March, 1917.

MAX WESTERMANN,
Notary Public.

Annual Subscription, $2 Single Number, 50 cents

GENERAL LIBRARY
OCT 14 1918
UNIV. OF MICH.

The Mid-West Quarterly

Vol. IV. July, 1917 No. 1

I. *David Starr Jordan—Eugenics and War* CHARLES KUHLMANN
II. *A Study in Immigration* - - - E. J. HAIRES
III. *The English in Egypt* - - - - J. E. MILLER
IV. *Movie Democracy* - - LEWIS WORTHINGTON SMITH
V. *Star Twinkling* - - - ELLERY WILLIAM DAVIS
VI. *The Sentimental Movement* - - DUDLEY MILES
VII. *The Æsthetic Fallacy* - - - - J. WERSHAW
VIII. *Screenings: Pacifism and Ideas—Educating America—An Irish Plot.*

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New Rochelle, N. Y. London New York

The Knickerbocker Press

Entered as second-class matter, October 1, 1914, at the Post Office at New Rochelle, New York

The Mid-West Quarterly

Is owned and controlled by the University of Nebraska

P. H. FRYE, *Editor*

BARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER
PHILO M. BUCK, Jr.
MALCOLM C. WYER
Associate Editors

T. A. WILLIAMS
Business Manager

SAMUEL AVERY,
Chancellor of the University
CHAS. SUMNER ALLEN,
President of the Board of Regents
Advisory Committee

The *Quarterly* is issued during the months of October, January, April, and July

Annual Subscription	$2.00
Single Numbers	50 cents

Address the Publishers, Messrs. G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
New Rochelle, N. Y., or
2, 4, and 6 West 45th Street, New York City

All contributions and editorial communications should be directed to the editors of The Mid-West Quarterly, Station A, Lincoln, Nebraska

THE
MID-WEST QUARTERLY

Vol. IV] JULY, 1917 [No. 4

DAVID STARR JORDAN—EUGENICS AND WAR

In 1907 Dr. David Starr Jordan published a little book, *The Human Harvest*, in which he tried to show that war does not, as is usually maintained, lead to the survival of the fittest, but that, on the contrary, it destroys the "best we breed." It produces reversed selection—guarantees the survival of the unfit. It could have no other result, he said, because the best men, the physically soundest, are placed in the army where many of them are killed or mutilated. Only the weak and diseased remain at home to perpetuate the race.

In *War and the Breed*, published in 1915, the same subject is treated in more detail and with a greater array of proofs. The theory was also advanced in his *War and Waste* and seems to form the core of most of his lectures in the interest of the pacifist propaganda. It has been taken up by the daily press and put forward as the final and conclusive answer to the biological militarists. It has become an accepted dogma in pacifist literature and may be found in such well-known works as *The Great Illusion* of Norman Angell and *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory* of Dr. George Nasmyth. We are, then, concerned with a trump card.

Dr. Jordan evidently received his first suggestion from the works of the late Russian sociologist, Jaques Novicow, for on his title page he prints this sentence from the latter's works: "War has at all times produced a reversed selection." Novicow has written a good deal on Social Darwinism in an effort to combat the theory of struggle with that of co-operation. He was a man of brilliant mind but his work is somewhat marred by a partisan spirit. While insisting that war is solely destructive, he was

frank enough to admit that the warlike nations have, as a matter of fact, contributed most to the advancement of the race. I have searched in vain in the works of Messrs. Jordan, Angell, and Nasmyth for this admission, though all three cite Novicow in support of their thesis. The reason for this omission is evident, for to admit the correctness of Novicow's reading of history would throw an immense burden of proof upon their shoulders and at the same time cut them off from the only field in which conclusive proof could be found.

In the *Human Harvest* heredity, working through selection, is represented as the sole medium of race improvement. "The change in the blood which is the essence of race progress," he says, "as distinguished from progress in civilization, finds its cause in selection only." "Evil influences may kill the individual but cannot tarnish the stream of heredity. The child of each generation is free-born so far as heredity goes, and the sins of the father are not visited upon him."

As a rule Olympian decrees are not popular. But the one here proclaimed will certainly bring a comforting assurance to those who are inclined to tread the "primrose way of dalliance." As a sceptical layman, however, I suspect that we have to do in this case not with Olympus but with August Weismann and his "continuity-of-germ-plasm" theory, and that Dr. Jordan has, as in the case of Novicow's damaging admission, forgotten to tell his readers that the specialists are not agreed on this point. Possibly Dr. Jordan has, in the above quotations, stated the Weismann theory a trifle more absolutely than its author would approve. Weismann held that the character of the germ cell remained constant through the succeeding generations except as modified by the blending of the male and female elements during the process of conception, and that the reproduction cells in the offspring developed, not as a new product from the new generation, but from unused materials left over from the original cells at conception. This, in making the reproduction cells entirely independent of the individual who served as host, made the transmission of acquired characteristics impossible. Improvement of stock could then come only through the mating of superior strains so chosen as to permit the laws of blending to work to the best advantage. Possibly there is room in the theory also for the occasional appearance of certain unexplainable "variations" which, if judiciously mated, could by degrees raise the

breed above the level of the parent strains or their blend as indicated by the usual rule.

But, as already stated, there is no agreement on this point nor upon the question as to whether or not acquired characteristics can be transmitted. It was necessary, however, for Dr. Jordan's thesis to assume that such characteristics cannot be transmitted and that the reproduction cell be regarded as proof against either deterioration or improvement through the vicissitudes in the life of the host, otherwise inferior cells might, through better individual conduct or the effects of environment, surpass their natural superiors. In that case the dysgenic theory of war would look much less convincing.

It must have been evident to Dr. Jordan when he wrote *The Human Harvest* that even if the germ-cell is in its genesis independent of the host it by no means follows that the health or conduct of the latter may not affect it for good or ill. But the historical proofs he then possessed for his own thesis on the effects of war could be more effectively used if he ignored this possibility. After the outbreak of the war he came into possession of material which promised a sensation if skilfully handled. In December, 1914, Prof. Vernon Kellogg published an article in which he tried to show the destructive effects of venereal diseases upon the reproduction cells. He found that these effects were not confined to the individual but transmitted from generation to generation to the lasting injury of the race. These diseases, then, were veritable "race-poisons." Using the British *Army Medical Report* for 1910, he tried, further, to show that the armies of the world are the breeding spots for these diseases and that, therefore, the very preparations for war lead to conditions making for reversed selection. It did not matter that Professor Kellogg reached this conclusion by a gross misuse[1] of his statistics, for Dr.

[1] It was necessary for Kellogg to show that these diseases were more prevalent in the army than in the civilian population. But he possessed no statistics for civilians and admitted that it was difficult to determine the percentage of infected persons. The medical report showed that the army contained a much larger percentage of infected persons than was disclosed among the applicants for entrance into the army. So he assumed that the percentage among the applicants was about the same as that obtaining among civilians generally, a totally inadmissible assumption. For, certainly the person wishing to enter the army and knowing that infection would bar him, would not apply since it could lead only to an humiliating disclosure. Only those who were ignorant

Jordan does not hesitate to cite poetry, editorials from daily newspapers, and isolated passages from scientific works torn from their context in which alone they have any real meaning. He accepted Kellogg's article without control just as he accepted all his other evidence provided only that it helped his case.

At the same time tempting reports arrived from the battle front. It was said that modern high explosives completely shattered some nervous systems merely through the shock they produced. This disorganization of the nervous system through injury of brain cells was said to produce Traumatic Neurosis. This disease, through nerve connections, in turn affected disastrously the reproduction cells and hence rendered the victims less fit for parentage. In connection with this Dr. Jordan quotes from a private letter of Dr. Ales Hrdlicka as follows:

"Such men (that is, those subjected to the conditions of the modern battle field) will marry in many cases and create progeny. But a father with epilepsy even though of traumatic origin, or with neurasthenia, nervous instability, or other marked disorders or weakening of his nervous system, cannot be expected to give rise to normal progeny. Judging from many analogous experiences with similar cases, it seems safe to assume that all deep-seated, long-continued mental and nervous disturbances will affect unfavorably the trophic centres that control the development of the germ cells, with the result of a more or less defective mental or nervous state in the progeny of such individuals." [A paragraph farther on this same writer continues:] "But it is not only the direct injuries to the brain or nervous system which comes into consideration in connection with the subject of the deleterious influences on the race of the present war. Perhaps even greater harm, both in the way of resulting defective personalities and following defective progeny, will result from the extreme and prolonged tension that must be sustained in many cases by the soldier in the trenches, for days and even weeks at a time, with maxima of excitation, fatigue, and depression; from the infectious diseases, such as typhoid, and from the diseases of the various important organs such as the heart, liver, kidneys, and the digestive apparatus, contracted through overstrain, exposure, or direct injuries. All such conditions will leave lasting marks on the organism. They will produce a large class of invalids, and these invalids, at best, will not be able to give the proper care to their progeny; but in many cases they will, doubtless, not be able any more to transmit to their progeny a 'healthy mind and a healthy body.'"

---

of their trouble would apply, which sufficiently accounts for the low percentage among the applicants.

The use of these statistics is also unfair in that it is not made sufficiently clear that the recruits for volunteer armies in times of peace usually come from the floating population—that is, a class naturally subject to this form of immorality quite aside from their connection with the army.

So, then, there is an end of the Olympian decree upon which Dr. Jordan based his theory at the outset—the independence of the reproduction cell from the effects of individual conduct. Improvement and deterioration of the race rests quite as much, if not more, upon good conduct and observation of the laws of health as upon the preservation of naturally strong strains. In fact, the distinction between natural and acquired potentialities necessarily disappears with the admissions contained in the above quotations, for the strong strain of today may be the weak one of tomorrow and *vice versa*, barring the small minority of cells so strongly tainted with "race-poisons" as lead to extinction in the course of generations through elimination in the ordinary struggles of life. Our author now recognizes as "race-poisons" the venereal diseases, salts of lead, alcohol, Traumatic Neurosis, most of the leading diseases of the race—in short, nearly everything which affects health injuriously. We may, then, assume, as the medical profession is inclining more and more to do, that a reasonably sound mind and body is the possible heritage of all but a small tainted minority, and that the fate of the race does not rest upon a few specially gifted germ cells but rather upon conduct, individual and collective. If we behave ourselves as we should, the gifted cell will arrive in due time, or, having arrived, will disappear if we misbehave. Thus both the moralist and the democrat score at one and the same time even on Dr. Jordan's own showing.

It must not be supposed, however, that our author now abandons his theory. On the contrary, wherever his material would seem to require it he reaffirms it in all its rigidity. In fact he passes back and forth between the two views without betraying any consciousness of the inconsistency. But even were we to grant the validity of his original view of heredity the militarist might still counter by saying that since the sound germ cell does not depend upon a sound body it is quite possible that the decrepit individual rejected by the recruiting officers may be the host of better cells than the able-bodied man he accepts. It is, indeed, a matter of common observation that persons with a superabundance of vigour only too often dissipate their heritage in riotous living. The "sport," or "roughneck," the young man out sowing his "wild oats," and very often the alcoholic, come not from the ungifted sluggard class but from those whose energies cannot find expression in the conventional grooves of society.

Nor does the race seem to be in any danger of a famine in variations of useful potentialities. Such variations are arriving in great multitudes, afoot, ahorse, and—shall we say?—by aeroplane. With the growing complexity of life following upon a greater knowledge and use of the environment, these variations are growing so rapidly in number that the real danger seems to be the swamping of the whole conventional machinery through which they must somehow be made to pass. Our social adjustments are falling behind the demands made by the capacities for varied reaction in the race. In a word, the trouble is not with man as an animal, as Dr. Jordan holds, but with man as a member of society. The real difficulty is to so direct the individual powers as to make them serve society without at the same time killing them outright or by slow strangulation in the form of laws or social conventions.[1]

When Dr. Jordan wishes to show that the English have deteriorated through losses in war, he points to the memorial tablets raised to commemorate the death of members of her most prominent families in foreign wars and to the long list of Oxford and Cambridge men lost in war. But when someone suggested that Tommy Atkins came rather from the lower ranks of society, he replied that the "best is not to be measured wholly from the standpoint of society or inherited wealth," and that "Tommy may have good stuff in him, as good it may be as the average lord." The reader may take his choice, but in either case I cannot see that war has killed the best in view of this statement of fact.

Dr. Jordan denies that there are compensations for the losses of war. Arnold Bennett had argued that the loss of men would leave a preponderance of women and thus lead to a better choice of wives by the remaining males. That seems in entire accord

[1] Mr. W. Trotter has written a very suggestive work (*Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*) dealing very largely with this very question of society's relation with and attitude toward the flood of variations released by co-operative adjustment to external environment. Trotter is a socialist and pacifist in disguise and this fact the reader must take into consideration. His work is speculative and wisely avoids definite judgments as far as possible. A more reliable discussion of this problem will be found in Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, 326 ff., in which it is made clear that we have more raw material than we can take care of, and that elimination takes place both at the lower and the upper end of society—the genius as well as the degenerate suffer from this "social" or secondary selection, which we discuss a little more in detail, below.

with Dr. Jordan's theory of selection, so, to be able to reply, he shifts his ground once more to the theory of race improvement through social means. He answers Bennett by saying that the preponderance of women will lead to legalized polygamy, increased numbers of illegitimate children, and drudgery and danger to the women who cannot find husbands. So anxious was he to turn everything to account that in a footnote on page 161 he cites with approval some remarks of Havelock Ellis to the effect that while war had produced reversed selection among the men of Spain the women had not been affected. That is to say, degeneration may go on among males to any extent without a parallel degeneration among the women. The father has no share in the heredity of his daughter!

It should be pointed out that the effects of war upon the civil population are sometimes such as to more than offset the loss of able-bodied men, not in total population but in average excellence. It has been shown statistically by impartial investigators that war increases the death rate and decreases the birth and marriage rates.[1] The weaker, those most easily depressed, naturally die first upon the added strain. The optimistic, that is the more desirable strain, both marry and have offspring. The pessimistic, the less venturesome, refrain and their strain tends to die out. Moreover, war checks luxuries which annually ruin and kill multitudes. The consumption of alcohol, one of the race poisons recognized by Dr. Jordan, has been nearly done away with for the time being in Europe. Russia claims that she is today better off both in men and wealth with war and no vodka than she was before without war and with vodka. This is no doubt an exaggeration, but there is a large element of truth in the boast, and if vodka is not restored after the war (and it is not the intention to restore it), the ultimate gain will greatly outweigh the losses. Hundreds of thousands of human vegetables have been uprooted and made over into human beings for the rest of their lives. To

[1] See F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 367–368. The cause here assigned for the phenomenon is economic. The psychic cause is too evident to require proof which has, moreover, been supplied from the battle front since the present war began, so far as the discussion has to do with the birth and marriage rates. It may be objected that the timid and unenterprising will marry and have progeny after the war and that is no doubt true. But every delay in marriage reduces the number of offsprings, since it has been shown that the early marriages are the more prolific.

the men who have taken a large part in this war few things will appear impossible hereafter. We may expect them to count in the world's work as they would not otherwise have counted. Invention has been greatly stimulated, as is shown in the revolutionizing of air navigation, while the medical profession has learned many things which will in the future do much to compensate for the loss of life. If the Entente wins, the depressing hand of the Turk will be removed from Europe and Asia Minor and a tremendous stimulus given to Russia as a result of her free entrance to the Mediterranean. If the Central Powers are victorious, the crowded condition of Germany will be relieved, order brought to the Balkans, and Asia Minor opened to the splendid energy and efficiency of the German people.

We come now to the historical proofs which Dr. Jordan has advanced in support of his thesis. I shall confine myself to the cases of Rome, Greece, and France. For his discussion of Rome and Greece, Dr. Jordan relies mainly upon a work of Professor Otto Seeck, *Der Untergang der Antiken Welt*. In these countries, Seeck argues, the best blood was destroyed during the frequent struggles between political parties. Civil war was followed by proscriptions which struck down the leaders and prominent men of the vanquished party. As victory passed from side to side the best men were gradually destroyed. "Whoever was bold enough to rise politically in Rome was almost without exception thrown to the ground. Only cowards remained, and from their blood came forward the new generations." Nevertheless, "In valour, discipline, and science the Roman armies remained what they had always been. . . . But the problem was how to replenish those armies. Men were wanting. The Empire perished for want of men." There were people enough, but the Roman *Vir* had given way to *Homo*. "Men of good stock were replaced by sons of slaves and camp followers, the riff-raff of those the army sucked in but could not use," says Dr. Jordan.

Let us remark here that there is no ground for the assumption that the slaves were of inferior blood. They were largely composed of the prisoners taken in war from which the weaklings had been excluded as not worth taking. Since the slaves were excluded from the army and hence not subject to reversed selection, according to the Jordan theory, they should have improved from generation to generation. We should observe also that Seeck does not ascribe the "rooting out of the best" to war but

to the proscriptions following the wars. Moreover, Jordan has, in this case as in that of Novicow, carefully neglected to give us the whole argument and conclusion. Seeck expressly denies that Rome's wars caused her ruin. He did not regard the killing in battle as the cause of race degeneration. He found part of the mischief in the volunteer army of long service which practically excluded the possibility of marriage. The remedy he suggested was not disarmament but universal military service.

As a matter of fact there is little history in this presentation if we may believe in the conclusions of impartial specialists—that is, scholars who have no preconceived theory to vindicate. In a scholarly and detailed work[1] Professor Dill of Belfast has set forth the causes of the decline of the Empire. Especially clear and convincing is his explanation of the destruction of the middle class. It was from this class that the army was mainly recruited. The senatorial class, largely composed of great landholders, were excluded from the army by law, as were also the servile class except under extreme necessity. It was not war that destroyed the middle class or small landholders, but the crushing burden of taxation on the one hand and slave labour on the other. The great landholders worked their estates mainly by slaves which, added to the privileges and exemptions their power enabled them to extort, gradually forced the small landholders to the wall, compelling them either to join the retainers of their rivals, enter the crowd of state-fed rabble, or turn to brigandage. They were not degenerate since, as Seeck admits, they fought as well as ever, but the causes we have mentioned so reduced their number that the army could no longer be supplied from their ranks and recourse was had to outside barbarians, largely Germans who came finally to hold most of the higher commands. The evil was aggravated by the contempt into which military service had fallen after nearly the whole of the cultured population had been excluded. To make matters still worse the civilians were forbidden to carry arms and thus lost the training in the use of them so that it was necessary to teach the recruit the use of the sword along with the rest of the army discipline. As desertions threatened to disrupt the army the recruits were branded as if they were "slaves of the *ergastulum*," says Dill. In the time of Marius, when the army was thrown open to the rabble, there was no effective opposition to

[1] Dill, Samuel. *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire.* Second Edition. London, 1906.

recruiting from this class. Now, however, many non-property-holding persons had become permanently attached to the estates of the great landholders who, out of personal interest, opposed their entrance to the army and the government was finally compelled to yield their demand to pay in money rather than in recruits.

Such is, in outline, the explanation of the scarcity of recruits. We need not depend on theory because the facts are plainly written in the imperial edicts of the time. It is more than probable that under a system less rigid and cumbersome than the Roman under the Empire an abundance of able-bodied men could have been secured. But if, for the sake of argument, we admit that this was not the case, that the men of the Empire had degenerated, we could not possibly ascribe the fact to the rooting out of the best through war. The Empire contained something like one hundred million inhabitants who, at the time of the Germanic invasions, had lived for three hundred years in the profoundest peace the Western world had ever known. The *Pax Romana* had put an end to the chronic state of war existing among the hundreds of tribes inhabiting the lands of the empire. This hundred million inhabitants furnished a standing army of 150,000 legionaries with a certain quota of auxiliaries increased or diminished as circumstances required. These soldiers did infinitely less fighting than the German tribes they were unable to check at the frontiers. All contemporary evidence emphasizes the warlike character of the Germans. They fought almost constantly among themselves or with other tribes to the east of them as well as with the Romans. If war were so potent a factor in race degeneration they should have been immeasurably more degenerate than the Romans they overthrew. Moreover, how shall we explain the high quality of Roman manhood during the republican period when all her great conquests were made? The Romans worked their way upward through the same state of chronic war we have observed among the Germans and elsewhere. It was the lot of every race in primitive times to sleep on its weapons, and he who could not defend himself at a moment's notice had only a choice between death or slavery. Where, then, did Rome obtain her splendid soldiers of the Punic wars? Dr. Jordan ascribes the fall of Carthage to the same race degeneration through war. But Carthage rarely sent her citizens to war. She hired mercenaries to do her fighting and took the field with

her own citizens only when these failed her. And yet Rome, which at this time recruited her armies only from the property classes, completely destroyed her. In fact, historians usually discover the military weakness of Carthage in her mercenary army.

And what shall we say to the charge of degenerate manhood brought against the Greeks? Greece lost her independence at the battle of Chæroneia in 338 B. C. Professor Oman, whose specialty is Greek history, writes of this battle:

"So ended this well-fought battle, for which Greece had no cause to blame her soldiers; but she might well ask herself in shame why Athens, Thebes, and Corinth were left almost alone to fight the battle of Hellenic liberty. Elis and Argos, Arcadia and Messene, were standing apart in selfish prudence; Thessaly sent her horsemen to help the Macedonian stranger. Once more the narrow spirit of local ambition had proved the evil genius of Greece."

Every student of Greek history knows that the great orator Demosthenes had for years tried to arouse his countrymen to the danger from Philip of Macedon. His "Philippics" are our present-day models of Greek oratory. In his insistence and vehemence he may be compared to our own Roosevelt. It was not a degenerate manhood but the sluggish indifference, combined with local jealousies, which caused the political downfall of Greece. The Greek soldiers at this time were the best in the world and there was a great superfluity of them. In spite of the incessant wars between the Greek cities, the surplus of fighting men was so large that Greek mercenaries swarmed in all the civilized non-Hellenic states of the Mediterranean. Xenophon has left us an account of the "Ten Thousand" who took part in the war of Cyrus to dethrone his brother. We find traces of them even in far-away Egypt. They faced Alexander on the Granicus and at Issus, and the Romans when at war with Carthage. More than sixty years after Chæroneia a military adventurer, Pyrrhus, gathered an army of them and twice defeated the Romans in their best fighting days, and for several years held at bay the combined might of Rome and Carthage — Carthage which was not degenerate because she did not send out the best of the breed.

Finally, what of "degenerate" France? Is she really in need of defence today? Even before *War and the Breed* went to press she had given a crushing answer to this particular slander. Nevertheless we shall deal with the evidence as presented by

Dr. Jordan and others. The Napoleonic wars, especially, we are told, destroyed the French physique so that the average stature of Frenchmen declined an inch or two. So disastrous has the reversal of selection proved that, according to Angell, even three-feet dwarfs are now drafted into the Army.

But here, as is only too often the case with pacifist statistics, the figures given prove nothing to the point in question. English scholars, among them Sir Ronald Ross, editor of *Science Progress*, Mr. Chalmers Mitchell, and Professors Karl Pearson and J. A. Thomson,[1] have dealt with Dr. Jordan's theory and declared that there is little evidence to support it. The case against France rests upon the fact that requirements as to stature were several times reduced in successive calls for recruits. But this, to my mind, proves nothing except that the taller men were taken at the first recruitings and that at succeeding ones men of shorter stature were also taken. It proves nothing whatever regarding the average stature of Frenchmen before and after the Napoleonic wars. Recruiting officers have always had a preference for tall men. This preference they could gratify at a time when comparatively small armies of volunteeers did all the fighting, as was the case before the revolutionary wars of France. Naturally the average stature of the pre-Napoleonic soldier was above that of an army comprising nearly the whole of the able-bodied men of the nation. The standing army of France before the revolution numbered about 200,000 drawn from a population of nearly 25,000,000. That is to say, before 1789 there was one soldier to 125 of the population. Today there is one to every seven or eight. The recruiting officer of today must, therefore, find sixteen recruits where his predecessor was required to produce but one.

Dr. Jordan reproduces the argument we have here criticised from the article of Professor Vernon Kellogg already cited. This

[1] I am depending here upon the analysis of this literature by Mr. Coulton in *The Main Illusions of Pacifism*, Chap. VIII, the works themselves not being accessible to me. While this work is frankly polemical in nature, it is at the same time thoroughly conscientious and exact in the statement of facts. It is a merciless piece of criticism, having to do largely with Norman Angell's *Great Illusion* and other pacifist works of this writer. He differs from the works he attacks in that he cites his authorities honestly and exactly. It is an excellent work of its kind and I gladly acknowledge my indebtedness to it in the preparation of this article.

article was prepared for the Carnegie Peace Foundation and no doubt widely circulated through its agency. And yet our author uses up considerable rhetoric in an effort to convince the reader that pacifism is a crusade in the interest of truth and that the pacifists must be classed with the great martyrs of the race!

The chief weakness of the dysgenic theory of war lies in the failure to take account of the enormous change which has taken place in the struggle for survival following the appearance of conscious co-operation. For survival in the human species has long ceased to rest mainly upon animal qualities. Natural selection still plays its part but it is overshadowed in importance and controlled by factors of a social and psychic nature. Man, because of his great mental capacity, reacts to his environment in a multitude of different ways and thereby produces an infinity of variations which effectually guard against race deterioration. Among lower animals heredity is a dominant factor because conduct is instinctively confined, or nearly so, to the narrow channel of subsistence and reproduction. Conduct being so nearly identical, variation must depend almost solely upon heredity since external environment remains just about constant. Not so with man. His conduct is indefinitely varied and he transforms his environment almost at will. Thus the animal side of his being now waits upon the mind which, through its wide choice of conduct, determines the health and vigour of the body to a much larger degree than is the case among the lower animals.

It is evident that as the moral code advances natural selection in the original sense must recede. The struggle for survival continues—is, perhaps, even intensified—but its character is changed. Co-operative adjustment to external environment having taken the place of individual adjustment, new individual qualities, in conformity with the new order, must take the place of the old. Inside the social group—city, state, nation, etc.—the individual has been enabled to develop his powers to an extent inconceivable among lower animals, because the menace of destruction from without is infinitely more remote. His potentialities have, therefore, enormously increased through freedom of action formerly prevented at every turn by immediate necessity. But this freedom from the tyranny of the natural environment was made possible only by the self-imposed restraint in the form of the social conventions—that is, the moral code, public opinion, laws, etc. For that reason a secondary or social selection has

largely taken the place of the former natural selection. Society now creates the environment and prescribes the rules governing the process of elimination and in that way determines who are fit or unfit. The task of this social selection, so far as it is directly creative of race improvement either through institutions or individual powers, has become chiefly that of assimilating the flood of variations which has followed the removal of the menace from the external environment, and survival is now conditioned, in the first instance, by society. The welfare of the individual is still the ultimate aim, but it is seen that this welfare is, in the long run, dependent upon society. If social selection is too rigid, as socialism would make it, the variations will decrease in number and by degrees individual potentialities will be lowered. If it is too lax there will be a tendency for society to break down and for natural selection to become effective again.[1]

I have indulged in this excursion into social dynamics in order to explain an obvious fact, namely, that heredity does not hold the dominant position in the human species that it does among the lower animals and that the very statement of Jordan's thesis therefore constitutes an exaggeration. Possibly the immediate compensations of war do not balance the losses, though this is not proved. The militarist can grant that much and yet not surrender his case, for history proves that the ravages of the most destructive wars are usually made good in a comparatively short time. The real test of the value of war lies in the potentialities of the situation created by it. Does it bring about readjustments necessary to give freer play to the creative forces of the race? Historians and sociologists have usually answered in the affirmative.[2]

We may take for illustration one of Dr. Jordan's "horrible examples," Rome. Did Rome's wars advance or retard civilization; that is the test of the value. The moment we ask that question the Jordan proposition becomes an absurdity. Western civilization today rests upon a Roman basis. Rome is today the "greatest single fact in history" no matter what has become of

[1] See W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.* Also Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Book III, Chap. 4, "Demogenic Association."

[2] I need not prove this attitude of the scientists since Dr. Nasmyth admits it and has taken much pains to make clear what he calls their pessimistic teaching. *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory.* See especially Chap. II.

the Romans. We find it difficult to print a sentence, try a case at law, or even worship God without betraying the fact that she survives in our very marrow. The touchstone of our political faith, "all men are by nature free and equal," is taken bodily from the Roman law itself the outgrowth of her conquests. Many of the legal codes of Europe are little more than an adaptation of the Roman law and the principles of international law found their first effective application in the Roman Empire. It was under the protection of the Roman sword that the superior civilization of the Mediterranean basin was carried to the dwellers of the great northern plains of the continent. The Christian church, modelled upon the Roman state and using the Latin language spread for her convenience throughout the Empire, found her work of conversion advanced whole centuries as a direct result of the Roman conquests. The persecutions over, the Roman law and Roman sword were everywhere the powerful aids of the Christian missionary. Speaking of the Augustan age Professor George Burton Adams says:

"One of the new buildings was the Pantheon, in which were gathered all the gods of the Empire, something new in the world, but symbol of a still more important thing that was new—the community of nations in a common system. This community of nations once established by Rome has never ceased, though it has changed its form, and out of it grew the idea of the unity of all men—the brotherhood of man, as they began to call it in the early days of the Empire. This idea, of such immense value in the civilization of the world, and soon to be so strongly reinforced by the teachings of Christianity, first rose to consciousness in the minds of men as a result of the conquests and organized Empire of Rome."

The work of the Empire was well and thoroughly done. So potent was its spell that long after it had ceased to exist people refused to believe in its demise. The very men who overthrew it gloried in the name of "Roman" and loaded themselves with the external trappings of the Empire. In the East it continued in unbroken line until finally overthrown by the Turks in 1453. Charlemagne re-established the Empire of the West in 800 and Otto I of Germany assumed the title of Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 961. It did not finally perish in name until 1806 at the hands of Napoleon. During the whole of the Middle Ages it was the one idea, aside from Christianity, which prevented the total political disintegration of Europe, and the Roman law

was one of the chief instruments through which the absolute monarchy finally restored order out of the feudal chaos.

But all the good which, according to Messrs. Angell, Jordan, and others, came from the Roman conquests, was the degeneration and destruction of the Roman people. A view so childishly crude, it is safe to say would not be tolerated in an undergraduate of any respectable college or university. And yet it has been hailed by the press and by some men who call themselves scientists, as a scientific discovery of great importance, while its authors, both here and in England, travel up and down the land to explain their doctrine to wide-eyed[1] and open-mouthed[1] audiences. They are regarded as men of genius who have put the dull and plodding students who have some respect for their sciences and the responsibilities which rest upon them, in the wrong. So from pacifist quarters now comes the cry that history must be rewritten; that there is too much war in it. Henceforth we must have history as we find it, let us say, in *War and the Breed*.

And, after all, the Romans have not perished. More people essentially of Roman blood exist today than at any other time in history. Nor are they degenerate. The proud Teuton recognizes them as superior to himself in native wit.[2] They are once more a great nation in their own *Italia* and again fighting the old barbarian enemy of the north. The great Catholic Church, with more communicants than any other Christian sect, is still essentially Roman in spirit, is directed from Rome and uses the Roman language. During the Middle Ages they taught Europe many things in the way of commerce and city government and gave the world the great Renaissance. But even if they had perished it would not have mattered greatly from a world point of view, provided they succeeded in doing their work. It is better for a nation to be warlike and accomplish something for human progress than be peaceful and do nothing. That is the historical point of view to which we must hold our theorist.

[1] Should the reader feel that these adjectives are too strong I would refer him to *The Main Illusions of Pacifism* by G. G. Coulton, Chap. I, and his descriptions of the Norman Angell and other peace societies of England. Mr. Coulton speaks from personal experience and in detail.

[2] See the careful and analytical statement on this point in *Grundriss zum Studium der Politischen Oekonomie*, by Prof. Dr. J. Konrad, Jena, 1900. Vol. 1, 32–35.

Would the world have been better off today if the Roman had confined his sway to his "Seven Hills" on the Tiber? I know of no recognized authority on Roman history who does not expressly or by implication answer in the negative. And the historian's answer is not essentially different with regard to Greece, France, England, and Germany.

These works of Dr. Jordan bring little useful information to the student. If there is a grain of truth in the theory they contain his real task was to isolate it so as to bring it into clear relief in order to determine its value in relation to the other factors involved in the larger problem. Had he followed this procedure he would have shown himself a true scientist. Instead he chose the rôle of the propagandist whose mission is to distort. To the scholar also there is only one unpardonable sin—infidelity to truth. Feeling that he has committed this sin the author naïvely seeks to disarm criticism by admitting exaggeration for the sake of effect. As the subject is essentially of a statistical nature this condemns the conclusion as nearly worthless. Having thus led his readers into the wilderness he leaves them there without chart or compass. For his method is as false as his conclusion. He covers up his tracks by citing his authorities in such a loose way as to make control all but impossible in most cases. His translations from foreign languages are often inaccurate. Sometimes this inaccuracy amounts to positive distortion. The key-sentence from Novicow printed on the title page of *The Human Harvest* is, "La guerre a produit de tout temps une selection à rebours." (War has at all times produced a reversed selection.) In Dr. Jordan's hands this becomes, "In all times war must reverse the process of selection," thus changing a judgment upon the past into a prophecy as to the future.[1]

On page 98 of *War and the Breed* we have one of the few exact citations, except for the page, to the source from which three

[1] This is not a mere quibble. Most wars of the past have been fought between armies composed of the strong and adventurous few so that there was something in the nature of the "weeding out of the best." So far as this supports the dysgenic theory the trouble must be ascribed to the volunteer system. Today war is waged by practically the whole able-bodied male population and the effect is necessarily different because the weaker members of these immense armies are, on the whole, the first to succumb, leaving the relatively strong to perpetuate the race. It is for this reason that Seeck favoured universal military service which Jordan condemns, though he was careful not to mention the fact that his chief authority held this view.

sentences are taken and translated, namely a biography of Ulrich von Hutten, by David F. Strauss. The first two sentences are from a letter of Luther to Spalatin, and are translated correctly as follows: "Yesterday I heard and read Franz von Sickingen's true and sorrowful story. God is a righteous and marvellous judge." Then follows a sentence from the biographer Strauss, "Sickingen's death is a verdict of God that strengthens the belief that force of arms must be held far from matters of the Gospel." Not only is the translation faulty and misleading in this sentence, but Dr. Jordan ascribes the words to Luther. If the sentence is by Luther then the judgment it contains must be referred to Sickingen as the original clearly shows. As reprinted by Jordan the original reads: "Sickingen's Unfall war ihm ein Gottesurtheil das ihn in der Ueberzeugung bestärkte, dass Waffengewalt von der Sache des Evangeliums ferne zu halten sei." (Sickingen's misfortune appeared to him a judgment of God which confirmed him in the conviction that force of arms must be kept distinct from the interests of the Gospel.) The correct translation would have made it clear that the sentence either could not have been by Luther or else that the pronoun *ihm* referred to Sickingen, and that the judgment on war and the Gospel was not Luther's but Sickingen's. Hence the mistranslation, unless we are to assume gross carelessness. Here again the reader is led to the door of a wrong conclusion, namely that Luther believed war to be unchristian. Luther was ordinarily a man of peace and did not think the interests of the Gospel could be directly furthered by war. But in political issues he did not oppose war as unchristian. One of the most furious incitements to war ever written was his address to the German princes in 1525 to crush the peasant uprising.

One or two blunders of this kind do not necessarily condemn a whole book. But the *Human Harvest* and *War and the Breed* are full of them from beginning to end so that Mr. G. G. Coulton of Cambridge, England, who has carefully examined them on this point, writes: "His professed translations from the German are extremely inaccurate. I have never had the misfortune to come across any book, written by a professed scientist, which treats its alleged authorities with such hopeless neglect of all scientific method." And again, "Such books as this bring science into contempt, without even helping the cause of real peace."

To sum up, these books of Dr. Jordan were not intended to

inform the reader, but expressly designed to mislead him. They are propagandist literature of a very low grade. On that point there can not be the slightest doubt. The author proves it by his one-sided and absolute statement of the disputed principles of heredity; by his shifting, without warning, from one school of biologists to the opposite school; by his chronic misuse of the authorities cited in support of his thesis; and by his systematic blinking of inconvenient facts. His misinterpretation of Seeck may have been unintentional in the *Human Harvest*. The repetition of the offence in *War and the Breed* is without the shadow of an excuse. For, when he made an address on "Eugenics and War" at Cambridge, England, in 1913, Mr. Coulton, in the discussion following the address, confronted him with Seeck's actual work and permitted him to see how flagrantly he had misrepresented him. Dr. Jordan was too shocked and confused to make any comment whatever. *War and the Breed* was published nearly two years after this incident and in it Seeck's work is used more extensively than in the *Human Harvest* to bolster up a position which he definitely and forcibly repudiates.

As things stand at present historians and sociologists are practically unanimous in their findings against the Jordan thesis. Still, a careful investigation into the subject of *Eugenics and War* might produce useful results. But no one who is not a scholar in spirit and equipment should undertake it.

CHARLES KUHLMAN.

Billings, Montana.

A STUDY IN IMMIGRATION

Emigration is now one of the most constant and orderly movements of human society, having grown thereto from the earliest days and from the most irregular of human impulses. Families, tribes or parts of tribes leave the place of their birth with a view of settling permanently in another land. They are emigrants in the country they leave and immigrants in the country to which they come. It is not only a going out with the fixed design of settling permanently in a new place of residence, in a new society, for labour, trade, and all of the purposes of civilized life, but it is more; it is the practical response which mankind has given in all ages to the command given to Adam and his children "to multiply and replenish the earth and subdue it." It is the necessary result of the increase of population within a limited though cherished space, and of the appointed destiny of the race, to people and develop this world of ours.

The natural law of population, though probably the deep underlying force of all emigration, is by no means the only important force causing the movement by which individuals, families, or even races of people have migrated from one part of the world to another. The conflicting interests of men, classes, and nations, racial instincts, famines with their intense pressure upon population, wars with their terrible toll of the best blood and treasure, compulsory and long military service during the most productive portions of a man's life, religious persecutions and religious fantasies, civil broils and political revolutions, the discovery of mines of precious metals or of fertile regions, the lure of genial climes, the love of adventure, and that perennial hunger and thirst for freedom and opportunity to better conditions, for a fair chance in the struggle of life, have all continued to create great tides of emigration. Nor do these work always in the same fashion. Famine in India, though oft recurring, has produced no considerable emigration; but the Irish famine in 1846 produced one of the most remarkable movements of peoples from one hemisphere to another in all the history of the world. As a result of that migration there are more Irishmen in the United States than in Ireland.

In modern times we have seen more and more these removals of individuals, families, and groups of people in large numbers, even without concert or distress, moving silently and intelligently, well knowing what they are leaving, whither they are going, and what they hope to achieve. From Asia the human tide flowed westward and northward through Europe, and thence to the new world on the farther side of the great waters. In America history repeated itself, and nearly four centuries passed before there was a general settlement of the Western to say nothing of the Pacific States, and even yet the great region of British Columbia is but little short of *terra incognita*. In fact, the immigrants and their descendants now possess the land. The Indians, the only people who can claim to be indigenous to this land, are now negligible in either numbers or importance.

While immigration has been the most potential factor in the development of this country, it is true that no official statistics of these great movements prior to 1820 exist. By the act of Congress March 2, 1819, collectors of customs were required to keep a record and make a return to the Treasury department of all passengers arriving in their respective districts from foreign ports. General history tells us that as early as 1700 a large number of Germans from the districts on the Rhine emigrated to America, most of them settling in Pennsylvania; some five thousand coming to that section in 1729. The earlier immigration, aside from the Germans already mentioned and the colony of the Dutch on Manhattan Island which dates from 1623 and some Scandinavian settlements, came from the British Isles. The outbreak of the revolution in 1775, of course, retarded immigration for a time. Following the breaking out of the European or Napoleonic wars and their continuance until 1815, the surplus population of Europe was absorbed by those conflicts for a period of about forty years.

Various estimates have been made of the number of immigrants into the United States prior to 1820. These range for the period between the landing of the Pilgrim Fathers in 1620 to 1820 from an average of 4000 to 7800 per year. Dr. Loring, of the Statistical Bureau, estimated that 250,000 immigrants came into the United States between 1775 and 1820. This would make an average of 5500 for those forty-five years. In 1820, the first year of the record made, there came 8,385 immigrants. The following years show a steady increase. In 1854, the year in

which my father brought his family here, the number of immigrants reached 427,833. The population of the United States, as shown by its census, was, in 1850, 23,191,876, of which 19,553,068 were white. In 1860 the total population was 31,443,321, of which 26,922,537 were white.

The large immigration during the period from 1840 to 1854 was due to a variety of causes, the principal of which were the Irish famine, the revolutions in Europe in 1848–1849, and the discovery of gold in California. After 1854 there was a gradual falling off until the first year of the Civil War, when the number was reduced to 91,920. The following year, 1862, strange to say, notwithstanding the Civil War and its doubtful outcome, the number was doubled. After the Civil War the tide of immigration set in very strongly to our shores, and in 1882 the arrivals aggregated 788,992. The total immigration from June 30, 1820, to the close of the fiscal year in 1893 was more than 20,000,000. This great influx of foreigners so affected conditions social, industrial, commercial, and political that all sorts of legislation restricting immigration was demanded.

By the act of Congress, 1882, a head tax was laid on every immigrant by sea, and commissioners were appointed to inspect vessels entering American ports, who were given power to prevent the landing of any "convict, lunatic, idiot, or person likely to become a public charge." Such persons were to be returned to the port whence they came at the cost of the owners of the vessel bringing them to this country. A law enacted in 1885 makes it unlawful to pay the transportation or to encourage in any way the immigration into this country of aliens under contract or agreement to perform labour in the United States. Subsequent amendments to this law in 1887, 1888, 1891 and 1893, 1894, 1895, 1900, 1902, 1903, 1904, and 1905, each served in turn more and more to restrict immigration, reducing the number as well as to improve the class of immigrants. To illustrate: The report for 1896 shows only 343,267 arrivals as against 603,322 in 1883. However, after 1896 the tide increased steadily again until it reached high-water mark in 1914 when the arrivals totalled 1,218,480.

In this period, which includes eighteen years before the present European war, the character of the immigration again changed most remarkably, there being a marked increase in the volume from Slavonic and Latin countries and a corresponding decrease

in the volume from the Germanic, Scandinavian countries, and the British Isles. To particularize: In 1913 Northern Europe, including Great Britain, sent us only 137,225 immigrants, while Southern Europe contributed 718,905, or more than five times as many. Then, too, the immigration from Northern Europe (excluding Russia) has become practically limited to Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain. Holland, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, and France have of late years contributed but few immigrants. In truth, France, Belgium, and Holland have at no time supplied us with more than a very small proportion; and for twenty years past, more immigrants have gone into Germany than have come out of it.

These changes are of profound importance to us as a nation. We are a composite people. In our great industrial and commercial cities north of the Ohio and Potomac rivers those of the populations who are either foreign born or are children of the foreign born aggregate from two thirds to three fourths of the entire population; while our census bureau estimates that the foreign-born population of the entire nation now aggregates 13,000,000, or more than one eighth of the total. In New England the people look with great alarm upon the marked and rapid change in the character of their population. The statistics presented are confessedly striking and astounding. Over one third of the present population of Boston is foreign born. The population of New England in 1910 was about 6,500,000 of which twenty-eight per cent. are foreign born. The foreign born in Massachusetts are thirty-one per cent. as against fifteen per cent. in the United States as a whole. In that State the foreign born, or children of foreign or mixed parentage, are two thirds of the total population. In the United States there are at least 3,000,000 people fifteen years of age and over who are unable to speak the English language, and ten per cent. of these are in New England. I recently read a statement made by Mr. Frank Trumbull, Chairman of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, in an address before the New England Society of New York City, in which he stated that a single Massachusetts town of less than 7,000 population includes representatives of at least twenty-one different nationalities, speaking as many different languages; and that there are 1269 foreign language newspapers in the United States, of which eighty-one are in New England, and printed in thirteen different languages.

Coupled with this large influx of illiterate aliens, we have multipled labour troubles which have occurred throughout the United States, and especially in these sections where illiteracy most prevails. It is true that in these troubles there has been manifested a disregard for property rights, but may we not pertinently inquire, how we can expect these foreigners to be profoundly impressed with respect for property if it happens, as is often the case, that their first experience on landing on American soil is to be mistreated and imposed upon.

In the same address to which I have alluded, this circumstance is recited:

"A few weeks ago the head of a large enterprise in New England told of a disturbance in a group of his workmen. He was asked to come out and talk with them, and did his best, but after a lengthy argument he was informed that the men did not understand a word he spoke. He then told the guards to push the men out of the plant. This simply increased the disturbance. He then ordered the guards to push the men back into the plant, and they all went to work and remained there thereafter."

He was compelled, however, to add there ought to be some better way to get men to work than by first pushing them out of the plant, and then pushing them back in again.

What is to be done with these illiterate aliens? At present the view taken by a majority of our people is to restrict immigration, reduce the *number* of immigrants admitted to our shores. We have developed no other remedy. Recognizing that the situation is bad, and knowing that in the past our policy and practice has been one of unrestricted immigration, with a resulting deluge of illiteracy and foreign customs and habits, our people are attempting the plan of *keeping out immigrants*, and as a means to this end we are applying a literacy test. That this plan is not well thought out, that it does not remedy the real trouble, ought to be apparent to any one having a speaking acquaintance with logic, but the fact is, we are about to enter upon such a course ignoring practically all the facts in the case except literacy. We overlook that the United States has been hitherto, and is yet, an undeveloped country. The foreigners now here have come on our pressing invitation to do a greatly needed work. They would not be here had the country not needed and called them. It still needs them. Before deciding upon a radical change of policy, we ought to make careful note of the fact that the tide has hanged, and that new conditions enter into the problem.

For several years it is estimated that from 300,000 to 400,000 foreign born have been returning from the United States to their native lands. In other words, a strong return current had set in, strengthened by the war and its call to the colors. More people have left the United States than have come into it. Every steamer for some time has carried, as a large part of its quota of passengers, men who are returning. During the year ending June 30, 1915, the increase of our population, due to immigration, was only 50,070 and during the period from June 30 to September 30, 1915, there was a net decrease of 5207. The figures for 1916 are not yet available, but the net decrease must be considerably in excess of those for 1915.

Compulsory military service in Europe and the closing of many of its ports have placed an embargo upon those who would if permitted come hither. Undoubtedly this condition will continue until the close of the war. What will be the situation after the war? Until its close the results must remain a matter of conjecture.

Two theories are each strongly advanced. Some insist that irrespective of which group of nations is beaten in the conflict of arms, Europe must gird up its loins and repair the wreck and ravage of war. Each nation must so far as possible prohibit the emigration of their strong, capable, efficient men and women. Their energies must be devoted to the rehabilitation of their waste places, the rebuilding of their homes, mills, factories, places of business, roads and means of transportation; the re-establishment of their industries and commerce, the regaining, so far as possible, of their lost trade, markets, and place in the various peaceful pursuits interrupted by this terrible struggle. In other words, of necessity they will to the utmost organize to keep their capable people at home and employed in constructive work. We saw what was done without previous organization at San Francisco after the earthquake a few years ago. We may readily infer what Great Britain and Germany may do with their superb organization and capacity.

In this connection it is well to remember that Germany is the most highly socialized country in the world. She owns her own railroads, express, telephone, and telegraph lines. The various German states also own and operate their great mines and some of the important industries, such as (if my memory serves me right) the potash industry, smelting works, hydro-electric power

stations, and public service instrumentalities generally. The Empire owns the docks, harbours, canals, and waterways. It also owns large agricultural estates and a variety of other enterprises.

It is this marvellous organization and all-round effectiveness, which has made Germany so wonderfully prepared and capable for this the greatest war in the history of the world, in which she is pitted almost single-handed against the greater part of Europe.

I have seen it authoritatively stated that more than 3,000,000 men were employed by Germany in her civil service at the outbreak of the war, earning each year $280,000,000 in various state undertakings, with an aggregate annual output of seven billion dollars. These wonderful resources, this organization and capacity must be taken into the account if we purpose intelligently to estimate or analyze the conditions which are to obtain after the war.

In Great Britain the same general forces will be set in powerful movement. Already the railways, factories, and manufacturing plants have been commandeered and only a few weeks ago, under new laws, vast quantities of wheat in store at British American points were taken over by that government. What is true of Germany and England is also true of France and some of the other European countries.

The thoughtful observer can already plainly see that war has changed the whole thought and policy of the countries engaged in this terrific struggle. At times like these changes of vital importance are quickly made—changes which in times of peace would require generations are accomplished in a few months. The necessities of these countries will be, if they are not already, overwhelming. Germany has foreseen and acted on these necessities for forty years. The other nations engaged are having their eyes opened and are beginning to realize their needs. Everywhere vast stretches of waste must be rebuilt and a new, definite program of social, industrial, and political rehabilitation entered upon with a vigour and determination born of compulsion to accomplish the stupendous task. When we consider the play of these tremendous forces and influences, we shall be inclined to consider as not even improbable the suggestion already made, that the terms Old World and New World, as applied to the Eastern and Western hemispheres, may be reversed; and that in the generation following this war the United States, proceeding along

the way it has pursued in industry, commerce, social life, and government, will be in fact the "*Old World*," and Europe, born anew of this great struggle, will enter upon a new life, economic, social, and political, and become the "*New World*."

. . . . . .

State socialism, on a scale hitherto not even dreamed of, is most likely to be one of the most important *by-products* of this war. Contrary to the accepted thought, socialism in such a situation will develop more rapidly, surely, and successfully in Europe than it is possible in America. It is precisely such a situation that would afford an acid test of a republic—the strain would of necessity come at its weakest point.

Again reports indicate that at least 5,000,000 able-bodied men have already been killed and wounded in this war. Who can even estimate the loss of life which shall yet occur? Certain it is that this enormous loss will occasion a vacuum, never before experienced in the field of labour. Industry will in every line find great difficulty in securing labour; factory, farm, mine, transportation, and commerce will each suffer and cry out for the want of men who will be needed, not only for the work which was being done before the war but for the work of replacing that which has been destroyed, to say nothing of the new work demanded. The shortage must result in an unprecedented rise in wages, especially in all the lines of skilled labour.

In addition, all European life will be discouraged and suffering from the strain and exhaustion of this terrible conflict. Even those who return to peaceful pursuits will do so with the old traditions and the disposition to yield obedience to custom and authority seriously impaired or destroyed. This means wholesale disorganization. Will not all this cause a strong swelling of the current which had already set in before the war from America back to Northern Europe, and will it not especially lure the most capable, effective, the genius for invention and organization, and all-round capacity for accomplishment?

Then, too, those who return to Europe will take with them their accumulations. Will they not in large number having gone back, acquire homes and holdings there and spend the rest of their lives in the fatherland? Will not the same spirit and prospect which led them to emigrate in the first place, hold them in the place of their nativity where the changed conditions secure for

them precisely those things for which they risked all in the days of their youth? The ambition for betterment and the homing instinct—will they not combine to hold them in the homes of their youth and middle life? Will not their children be inclined to remain where they find wage and other conditions so favourable?

. . . . . .

But on the other hand there is a phase of this subject which is worthy of careful thought and, in my judgment, makes one of the most serious problems in immigration we have ever faced. At the close of this war there will be many million widows and dependents, most of them children and old people of both sexes, who will be without homes or means and who must be cared for. They will not be wanted by any of the nations that now have each other by the throats. They will be only a burden during the period of reconstruction—a heavy one which too many will desire to cast off. Millions of these have friends and relatives in the United States to whom they will appeal in piteous tones and with outstretched arms. Especially will this be true of the inhabitants of Russian Poland, Armenia, and the Balkans, and of the Jews, who have for two thousand years been without a country but who suffer perhaps more than any others in the lands where cannon are heard today. War is always hardest on the Jews. They have as a people no voice in government, and everywhere are they subjects of personal and official ostracism and discrimination if not persecution. As one compensation for this situation, which is a disgrace to every land under the sun, we must note that Jews always help each other as no other people do, and nowhere is this creditable assistance more freely extended than here where organized agencies exist to distribute and care for and find useful employment for these unfortunate and dependent people.

The Slavic and most Latin countries of Europe have not experienced the effects of state socialization we have noted in Great Britain, Germany, and France. Southern Europe has a larger peasant population. Much of their region has been and more will be fought over. Their live stock will have been almost entirely commandeered—their homes and implements destroyed —their lands laid waste. Hope will be at a low ebb and grief and despair stalk abroad by night and noonday. It is an axiom of economics that such conditions result in lower wages, a lower standard of living, and retrogression generally. It is clear that

immigration from the more unfortunate countries, with their less desirable population, will be to the United States, and be very heavy. Where else can they go but to America? Friends and relatives here will assist them and hold out hope of what they may do here where so many millions of the downtrodden of Europe have found an asylum and good fortune. It is only necessary to have a little acquaintance with the operations of the banks of our country where there is a foreign population to realize the large proportion of immigrants who come here assisted by relatives and friends who have made for themselves homes among us.

Again the millions in the trenches during this war, taken as they were from the farm, shop, and mine, will in the army have experienced a freedom and change they have never before enjoyed. By this association with comrades and by being largely thrown upon their own resources, they will acquire an initiative and a breadth of view to which they had previously been strangers. With this will come a spirit of independence and an ambition to lead a broader life, and a corresponding refusal to be satisfied with the old conditions. This will beget a restlessness which will result in change and an inclination to take up a new life.

Further, a population at least four times that of the United States will be in a condition closely approaching, if not reaching, a condition of financial chaos. The old order will never be re-established. When the war closes, the old world will be in a state of flux. National boundaries will be more or less changed—some nations may lose their identity. In this situation millions will turn a wistful gaze to America—now the land of political and social liberty and till now, comparatively speaking, not exorbitantly taxed. A land happily separated by an ocean on either side from any country with the capacity seriously to endanger it. How many of these unfortunates will be impelled to come here for a new chance in this new western world?

. . . . . .

What course shall we pursue in this case? What changes, if any, should we make in our immigration laws in view not only of the present but of what we may reasonably anticipate as the result of this war? We are still a new, growing country, needing labour to develop it. This labour must in part come from abroad. Much of that labour is illiterate but useful nevertheless. It were

better if educated, but no great evil has befallen us because of its illiteracy. Our trouble with immigrants thus far has been with the evil disposed and transient classes. Literacy is no test of those qualities which make for good citizenship. The real problem is how to Americanize those who come.

Am I not entirely within reason when I insist that the real remedy essentially involves three concrete things: first, free education; second, American standards of living; third, higher and better standards and methods for the rite and ceremony of naturalization?

Those who have come, have done and are doing much for America. Those who are yet to come may do even more. In return for what they have done, and shall yet do, we owe at least an earnest, intelligent effort to help them become genuine and prized Americans.

To prevent immigration into the United States of those who cannot read or write, or, in other words, to submit to what is called the educational test, is not a novel proposal. This is the fourth time in about twenty years that such a measure has been considered by our Congress and presidents. Similar bills have been passed by Congress and vetoed by Presidents Cleveland and Taft, and for the second time by President Wilson. With this reversal of policy we shall close our doors to those who for three hundred years have found America to be the asylum for the well disposed and oppressed of every land. We shall demand that all other doors stand wide ajar and ours only be closed.

Our laws as they now stand deny admission to those who are weak, afflicted with infectious or contagious diseases, those with a record as criminals and those who are likely to become a public charge. There is no assertion that these laws have not been fairly enforced, no fear they will not be duly enforced in the future. Last year more than sixteen thousand were turned back from our ports because they came within the classes to whom the law denies admission. Do we need further laws? During my service in Congress a number of important questions on this subject arose, and it became my duty to take a positive attitude. I then stood, and now stand, for the following fundamental propositions:

Bona-fide immigrants to this country may in the main be classified as follows:

(1) Those who come for the purposes of study or travel.

(2) Those who come to labour or engage in business temporarily, expecting to return to their native land with their earnings when their temporary purposes have been effected.

(3) Those who come here for the purpose of making this country their permanent home and becoming citizens.

Persons of the first class, and who are otherwise unobjectionable, should find here an open door for all the purposes of a legitimate traveller or student. They should be treated hospitably, with all reasonable consideration as guests, so long as they demean themselves as guests should.

With respect to the second, or transient, class, the temporary labourer or business man, the Government should be free, through its administrative department, from time to time to make such rules and regulations as would best conserve the interests of our own people. As to these rules the President should be allowed great latitude in the exercise of his good judgment, and from his decision there should be no appeal.

With respect to the third class, or those who came here with the avowed purpose of becoming citizens, the following conditions should be prescribed:

(*a*) The immigrant should be physically sound and capable of earning his living.

(*b*) He should be morally clean.

(*c*) He should be favourably disposed to the institutions of our country.

I would require no further qualification, and certainly none relating to creed, colour, race, or station in life. I would impose neither a literacy nor financial test or condition. Those who do not come *bona fide* and for a commendable purpose, those whose presence would be an injury to our people here, should be denied admission.

To effect these purposes a plain, simple law expressing these fundamental propositions should be enacted. By way of enforcement I suggest that an immigrant before embarking be required to submit satisfactory proof to a regularly accredited consul or minister of the United States that he falls within one of the classes named, and obtain from the consul or minister so passing on the proofs a certificate to the effect indicated.

To carry this plan into practical effect would require a recasting of our consular and diplomatic service. As that service now is, with a few honourable exceptions, its principal function is to

afford a lying-in hospital for political unfortunates. In my view, with the impending situation, to which I have alluded, there will be occasion and need to inaugurate and maintain a well trained consular service, made up of men who know our own United States and also the country and people where they serve, experts in commerce and development, men of broad views who grasp what is involved in the wise intercourse of nations, and who possess the initiative to make this effective for the general good.

The policy and practice suggested would, I think, be consistent with the spirit and genius of our country, and exemplify the sentiment of a great people who prize liberty as a means of securing the opportunity to lead worthy lives; who, gladly extending a genuine welcome to all in sympathy with their institutions and the aspirations of its founders, will not jeopardize their great heritage by admitting to their fellowship those who are at variance with those principles and institutions.

E. J. HAINER.

Lincoln, Nebraska.

THE ENGLISH IN EGYPT

In the minds of many fairly well informed persons, Egypt is placed as a part of the British Empire. It is classed with India, Australia, and South Africa, as more or less a self-governing country and yet subject to the King and Parliament of Great Britain.

The fact is, the Government of Great Britain has never laid claim to sovereign power in Egypt. From time to time various persons responsible for British policy have declared that England has no other purpose in Egypt than to prepare its inhabitants for self-government. They claim to be in Egypt for the good of the Egyptians, or, in other words, they are in Egypt bearing a portion of the "white man's burden."

The position of the British in Egypt is spoken of as a relation unique among the peoples of the world, and so it seems to be. The relation of the British to the Government of the Soudan is entirely different from its relation to the Government of Egypt, and it also is unique. This, of course, is a matter of interest, but it is not surprising, for is not the whole British scheme of government, local and imperial, a thing different from the governmental machinery of any other people or empire? Hard and fast constitutional limitations, statutes, or even traditions seem to have no place in the Anglo-Saxon conception of government. Canada, Australia, India, South Africa, and a score of other dependencies of the Empire, each has a relation to the central government peculiar to itself.

Even Scotland's relation to the Empire is not quite the same as that of England, and now an entirely new experiment is to be tried in Ireland. Is it possible, indeed is it not very probable, that it is just this flexibility and adaptability, this absence of subjection to "the letter that killeth," which makes British governmental machinery work so smoothly in all quarters of the great Empire?

Egypt is a part of the Turkish Empire, and in theory the Khedive is a vassal of the Sultan of Turkey.[1] So far as formal

[1] The Khedive was declared independent of Turkey at the beginning of the war. The English position in Egypt, however, remains much the same as before.

treaties or agreements are concerned, the English representative in Cairo is on exactly the same footing as that of France or any other great power represented at the Khedival court, and yet in fact, in all important matters, England governs Egypt. Under the Sultan the Khedive is supreme. He has a cabinet of ministers whom he appoints and who exercise the functions delegated to them, as do ministers in other countries. At no point is there any connection or contact between the Government at Cairo and that at London, and yet the English govern Egypt. The governmental voice is that of the Khedive, but the arm that governs is that of the British agent. How England's influence in Egypt and England's occupation of Egypt (for England maintains an army there) began and how it has continued, is not a very long story. Except as it touches the Soudan, it is not a romantic or thrilling tale. The English seem to have blundered into Egypt in a manner contrary to all their previous declarations and apparent intentions, and since that time to have sustained a relation to the government of the country contrary to all precedent.

It is easy for present-day historians, particularly Germans, to call the English occupation a deep scheme of British statesmen, but the Englishman insists that it is all an accident, and that some day he will probably retire just as awkwardly and with just the same lack of precedent as marked his entry.

The story of Egypt is full of intense interest, whether you gather it from brief references in Jewish or other Semitic traditions, or read it in the boastful records of her rulers, inscribed on pyramid, obelisk, temple, and tomb. In these latter years much has been conjectured, and some things proven, but most of Egypt's story of the past is yet to be revealed, and perhaps the English occupation will be only one more obscure chapter for the archæologist of fifty centuries hence.

The temples and the tombs; the art and the architecture of ancient Egypt, fill the thoughtful traveller with endless wonder and admiration. One might well wish for a life that could be devoted to unravelling the mysteries and interpreting the records handed down on granite, clay, and papyrus. But while contemplating the wonders of Ancient Egypt, my mind continually reverts to the Egypt—to the Egyptian—of today, to the land watered and fertilized by the same river and cultivated in much the same fashion as in the days of the mighty Pharaohs, and to the people in every feature so strikingly like the mummies placed

in their tombs thousands of years ago. How happens it that a people with such a history as that of Egypt, pays tribute to a foreign sovereign, is nominally ruled by an alien prince, and is actually governed by a people foreign alike in race and religion and as different in every quality of mind as any two peoples of our little planet?

As far as the East is from the West, so far is the Egyptian separated from the Englishman. Lord Cromer quotes approvingly:

"Those who have been in the East and have tried to mingle with the native population, know well how utterly impossible it is for the European to look at the world with the same eyes as the Oriental. For a while, indeed, the European may fancy that he and the Oriental understand one another, but sooner or later a time comes when he is suddenly awakened from his dream, and finds himself in the presence of a mind, which is as strange to him as would be the mind of an inhabitant of Saturn."

At another place he says, while discussing the people of Egypt: "The European and the Oriental reasoning from the same premises, will often arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions." How happens it that the English govern and govern in such an indirect and irregular manner a people with such a history, so alien in race and religion and so opposite in every mental and moral quality? Is England directing wisely this half-unwilling, altogether unsympathetic, and only half-appreciative people? Is she bringing to them present benefits and future blessings? In ages to come are the Egyptians in particular and the people of the world in general, to be better or worse because of the English occupation?

Egypt was conquered by the Turks in 1517 and ever since has continued to be a part of the Turkish Empire. Mohammed Ali, an Albanian Turk who was sent to Egypt as a captain, became Pasha in 1805. He defeated the English, carried on a successful campaign in Arabia, and twice defeated the Turks. Had not England and Austria intervened he would doubtless have secured absolute independence for Egypt. What he did secure was the sovereignty of Egypt for himself and family, subject to an annual tribute of £318,930. In 1866 and 1873 Ismail, by purchase and coercion, obtained further concessions from Turkey and at that time the annual tribute was increased to £700,000. Ismail was a good spender and European intervention was directly due to his extravagance.

To be sure the French had attempted the conquest of Egypt, thinking thereby to cripple England in the Mediterranean and in India, and while that adventure may have drawn the attention of England more particularly to Egypt, it had no direct connection with the intervention which began during the reign of Ismail.

In 1863, at the close of Said Pasha's reign, the debt of Egypt was £3,293,000. By 1876 the debt had reached almost ninety-five million pounds, and with nothing substantial to show for the money except the Suez Canal, which had cost sixteen million pounds. It is easy to say that European governments had no right to interfere in the affairs of Egypt merely because the Government of Egypt was unable to meet its financial obligations. In the case of Egypt the debt was a governmental obligation. The ruler of Egypt who borrowed and spent the money, was an educated man who seemed to know what he wanted. It is not fair to say that Ismail had not always received full value for the bonds he issued, that he paid exorbitant rates of interest, that renegade Europeans had helped him to squander the money, etc., and that therefore he should not have been compelled to pay. He wanted a big army, less interference from Turkey, canals, railroads, all the things good and bad which European monarchs indulged in, and when he no longer would or could pay the bills, it was right and proper that someone should step in and put his affairs in order. To this arrangement he agreed, but in a little while he tired of restraint, dismissed the Europeans who were trying to put his house in order, and as a result lost his throne.

Mr. Stephen Cave had been sent to Egypt by the English Government in 1876 and in his report gave his opinion of Egypt's condition as follows:

> "Egypt may be said to be in a transition state, and she suffers from the defects of the system out of which she is passing, as well as from those of the system into which she is attempting to enter. She suffers from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste, and extravagance of the East, such as have brought her suzerain to the verge of ruin, and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilization of the West."

The Government of Egypt suspended payment in the spring of 1876. About this time or a little earlier, a National bank under foreign control was suggested, and France and Italy each appointed a commissioner but England declined to take part, Lord

Derby declaring that he did not wish to interfere with Egypt's internal affairs. The plan was dropped, but a little later a decree was issued constituting "a Commission of the Public Debt," the commissioners to act as the representatives of the bondholders. The French, Austrian, and Italian governments each named a representative, but again the British Government declined to take part. Instead of placing a representative on the commission the British Government sent Mr. Goschen to Cairo to represent the interests of the English bondholders. Mr. Goschen was accompanied by Mr. Joubert to represent French interests. As a result of the work of these gentlemen the debt was somewhat reduced and refunded. The fiscal administration of the country was reorganized and two controllers-general were appointed, one to supervise the revenue and the other the expenditures. In all this the Khedival Government, probably from necessity, acquiesced, and two Europeans were appointed to these positions. By the same arrangement the revenues from the railways and the port of Alexandria were put under the control of a board composed of two Englishmen, two Egyptians, and one Frenchman. Even yet the English Government declined to take any official action, contenting itself with the statement that it had no objections to offer.

About the same time the Egyptian Government again asked the English Government to appoint a Commissioner on the Public Debt, and the British Government again declining, Mr. Goschen, as the representative of the English creditors, was appealed to. Mr. Goschen named Mr. Baring, and thus commenced Lord Cromer's long and invaluable service in Egypt.

It is well to keep in mind the fact that while the representatives of the continental powers serving the Egyptian Government were official, the English representatives had no official support from their Government.

Lord Cromer says that the commissioners soon found that they were facing an impossible task. The government of the country remained in the Khedive's hands. His agents collected the taxes and handled the money in the treasury; there was no responsible ministry; about one fifth of all the land in the country had become the personal property of the Khedive; taxes were collected in the most arbitrary and cruel manner. Confiscation, torture, and even death were resorted to by the collectors. Schemes for extorting money were not limited by laws or gov-

ernmental decrees, but were as numerous and varied as the many officials and collectors could conceive.

About the same time a low Nile brought on two years of poor crops. The bondholders clamoured for their interest and the general creditors for payment of their claims, but the treasury was empty. The English Government was averse to coercion, but the French Government felt differently. The British finally yielded and the pound of flesh was demanded. The tax-collector went forth and by schemes uneconomic and cruel secured the money to pay the interest due. But matters had reached a crisis and the Commissioners practically threatened to strike unless a thorough inquiry into all the affairs of government should be ordered and faithfully carried out. To this scheme the Khedive was finally forced to yield.

The Commission made a thorough investigation of things political as well as economic and financial, and as a result a responsible ministry was provided and a part of the lands held by the Khedive personally surrendered to the state. European ministers were appointed and the foreigners were thus brought into direct contact with the people.

Ismail assented to all the reforms proposed and then immediately began intriguing to make them of no effect. He finally dismissed his European ministers and made every effort to restore old conditions, while at the same time talking loudly for radical reforms. The Commissioners had devised a reformed scheme for raising revenue, scaled down a part of the debt, and reduced the rate of interest, but the Khedive, assuming to scorn the suggestion of repudiation, proposed an alternative revenue scheme which was practically a return to the old barbaric means of extorting money. The final result was that the concert of powers demanded Ismail's abdication, to which, after some bluffing, he assented on June 26, 1879. He was succeeded by his son Tewfik.

Up to this time in the relations of the representatives of the Powers with the Egyptian Government, the initiative had almost always been taken by the agents of England and France, and yet Austria, Italy, and Germany were not inactive. Indeed, in one important emergency it was Germany that was most insistent upon prompt action. For a time the British Government was very reluctant to put pressure upon the Egyptian Government, insisting that it was not the business of the Government to

press the claims of her citizens against another Government. The position of the British Government at that time was much the same as that taken by those Americans today who insist that it is not our business to interfere in the affairs of Mexico because the financial interests of our citizens are jeopardized.

Lord Cromer thus states the case:

"As regards local policy (in Egypt) the British had never espoused the cause of the bondholders so warmly as the French Government. On the contrary a just consideration for the interests of the Egyptian people had always tempered any support given to the foreign creditors. As regards general policy it had for years been the tradition of the London Foreign office that British subjects who invested their money in a foreign country must do so at their own risk. They could not rely on any energetic support in the enforcement of their claims."

When finally the British policy was reversed as to Egypt, and Britain assumed the leading part in the direction of Egyptian affairs, the change was made not so much in the interest of English bondholders, but because Britain could not afford to see any other European power dominate Egyptian affairs, thereby threatening British communication with the Far East.

So long as India, Australia, New Zealand, etc., are parts of the British Empire, control of the Suez Canal and the route through Egypt is as essential to that Empire as control of the Panama Canal is to our own country. The Government of Turkey was not satisfied with Tewfik as ruler of Egypt, but insisted upon the right to select another Khedive. The English and French were, however, insistent not only that Tewfik should be ruler, but that all the independence which had been secured by force, by diplomacy, and by bribery, should be conceded, and Turkey had, of course, to yield.

Soon after Tewfik's assumption of power the Prime Minister addressed a joint note to the representatives of England and France, expressing the hope that if Controllers-General were nominated under the decree of 1876, their functions would be limited and that they would not be invested with any administrative and legislative powers. The response was a characteristic diplomatic reply: "The two governments accepted in principle His Highness's offer to re-establish the office of Controllers-General and stated that the details respecting their powers and functions would form the subject of a further communication."

The French Government named M. de Blignieres and the

English Government Mr. Baring. The Controllers decided not to demand any part in the direct government of Egypt, but to ask for general powers of supervision and inspection, trusting to the exercise of personal influence to do the rest. The decree issued by the Khedive fixing their status, followed the above suggestions and gave them seats in the Council of Ministers, but no vote. It was also agreed that the Controllers should not be dismissed without the consent of their respective governments. Lord Cromer lays much emphasis upon the statement that at this time he and his French colleague made every effort to merit and secure the goodwill and confidence of the Egyptian Government and people. The Prime Minister, Riaz Pasha, was a reformer himself and he fully appreciated the need of foreign assistance, but he was nevertheless jealous and sensitive on the subject of foreign interference.

The Controllers seemed to feel that one of their first duties was to protect the Egyptian Government and people from the exactions of unreasonable creditors, and in turn to protect the Egyptian people from the exactions of an arbitrary government. For a time Egyptian affairs seemed to run smoothly. System and justice were injected into fiscal affairs, the relations of the Controllers-General and the Government were pleasant and the country was prosperous. In 1880 Mr. Baring was transferred to India and Sir Auckland Colvin succeeded him in Egypt.

Early in January, 1881, there was a mutiny in the army led by Colonel Ahmed Arabi. The mutineers soon dictated terms to the Government and the final result was the Arabi rebellion. The mutiny seemed to originate in the just grievances of the army, but as it progressed took on a wider scope, leading to the formation of a formidable party opposed to the Khedive and all foreign interference.

The country was threatened with anarchy. The English and French governments were agreed in their desire to maintain order, and in the opinion that the Khedive must be supported, but on the question as to how this was to be done they differed radically. The English held to the opinion that if force were necessary it were best to have it come from the Sultan of Turkey, whose overlordship was acknowledged; whereas, the French were determined that there should be no interference on the part of the Turks but that France and England should exercise whatever force became necessary. To this view England finally

yielded, and at a most critical time joined in a note to the Khedive, which, if it meant anything, promised him armed support in his struggle with threatened revolution. This note only aggravated the situation and increased the fanaticism of the revolutionists. After this decided position had been taken by France and England, a change of ministry took place in France, and immediately the policy of France was reversed. In the meantime Arabi was having his way in Egypt. He had been made minister of war. The anti-foreign agitation had gone so far that a number of Europeans had been killed and many thousands had fled from the country. Arabi was in effect bidding defiance to all Europe. All the correspondence and negotiations seem to prove that England was sincerely desirous of avoiding direct interference. She urged first that Turkey should be advised to interfere and if that could not be brought about that the Powers should act jointly. She was particularly insistent up to the last hour that France should join in any show of force found necessary.

But France declined and finally England acted alone. Alexandria was bombarded and English troops landed. Then there were further negotiations looking to joint action with Turkey, but they came to nothing, and finally England again acted alone. Arabi was defeated; the rebellion was crushed. English troops were in Cairo sustaining the Government of the Khedive and there they have remained to this day, and there they are likely to remain indefinitely.

Many Englishmen, perhaps a majority, thought that with the suppression of the Arabi rebellion, England's work in Egypt was accomplished, and that nothing remained but to withdraw the English troops. A few months, or at most a few years, would see the end of British occupation. Those who talked in that fashion were for the most part moved by the best intentions or sentiments but they did not reason; they only theorized and theorized without regard to stubborn facts. Fortunately there were Englishmen in London and Cairo who understood that there was real work to do in Egypt, work that would redound to Britain's finebet and at the same time to the benefit of civilization, and that above all would save Egypt from anarchy.

At this time there was much talk of a representative government and other democratic institutions. Lord Dufferin was sent to Egypt to investigate and report upon what measures were necessary to insure stability and progress. He was asked to

devise a plan for the complete rehabilitation of the country and at the same time one that would not be inconsistent with the speedy withdrawal of the British troops. Lord Cromer remarks, in referring to Lord Dufferin's mission: "It was not the first time that an endeavour had been made on the banks of the Nile to make bricks without straw."

Lord Dufferin of course reported that the withdrawal of Europeans from the Egyptian service would be a calamity frightful to contemplate. In deference to British public opinion Lord Dufferin suggested a certain development of free institutions, but added:

> "A paper constitution is proverbially an unsatisfactory device. Few institutions have succeeded that have not been the outcome of slow growth and gradual development; but in the East even the germs of constitutional freedom are non-existent. Despotism not only destroys the seeds of liberty, but renders the soil on which it has trampled incapable of growing the plant."

Cromer quotes Manzoni as having said in the early days of Italy's struggle for unity "that his country must be morally healed before it could be politically regenerated."

The Egyptian Fellah was accustomed to gather and thresh his grain by hand and cultivate his land with a hoe and primitive plough just as his ancestors had done for thousands of years. He might learn to use the steam plough, the harvester, and the thresher, but not for generations would he even desire such knowledge if left to himself. Accustomed to the three "Cs" the *Courbash*, the *Corvee*, and Corruption, how could he, without assistance, establish justice and mercy? His only conception of government that embodied in an absolute ruler by the will of Allah, what could he know of the duties and obligations of a free citizen?

The English might have done one of several things. They might have withdrawn absolutely and left Egypt to anarchy or absorption by some other power; they might have annexed the country to the Empire, or they might have established a protectorate. But in the end they did none of these things. They remained in Egypt, not to govern as any other nation or people has ever been governed, but nevertheless in all essentials to guide and direct and to insure protection and prosperity to the millions of common people who throughout almost countless ages had known nothing but cruel oppression.

The joint Anglo-French control came to an end. France objected and sulked for many years, but it was doubtless fortunate for all concerned that the British Government was firm. Both England and France seem to succeed fairly well in governing or controlling Orientals, but by methods so different that they could not work together without friction.

Mr. Baring was at this juncture recalled from India to represent the British Government at Cairo, and it was he who for many years to a very large degree was arbiter between a despotic government and its subjects and the creditors of both. It cannot be disputed that to Lord Cromer and his associates belongs the credit for the great things done in Egypt; the greatest of which has been the establishment of justice and security for the Fellaheen.

Lord Cromer insists that the British were in Egypt without protest from any nation of Europe except Turkey, and with the approval of all Europe except Turkey and France. He adds that the English were hailed with delight by the lawful rulers of the land and by the mass of the Egyptian people. The Khedive, of course, had abundant reason for rejoicing, for he owed his throne in the first place to the English and French, for had it not been for English soldiers and ships he certainly would have lost it to Arabi or the Turks. But there is some reason to think that Lord Cromer spoke without his usual caution when he said that the mass of the Egyptian people were glad to have the English with them. It is doubtful whether the great majority of the Egyptian people had a well-defined opinion on any broad subject of government, and it is not at all probable that at that period they distinguished between the English and other foreigners who to them were all inferiors because Christians and not Moslems.

When Lord Cromer wrote, "He (the Englishman) was convinced that his mission was to save Egyptian society and moreover that he was able to save it," he doubtless had a strong personal conviction and masterful purpose. If England at this juncture had banished the Khedive and the Pashas, cut loose from Turkey, abolished the mixed tribunals and the Capitulations, in a word taken over the government *in toto*, the task ahead would have been comparatively simple. But England was committed to the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, she was responsible for the Khedive, she had made pledges to other European governments, and above all, public opinion in England

was strongly against taking over the country. What the Englishman did was to throw to the winds all political reasoning and so called fundamental principles of government. He said, "I will not interfere with the Government of Egypt, but I will see that Egypt is well governed. I will not give orders, but I will give advice in very firm language." Nominally the representative in Cairo of any of the great Powers has as much authority as the British representative, but practically the Britisher is in control. To quote again from Cromer,—"He (the Englishman) would act with all the practical common sense, the scorn of theory, and the total absence of any fixed plan based on logical reasoning, which are the distinguishing features of his race."

It may be well to state, briefly, the nature of the government the Englishman found in Egypt, and through which he has had to direct the affairs of that country.

In the first place, Egypt is a part of the Ottoman Empire and subject to the Sultan. The semi-independence of Egypt was first obtained and maintained by force, purchase, and bribery, and has lately been maintained by the diplomacy and power of the British. Egypt sends no representatives to foreign countries; all Egyptians are Ottoman subjects; the size of the army is limited; no ships of war may be constructed and an annual tribute of about three million dollars is paid. The Khedive is supreme in all internal affairs and governs through a council of ministers who have charge of departments similar to those in other modern governments.

The country is divided into provinces, each of which has a local council of from three to eight members, who are elected by universal suffrage. There is a legislative council composed of thirty-four members, fourteen, including the president, named by the government, fourteen elected by the local councils from their own members and one each from the six largest cities and towns. The assembly is composed of eighty-two members made up of the six ministers, the thirty members of the council, and forty-six delegates who are elected by the people. No decrees can be promulgated which have not been submitted to the council, but the council can only discuss; it cannot veto a decree. If it does not approve, the decree may be promulgated without approval, but in that event the government must give its reasons for not agreeing with the council. The council may not even dis-

cuss matters relating to the budget which are imposed upon the treasury by international agreement.

The assembly must also be consulted by the government in regard to all public works, loans, taxes, etc., and in addition it may express its views upon subjects or proposals not submitted by the government. As in the case of the council, the government need not conform to the will of the assembly, but if it disagrees it must give its reasons for dissent. The council and assembly were established by a Khedival decree in 1883 and were the result of Lord Dufferin's mission to which we have referred. Lord Dufferin seems to have had no illusions as to the fitness of Egypt for self-government. The scheme seems to be a concession to the democratic instincts of the English public and at the same time sufficiently conservative to insure a stable government. It will admit of elasticity and progress without radical change in form. If the Egyptian people are capable of developing self-government it will be shown in the council and assembly and these bodies will gradually assume importance and power. It is easy to believe that the time may come when neither Khedive nor ministry would dare to disregard the will of the council or assembly were they convinced that the will of these bodies was backed by the people of Egypt. On the other hand, so long as the people show no capacity for self-government the Khedive and his ministry will rule.

In discussing the work of the assemblies, Lord Cromer says that in most cases the enlightened members have not acquired the courage to express their true opinions. He remarks that while to Europeans it may seem a contradiction, "the freedom of speech is checked by the freedom of the press." We have heard of such a condition nearer home.

To quote again from Lord Cromer: "The purely Egyptian portion of the machinery of government would never get into motion were it not impelled by some strong motive power. The motive power is furnished by the British officials in the service of the Egyptian Government." These officials may be ministers, they may be secretaries, under secretaries, or simply advisers, or experts. They are nominated by the British Government or its agent in Cairo and in most cases their will finally becomes the rule. The subordinate places in the government are sometimes filled by English or other Europeans, but to an increasing extent by Egyptians. The Egyptian army is under an English Com-

mander-in-chief, whose Egyptian title is Sirdir. Most of the superior officers are British, while the subordinate officers are Egyptian or Turko-Egyptian. In the civil service in 1896, 8444 Egyptians and 690 Europeans were employed. In 1906 the figures were 12,027 Egyptians and 1252 Europeans. Of the increase in Europeans 303 were in the railway service where it is considered absolutely necessary for the safety of the service that Europeans be employed.

But in addition to the governmental machinery operating in Egypt which we have outlined and which would seem to be sufficiently complicated, there are wheels within wheels which further confuse the situation. One of these extra governmental bodies is the "Commission of the Public Debt." I have no late information, but the Egyptian Government was to have an opportunity to abolish this commission when the debt was refunded in 1912, and I have no doubt the privilege was exercised, as the commission was always regarded by the English as an embarrassment. It at first consisted of an Englishman, a Frenchman, an Italian, and an Austrian, and later a German and Russian were added.

The commission being the result of international agreement, it could not be abolished or its duties modified except by unanimous consent. As the business of the commission was to look after the interests of the European creditors, it was naturally less sympathetic towards the needs of the Egyptian people, and as a consequence Egyptian interests sometimes suffered from lack of funds. So long as the Egyptian Government was uncontrolled in its expenditures, such a commission was absolutely necessary to avoid bankruptcy and repudiation, but after the English assumed a controlling influence the commission might well have been dispensed with.

In 1876 the railways passed into the control of an international commission composed of British, French, and Egyptians. This arrangement was ended in 1894 when the railway administration passed into the hands of the Egyptian Government and consequently under the control of its English advisers. The Daira properties were a portion of the vast estate of Ismail Pasha which he pledged as security for a loan of £9,500,000, and the care of which was put in the hands of an international commission known as the Daira-Sanich. Its affairs were liquidated in 1898.

The domains administration was an international commission

to administer the estate ceded by Ismail under pressure in 1878 and on which a loan of £8,500,000 was secured. I think its affairs have now been wound up. The mixed courts are another result of internationalism. They consist of three courts of first instance and a court of appeals. The judges are European and Egyptian, the former nominated by the various governments. They have jurisdiction in all civil cases between Europeans and Egyptians, between Europeans and the Egyptian Government and between Europeans of different nationalities. Before a new law can be recognized by the judges it must have the approval of all the foreign governments. The result is that to make the system workable the judges make the law.

The most important and far-reaching phase of internationalism in Egyptian affairs is comprised in the term Capitulations. Some progress has been made in Egypt in mitigating the injustice of the Capitulations, particularly in the regulation of the liquor traffic and taxation. That such progress is necessarily slow will be understood when it is stated that every change must have the consent of all the Powers of Europe, and the Government of the United States. If an Egyptian is accused of a criminal offence against a European, he is not tried by an Egyptian court, but by the consul of the European.

The problem facing the English in securing good government for Egypt under such difficulties looms large, and it is certainly greatly to their credit that there has been so great a measure of success. An account of what has been accomplished, given with any detail, would fill a volume, and I will confine myself to another quotation from Cromer.

"No one can fully realize the extent of the change which has come over Egypt since the British occupation took place unless he is in some degree familiar with the system under which the country was governed in the days of Ismail Pasha. The contrast between now and then is, indeed, remarkable. A new spirit has been instilled into the population of Egypt. Even the peasant has learnt to scan his rights. Even the Pasha has learnt that others besides himself have rights which must be respected. The courbash may hang on the walls of the Moudirich, but the Moudir no longer dares to employ it on the backs of the fellaheen. For all practical purposes, it may be said that the hateful corvee system has disappeared. Slavery has virtually ceased to exist. The halcyon days of the adventurer and the usurer are past. Fiscal burthens have been greatly relieved. Everywhere law reigns supreme. Justice is no longer bought and sold. Nature, instead of being spurned and neglected, has been wooed to bestow her gifts on mankind. She has responded to the

appeal. The waters of the Nile are now utilized in an intelligent manner. Means of locomotion have been improved and extended. The soldier has acquired some pride in the uniform which he wears. He has fought as he never fought before.

"The sick man can be nursed in a well-managed hospital. The lunatic is no longer treated like a wild beast. The punishment awarded to the worst criminal is no longer barbarous. Lastly, the schoolmaster is abroad, with results which are as yet uncertain, but which cannot fail to be important."

It is perhaps not a favourable time to discuss such a question as the English occupation of Egypt. The present conflict in Europe is, to so large an extent, directly due to race rivalry and race prejudice, stimulated through years, decades, and even centuries by race subjection and oppression, that our instinctive prejudice against the control of one people by another has been very greatly deepened. The conditions in Europe are such that most people in our own country are ready to declare that no race should ever be ruled or controlled by another race. In the present crisis it is easy for us to conclude that Slavs, Poles, Magyars, Czechs, Greeks, Turks, etc., etc., should each be allowed to govern themselves, and even though we have to admit that such a condition would not guarantee the peace we so much desire, we want to see the experiment tried.

Personally I see little hope of lasting peace among nations until we have an international police force to enforce international peace and justice and honesty between nation and nation as well as between a nation and the citizens of another nation. But, taking the world as we find it, it does not follow that because we have concluded that each European people should be allowed to work or fight out its own destiny, that every people in the world should be conceded the same right.

The Egyptian people have seemed to stand still for three, four, or five thousand years. They have been by turn heathen, Christian, and Mohammedan; they have been governed by native princes, Ethiopians, Syrians, Romans, Arabs, and Turks. At times Egypt has been known as a great Empire, and again as a mere province. There have been great rulers who have built wonderful temples and marvellous tombs, but the mass of the people through all the changes of government and religion, have been little better than beasts of burden, liable at all times to the corvee and the courbash. If the English are bringing to these long oppressed Fellaheen a large measure of justice and mercy,

why should we take seriously the little group composed largely of Turko-Egyptians who demand that the government be restored to them.

By what right does the Khedive, who is of Albanian descent, rule Egypt? By what right could the Turkish Pashas rule Egypt? Should the Levantines or the Greeks who are in Egypt in large numbers, rule the country? Is there the slightest ground for hope that any of these classes would govern wisely or justly should the power be given them? To claim that they would, contradicts all the facts of history and has no basis in reason. But some will say—turn the government over to the people of Egypt. Meaning of course the common people, or Fellaheen, who include perhaps eleven twelfths of all the people who live in Egypt. But so far as history or tradition goes, the common people of Egypt never have taken any part in their government; have had no training in self-government, and could therefore have no conception of such a government.

The English may not be entirely unselfish in their dealings with Egypt, but it certainly cannot be denied that the Egypt of today is better governed than the Egypt of any period in the past; that the common people are better protected in their property and their lives than in any previous period of which we know; that the material prosperity of the country has been very great. and that some progress has been made in modern education.

In addition, the English seem to be making an honest and consistent effort to give the Egyptian peasant some conception of self-government. The few self-seeking Pashas who demand that the English retire and leave Egypt to the Egyptians, mean thereby themselves or their own class. But it seems to me that he who does not close his mind to the facts will insist that the English should remain in Egypt until there is ground for a reasonable hope that the Egyptians can govern themselves.

J. E. MILLER.

Lincoln, Nebraska.

MOVIE DEMOCRACY

When at the dinner-table a man looks doubtfully at the meat or the pastry and permits his heart and his tongue to grow fonder over the memory of what his mother used to put before him, the chances are, not that he disapproves of his wife's bakery system, but that he has been adventuring at other tables and has discovered a new taste. When a young man working for fifteen dollars a week or less gives up his job, it is not usually because he thinks his employer's business is run on false principles. An expansion of his tastes and his desires has driven him to look into the merits of some other bit of industrial machinery with which he fancies it may be to his advantage to ally himself.

Ruskin says somewhere: "Tell me what you like, and I'll tell you what you are." He might have added that out of our likings develop most of our activities. We want something, and then we want the machinery for getting it. Life, therefore, goes forward by two processes, one a process of spiritualization, if the word will not be understood in any pretentious sense, and the other a process of organization. Usually it is to be observed that organization is the second of these processes. Men find themselves in a state of mind that has not come out of any deliberate intention of theirs. They are groping about for something or trying to get away from something before they begin thinking what they shall do about it. Whether it is a taste or a distaste that makes the trouble is immaterial. Whether the head of the house decides to get a divorce *from* his wife or buy a new gas range *for* her is also, in one sense, immaterial. The trouble did not start with the gas range or with the legal arrangements for divorce. It began with a perfectly innocent piece of chicken liver, cooked out of the house, to be sure, the enjoyment of which should have added to the sum total of human happiness.

A little want usually carries others in its train. A general sense of the fitness of things, for instance, pushes the buyer of a new pair of shoes forward to the purchase of a new suit. His hat is now too rusty and must be retired to a shelf in the closet. With this rehabilitation completed, he is really too well dressed to herd with everybody on the street cars. When he has bought the

automobile, the most obvious next step is the building of a garage. The garage in its newness then outshines the house, and there he is, looking his family in the face and explaining the inflexible nature of a bank account. He is now in the grip of the art of architecture, the least of the fine arts, to be sure, and yet a factor in the process of human spiritualization, and he spends days and nights as a committee of ways and means for securing the tribute money.

That, in the increase of leisure among us, we are giving the arts a larger place and that in all of them a great deal of work of the highest order is being done, probably more than at any other period of the world's history, I should be the last to deny. The fact is abundantly significant, but beyond this acknowledgment I shall ignore it for other facts of a different import. When a man has an attack of cholera morbus, the possession of sound teeth, an epicure's taste, and immediate opportunity to gratify it fully would generally be recognized as for the moment negligible. Pathology would be given precedence over gastronomy. It is pathology that is called for in dealing with certain phases of the arts just now, because never has there been so universal a disintegration in both the theory and practice of the three major arts, music, painting, and poetry, as that of the current hour.

Pathologically considered, then, music is struggling with the problem of being something else, and as much as possible everything else. The most astounding statement of a musical attitude of the present that now occurs to me I found recently in the pages of a book on the Wagnerian music dramas by Albert Lavignac. "Musical language, notwithstanding its lack of precision, or perhaps for that very reason, constitutes the highest, purest, and most sincere expression of human thought, the one furthest removed from materialism and conventionalism."

This is a thing to pause upon, not because one writer makes declaration of this sort, but because many musicians, both performers and composers, and many musical amateurs are of the same mind. What is thought? we may ask. What sort of melodic movement means that it is time to milk the cows? What sort of harmonic progression declares the composer's faith in the triumph of righteousness in the more benighted parts of Europe not later than 1927? What crash of what instruments following how long a silence of the drums and the cymbals and the triangle signifies unmistakably to everyone except the fool who has no

music in his soul that the Russians or the Austrians have now attained complete and final control of Galicia and that Przemyl is to be made into something euphonious for the sake of countless generations of school children in that redeemed country?

Musical experimentalists, increasingly anxious to extend the scope of their art, are responsible for this effort to make its symbols do the work of other symbols, appeal to other senses, and be the equivalents of colours, odours, words. The prime difficulty is that the musician's symbols symbolize nothing, and it is upon the rock of the consequent divergence in the understanding of them that these musical theories break into a flutter of chaotic madness. Words are the only real symbols of ideas and of human affirmation, and music without words is not a medium for the communication of thought. The spread of that idea is only a form of intellectual and æsthetic disintegration.

Impressionism, post-impressionism, cubism, futurism, are the new movements in painting. These terms are not the exclusive possession of pictorial art, but they have been associated with it more than with any other. As applied to painting, too, they are easier of definition. Impressionism, it will be seen, suggests at once an intensification of the play of the canvas upon the eye. As impressionism is the starting-point of this development, it will be well to look into impressionistic theory a little. In the first place, the impressionists insist that colour is a matter of the sunlight, its direction, its intensity, its quality as affected by the atmosphere, more than of the object itself. Form, as well as colour, distance, perspective, volume are all creations, as it were, of light; and they change with changes in illumination. Again, as the sunlight contains only the seven tones of the spectrum, painters should employ those colours only, and, by proper juxtapositions, combinations, and blendings, produce the whole gamut of colour for the eye. These combinations and blendings, it should be observed, are to be made on the canvas, not on the palette. That is, the new colours to come from the combinations and blendings must be produced by the union of light from the different colours placed separately on the canvas, not combined in the paint. It is the impression on the retina that is important, not fidelity to the form and colour of the object as it is put on the canvas, but fidelity to it as the canvas brings the colours together in the eye.

The consequence of this is that the painter has become con-

cerned with problems of technique in which light and atmosphere are dominant factors. How will two colours placed side by side unite on the retina? How will the tone of a vase of which the ground colour is rose be modified by the presence near it of a blue scarf? What will be the effect on both, if the light is a diffused light reflected from brown wall-paper with orange flowers?

These are difficult problems, and interesting, but they deflect the artist from his proper course. Says Camille Mauclair in *The French Impressionists:*

"Light becomes the sole object of the picture; the interest of the object upon which it plays is secondary. Painting thus conceived becomes a purely optic art, a search for harmonies, a sort of natural poem, quite distinct from expression, style, and design, which was the principal aim in former painting. It is almost necessary to invent another name for this special art, which, clearly pictorial though it be, comes as near to music as it gets away from literature and psychology."

Under the influence of this art doctrine, it is not the universe that now captures the artist's fancy, but one of nature's ways of manifesting herself, her technique of visual revelation. It is not the wonder of trees or the wonder of rivers or the wonder of quaint houses set quaintly in quiet streets or the wonder of men and women, but the wonder of air carrying the sunbeams.

There are two comparatively recent American paintings that may serve in illustration. One is that of a woman half-reclining in front of a window with the shutters closed at a slant to let the light come through brilliantly in a focus on her upturned shoulder. The painting is not a painting of the woman, although the woman is there. It is not a painting of an interior as an interior. It is not a painting of any of the symbols of character or of any of the settings of life that have human meanings. It is merely the painting of light uniquely introduced so as to play on a bit of warm flesh skilfully posed and exposed to catch it. The woman is perhaps beautiful, but she is subordinate. Her business is to take an attitude, like a shop-girl showing a gown, so that our eyes may gather from her half-turned back and shoulder the vibrant intensity of the sun.

In the second picture there is also a woman, and with her another woman. Further, the two of them have what should be the pleasure of the presence of a man. It does not appear to be a pleasure to either of them, however, and the man's possibility of double pleasure in the presence of two women seems to have

been smitten with incomprehensible cold. He sees neither of the women, although they are not bad to look upon, and they are as indifferent to him as can be. It is all more like a puzzle than anything else, and you are wondering whether some mental cataclysm has deprived the three of them of their faculties just at the moment of their lifting their teacups up together, when you realize that they too are an exalted kind of dress-form. With the leaves on the trees above them and some other adjunct paraphernalia, they serve to exhibit a wonderful blue light, the very madness of scintillant colour dropped down from the summer sky. The man is blue, therefore, in spite of the women, blue and indifferent and bleary. In spite of the man, too, the women are blue, —and they are some other things that one may not say about women when they have palpably put on their best clothes—and the little green leaves are blue, and nothing but reckless enthusiasm for the latest novelty in art saves the beholder from being deeply splotched with the same colour.

It is enough here if we observe that an important movement in painting is disdainful of any rational sense of values. Human beings, the things that human beings gather about them, the natural world as a thing for the eye to take account of, all must be dealt with as merely means to the end of making luminosity, the abstraction, not the thing luminous, wonderful for the senses. This disintegration is like that taking place in music, and it also depends upon a growing looseness of relationship between thought and sense impressions, a greater interest in those unrelated sense impressions than in truth or beauty or measure or the larger realities of life.

This disease of the arts has only lately taken hold upon American literature, coming to us now as what is loosely called the new poetry, a literary form in which imagism and *vers libre* are the most obvious technical elements. For English-speaking peoples, music and painting are, perhaps, in a degree exotic. As a race our art has been the art of literature, because the substance of literature is, not sound, not form or colour, but ideas, life. It is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon temper, whether in England or America, to subordinate the life of the senses to the life of the mind. This new movement, therefore, seems not wholly in keeping with the spirit of our life, because it is essentially literary impressionism. As the term suggests, imagism addresses itself frankly to the senses, and it does so in the fashion

of sense detachment. Images are presented as separate items to be enjoyed in isolation and not as part of a moving roll of ideas. They are not details of a world that the poet's mind organizes and interprets, finding them more and more interesting as they take shape in the growth of his vision. Imagism does not give play to the higher intellectual faculties. It is, therefore, not in the Anglo-Saxon mood, but rather in that of a passive æstheticism wholly alien to the spirit of the race.

Vers libre is again a symptom of disintegration, or an influence toward disintegration, more probably both. It is a rebellion against the need of organizing thought until the form it takes shall be a power over the mind. One cannot easily escape the conviction that, in the individual writer, this rebellion has its origin in an impatient disinclination to do all the hard work that is involved in the task of bringing form and substance into oneness. At least it is fairly evident that it marks a relative failure of the art impulse, of the will to make something fine and perfect. In the new poets there is a break-down of the warmer motives of the mind. They are not really creative intelligences, but what Holmes calls "poets by excess of sensibility." So understood, it all constitutes a feminization of the arts which is doubly dangerous, because, on the one hand, it results in the feminization of life, and, on the other, it withdraws men of active temper and virile intelligence from any thorough-going interest in any of the arts, when they seem abiding places for freakishness and unreality.

How far disintegration in the arts is disintegration in life must remain a somewhat doubtful question. We can never quite know how much the arts play upon and affect the emotional life of man in the mass. That they affect it deeply, however, there can be no doubt, and it is a matter of no little moment that the art that is the expansion of life for us shall not be shifting, uncertain, aimless, indecisive, a series of kaleidoscopic impressions passing over us as vainly as the shadow of the villain across the screen at the theatre. Slipping from movie to movie is an easy sort of self-indulgence, as any student of the city streets knows, and the impulses so engendered are certainly impulses of disintegration. We must remember that we were once one people, at least in the governing class, and we have now become more or less many. Immigration from the south of Europe, as well as from Germany, is doubtless having its effect upon us. The more mercurial temper, the greater sensu-

ousness, the slighter care for order and measure in the social complex which in large degree characterize our later arrivals, have become threatening elements in our national existence. Their spirit and attitude are not only entering into our citizenship, but they are also finding a voice with our voices and are helping to determine the course upon which our future shall venture. Their effrontery is now and then amazing, and they show a marked predilection, at times, for doing in Rome as the Vandals do.

What we are naturally as Anglo-Saxons, what we should be, is worth keeping in mind. In *The New Tendency in Art*, Mr. Henry Rankin Poore has a pronouncement on this subject that seems to me essentially sound.

> "The Yankee does not feel that he has reached the end of his road, and, moreover, a large part of his sagacity lies in keeping this open. The fact that in literature, painting, music, and sculpture American and English art has been practically uninfluenced by 'Primitivolatry' and 'Savageopathy' is evidence that these nations are ascending instead of descending. Our ambition is beyond, *in this same direction*—we have not yet reached our perihelion, but are persisting in our orbit, as yet dissatisfied with accomplishment of what is at hand and reaching toward the fuller illumination of it, which we know must be beyond."

This is a fair showing of the Yankee spirit and tendency, and I quote Frederic Harrison, *Impressions of America*, 1901, to the conclusion that "the citizen of the United States seems to me very much what the citizen of the United Kingdom is—only rather more accentuated." In his view we were then maintaining our Anglo-Saxon character, but the problem remains. Shall we still be Anglo-Saxon fifty years from now.

At first glance these several disintegrations, the disintegration in music, the disintegration in painting, the disintegration in poetry, may seem to be unrelated. If that were so, it would be serious enough, but when they are seen to be, all of them, forms of one thing, an excessive egoism, they constitute a recognizable menace. The danger in democracy and the danger in romanticism are alike in this that both of them tempt the individual man to an undue emphasis upon the specific in comparison with the general, upon himself in comparison with the social whole. It is as romantic and democratic expressions of life in a romantic and democratic world that these things look for justification for themselves. If I mistake not, it is as romantic and democratic aber-

rations that they deserve to be considered and weighed. Whether properly or aberrantly romantic and democratic is largely a matter of the degree of egoism they exhibit, a question of whether it is or is not excessive.

Because music is more elusive than either painting or poetry, it will not be so easy to see the egoistic trend in the musical doctrines that have been discussed. That difficulty will be a little lessened, if we bear in mind that writing a piece of music so that it shall tell a story or achieve something of that sort is a kind of musical posing. It is musically insincere. Posing of any sort, as soon as it is felt as posing, draws attention from anything that it may be supposed to embody as content to the cleverness of the one who is posing or who has managed the posing. Musical posing puts the emphasis, not upon the music as music, but upon the person who exhibits his musical skill.

It may at once be asked: Why is music of the sort in question posing? Recently I had the pleasure of being present at a semi-private concert in New York at which a composer for the violin presented some of his compositions. One of the numbers was announced as being founded on the tones of a woman's laugh and as running over the name Margaret with its variations and diminutives. This was a declaration that the piece was representative music, imitating the sounds of the human voice. I immediately lost concern for the playing as playing and transferred my attention to the listeners. They were obviously interested and obviously pleased, but quite as obviously their interest was that of pure curiosity. When they detected on the strings of the violin a ripple of sound that was like a woman's laugh, they nodded and smiled with satisfaction, not with any æsthetic feeling at all, but in simple recognition of the fact as fact that the sounds coming from the instrument were imitatively correspondent. Pleasure in this sort of thing is not musical pleasure, but pleasure in seeing that the composer has succeeded in what is metaphorically a sleight-of-hand performance. Approval of it is approval of his cleverness and is important mainly as contributing to his vanity. He has conceived and executed something unique, something that, as an achievement, centres interest upon himself, and not upon the music as music or upon anything that may be thought to be the content of the music. It is consequently, not the artist's devotion to his art, but his devotion to himself, æsthetic egoism.

Impressionism and the moods in painting that have succeeded it are also egoistic. The theory of impressionism does not necessarily have this character in itself, but it comes to this consequence in the painter. Emphasis passes from the subject matter of painting, man, nature, the visible accompaniment and conditioning of life, to special methods of representing these things. Again it is the artist's cleverness as a technician that calls for admiration. He is not posing quite as consciously, perhaps, as the composer who asks his hearers to verify his personal belief that what seems to be a piano sounds like a squirrel running along the branch of a tree and chattering. That he is posing, in his way, is, however, none the less true, and the sign of it is in the excessive importance that he assigns to the part played by his craftsmanship in the product. The business of art is to hide art. It is so that the artist slips into the background and leaves the thing that he has created to make its impression. This is not the way of the newer schools. "See *how* I get my effects," they seem to say, and when we applaud what they do we are giving our approval, not to a revelation of life, but to a showing of skill. That is always, of course, approval of the artist who stands before us as the embodiment of that skill, who plays harlequin tricks because he can, who thinks that seeming to be skilled is finer than seeming to be sincere and certainly much better than being forgotten, as the great painters are forgotten when we stand before their canvases and feel ourselves thrilled with the tragedy or the pageantry of the world.

It is because interest in the medium of his art, the thing with which he has to work rather than the thing that he should present, is intensely subjective that we may look upon it as romantic aberration, extravagance, egoism. In the Sixth Exhibition, Oil Paintings, by Contemporary American Artists in the Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington, beginning Dec. 17, 1916, there were shown two pictures by Mr. F. C. Frieseke, one of whose paintings, a rush of blue sunlight turning a man and two women into lifeless insipidity, has already been noticed. They repeat this picture's note unmistakably in being simply colour with objects, human and other, thrown in to give excuse for the spreading of the artist's palette over the canvas. In them the painter subdues the aspects of the world about him, aspects open to his study and his interest, to the narrower personal pleasure of his own eyes, pleasure in pale blue and pastelle pink. Evidently his object in painting

them was self-expression, the object of the egoist, and not interpretation of his world.

On this subject, the report of Camille Mauclaire, already quoted, is instructive, because his word is that of an admirer and an apologist for the school. "Light becomes the sole object of the picture," he says, as we have seen; "the interest of the object upon which it plays is secondary." This is saying that painting, so conceived, breaks away from its function as a representative art and becomes a presentative art. The "search for harmonies" in which this results is an inventive rather than a representative process. It is evolved from the inner man. It is not an aspect of the world revealed to us in the light of that man's personality. Instead, it is that personality itself, the light centring upon it, its colours warming the canvas, its idiosyncrasies distorting the actualities that it should represent and make more true through the sincerity of its interpretation. This method is not the method of vision in art. It is again the method of egoism and of personal exploitation.

The egoistic character of the "new Poetry" is more immediately apparent. An article by Mr. James Oppenheim in the *New York Times* for January 30, 1916, "Democracy in Verse and Art," written in advocacy of free verse, is fairly conclusive in the matter.

> "To me, democracy means not one level," he says, "but all levels integrated into union. In a democracy a man should be pre-eminently himself, whether that means being a hod-carrier or a philosopher. In this way we shall have a rich society in which each man makes a unique gift to the community, namely, himself. So in art we must throw open the doors to every form of expression possible. Let each artist search for the form through which he may most surely be himself. Then his expression will have 'originality' or 'difference,' and the rest of us shall profit by the profusion and variety of our arts."

If we look at these affirmations carefully, we shall see that they insist upon the interpretation of art as self-expression. They centre the world in the artist. They make his psychology and his æsthetics more important than the æsthetics of the race. They are again a development of that ultra-romanticism that, in the art of a democracy is a menace to the stability of the whole social order. In a democracy it is vitally important that each man should search, not for anything "through which he can most surely be himself," but for that form of expression and that way of living that most happily relates him to his fellows and to the

full round of life. We cannot be "integrated into union" by a process of individual isolation. It is because the arts are all exhibiting tendencies to such isolation that they constitute an insidious form of attack upon the solidarity of American life. They have assimilated part of the American spirit, its love of liberty. They reject its better part, the Anglo-Saxon love of law and order, to which liberty has been and should always be, in America, not over-lord, but chief ministrant.

That the course and direction taken by the arts is closely related to the current feeling for democracy appears sufficiently in Mr. Oppenheim's attempt to justify his understanding of the basic principles of the arts by their agreement with his understanding of democracy. Are they not both wrong? I think they are, and the egoism that is the determining factor in them, the intense desire for individual self-expression, the excessive personalizing that marks them, is characteristic not so much of American democracy as of an instinctive naturalism that is more native to the Germans than to us, over-emphasizing the trivial and the accidental and the fleeting. It appears no less unmistakably in the German drama of the present. It is discoverable in the frightful egoism of the whole German people during these terrible years when they have felt that they must take for themselves a place in the sun not theirs.

The spirit of this naturalism may be said to be in the main that of a passive obedience to what is natural in us, a yielding to the call of our natures, as if they were our ultimate monitors. It advises us to give a loose to the impulses to which we were born and so to bring life to its fullest of experience. Whether that brings life as a whole to rounded completeness, to beauty, to balance, to its full measure of the just and the fair is another consideration. Its trust is in the doctrine of *laissez faire*. It refuses to consider consequences. What shall be shall be, by the laws of the universe, and it is ages and eons too late, by its reckoning, to do anything with either the laws or what shall flow from them.

Anglo-Saxon personal liberty is an entirely different thing. It has grown up in an atmosphere of independent expansion of life in which man's higher faculties have called for more and more play. It has been assertive of those higher faculties as in their freedom more and more dominating the lower, instead of yielding to them, and it has justified itself as so leading life forward.

Its insistence upon freedom has been an active and constructive passion. It has come, not from any instinct for passive self-indulgence, but from an eagerness for larger and more triumphant functioning in a social complex that is so continually enriched. The difference between the two is one that in our thinking we may easily blur and lose, but, in human action as social, political, and art impulses, they are very different things with very different consequences. Personal liberty has led the Anglo-Saxon world steadily forward. Naturalism asks us to share our world blindly with the brute, to be as the brute, indeed, if the brute in us calls.

It is highly probable that in Europe the close of the war will see a stiffening in the arts and literatures of all the belligerents. For each of them the experiences through which they have passed will have been a tremendous organizing and unifying influence. We, on the other hand, will be, more than any other great people in the world, the prey of disintegrating internal movements, those that we now see in operation and others inevitably to be contributed by the influx of aliens who are already at variance. They will bring their interpretations of our American liberty with them, as before, and they will be more tenacious of their own conceptions and their own ideals than before. More than ever, therefore, we are in danger of being a conglomerate without homogeneity, and, unless we sternly control our destinies and keep forward on our course, we may have to face issues that may well make us fearful for democracy, or for that form of it in which we have put our faith. Indeed, we do face them now, and the question whether we can so educate the foreigner and so limit the influence of the foreign-language press as to maintain our American character is still open.

LEWIS WORTHINGTON SMITH.

Drake University.

STAR TWINKLING

Everywhere, always, by everybody the scintillation or twinkling of the stars has been observed. Of the phenomenon countless explanations have been offered. Arago has made quite a collection of them.

There is Aristotle. "Our vision, when extended very far, trembles because of its weakness; this is why the fixed stars seem to twinkle, while the planets do not; for the planets are nearer to us. The trembling vision makes the stars seem to move; the effect is the same whether it be the vision or the object perceived that trembles." Vision was thought to be by means of rays or feelers reaching out from the eye to the object.

Tycho, a close observer, thought a main cause of the twinkling of the stars to be their rotation, a star during a rotation showing many facets. Whoever has noticed the sunlight reflected from the revolving hexagonal hub-cap of an automobile wheel can see how natural this explanation is. The planets, according to Tycho, did not twinkle because they did not turn.

Hooke, with more shrewdness, sought the cause in the passage of the light from the star through an atmosphere forever trembling. A layer of warm air confined between two layers of cold air might act as a sort of lens to here collect, there disperse the rays.

Newton, noticing that stars which twinkled to the eye did not twinkle when seen through the telescope, suggested that a slight refraction of a ray from a star might cause it to miss the pupil of the eye while yet being caught by the object-glass of the telescope. Had he, in order to test this idea, covered all but a small circular bit around the centre of the objective, he might have been led to discover the phenomena later to be observed by Arago.

Lalande says: "The diameter of a star is so small that the least particles of matter, passing between it and us, by the agitation of the atmosphere, suffice alternately to hide and show the star."

Erasmus Darwin would explain the phenomenon by eye-fatigue.

Thomas Young says: "The cause of the scintillation of the stars is not perfectly known; but one can attribute the phenomenon, with some probability, to changes in the atmosphere that alter its refractive density."

Such are some of the attempts at explanation. Two things are to be noted about them. They do not attempt to explain the changes in colour generally shown by a low-lying twinkling star. In none is there any reference to an attempt at measured observation. "Those whose curiosity is satisfied with observing what happens," says Maxwell, "have occasionally done service by directing the attention of others to the phenomena they have seen; but it is to those who endeavour to find out how much there is of anything that we owe all the great advances in our knowledge."

Naturally also, there being no measured data, there were no calculations by which theories might be tested.

But about the beginning of the nineteenth century closer observations began to be made. There were more or less successful attempts to trace a connection between star-twinkling and the altitude of the star, the state of the atmosphere, the time of the year, the geographical situation of the observer. Then Nicholson discovered that the image of a star in a mirror could, by a proper movement of the mirror, be made to appear as a ring of light. If the star twinkled there would be gaps in the ring. If the star showed colours, the ring of light would become a string of brilliant prismatic beads. Something of the effect can be gotten by shaking one's head rapidly while gazing at a twinkling star; or one can interpose between eye and star a moving eye-glass or better yet a moving opera-glass. But Nicholson, by observing the moving image of Sirius in a telescope, upon the tube of which he lightly tapped, was able to satisfy himself that the star changed colour at least thirty times a second.

Arago took a further step. Covering the objective, save for a small hole of 27mm. diameter, he found that at the focus of the objective the image of a star showed a bright clearly defined disk, surrounded by very thin and serrated luminous rings. The brightness of these rings constantly changed in different parts of their contours; often in some points, there was complete disappearance. Cautiously pushing in the eye-piece of the telescope, he found that the bright disk, with its surrounding rings, expanded. Pushing the eye-piece still further in, a black

spot appeared in the centre of the bright disk. Continuing the pushing in the eye-piece, the black spot expanded into a black disk, then a bright spot appeared in the centre of the black disk, this in turn expanded into a disk, and so on continually. Suppose the telescope directed upon a non-twinkling star and so adjusted that a bright spot just appeared in the first black disk. Turning now the telescope upon a twinkling star, it is found that the bright spot instead of shining steadily comes and goes. Count the number of appearances of the spot in a given time and you would have, so Arago thought, a measure of the intensity of the twinkling: the telescope had become a scintillometer. Thus on January 14, 1851, Sirius, at an altitude of 20°, gave a bright spot in the scintillometer forty times in five minutes, but Capella, at an altitude of 81°, gave it only eight times in five minutes. The light and dark rings are interference phenomena due to the passage of light through the small circular opening. Were the source of light brilliant enough, we might get variously coloured instead of light and dark rings. In fact, Arago once observed, strongly twinkling, an image of the sun reflected from the ball under the cross surmounting the cupola of the Sorbonne. Turning his telescope upon it, he found that the bright spot coming and going in the centre of the dark disk showed brilliant colours.

Arago was lead to a theory of star-twinkling that was generally accepted for a generation or more.

> "Suppose," he says, "that the rays falling to the left of the centre of the objective have encountered, in the upper regions of the atmosphere, layers which, because of their temperature, density, or hygrometric state, have a different refractive density from that of the layers traversed by the rays to the right; it may happen that, by reason of this difference in refractive density, the red rays to the right of the focus totally destroy the red rays to the left, and that the focus changes from white, its usual state, to green; the next instant, in the same way, the green rays may be totally destroyed, and the focus therefore become red, and so on. . . . But generally, the rays on the right and left of the focus, instead of totally destroying each other, only partially do so. In this case there is still a display of colours at the focus, but less intense.

Jamin tells us that nothing is lacking in Arago's theory except precision of statement. This he attempts to give. After the light from the star, he tells us, has passed the objective of the telescope, the wave-front is approximately spherical, the rays perpendicular to the front meeting at the focus. More strictly,

they form a conical caustic whose vertex is the focus. Outside the caustic there is darkness. The wave-front advances down the caustic, its surface normal to that of the caustic, and concave toward the focus. But there is also a wave-front tangent to this at its intersection with the caustic, but convex toward the focus. This also proceeds on to the focus. Consider now a series of wave-fronts, both concave and convex, differing in phase, each from the next, by a half wave-length. There will be interference between any convex wave-front and the next concave front. The locus of the intersections is a conical surface of minimum illumination sensibly parallel to the caustic. Within this dark surface there is a light surface, then a dark one and so on. Arago saw in his scintillometer various cross-sections of these surfaces. For example, the dark disk with the bright spot in its centre was a cross-section touching the vertex of one of the bright conical surfaces.

Jamin calculated these conical surfaces for various lenses and reflectors and verified his results by experiment. And he was able to easily explain the coming and going of the bright spot in the dark disk when the star under observation twinkled. This was due to changes in curvature of the spherical wave front, accompanied necessarily by a to and fro movement of the conical surfaces along the axis of the telescope. But he does not seem to have even inquired how much to and fro movement there was. The putting of this question and the answering of it was left for Exner as late as 1880.

Nor does Jamin at all question Arago's explanation of the changes in colour of a twinkling star.

But there came to be criticism, notably by Montigny. He insisted that atmospheric dispersion must be a factor in the colour phenomena so striking in twinkling stars of low altitude. He further suggested that the vanishing of a star from the field of view might be due to a momentary total reflection of rays sufficiently oblique to a layer of air more rarified than that which they were traversing. This possibility, if it be a possibility, would seem to carry with it the further possibility that as some stars have their light carried away from the telescope by total reflection, other stars might have their light carried to it by the same means. That is there might be momentary appearances of a star that was just out of the ordinary field of view. I am not aware that there is any recorded observation, however, that justifies

this expectation. Furthermore, stars up to an altitude of 40° have been observed as spectra. A totally reflected star should then at least sometimes be observed as a reversed spectrum, the red end uppermost. Of this likewise there is no record.

But that atmospheric dispersion is an active and sufficient cause of the colour phenomena is conclusively proved by the spectroscopic observations of Respighi. A few of his results follow.

(I) In the spectra of stars near the horizon we may observe dark or bright bands, transversal or perpendicular to the length of the spectrum, which more or less quickly travel from the red to the violet or from the violet to the red, or oscillate from one to the other colour; and this however the spectrum may be directed from the horizontal to the vertical.

(II) In normal atmospheric conditions the motion of the bands proceeds regularly from red to violet for stars in the west, and from violet to red for stars in the east; while in the neighbourhood of the meridian the movement is usually oscillatory, or even limited to one part of the spectrum.

(III) In observing the horizontal spectra of stars more and more elevated above the horizon, the bands are sensibly parallel to one another, but more or less inclined to the axis of the spectrum, passing from red to violet or reversely according as the star is in the west or the east.

(IV) When strong winds prevail the bands are usually rather faint and ill defined, and then the spectrum exhibits mere changes in brightness, even in the case of stars near the horizon.

To get an understanding of these phenomena imagine a star in the east at an apparent altitude of 10°. According to Rayleigh the separation of the red from the violet rays reaching the observer would, at the limit of the atmosphere, be 185 cm. Suppose now that some slight inequality in the atmosphere, lying in the path of the violet rays to the lower part of the objective, cast a shadow there. It would at the same time cast at the upper part of the objective a shadow for a ray of greater refrangibility. There would be shadows for intermediate rays at intermediate places on the objective. The light then passing through a horizontal spectroscope, would reveal in the spectrum of the star a shadow-band slanting downward from the less to the more refrangible colour. The farther the cause of the shadow is from the observer the less will be the range of refrangibility in the rays simultaneously shut off from the objective and the more nearly vertical will be the shadow-band in the spectrum. The sensible parallelism of the bands in the case of a given star at a given time indicates an approximate agreement in the distances of the ob-

stacles causing the shadows. So far the effect of the earth's rotation has not been considered. This in a time which may vary from half a second upward, depending upon the latitude of the observer and the declination of the star, will carry the refracting obstacle through the observed angular dispersion spectrum of the star. Hence the band in the spectroscope will move from the violet to the red end of the spectrum. The same reasoning shows that for a star in the west the band would move from red to violet.

Concerning the nature of the irregularities in the atmosphere, the diffraction obstacles, light is thrown by the observations and measurements of Exner. Jamin's explanation of the Arago scintillometer has already been mentioned. It is from this that Exner starts. He first notices that the distance from the focus of the points of maximum and minimum illumination along the axis of the telescope, the vertices of Jamin's conical surfaces, depend upon three constants only, the focal length of the telescope, the wave-length of light, the radius of the opening of the scintillometer. In fact, calling these constants f, λ, and r, there is approximately maximum illumination if the distance from the focus is zero or an odd multiple of $\lambda f^2/r^2$; there is minimum illumination if the distance is an even multiple, other than zero, of this same quantity. Next he measures the to and fro movement of the maxima and minima when the observed star is a twinkler. This will be the amount the eye-piece is shoved in from the point where a bright spot first appears in a dark disk to the point where a dark spot ceases to appear in a bright disk. Calling this distance α, he shows that approximately the radius of curvature of the wave-front as it comes up to the objective is $2f^2/\alpha$. A number of observations taken at several dates from November 24, 1880, to January 7, 1881, show radii of curvature varying from 1817 meters to 19,380 meters and averaging 4733 meters. This is the absolute value of the curvature; with the twinkling the sign varies from positive to negative and the wave-front from concave to convex toward the focus.

Slight though these variations in curvature may be, the resultant gathering and dispersing of the rays leads to marked variations in intensity of light along the advancing wave-front. If, the objective being uncovered, one pushes in the eye-piece until the image of the star is a large disk, these variations can be distinctly perceived. The disk appears as if illumined by sunlight

reflected from rippling water. Under favorable conditions the bright spaces will be separated by a network of dark lines. If the star is brilliant and of low altitude the spaces will show various and constantly changing colours. Exner calls this the Marius phenomenon as having been first observed by him. On one occasion, in January, 1880, Sirius, then at a low altitude, showed the phenomenon with remarkable distinctness. Parallel to the dark lines of the network were alternately bright and dark lines. These Exner considers to be the sections of many Jamin conical surfaces whose bases make up the surface of the objective.

The constantly changing directions of the rays also accounts for the oft-noticed irregular dancing of the stars especially when the twinkling was very marked. Arago, for some reason, doubted this apparent motion of the stars. A simple observation of Exner's settles the matter. Covering the objective of the telescope save for three collinear holes of diameter 3.2, he found that the three images of the star, obtained when the eye-piece was slightly pushed in, were constantly, irregularly, independently, changing their positions and were hardly ever collinear.

Furthermore if the telescope is adjusted for seeing the Marius phenomenon and then the objective be covered, save for a straight diametral slit, the image of a twinkling star will be a wavy strip. The waves can be counted and the diameters of the concavities and convexities in the wave-front determined. Having both the diameter and the curvature of these, it is easy to approximate the depth. This is comparable with a wave-length of light.

Thus the colours of the twinkling stars are accounted for by the regular dispersion due to the atmospheric layers; the dancing of the stars and the marked variations in light intensity, by super-imposed constant irregular refractions along the advancing wave-front.

As for Arago's notion that the colours might be produced by a half wave-length difference in phase between the two halves of the objective, note that if the uncovered portion of the objective were as small as 1cm., yet, while the half wave-length difference would cause extinction of light immediately at the focus, there would be visible to the eye beside the focus two maxima only six seconds of arc apart. These would together have about the intensity of light at the focus when there was no difference of phase. Whether the two images would be distinguished by the eyes is doubtful, especially when one considers that each would be dancing through perhaps as much as or more than the distance between them.

While Mascart, writing sometime in the eighties, can say, though knowing of Exner's work, "Arago has pointed out, in 1814, the principle of a complete theory of scintillation," he takes the pains to "translate" it in such wise as to remove what Rayleigh considers "some of the most objectionable features."

That the planets do not twinkle is due to their apparent size. Variations in colour, size, and position for hundreds perhaps thousands of parts of the apparent disk, going on all in complete independence, there is merely an average effect for the whole. But one does sometimes see a sort of boiling of the disk, and marked disturbances along the edge of the disk. Small planets do twinkle and Venus has been observed to do so. Moreover, in a solar eclipse, immediately before the second and after the third contact, there is an exceedingly brilliant linear light source. This gives, on an enormous scale, a modified Marius phenomenon. The dark network becomes a series of dark bands at right angles to the light-source and apparently moving transversely to their length. Obviously there is nothing to reveal motion in the direction of their own length.

On any bright day one can observe the twinkling of the sun's image as reflected from shining convex surfaces. All the phenomena except those discovered by Respighi can be made manifest in these terrestrial twinklings. Possibly even these might be gotten if one could keep a spectroscope trained upon a brilliant light carried by an aeroplane in rapid motion through atmospheric layers of various densities.

It is not to be supposed that we yet know all about the matter. Thus Rayleigh, in the course of a mathematical discussion says:

"A preliminary question requiring investigation is as to the origin of the irregularities which cause scintillation. Is it always at the ground and mainly under the influence of sunshine? Or may irregular absorption of solar heat in the atmosphere, due to varying proportions of moisture, give rise to transitions of necessary abruptness? Again, we may ask how many obstacles are to be supposed operative upon the same ray? Is the ultimate effect only a small residue from many causes in the main neutralizing one another? It does not appear that in the present state of meteorological science satisfactory answers can be given to these questions."

ELLERY W. DAVIS.

Lincoln, Nebraska.

THE SENTIMENTAL MOVEMENT

In these days of prison reform, the abolishment of child labour, and the successful production of Galsworthy's *Justice*, it is interesting to look back some two centuries, when a quite different philosophy of human relations was regnant. That is what Dr. Bernbaum has done in *The Drama of Sensibility*.[1] The scope of his volume he indicates by a subtitle: "A Sketch of the History of English Sentimental Comedy and Domestic Tragedy, 1696–1780." More than a sketch he deems impossible where no extended discussion has brought forward the relative significance of its various features. There has been, however, a pretty general agreement on the important aspects of this development of eighteenth-century drama. Sentimental comedy is usually said to have begun with Sir Richard Steele under the stimulus of the moral reaction inaugurated by Jeremy Collier. Goldsmith is held to have protested vigorously against it and to have signed its death-warrant with *She Stoops to Conquer*. The knell was tolled by Sheridan in those comedies which yet sparkle upon our stage. Domestic tragedy has lingered in the dim background of that neglected period, but the credit of originating it is generally conceded to George Lillo with his *London Merchant*, whence it spread to France and burgeoned in Germany. Now Dr. Bernbaum, in spite of the paucity of discussion, has contrived to set himself at variance with all these received opinions.

His definition of "sentimental" in this connection is at the root of these divergences. With him the term does not denote the moralizing tendency which many writers have singled out as the distinguishing animus of the type. The truculent Collier and his *Short View* seem to him to have no significance for the sentimental movement in English drama, either as a symptom of popular discontent with the immorality of Restoration comedy or as a moulding force in the practice of later English playwrights. Nor does that other phase of morality, in which every step in the

[1] *The Drama of Sensibility*. A sketch of the history of English sentimental comedy and domestic tragedy, 1696–1780. By Ernest Bernbaum. (Harvard Studies in English, Volume III.) Boston: Ginn and Company. $2.00 net.

action is emphasized or encumbered by some appropriate or far-fetched aphorism, seem to him a noteworthy feature of the type. He does not even cast a glance at the complaint of Goldsmith that in the "genteel" comedy of his day all the characters not of recognized social rank had to be excluded as intolerably "low," nor does he lay much stress upon the elimination of the libertines and ladies of pleasure so dear to the heart of Restoration audiences. *Mirabile dictu*, he does not accept even the test of tears. He recognizes that tears were shed long before the beginning of his period, that Elizabethans must have wept over *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, and that in the Restoration era Otway's *Orphan* and Southerne's *Oroonoko* probably brought moisture to many a glistening eye. Something else he holds needful to characterize the drama of sensibility. Yet it is not the mixture of types which seemed to explain the genre to the Frenchmen of the period. He argues indeed that sentimental comedy was a mixture, that in the heyday of solemnity smiles were mingled with the tears. But, again, that was not the essential feature. The distinguishing mark seems to have been suggested to him by Lanson's study of *Nivelle de la Chaussée*, where the celebrated critic treats La Chaussée as a forerunner of Rousseau and the founder of modern French drama. Dr. Bernbaum too discovers that the drama of sensibility in England was an expression of the humanitarian conviction that man is innately good and that where he is not already perfect he is perfectible by an appeal to the emotions.

This definition strikes at fundamentals. It goes beyond the chance characteristics of fashions in writing. It even looks behind the author's purpose. It seeks by analysis to discover the dramatist's way of thinking about his fellow-men. But for this very reason one notes as curious the date which Dr. Bernbaum selects for the beginning of the reaction from the dominant distrust of human nature in Restoration comedy. He dates it from a night in January, 1696, when was produced Colley Cibber's first play, *Love's Last Shift, or The Fool in Fashion*. The reasons for this decision are not quite clear in spite of copious discussion. In Elizabethan times a half-dozen examples like *The London Prodigal* might have been found where the faithful and long suffering wife is finally rejoined by the young spendthrift and where the pathetic scenes are more effective than the humour. The author candidly admits the similarity in the artistic and the ethical

effect of such plays, but he rejects them as beginnings because "they were unsupported by a contemporary sentimental movement in popular taste or ethical thought." One of these pieces Mrs. Behn rewrote (1676) as *The Town Fop* in a form more pathetic than Cibber's play, yet this too is rejected because it was neither successful as a theatrical production nor influential as a model for later writers. Etheredge's *The Comical Revenge* (1664) is also rejected because the gay Sir George found that the satirical parts of his comedy took much better than the emotional. Yet Dr. Bernbaum does accept *Love's Last Shift*, apparently on account of a legend recorded by Davies nearly a century later to the effect that the first-night audience eased their minds by "honest tears." Now it is interesting to note for what purpose Davies records this ancient legend:

> "The honest tears, shed by the audience at this interview [between husband and wife], conveyed a strong reproach to our licentious poets, and was to Cibber the highest mark of honour. The uncommon run of this comedy, which I have been told formerly, by several who lived at that time, was greatly admired and followed, is a convincing proof that the people at large are never as vicious as to abandon the cause of decency and virtue; and that it was entirely owing to our dramatic writers themselves, that plays were not lessons of morality as well as amusements of pleasure."

Moreover, if this was so singular an occurrence, such as "must have amazed the cool observer even more than the play itself," as Dr. Bernbaum opines, it is remarkable that it made no impression on Cibber himself or his contemporaries. The impression produced at the time was that Cibber furnished a specimen of consummate acting in the rôle of Sir Novelty Fashion, and the popularity which it attained appears to have been secured by his performance rather than by the pathetic neglect endured by Amanda or by her remarkable recovery of her husband Loveless. Is its popularity, then, a good reason for selecting it as the first exemplar of sentimental drama?

But if one may wonder why Dr. Bernbaum does not date his beginning earlier, one may wonder still more why he follows Croissant's study of Cibber in dating it so early. Does he fancy that the play was an outcropping of a contemporary humanitarian interest? There was, to be sure, a notable improvement in public conduct, a Society for the Reformation of Manners was very active, social problems relating to the poor received un-

wonted attention, and the church attempted many new forms of charity. A little later Defoe was conspicuously active in the cause of debtors. But more than a decade was to pass before Steele and Addison in *The Tatler* and *The Spectator* petitioned for the alleviation of the lot of the poor, and longer still before Shaftesbury put into shining rhetoric the vision of a world where the natural impulses of the heart would be admired and where the social feelings of sympathy and benevolence should be exercised. All these were the faint and far-off beginnings of that humanitarian interest which was trumpeted abroad by Rousseau. Indeed, it was only after Steele's papers in *The Tatler* and *The Spectator* had had time to sink in that kindliness became less unfashionable in England. Dr. Bernbaum seems to recognize this in placing the early blossoming of sentimental drama in the years of George Lillo's rise, 1729–1732, and in deferring its summer luxuriance to the days of Goldsmith and Sheridan. To find the movement already active in 1696, and in the drama, is surprising. Comedy was still a particularly aristocratic form of literature. Its writers enjoyed a complacent disregard of the multitude which would make them peculiarly inaccessible to these stirrings of a new philosophy. It was the day of triumph for the brilliant, hard, and cynical Congreve.

To discover the new attitude toward life in *Love's Last Shift* requires rare penetration. Such penetration Dr. Bernbaum exhibits to a rare degree. Amanda's "moral scrupulosity," of which he speaks, appears to be curiously furtive and characterized by *finesse*, her few words on the subject being quite belied by the assurance of her conduct. To speak of "the power of her virtue to triumph through an appeal to pity" rather warps the culminating situation. The heart of a man throbbing with new-found love for a handsome woman, especially when this spendthrift sees all about him evidence of her princely income, does not need pity to bring him to accept the good the gods provide. Cibber apparently meant these motives to be obvious, since "the characterization of Loveless as good at heart," which Dr. Bernbaum discovers, is so very tenuous as to occur only dubiously in one scene. His expressions of remorse were doubtless intended to be sincere enough, though his declaration that he "will labour, dig, beg, or starve, to give new Proofs of my unfeign'd Affection" is an excellent example of the "frothy Stage-Language" which Cibber himself acknowledges in the dialogue.

Though he speaks also of the "mere moral delight of the Fable" and though the epilogue addresses the ladies with "Pray let this figure [Amanda] once your Pity move," he reveals unmistakably that his purpose in composing the play was not sentimental: "My early success in the *Old Batchelor* . . . having open'd no farther way to my Advancement . . . I resolv'd to leave nothing unattempted that might shew me in some new Rank of Distinction. Having then no other Resource, I was at length reduc'd to write a Character for myself." How then does the play differ from *The London Prodigal* and other Elizabethan productions in which "what seems like sentimentalism was probably a temporary and unconsidered mood?" Indeed, Dr. Bernbaum is consistent enough to admit that in all the five alleged sentimental plays produced up to 1704 the mood was indulged in merely by chance or out of caprice.

He specifically denies that Steele founded sentimental comedy, as he is commonly held to have done. In consonance with his definition he rejects as a basis for the view Steele's declaration in the preface to *The Lying Lover*, that his "honest ambition" was "to attempt a Comedy which might be no improper entertainment in a Christian commonwealth." He calls this talking "vaguely about the morality of their plays." But he appears to overlook what Steele says about the sentimentality in the epilogue:

> "Our too advent'rous author soared to-night
> Above the little praise, mirth to excite,
> And chose with pity to chastise delight.
> For laughter's a distorted passion, born
> Of sudden self-esteem and sudden scorn; . . .
> While generous pity of a painted woe
> Makes us ourselves both more approve and know."

Moreover, Steele constructed the play so that the interest would culminate in the fifth-act reformation of Young Bookwit. In the preface he remarks: "The anguish he there expresses, and the mutual sorrow between an only child and a tender father in that distress, are, perhaps, an injury to the rules of comedy, but I am sure they are a justice to those of morality."

The Careless Husband, which Dr. Bernbaum thinks established the new type after declining fortunes, seems to be another weak link in the chain. Interesting is his assertion that the action is

dominated by the sentimental heroine, Lady Easy. Not only did Cibber intend Lady Betty Modish to be the most taking part, since he threw aside the first two acts for two years "in despair of having Justice done to the Character," but his intentions were recognized by the public, since Cibber asserts, generously enough, that "Whatever favourable Reception this Comedy has met with from the Publick, it would be unjust in me not to place a large Share of it to the Account of Mrs. *Oldfield*." The careful reader of today must likewise conclude that the main plot is a trick played on the incorrigible coquette to delude her into acceptance of her devoted lover, Lord Morelove. Now in the case of *The Lying Lover*, where the sentimental appeal was avowed and central, Steele assures us that the "Play was damn'd for its Piety."

From all which it appears that Dr. Bernbaum wishes to date the beginning of the drama of sensibility with plays wherein the sentimental scenes do not represent the chief interest of the author and which succeeded because of other elements,—in short, with plays that do not meet his own test of support "by a contemporary sentimental movement." Would it not be more consistent, therefore, to begin with Steele's play, where the sentimental, or at least the moral, purpose is clearly avowed? A similar situation occurs in French drama. Marivaux depicted the delicate troubles of sentiment without ever becoming pathetic. Destouches voiced the new feeling of pity for the oppressed and of admiration for the virtuous, by presenting characters full of tenderness and tears. Yet neither of them is regarded as the founder of the French *comédie larmoyante*. That honour is given to Nivelle de la Chaussée because he made sentiment the essential feature of his comedy and its chief excellence. That is the only sense in which he invented the *genre*. He conceived clearly and distinctly what others had produced by chance or unconsciously. It must be conceded, however, that Dr. Bernbaum makes Destouches the founder in France just as he does Cibber in England.

To discuss the origin of domestic tragedy, in which he is equally at variance with received opinion, would but further illustrate our historian's methods. The general reader, however, will be particularly interested in the treatment of Goldsmith and Sheridan. The usual view has been that Goldsmith dealt the death-blow to sentimental comedy, and that the work of Sheridan

exhibits the benefits that were thereby conferred upon the drama. In this version of the matter sentimental comedy is a highly moral performance. The characters are very genteel, and act from motives of the nicest delicacy. The whole action tends to establish or illustrate some moral platitude, and the dialogue is besprinkled with didactic sentiments of unimpeachable propriety. The pathetic situations and the long-drawn-out distresses of the figures so absorb the attention that Fielding spoke of "sentimental comedy" as a "very grave and solemn entertainment, without any low wit, or humour, or jests," or "anything which could provoke a laugh." And Sheridan's Mrs. Dangle regretfully remarked, "There was some edification to be got from those pieces, Mr. Sneer!" It seems tolerably clear that after Goldsmith and Sheridan comedy was in a merrier mood and presented more truly ludicrous characters. On the other hand, Dr. Bernbaum, like Lanson, connecting this class of drama not with moralizing or tears but with the humanitarian idealization of common life which was spreading through society more and more to the perfect day of Rousseau and the French Revolution, finds no such influence exerted by those famous authors. Not only does he discover no effect of *The Good-natured Man* or *She Stoops to Conquer* on contemporary comedy, but he finds in these plays, and in Sheridan's too, many deep influences of the sentimentalists. He finds, in fact, the triumph of sentimentalism in the very period when by others it has been held to have disappeared. He too is right. The hard ring of Restoration laughter echoed no longer through the theatre. The age of heartless cynicism had passed. In his sense of the term sentimentalism is regnant to this good day in drama and social activity.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Dr. Bernbaum resolved never to argue. It gives the impression of conspicuous facility in overlooking important aspects of a subject and of fatal ease in interpreting evidence so as to support his own peculiar contentions. But he has the distinction of tracing an important development which has been too little studied for its influence on the drama, of basing his thesis on a fundamental relation, the author's attitude toward his fellow-men, and of producing a discussion which will be both interesting and suggestive to readers of eighteenth-century literature.

DUDLEY MILES.

New York City.

THE ÆSTHETIC FALLACY IN LITERARY APPRECIATION

The college-curriculum probably contains few courses harder to teach effectively than those in literature, and few that count more in the broadening of the personal horizon than such courses successfully taught. The trouble appears to lie in the difference of opinion as to what literature means and in the general unsettlement of criteria of judgment and appreciation superinduced by the carrying over of scientific reasoning and scientific methods into a field naturally unsuited to those processes.

On the part of college-teachers, the conflict arises largely from acute specialization in some interesting by-path that branches off from the main literary highway. The requirements for the doctor's degree today force upon the candidate the choice of a narrow, definite piece of investigation teeming with facts and subject to logical and chronological proof almost exclusively. The qualities most abhorred in such labour are imagination, inspiration, and emotional sympathy. Essays like Macaulay's on Milton are not rated as of proper thesis-calibre. Consequently, the only avenues of literature open to advanced students who expect to teach are the history of literature, the sociology of literature, the philology of literature, the jurisprudence of literature, the economics of literature, and the like. The emphasis is shifted from the consideration of a literary work as a significant artistic or intellectual creation to the use of that work as a collection of unrelated facts: and this shifting of emphasis cannot help being fatal to the literary interests of the student, since he has not the background of paraphernalia which alone can make such investigation seem vital. For purposes of scholarly production, the study of literature has become a purely impersonal, intellectual, and statistical pursuit. The desire to appreciate it as art, as personality, as feeling has vanished. The rewards often reaped by the student may be inferred from a conclusion recently drawn by an undergraduate in one of our large universities: "Courses in literature confine themselves to the deadening processes of dissection, study of technique, study of 'periods' and of style, to the utter exclusion of any possible appreciation of the work itself."

Apparently, the humane letters are not always humane—in our colleges.

The ordinary student, in his turn, has lost or is losing something of the capacity to enjoy the study of literature as such. Surrounded on all sides by courses that stress the detail and not the sum total, imbued with the capital importance of objectivity, convinced by almost every tendency of college-life that he is mainly, and especially for college-purposes, intellect and nothing else, he is inclined to disparage the indefinite, the unpositivistic, the emotionally strong or fine, the philosophically thoughtful, the artistic. He prefers, in a literary course, to be burdened with facts rather than to think about relations, or to react on a book personally, or to increase his stock of pleasures through his perceptions or through intellectual reflection. Facts bewitch him. He believes that somehow, somewhere, at some time, they are all going to serve him. Yet, after he leaves school, how much of the factual impedimenta remains with him, and how long? The dates, the periods, the catalogue of names, the derivations, the influences, the sources,—how many of them does he assimilate with any permanency?

In addition to these obstacles, it must not be forgotten that the foundations of literary appreciation have been undermined by the prevalent freedom and individuality of thought. Principles of judgment, such as have existed in the past, have lost their authority. Systems of taste have exploded into chaos through contact with the idea of relativity. Homogeneity of impression seems disrupted: and that is ominous in education, which, after all, is a highly conventional and hard mould in which fluid mentality is fixed. Not a few teachers are experiencing a sort of *crise de conscience* with respect to literature: and this state of mind bears a striking resemblance to the inner struggles which, for similar reasons, individuals have undergone in religion.

If literature is susceptible of being taught, whether as art or as science,—and its presence in our colleges would appear to indicate that it is suitable for instruction,—there should be no difficulty in applying to it certain valid laws of appreciation, if they exist, or in formulating such laws, if they do not exist. It is commonly understood that these laws have already received expression, and that they constitute the system of æsthetics. Close inspection, however, reveals the fact that our interpretation of æsthetics as applied to letters is, to say the least, ambiguous, that æsthetics

can have to do with only a few of the elements of literary works, and that to employ it as the single standard of appreciation is to forego the essential values of most efforts in literature. The employment of the æsthetic test alone is responsible for much of the discontent and doubt observable among teachers and students: and it is worth a little trouble to see how far it can legitimately carry, and wherein it falls short. A great many of the ills of mankind are due to the attempt to follow traditional rules or dogmas formulated in days when conditions were not complex, nor analysis keen, nor thought especially profound, and it may be that what ails the theory of appreciation is want of contemporaneousness.

Æsthetics,—to talk by the book,—has for its province the definition of the Beautiful, the examination of the factors entering into the Beautiful, and the consideration of that side of us which recognizes and appreciates the Beautiful. The æsthetic emotions have nothing to do with the keeping up of existence; they are free from repulsive ingredients; they are of a sharable nature, unlike the exclusive pleasures involved in eating and drinking; they afford the "maximum of stimulation with the minimum of fatigue in processes not directly connected with necessary vital functions." They are aroused by sights and sounds, by intellectual suggestions of "muscular impression, touch, odour, and other pleasurable sensations," and by the revival, through intellectual suggestions, of "pleasurable emotions, as tenderness and power, and in a softened measure, of emotions painful in reality, as fear." The formal traits by which the Beautiful must be marked include symmetry, simplicity, purity, variety, and other easily conjectured qualities.

This theory of æsthetics,—which is the common one,—cannot but be repugnant to those who regard any representation of the truth as beautiful, no matter what the size, stuff, texture, contour, or general appearance of the truth depicted may be. To utter realists it must seem purely academic. To the apostles of Keats's dictum, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty," it must appear one-sided. Those who oppose expressiveness in art to formalism will find it antiquated. The impressionistic or subjective critics of the school of Jules Lemaître, who feel that any discussion of a work of literature can only represent the playing of a personality about or on a book, will see in it the traditional worship of an idol or dogma, without self-examination. The majority of teachers,

however, still hold fast to æsthetics as the science of the appreciation of literature,—and the sole science.

We may, nevertheless, conscientiously doubt that any vital connection exists between most literature and æsthetics. We may, perhaps, have to arrive at the conclusion that, whatever theories, sciences, or arts the appreciation of literature may involve, the part played by æsthetics is variable, often casual, and in large measure negligible.

Can we say that a novel is, like a statue, beautiful and awakens æsthetic emotions? There is reason for thinking that this is rarely possible, unless language is to be put to dubious uses. A novel may have an air of supreme truthfulness; it may be profound in psychological delineation; it may have a high ethical motive as an impassioned plea in the interests of humanity; it may entertain by the variety and ingenuity of its incidents or by the happiness of its wit and humour: it may be significant because of any or all of these characteristics,—and yet it may have little beyond some descriptive passages and its style which can be called æsthetic. The novelist is limited by no rules farther than that he shall tell a fairly long story, and that he had better tell it in prose. Everything else is arbitrary. Let the novelist speak at almost any length; let him emphasize one element rather than another; let him present a simple or a complex, a regular or an irregular, a rambling or a cogent, composition; let him stick to any point of view or method or let him deviate from it: it is all one. He has perfect liberty of choice. All that we ask is that he be *notable, distinctive.* We may place him among the classics if he has nothing to offer but a distinctive style, or a distinctive plot, or a distinctive portrayal of character, or if he has applied ideas or expressed emotions in a distinctive way. A cursory analysis would convince us that we rank the *Tale of Two Cities, Henry Esmond, Treasure Island, Mme. Bovary, Wilhelm Meister* among the memorable works for entirely different reasons. We have no single standard for measuring them. The pleasure we get from each is of a special kind: and that pleasure has only a slight admixture of the æsthetic. Therefore, to persuade the student that the novel is amenable to æsthetic laws, or to such laws in any conspicuous degree, is to build up in his mind a fragile system of literary appreciation most difficult to sustain against the pressure of inquiring thought.

What has been said of the novel will hold in almost every

particular for the drama. Outside of the decorations and the music,—which do not form a part of the literary play,—or of the descriptive passages, there is little in the drama which must perforce have to do with the faculties that evaluate beauty.

That form of literature which appears to be most obviously æsthetic is lyric poetry. It is usually pictorial, notwithstanding the "confusion of the arts" which Professor Babbitt deplores in his notable contribution to American criticism, *The New Laokoon*. It calls up ideal visual sensations with considerable frequency, and revives pleasurable experiences. Combining this power with the music of verse, it brings into play the two senses through which the major portion of our æsthetic enjoyment is derived,—the sense of sight and that of hearing. It is generally short, and may be appreciated both as a whole and with reference to its separate divisions almost at a glance of the eye. It is cast in a relatively small number of fixed forms or patterns: and these patterns have come to stand for a real framework, just as the normal human figure is the framework by which the broad lines of sculptured figures are judged. It has behind it a rather carefully conventionalized theory of technique, and is thus bound by a large number of accepted rules, which act as a kind of standard or measure of accomplishment. These rules, nevertheless, we must observe, concern the workmanship and not the evocation of sensuous beauty, and are, therefore, not strictly æsthetic. Nor is all lyric poetry suffused with the charm of æsthetic appeal. The science or theory by which we may appreciate Thomas Campion's poem beginning, "The man of life upright," or many of Browning's poems, is quite different from that which enables us to enjoy most of Keats's work. On the one hand, we have a problem in ethics: on the other, a problem in æsthetics.

The foregoing has barely mentioned one of the most important factors in literary composition, usually treated as æsthetic, but in reality having little direct connection with æsthetics. That factor is technical perfection, or, in a more limited interpretation, style. Now, style can in no fashion be considered an æsthetic attribute. It does not result from perception through the senses. It is appreciated by means of an active and intellectual process of a logical nature, and not through a passive and emotional state, as are the genuine æsthetic attributes. It is teachable,—as, perhaps, æsthetic enjoyment fundamentally is not,—since, like geometry, it is a system, and the basic principles of the system are

accepted as rational, to start out with. It obeys no law other than that of wont and habit. In one period of any literature it means one thing and in another, another. Malory, Robert Greene, Sir Thomas Browne, Defoe, Addison, De Quincey, Carlyle, Stevenson have diverse styles, have little in common, and nevertheless have been praised as stylists. Apparently, any order of style may be accorded the cross of merit, provided it finds sufficiently enthusiastic admirers and succeeds in being handed down as a tradition. There is no law governing the selection of words, the arrangement of clauses, the cadence of the sentence. The French style may gather adherents in Germany, and the German in France. Virgil, pronounced as French in France, as English in England, as German in Germany, as Old Roman in America, is unanimously agreed upon as harmonious and musical. By a species of hypnotism, strong minds proclaim the worth of a style and will the notion of that worth on others. The teaching of rhetoric in the schools tends to develop a taste for a particular kind of style, and that particular kind of style is likely, in consequence, to be termed good or beautiful. It need not be natural. Indeed, it profits by being artificial and sophisticated.

Strictly speaking, then, technical perfection does not fall within the province of æsthetics. Nevertheless, that is what we usually have in our thoughts when we speak of æsthetic values. Should we, therefore, teach literature as a product or as a process?

If we teach it as a product, we must let individual feeling take its course, trusting that the Beautiful is eternally and universally beautiful, and that it will appeal to the individual in accordance with the gifts of perception which Nature has bestowed on him. In that case, training in literature becomes *education* in the literal Latin sense,—that is, *educing*. The utmost that the teacher can accomplish is to set before the student that sort of Beautiful by which he himself has been most deeply moved, and to trust to Providence that the effect on the student will approximate the effect which the writing has had on him. Much that he will present is, of course, liable to be lacking in positive results unless his students are attuned to the pitch of his own particular reflections and reactions. Teaching then is an *awaking*, and not an imparting of information or doctrines. It is to be supposed that under these conditions the qualities stressed as æsthetic will be those accepted by the teacher when he was going through his

training in appreciation. If he has become habituated to the conventional system of æsthetics now practised, he will set Henry James æsthetically above Jack London, Stevenson above Kipling, Thackeray above Dickens, Keats above Walt Whitman; for, in accordance with Burke's statement and the general opinion, the outstanding elements of beauty are smoothness, delicacy or even fragility, softness. He will imbue his students with the conviction that the gender of beauty is feminine, and they, like the runners of ancient days, will, in their turn, pass on the torch handed over to them. If, however, the teacher rebels against the established system and sees the beautiful also in what is big, massive, heavy, masculine, radical, he is likely to draw from his students an admiration for writers at present outside the system and to inspire a preference for the granite of literature over the marble. Whichever course he chooses, he will simply serve as the touchstone to the natural tastes inherent in his students. His work will be a series of more or less powerful evocations or provocations.

If, on the contrary, we teach literature as a process, we must leave out of the question entirely all that is instinctively beautiful, all that quite naturally and without forcing gives us pleasurable feelings,—in other words, all that is genuinely æsthetic,—and bend our energies toward evolving a satisfactory theory of technique and persuading the student that work done in a certain way is beautiful and that work not done in this way is not beautiful. We must construct a system, recognize that it is a system, and impose it on our students. That system may correspond to nothing in Nature, but we must be able to justify its existence. Like Brunetière, we may choose the seventeenth century as the standard of excellence or we may select the classical literatures, as has so often been done in the past. Whatever we do, we must, in order not to make literary sceptics of our students, guard against mistaking our hand-made system for an application of æsthetic laws. The pleasure derived from the appreciation of such a system of technical perfection will be primarily rational and associative, and quite distinct from æsthetic pleasure. It will have true significance for a cultivated *élite* and must not be expected to enthuse persons who have not had the opportunity of becoming familiar with the conventions or do not care to become familiar with them,—as is the case, for instance, with most of us in regard to Chinese or Japanese music.

The dual nature of every problem in literary appreciation makes it evident that æsthetics as the science of beauty perceived through the senses cannot be employed as the sole and single guide. Its scope extends only to a small group of literary effects. It is also plain that æsthetics regarded as the appreciation of technical perfection implies too narrow a conception of literary appreciation. It is a conventional system, and must always condemn what is new, progressive, radical, or foreign.

The truth is that training in literary appreciation comes not from any one branch of knowledge nor merely from the instruction received at school. It is the cumulative result of our education in all branches of knowledge and feeling, of our personal experiences, of our natural aptitudes, of our imaginative activity, of our physical or mental sensitiveness, of our acquired taste for felicities of style impressed upon us by a long system through direct precept, suggestion, and insinuation, and by our educated horror of the platitudinous and of the obviously artificial. The foremost duty of teachers of literature, especially in undergraduate courses, consists in encouraging students to *think* about books, to analyse what it has cost men—and some of them, gifted men—months or even years to produce, to apply to works ostensibly composed for entertainment the truths, emotions, and insight obtained through other studies and through life-experiences, and, above all, to get personal reactions. Looked at from this angle, literary appreciation is self-appreciation under guidance.

A not unimportant part of the teacher's obligation, also, lies in the selection, on a rational and right psychological basis, of the books best adapted to the normal student of college age. The most significant things, the really poignant things, in the works of Anatole France, for example,—a man preternaturally keen, intellectually ripe, and, one might almost say, always old, with a curious store of recondite information,—are beyond most of our young undergraduates. They must live a great deal before they can appreciate them; they must be in the thirties at least before they can read them with genuine understanding; and no system of æsthetics can help them before they have made the proper personal preparation.

It follows, then, that conditions are not so bad, after all, since very definite improvements can be suggested and a definite philosophy of appreciation may be evolved. The immediate essential is to think with our eyes on the truth and minds open to

recent developments. Thus, when students refuse to warm up to our obsolete, so-called "æsthetic" system, we ought to realize that they are merely repeating what has been taking place among the thinkers with respect to the whole fabric of thought. In scientific methods and viewpoints, there has been a Renaissance. The teaching of literature has, on the whole, remained mediæval, while the ultimate object of instruction—namely, the student-mind—has been advancing, or at least moving, to new positions. Consequently, there is occurring now what has so frequently occurred and so rarely been taken to heart: an older, conservative generation is trying to communicate in its rather antiquated language with a younger, radical generation, and, as is to be expected, the language of the former reaches the latter with extreme attenuation of meaning. The fault unquestionably lies with the teacher, for the job is his, and he is not carrying it on effectively.

The defence which the teacher is likely to make use of through railing, in the name of æsthetics, against the irreverence of the day, the lack of standards or principles, the deleterious influence of the popular magazines and newspapers, the Brummagem glitter of the "best-sellers," the meretricious quality of the "up-to-date" drama, the anarchy of the latest verse, leads to nothing, and, what is more, signifies nothing. The only purpose which such apology has served has been to insulate us in our little tower against self-analysis and progressive action.

If, consequently, our pet formula is proving too narrow, we have no recourse but to enlarge it. If the field in which we took our doctor's degree—in all probability a very distant connection of literary appreciation—is really unsuitable for the non-technical student, let us reserve it for our peers in our hours of scholarly leisure. The age and the student have their rights. Let us meet them half-way: ultimately, we shall have to do even more than that. Let us admit that the appreciation of literature, having passed through almost innumerable phases without wrecking the car of progress or delaying it in any conspicuous manner,—through grammatical hair-splitting, adoration of classical allusion, Aristotelian measurements, immersion in the milk of human kindness, application of heredity, environment, and master faculty, and the like,—may undergo still another transformation without serious injury to truth, beauty, the Three Graces, or the decalogue. Nor would the element we term "æsthetics" suffer

eclipse or be relegated to any lower position than that which belongs to it of right.

It is doubtful if the teaching of literary appreciation,—which should mean the teaching of literature in our secondary schools and colleges,—can ever be anything else than a perpetual and very versatile inspiration, depending for its success, not on any hard and fast doctrine, but on a broad sympathy and a willingness to understand and to make use of the personal equation. The notion of the control of appreciation through æsthetics has, it should seem, been one of those convenient generalities not inappropriate to a metaphysical, scholastic era, but hardly appropriate to an age which is in the habit of subjecting all systems to crucial tests.

J. WARSHAW.

University of Missouri.

SCREENINGS

PACIFISM AND IDEAS

A remark frequently made by those who should know better is that the war in Europe is purely an affair of economic strategy in whose outcome we have only a trifling national interest. Most frequently is this notion encountered when we discuss the advisability of America's participation in the war. We obviously have no great economic interest at stake; the cost of the war in treasure and life will so far outweigh the trifling losses we have endured, that national pride, like a prudent banker, should charge present losses to overhead expense, and continue to levy toll on the misfortunes or needs of our neighbours. "War is Hell," reads a propagandist advertisement in a daily paper this morning, "a hell of hate, intolerance, high cost of living, war debts, misery and sorrow." The corollary is clear, let Americans be tolerant of everything and live safe, for no cause is worth the misery and sorrow engendered by war.

There is a species of pacifism which has the dignity of ideas—a deep and abiding belief that mankind is at heart good and that sufficient show of brotherly love will disarm even the most rabid of tyrannies. Such a loving premise lies at the heart of Tolstoi's doctrine of non-resistance. Though it may be contradicted by every page in history, it at least is built upon a beautiful ideal, and in the days to come, when the lion and the lamb lie down together, and when a little child shall take precedence over age-long wisdom, it may be more than the dream of mystics and the comfort of sick souls.

But this other pacifism which sees man moved chiefly by economic laws, and solves the riddle of life only by formulas drawn from statistics and bank clearances, is of quite another sort. It would make every war a bloody offering to the idol of the market place. No resistance to armed force is worth the misery and sorrow and resulting economic loss. The resistance the Greeks offered to Persian aggression, the war of Swiss liberation, the thin blue line that held resolute at Valley Forge were all mistakes, bitter mistakes when measured by a banker's ledger,

and the loss of life that might have been turned to economic production. Of this type of thinking is all the ruck of pamphlets and treatises which, whether under socialistic guise or not, we might describe under the one term of Norman Angellism. It is hard at times for any American who remembers the cause that armed his country in its wars to be patient at the persistent iteration of this doctrine.

We have also read Henry James's *Moral Substitute for War* and Bertrand Russell's *What Men Fight For* and there is much in these books that deserves careful consideration. Philosophically they may be right when they lay their fingers upon the causes of man's combativeness. But much of their argument is beyond the mark today. It is not an abstract theory that we are confronting but a condition. In a conflict of ideals both parties to the conflict may agree to abide by the decision of an unarmed contest. But when one of the ideals comes forth armed and persists in the attempt to force by physical might its stamp upon the lives and destinies of its opponents, the problem instantly acquires a new significance. To put it concretely, so long as the belief that the essence of a state's power is *might*, and that only through a constant readiness to exercise this might has any state the *right* to exist, so long will it be necessary for those states which have struggled for a different conception to resist aggression with physical force; and it is resistance to armed aggression that explains the unusual spectacle of America preparing for war. No nation goes to war chiefly on economic grounds. And these economic pacifists are themselves a proof of this contention. If there were nothing but an economic reason for American interference, because American property has been unlawfully destroyed and a few American lives lost, adventurous souls who had much better been engaged at home, if property and lives were the sole cause for our drawing the sword, then they would be most emphatically right in their unwillingness to throw good money and useful lives after the bad and adventurous. But the enthusiasm for war, when it does come, is founded on a much more subtle idea. The people who respond to the call to arms are moved by an appeal to motives which lie deeper than economic formulas. The War for Liberation, the War of 1812, the Civil War, even the Spanish-American War were popular because the people saw clearly that there were ideas involved, that they were conflicts of unreconcilable ideals. In all these wars it is not hard

even for him who runs to read that we were fighting for what we thought was the idea of justice. Doubtless there were economic causes also, but if they were the sole or even the chief cause, our whole history is a monstrous hypocrisy.

But it is not difficult for the student of American thought in these later years to track to its source this doctrine of economic pacifism. It is but a manifestation of the materialism that has sunk deep roots into our whole theory of life and civilization. Of late when our prosperity has become more general, and when even on second sight it is often impossible to tell whether a man belongs to a profession, a business, or a trade, and when the chief aim of all is to maintain a certain "front," we have gradually come to regard mere economic success as the be-all and end-all of the whole of existence. And in this process of even reducing a life's worth to the balance of a ledger even the standards of religion have been altered; for at the heart of most of our humanitarian movements there lies the thought, not as in the old days of a sinful soul saved from perdition, but of the transfer of a member of the community from a liability to an asset. In short we have come to regard ourselves chiefly as sentient and self-directing pawns in a great economic game.

Naturally the problems of education are given an economic twist. The Gary schools and the Flexner-fathered school in Columbia are a frank admission of the fact that the chief business of education is the production of citizens who shall be economically efficient. And to such an extent has the idea of mere trade absorbed the attention of the world that there is little impulse left in these suggested vocational courses for the fostering of the ideals of the once learned professions. The trade-school ideal has even crept into the best of our universities and our courses are being so plentifully planned for the business of commerce or education, that one rarely gets a hint that one of the duties of life, or at least one of its chiefest pleasures, is the art of living. The courses most heralded as practical are those in economics and sociology or the commercial languages. Even the professor of English is asked to give courses in business English, as though there should be a difference between the English of the market place and the English of literature. It is practical science and practical mathematics that are wanted, and history is demanded

not as the clue to the texture of our national lives, but as a chart of the ebb and flow of economic tides.

And now at this moment of crisis the men and women who have devoted themselves in education or philanthropy to the more material aims of existence are proclaiming that patriotism and morality require that America stay out of the war. Life to them is a huge eleemosynary institution and they are its directors, and naturally any event that shall fill the wards to overflowing is to them the worst of national catastrophes. The demands of patriotism to them require a persistent battle against want and suffering; morality to them is healthful living, paying one's debts, and contributing to the welfare of the community. Evil to them is a thing that can be combated most effectively with quicklime statistics, prohibition laws, an enforcement of the seventh commandment, and a suffrage amendment. Their lives and thought are not concerned with ideas but with things, with the counters of our material civilization. Or if they lift their thoughts higher they become mystics, and with a devout trust in the divinity of man hope for a millennium through the gentle gospel of sweet persuasiveness. Democracy they urge will come to all men in the fulness of time, like an awakening to an apocalyptic vision, with slow music and flowers and anthems of brotherly love. The world is a grand opera, and when the right chords have been sounded, the whole edifice of evil, tyrannies, and injustices will, not as in the past with convulsions and blood and heart-rending cries, but with the magic of a scene carpenter's art, dissolve into the new era of peace and goodwill.

In the meanwhile they will be tolerant of everything—except the little delinquencies of individual practice which they can fight with legislation. Ideas, creeds, the things that formerly provoked the hottest discussion and the bloodiest of wars, are mere abstractions, and matters of opinion, things not worth quarrelling about now because they are beyond the reach of legislative enactments and police court investigations, though in their effects they may be as insidious and deadly as a most dreaded disease. So long as a man does not beat his wife and refuse to pay his debts, it makes no great difference whether he professes a belief in Czarism or postum cereal. The economic pacifist sees no final issues in ideas.

Is it to be wondered at then, when brought face to face with an international catastrophe like the present war, that so many

Americans stood bewildered, like old Caspar at Blenheim, wondering what it was all about, and what they fought each other for? And the readiest explanation was the one closest to hand: "it was an economic struggle," we said, "and none of our concern." The world had truly gone mad, we thought, and it was our duty to ourselves and to others to keep out, and, if chance offered, to pick up an honest and thrifty penny, even at the cost of our friends. We find ourselves with high-sounding words in the early days of the war. America was to be the conserver of civilization, and at the end of the cruel conflict to hand back the torch which armed heels had trod under foot in Europe, to sit at the council of peace with level eyes, to bind up the cruel wounds and to bring sweet peace. In the meanwhile we would rush our trade by leaps and bounds into the world's foremost place and make ourselves economically inexpugnable.

All this we were saying two years ago. Then by slow degrees we saw ourselves, protesting the while, drawn nearer and nearer to the inevitable conflict. Ships were sunk, lives lost, millions of dollars of damage done, and we helpless even in our sternest diplomatic utterance. It was not an edifying spectacle, if we look at it purely from the economist's point of view. True by wilful aggression we were losing millions, but to punish the aggression meant to spend millions upon millions. To the man who can reckon only in dollars and cents the thought of our entry into the war looked not unlike burning the granary to punish the thieving rats.

And the economic pacifist protest came strongest from the middle west. Not only because the west is farthest from the scene of conflict, but because the west with its rapid and newly acquired prosperity has most kindly welcomed the purely economic standards of life. We here in the middle west see our wealth so palpably grow under our very eyes, and we have seen the time, not so very many years back, when it refused to grow, that now it has become to us an absorbing interest. We can look with only horror on anything, be it war or grasshoppers, that can interrupt its increase. Hence the instant response and rally to the President who kept us out of war! Is it to be wondered, when the President spoke of national honour and international law and duties to humanity, that many of us here in the west remembered our prophets, looked to our broad acres, and shuddered?

For willingness to enter upon a national conflict requires an idea. But our professional pacifists can see in war only shedding of blood and waste of treasure, war debts and sorrow and misery. To them no conflict is worth man's effort, for the loss to this generation and to those that follow can find in it no adequate compensation. They see life merely in a play of its counters, ideas and ideals are to them mere vapoury abstractions; for here on earth are the well grounded concrete entities—the bills and exchanges of the market place and the comities that are disturbed only by lawsuits. That men may have conflicting ideals, for which, as the world today is constituted, there is no tribunal, is to them impossible. If ideals conflict let us give way today, maybe tomorrow the aggressor will be in a better frame of mind; if not, ideals are changeable—like a suit of clothes. For to be physically safe is to be morally right, so argues our professional pacifist.

Loss of wealth and life through war is what our professional pacifists deplore. But that nothing is gained save through some effort which necessitates a corresponding loss somewhere, is a mere law of nature. For every oak tree there are a myriad of unfruitful acorns and a forest of blighted saplings. Every scientific discovery, every work of art, every ornament of civilization is pursued by a path strewn with the wrecks of fruitless efforts, misspent treasure, and sacrificed lives. Even so economic a thing as a lawsuit or a transfer of property involves a loss somewhere if only in lawyer's and broker's fees. And what a terrifyingly uneconomic thing a mere courtship is with its thousands of useless presents, its wasted sighs, and its perfunctory wedding fees. The primitive savage who with a well aimed blow from his stern axe beat his lady-love into insensibility and carried her to his cave knew at least a thing or two of economics and the conservation of resources, though he was no pacifist. But those who value our civilization only for its material benefits and social comities, have at least one thing to learn, which even the savage knew, that even the most transient of these are things to gain which even the most pacific of men must sometimes risk even their lives.

P. M. B., Jr.

EDUCATING AMERICA

Somewhere in his essay on Cromwell Voltaire makes the pointed remark to the effect that the great Puritan, though amidst a host of fools, grew wise at last, and bethought himself that it was better to guide them than to be governed by them. There are not a few Americans who think that Wilson has likewise found himself not dissimilarly beset. Certainly the Congress that adjourned on the fourth of March had never distinguished itself by any lapses into intelligence. It produced only a scant handful of men whose eyes could see beyond the political exigencies of getting themselves re-elected; and these, perhaps from the contempt which self-satisfied obtrusiveness always feels for superior qualities, were unable to gain a respectful hearing. The parable in Plato's *Republic* seemed about to become with us a grim reality. The storm, which even yet blows with exceeding fury, found us with the crew in anarchy and the ship at the mercy of the tempest.

Since the beginning of the European War what America has needed most is a resolute and obvious policy. But this, save the vague dictates of neutrality and the still vaguer requirements of international law, a subject never studied with much zeal on this side of the Atlantic, was the one thing no one gave himself any trouble about. We munitioned the Allies, now our allies, and quarrelled with Britain over seizures. *The Mid-West Quarterly* has already called attention to the unique similarity between the diplomatic situation last year and that before the War of 1812. It required no prophetic eye to foresee that before long we would have to decide the momentous question of entering the war, and there was never any doubt on which side it would be. But what we so clearly lacked last year was leadership, which when the obvious moment came would speak the word, unite our thoughts and our energies, and give us a cause worth fighting for.

Of all our presidential campaigns for two generations certainly the one which resulted in the re-election of Mr. Wilson was the most irrelevant. No counts at issue were raised worthy of serious attention. A toss of a penny for many thinking persons would have decided the election as satisfactorily as a count of

noses. For even the slogan, "he kept us out of war," meant little except to the professional or conscientious pacifist.

But after a policy of apparent drifting Mr. Wilson surprised us by the rapidity and decision of his actions. First Mr. Gerard came back from Berlin. We can well guess what revelations he made in the conferences at Washington. Then followed on the German notice of willingness to open peace negotiations, the request to both belligerents to state what they were fighting for. Only the Allies were unequivocal. Germany merely reiterated her request for a peace conference. Immediately Mr. Wilson appeared before and amazed Congress with his message pleading for a world compact to enforce international agreements, and stating with forcible clarity what obligations such an international organization would lay upon America. At first the world was by its ears; the Allies were pained by the phrase "peace without victory"; and even we were incredulous and smiled at our idealist President; scarcely a man guessed that it was an important step in educating America for a part she was so soon to play. Wilson was rapidly pushing himself into the place of intelligent leadership. America was to have a policy.

What that was to be subsequent events have made clear, even to the most indifferent. We had been struck and struck grievously by German aggression. We were to strike back; but not solely because lives had been lost and ships sunk, but for a much more deeply grounded issue. If there are to be any international agreements these mean international force. America finally takes its place as an active member of the family of nations. And the now accomplished fact is due to the resolution of Mr. Wilson. There are those who would have struck sooner, but would they have had the united country at their back. Now Congress may raise its voice in sporadic protest; but the nation is behind the President as it has never been behind a president since Lincoln. For the moment, at least, we have no parties. Mr. Wilson has become leader.

P. M. B., Jr.

AN IRISH PLOT

Life even in these troublous times has its compensations. Scarce a day passes that we are not fed upon the grewsome details of some plot that imperils our national safety. The national capital is to be bombed—Heaven grant that Congress be in session at the hour; the Panama Canal is to be attacked by land, water, and air; even our inland little city had its thrill when a stranger asked to be directed to the State Arsenal. We are even beginning to look with suspicion at our next-door neighbours—they may have English names, to be sure, and we may have known them for years, but all may be the precaution of a long maintained disguise. And when on a night last week the plaster of my front room ceiling came down I felt sure——

But all these are German plots. There is a mournful sameness of *Blut und Eisen* in their ingredients; their malignity lacks subtlety, like the reportorial intelligence that serves them up for our matutinal indigestion. But the Irish plot, conceived now some ten years ago, in the subtle brain of George Moore, which was to explode at the fittingest moment and with its scandal set the world's tongue to wagging—and bulge the conspirators' pockets—was to be spectacular, to be a Donnybrook Fair entertainment, with the author to collect the gate receipts. The bomb was set, timed, exploded; but even those nearest scarcely noticed the report.

I am referring, of course, to *The Brook Kerith*. Whatever the literary merits of the book, whatever its historical significance, we can well imagine the dust and débris there would have been, had circumstances been otherwise; what a thundering remonstrance from orthodox consciences, what a theme for a thousand pulpit diatribes; the public would have listened, been scandalized, bought, and wondered what it was all about, and George Moore would have waxed fat with royalties.

But in these latter days the public has too serious matters to think about to confuse a literary squib and a cosmic catastrophe. We are slowly getting a more genuine standard of values in these days of *real politik*. And the chastening of spirit that was administered to this clever but unscrupulous literary Irishman—a

real chastening it must have proved—is one of the wholesomest of signs the literary world has seen for many a year. If for nothing else, let us give the Great War credit for a clarifying of our literary judgments.

For *The Brook Kerith* is not a book in any sense of the word. When about ten years ago its theme was announced there were many of us who expected something at least startling. When about ten weeks ago the book appeared we were amazed, then amused. How could a man of George Moore's intelligence fail to comprehend the elementary law of nature that there must be some organic and logical connection between an effect and its cause; and that for spiritual phenomena as well as for material there must be some cause which *rightly* considered will yield us a sufficient and satisfactory explanation of the event. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, from nothing can come nothing, though bad scholastic Latin, involves a genuine and very precious truth which obtains not only in the world of nature and in the constitution of society, but even in those unscientific by-products of social integration which we call religion. It was the very unscrupulousness of George Moore's plot, like that of another plot nearer to today, that proved its undoing.

There is something immensely attractive about the theme he selected. Jesus of Nazareth did not die on the cross, but was taken down and nursed back to health by Joseph of Arimathea. He had been a renegade Essene monk, and when whole renounced the world and his attempts at creating a new religion, retired to the banks of the Jordan, and took up again his shepherd's crook and daily task with the Essene brethren. In the meanwhile under the leadership of the irrepressible Paul the cult of Jesus grew daily in strength and numbers. An accidental meeting delivered to the apostle to the Gentiles the true story of Jesus' death and resurrection, and the story closes with Paul in apoplectic disbelief, and Jesus meditating an immediate descent upon Jerusalem with a proclamation of the truth.

The theme is a big one—Æschylean, titanic. It is as though one should prove that Napoleon never reached St. Helena, or that Cæsar died by proxy under the dagger of Brutus. Such stories of mysterious miscarriages of history are not uncommon, and are hugely attractive to the romantic imagination. Nor is it unlawful to lay hands upon the character of a historical personage and read into it a new motive and a novel meaning. But we do so at

our peril. We may say of Cæsar what we will, in a novel, but we may not hope to bring aught but shame and confusion to ourselves should we fail to appreciate the historical fact that he was the conqueror of Pharsalia, the welder of the Roman Empire, and an historical institution that even today sits enthroned in the political imagination. Cassius may cynically insist that "this god did shake, and alas, it cried, 'Give me some drink, Titinius,' as a sick girl," but he paid for his lack of historical perspective with his life. So, too, we may gibe at Napoleon, but we may never twist our gibe into a falsehood. We may remember that he was rude to his courtiers and that he toyed with the necks of ladies in waiting; but we may never forget that he was also the victor of Marengo and Austerlitz and the author of the Code Napoléon. In all historical novels history will have the last word, and to it we must turn for the corrective of a diseased historical imagination.

Judged by the standard of history, by what he accomplished —whether we like it or no—by the institution he and his followers set up, and of which he was the inspiration—be we its bitterest enemy—Jesus of Nazareth was no irrelevancy as George Moore would have him. Nor was Paul, and him we may judge by his writings, whatever we may think of their theme; nor was Paul only an unintelligent Jewish fanatic and robust propagandist. His place and that of the man he proclaimed to the world are fixed by history, and it is by history that they shall have to be judged, and not by the unrestrained Celtic imagination of a mere purveyor of romantic fiction.

But the Jesus of George Moore is an irrelevancy, an irrelevancy quite as lacking in fertility as the new philosophy the Irishman puts into his mouth. I select from the deepest musings of the repentant Jesus. What worth does this passive optimism offer to a world struggling with blatant confusion? Can we conceive of such a spineless thinker as the protagonist of a new act in the world drama?

"What we deem mistakes are part of some great design. Nothing befalls but by the will of God. My mistakes! Why do I speak of them as mistakes, for like all else they were, from the beginning of time and still are and will be till the end of time, in the mind of God."

It was not long before he felt himself thinking that the world was right to defend itself against those that would repudiate it.

"For the world," he said to himself, "cannot be else than the world, a truth that was hidden from me in those early days. The world does not belong to us but to God. It was he that made it, and it is for him to unmake it when he chooses and to remake us if he chooses. . . . It may be that the priests will some day come into the knowledge that all things are equal in God's sight."

This ideal of life may be pretty and attractive, and it may have a hoard of followers today; but it is decadent George Moore, not Jesus. It is impotent, Oriental passivism, not militant, Occidental Christianity.

Nor would Paul, whose writings are so deeply tinged with Greek philosophy, ever have allowed himself so to slander the people of Athens. "A frivolous people, living in a city of statues in the air, and in the streets below a city of men that seek after reason, and would explain all things in the heaven above and the earth beneath by their reason, and only willing to listen to a story of a miracle because miracles amuse them."

It would be hard for the historical Jesus and the historical Paul to recognize themselves in the flawed and cracked characters given us in *The Brook Kerith*. It was an ambitious plot the author set himself, and he failed, failed because there is far too much of George Moore and far too little of Paul and Jesus.

Even in so elementary an intellectual exercise as writing a novel there must be some preparation of intellectual discipline. We no longer expect to see miracles, and the day of special inspiration is past, if it ever existed; but even the wildest advocate of pre-adolescent precocity does not now expect perfect wisdom out of the mouths of babes and sucklings. In short, an author must have an intelligence equal to his theme. George Moore was able to write convincingly when he was his own subject, and his philosophy of life was sufficient to give an intelligible clue to his juvenile *Confessions of a Young man*. But George Moore, clever Irishman though he be, has no clue by whose help he can follow a cosmic phenomenon like the earliest motives of Christianity. He who would write a great book, said a wise man, must first live one. For this reason *The Brook Kerith*, though it shows an admirable amount of painstaking research, remains, among the books of the year, a painless futility.

On the same subject a better and more truthful book, though not nearly so well known, and one which I hesitate to praise because it was written by a friend, is Schuyler's *Hope of Glory*.

P. M. B., Jr.

Publications of

The Hispanic Society of America

G. P. Putnam's Sons of New York and London have been appointed publishing agents for The Hispanic Society of America; and they are prepared to fill orders for the series of publications issued by the Society.

The Hispanic Society, the organization of which was completed in 1904, has for its purpose, in addition to the establishment of a free public library, a museum, and an educational institution, the advancement of the study of the Spanish and Portuguese languages and of the literature and history of the countries wherein Spanish and Portuguese are spoken.

The publications thus far issued by The Hispanic Society comprise about one hundred titles. Among the more important works included in this list, exclusive of those the editions of which are exhausted, is the authoritative Spanish edition of Don Quixote de la Mancha. It is planned to complete the work in seven volumes, the first three of which are now in readiness.

Illustrated Catalogues of the Works of certain great artists, such as Sorolla, Zuloaga, etc.

Reproductions of maps of historic importance, such as the Genoese World Map of 1457; and of Spanish texts in facsimile.

Publications of literary criticism, as those of Ramon Menendez Pidal, and James Fitzmaurice-Kelley.

The Revue Hispanique devoted to a study of the languages, the literatures, and the history of the Castilian, Catalan, and Portuguese countries, —six issues annually.

The Bibliographic Hispanique, an annual catalogue of books and articles of importance in the Hispanic field.

Copies of the General Catalogue of the publications of the Society and announcements of the issues of each season will be sent on application.

The Illustrated Catalogue will be sent on receipt of twenty-five cents.

G. P. Putnam's Sons

New York London

Now Complete

The Cambridge History of English Literature

Edited by

A. W. Ward, Litt.D., F.B.A., Master of Peterhouse

and

A. R. Waller, M.A., Peterhouse

14 Volumes, Royal Octavo, of about 600 pages each. Price per volume $2.75 net (by mail $3.00) per set $35.00.

The Volumes

Vol.	I. From the Beginnings to the Cycles of Romance.	Vol.	VII. Cavalier and Puritan.
Vol.	II. The End of the Middle Ages.	Vol.	VIII. The Age of Dryden.
Vol.	III. Renascence and Reformation	Vol.	IX. From Steele and Addison to Pope and Swift.
Vol.	IV. From Sir Thomas North to Michael Drayton.	Vol.	X. The Rise of the Novel: Johnson and His Circle.
Vol.	V. The Elizabethan and the Jacobean Drama. I.	Vol.	XI. The Early Georgian Era.
Vol.	VI. The Elizabethan and the Jacobean Drama. II.	Vol.	XII. The Nineteenth Century. I.
		Vol.	XIII. The Nineteenth Century. II.
		Vol.	XIV. The Nineteenth Century. III.

Press Comment

"One of the most stupendous literary undertakings of modern times. Presents an accurate, impartial, impersonal, and well-balanced study of the development of the English language and literature."—*Chicago Herald.*

"It interprets individual authors ably, often brilliantly, always honestly, soberly, and painstakingly."—*Springfield Republican.*

"The literature of the English language, as one of the richest in the world, has for the first time received adequate treatment in these volumes. The erudition they exhibit, the comprehensive character of the plan upon which the essays have been grouped, lead us to think that here we have a masterpiece of editorial skill, as well as an account of a national literature, unexcelled, if not unexampled, in any other nation."—*Literary Digest.*

At All Booksellers or the Publishers

NEW YORK: 2 West 45th St., Just west of 5th Ave.

G. P. Putnam's Sons

LONDON: 24 Bedford St. Strand

The University of Nebraska

The University of Nebraska includes the following colleges and schools:

THE GRADUATE COLLEGE. Courses leading to the degrees of Master of Arts and of Doctor of Philosophy. Work may also be pursued without reference to a degree.

THE COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES. A four-year course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science.

THE TEACHERS COLLEGE. A two-year course leading to the Teachers College Diploma and the University Teachers' Certificate. Students register in this college in the junior year at the same time retaining identity in another college of the University which grants the degree of Bachelor of Arts or of Science simultaneously with the granting of the Teachers College Diploma and University Teachers' Certificate by the Teachers College.

THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE. A four-year course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science in agriculture, forestry, and home economics.

THE COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING. A four-year course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science in Agricultural, Architectural, Civil, Electrical, or Mechanical Engineering. Also six-year Academic Engineering courses.

THE COLLEGE OF LAW. Course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws. One year of academic work in addition to full entrance credits is required for admission. A combined Academic-Law course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Arts in four years, and to the degree of Bachelor of Laws in six years.

THE COLLEGE OF MEDICINE. A four-year course leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine. A six-year course leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Arts or Science and of Doctor of Medicine.

THE SCHOOL OF COMMERCE. A four-year course in Political Economy and business administration leading to the Bachelor's degree.

THE SCHOOL OF FINE ARTS. A four-year course, including the Fine Arts, leading to the Bachelor's degree.

THE SCHOOL OF PHARMACY. Two-year and three-year courses. Also a four-year course leading to the degree of Bachelor of Science.

THE AGRICULTURAL HIGH SCHOOL. A secondary school training for practical farm life.

THE SUMMER SESSION. An eight weeks' course primarily for teachers.

UNIVERSITY EXTENSION. Courses offered in many departments for which college credit is granted. Work in this department may be taken to meet preparatory requirements.

The Nebraska Experiment Station, the new Agricultural School at Curtis, and the Experimental Sub-Stations at North Platte, Valentine, Culbertson, and Scottsbluff are under the control of the board of regents.

On Any Point of Information Address

THE REGISTRAR

Station A. Lincoln, Neb.